Omar Alejandro Garcia v. State of Tennessee
Omar Alejandro Garcia (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Guilfoy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy Guilfoy, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas L. Cope
Following a bench trial, the defendant, Thomas L. Cope, was convicted of reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, violation of the open container law, and failure to yield the right of way. The reckless endangerment conviction was merged into the aggravated assault conviction, for which the defendant was sentenced to three years at 30% and a concurrent sentence of thirty days for failure to yield the right of way. The effective three-year sentence was ordered to be served by split confinement with 210 days’ incarceration with the balance of the sentence served on supervised probation. He was fined $50 for violation of the open container law, with the same punishment for his conviction for failure to yield. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanta Stinson
The Defendant, Shanta Stinson, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, identity theft, a Class D felony, two counts of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1000, Class E felonies, two counts of vandalism, Class A misdemeanors, and illegal possession of a credit card, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403 (2014) (aggravated burglary), 39-14-103 (2014) (theft of property), 39-14-146 (2014) (theft of merchandise), 39-14-105 (2014) (grading of theft/vandalism), 39-14-150 (Supp. 2011) (amended 2013, 2014) (identity theft), 39-14-408 (2014) (vandalism), 39-14-118 (2014) (illegal possession of a credit card). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of five years for aggravated burglary, three years for theft of property valued at $1000 or more, two years for identity theft, and two years for each theft of property valued at more than $500. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to two concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each vandalism and illegal possession of a credit card conviction, for an effective five-year sentence. The court ordered the Defendant to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75% service for the vandalism convictions and to serve her other sentences on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for alternative sentencing relative to her vandalism convictions and ordering her to serve the sentences in confinement.
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Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mid-South Maintenance Inc., et al. v. Paychex Inc., et al.
This is an arbitration case, wherein plaintiffs and the defendant-signatory expressly agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising from the contract and further agreed that the contract would be governed by New York law. Plaintiffs later filed suit against the defendant-signatory, as well as one of the defendant‘s employees, who had not signed the arbitration agreement, for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and aiding and abetting conversion. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff‘s claims were outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, citing Tennessee law. We hold that, pursuant to federal and New York law, because of the delegation clause contained in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator is the proper tribunal to determine issues regarding the scope and unconscionability of the arbitration agreement. We also hold that because plaintiffs‘ claims against the non-signatory employee are intertwined with the claims against the signatory defendant, all disputes regarding the arbitrability of claims against the non-signatory employee must also be resolved by the arbitrator. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enterprises, LP, et al
A property owner (“Seller”) who had 91 acres contracted to sell 5.01 acres to Buyers. The contract contained the condition that Buyers would reserve a 60-foot strip of land along the western edge for Seller and that Buyers would construct a road along the 60-foot stretch to enable Seller to access her property from the west. The closing on the property occurred in March 2005, seven months after the contract was signed, but the warranty deed did not carve out the 60-foot strip consistent with the contract. Seller did not realize the deed did not reserve the 60-foot strip until November 2007, when she went to see her attorney. She contacted Buyers’ attorney immediately in an effort to have the deed corrected. When that effort was not successful, she filed a complaint alleging breach of contract in September 2008, less than four years after the sale was closed. Buyers argued Seller was barred by waiver and estoppel from succeeding on her contract claim because she sat on her rights for years while Buyers constructed a new building and left no space for a road to be built along the western edge. The trial court disagreed and awarded Seller damages in the amount of $850,000. After the case was on appeal, the defendants had a road constructed that provided Seller access to her property, but it was in a different location than the contract contemplated. The case was remanded to the trial court for the consideration of these additional facts, and the trial court reduced its earlier damages award down to $650,000. The Buyers appealed the trial court’s judgment, arguing the trial court erred in ruling Seller was not barred by estoppel, waiver, or laches, from recovering on her breach of contract claim. Buyers also argue the trial court erred in its award of discretionary costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frederick J. Schmitz, Jr.
The defendant, Frederick J. Schmitz, Jr., appeals his Dickson County Circuit Court jury conviction of driving without a license, for which he received a sentence of 30 days’ probation. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the conviction, that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-301 is unconstitutional, and that various procedural errors occurred attendant to his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demance M. Beasley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demance M. Beasley, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Charles Lugiai
The defendant, Michael Charles Lugiai, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Scott Kruse v. State of Tennessee
Convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison, petitioner, David Scott Kruse, has filed his third petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as being time-barred. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Paulette E. Dukes v. James F. Dukes
Husband and Wife were declared divorced in 2009; incorporated in the final decree of divorce was a Marital Dissolution Agreement containing a provision that required Husband to pay premiums on two life insurance policies, one which covered his life and named Wife as beneficiary and one on Wife’s life, naming him as beneficiary. In 2014 Husband cancelled the policy on his life because the premium had increased significantly. Wife filed a Petition for Contempt; after a hearing, the court held Husband in civil contempt and ordered him to obtain a $50,000 life insurance policy to replace the one he had cancelled. In the event he could not obtain such a policy, the court entered a $50,000 judgment against Husband and required him to make monthly payments on the judgment to the clerk of the court. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment holding Husband in contempt and remand for entry of a supplemental order clarifying the conditions of the $50,000 judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chyanne Elizabeth Gobble
Defendant, Chyanne Elizabeth Gobble, pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving a death. The trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced Defendant to two years' incarceration, suspending all but thirty days to supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. We hold that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in placing undue weight on an irrelevant factor. Upon our de novo review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of an order placing Defendant on diversion for a period of four years in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rodney Bryant
Appellant, Rodney Bryant, was convicted of carjacking and sentenced to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian Brawner v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Brian Brawner, was convicted of aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of attempted first degree murder. The trial court merged his aggravated assault conviction into his conviction for facilitation of attempted first degree murder and sentenced him to an effective term of thirty years. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and pursuit of post-conviction relief, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to comply with the filing requirements and failure to state a basis for relief. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick Trawick v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Patrick Trawick, was convicted of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus six years. After denial of his direct appeal and his petition for post-conviction relief, he filed the instant petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that an eyewitness’s recanting of his identification of petitioner constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled him to relief. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, and this appeal follows. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vicki Headrick Webb v. Max Sherrell et al.
Vicki Headrick Webb (“Plaintiff”) appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) in this suit involving title to real property and a boundary line dispute. We find and hold that Plaintiff has significantly failed to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27 rendering this Court unable to address any of Plaintiff's potential issues. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court's judgment, find Plaintiff's appeal frivolous, and award the defendants damages for frivolous appeal. Defendants raise an issue on appeal regarding whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to award them discretionary costs. We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court's determination that “the circumstances and equities do not favor the award of discretionary costs . . . .” We, therefore, affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Tommy Burney Homes v. Wayne K. Francis
Plaintiff filed a detainer warrant to regain possession of property and for unpaid rent; the warrant was served upon the father of the purported lessee. The General Sessions Court initially entered a default judgment, allowing Plaintiff to regain possession of the property; several months later the court entered a default judgment for damages against the purported lessee. Eight years later Plaintiff sought to execute on the judgment by issuing a garnishment. The judgment debtor moved to quash the garnishment and to set aside the money judgment on the ground that there was no personal service on any defendant and that the money judgment had not been entered against the judgment debtor. The court granted the motion and held that the judgment was void; Plaintiff appealed to Circuit Court. After a hearing, the Circuit Court reinstated the money judgment; the lessee appeals. Holding that the lessee was not properly served for purposes of entry of a default judgment for money, we reverse the ruling of the Circuit Court and dismiss the case. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin LaMont Buford, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kevin LaMont Buford, Sr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for facilitation to commit felony murder and attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery and his effective sixty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Sabrina Brown
The employee sustained a compensable injury to her right knee. While recovering from surgery, she reinjured the knee. Her employer asserted the reinjury was an intervening event which absolved the employer of further liability for medical care or temporary disability benefits. The trial court found the reinjury was not an intervening event, ordered medical benefits, and awarded additional temporary disability benefits. The employer has appealed, asserting the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Marcus Terrell Church v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marcus Terrell Church, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee Allen Robinette
The defendant, Bobby Lee Allen Robinette, pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and four counts of the theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, Class D felonies. The defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-three years. Thirty-one days after the entry of the judgment, the defendant filed a motion to set aside his pleas, which the trial court denied. The defendant appeals, arguing that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily based on the State‟s failure to file a notice that he would be sentenced outside Range I, based on the assertion that he was sentenced outside his Range in one conviction, and based on certain omissions from the inquiry required under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the defendant‟s motion was timely because the judgment forms do not bear a “file-stamp” date indicating when they were filed with the clerk. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joshua Dunn v. State of Tennessee
Joshua Dunn (“the Petitioner”) appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Connie Lavell Tate
Appellant, Connie Lavell Tate, was indicted on three alternative counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. The State dismissed one count prior to trial, and she was convicted of the remaining two counts. After merger, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years as a Range I, standard offender. It suspended the sentence to probation and placed appellant on supervised probation. In this appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Connie Lavell Tate - dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. In this appeal, the majority upholds the sufficiency of the aggravated assault conviction reasoning that the jury was entitled to discredit the Defendant’s version of the events. A jury is indeed entitled to believe or disbelieve whatever testimony they so choose. However, the only evidence establishing the offense was provided by the Defendant’s statement, in which she claims self-defense. While the jury was free to reject this version of events, the State was not relieved of its duty to supply affirmative proof that the Defendant was the first aggressor. In my view, because the State failed to carry its burden in this regard, I would have reversed the judgment and dismissed the conviction. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Austin F. Busha
Appellant, Austin F. Busha, filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion contesting the legality of his sentence in case number 13492. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to correct appellant's expired sentence. Appellant submits that the trial court's ruling was error, and the State concedes. Because the award of pretrial jail credits lies strictly within the jurisdiction of the trial court, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals |