Meredith Garrett v. Hidden Valley Homes, LLC et al.
M2022-01531-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

In this breach of implied warranty of good workmanship and materials case, the trial court awarded Appellee $77,494.36 in damages. Although the parties agree that the proper measure of damages is the cost to repair the defects, the parties dispute the method of repair and its cost. In determining Appellee’s damages, the trial court relied on testimony from Appellee’s expert contractor. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. The parties’ respective requests for appellate attorney’s fees are denied.

In Re Lieselotte H. Rogoish Revocable Living Trust
M2022-01464-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ben Dean

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a beneficiary of a trust seeking an accounting and removal of the trustee. The trustee asserted the affirmative defense that the beneficiary violated the no-contest clause in the settlor’s trust. The trustee served the beneficiary with requests for admissions, to which the beneficiary responded with objections to the majority of the requests. After the trial court granted his motion for the requests for admissions to be admitted, the trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the no-contest clauses in the trust and will of the settlor. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the beneficiary’s petition with prejudice. The beneficiary appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In Re Preston H. (Concurring)
M2022-00786-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon Guffee

I concur in the result reached by the Court and in its analysis in all but one respect.  In considering whether the father of Preston H., Christopher W. (“Father”), established an affirmative defense to the claim that he abandoned his child by failure to support, the Court reasons that it is unnecessary to determine “whether willfulness [of Father’s failure to support] presents a question of law, fact, or a mixed question of fact and law.”  In my view, the outcome of the appeal depends on that determination.

Kimberly Miller v. State of Tennessee
M2022-00901-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

Petitioner, Kimberly Miller, appeals as of right from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, wherein she challenged her convictions for first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony murder, for which she received a life sentence.  On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to permit Petitioner “to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision on whether to assert—or not assert—the statute of limitations for all lesser[-]included offenses of first degree murder and first degree felony murder” and counsel’s failure to file a motion to dismiss, “along with alternative requests for mandatory or permissive jury instructions, related to the violation of [Petitioner’s] Due Process rights under the federal and state constitutions” based upon a lengthy, pre-indictment delay.  Following a thorough review, we affirm. 

Akrem Hasan v. Jim Burrow et al.
M2023-01354-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Brothers

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In Re Preston H.
M2022-00786-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Sharon Guffee

Courts in both Florida and Ohio denied petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights in favor of the Prospective Adoptive Parents.  While Florida courts were still exercising jurisdiction over the transition of the child from his Prospective Adoptive Parents to his Mother and Father, the Prospective Adoptive Parents sought for the third time to have a court terminate Father’s parental rights, asserting willful failure to support in Tennessee.  The juvenile court dismissed the petition, finding that Father’s failure to support was not willful because the failure to support was tied to the Prospective Adoptive Parents’ representations that they would no longer pursue custody, to Father’s financial outlays related to preparing his home for a transition of custody, and to the complex, multi-jurisdictional nature of the litigation, in which Florida courts were expressly exercising jurisdiction for many months after the filing of the Tennessee petition and during the entirety of the period of non-payment.  The Prospective Adoptive Parents appeal, asserting that the ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest, and that the court erred in assessing fees for the guardian ad litem.  We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

State of Tennessee v. James Tyler Fucci
M2022-01425-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Bateman

The defendant, James Tyler Fucci, appeals the denial of his request for judicial diversion of the six-year sentence imposed for his Montgomery County Criminal Court guiltypleaded conviction of aggravated assault. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. We remand for entry of a judgment on Count 2 reflecting that the charge was dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher A. Williams
E2023-00332-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.

Defendant, Christopher A. Williams, while on parole under a sentence from the Sullivan
County Criminal Court, was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base. The State filed a
detainer based on Defendant's violation of parole. Defendant filed a pro se "Motion to
Terminate Parole as Unsatisfactorily Completed/Alternatively Revoke Parole and Impose
Sentence in Absentia to Run Concurrent with Federal Supervise Release," which the trial
court denied, finding that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") "does not apply
to probation violations." Defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider, asserting that he
was denied a due process hearing on his parole revocation. The trial court denied the
motion, and Defendant appeals. We dismiss Defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Jacob Thomas Cook Et Al v. Jefferson County, Tennessee Et Al
E2022-01537-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge James L. Gass

This case involves an accident between a motor vehicle and a school bus that occurred on
Highway 11E on a foggy December morning in Jefferson County, Tennessee. The
automobile was traveling eastbound on Highway 11E when it struck the bus, which was
stopped across the two eastbound lanes of Highway 11E positioned to make a left turn onto
the westbound lanes. The driver of the car, Jacob Cook, sustained serious injuries as a
result of the impact. Mr. Cook, together with his grandfather, Rickey Macari, who owned
the vehicle, brought an action in tort seeking damages against Jefferson County, the
Jefferson County Board of Education, and the driver of the school bus, Harold Moody. In
their complaint, Mr. Cook and Mr. Macari alleged that Mr. Moody's negligence in stopping
the school bus across the eastbound lanes was the proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries.
The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that Mr. Cook's negligence, and not Mr.
Moody's, was the proximate cause of the accident because Mr. Cook had been speeding
when the accident occurred. During a bench trial, the defendants' expert witness, an
accident reconstructionist, opined that Mr. Cook had been speeding at the time of the
accident but that Mr. Cook's car would have collided with the stopped school bus even had
he been following the speed limit. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found
that Mr. Cook was indeed speeding at the time of the accident, but that Mr. Moody should
not have attempted to turn left across the eastbound lanes given the traffic and weather
conditions. Accordingly, the trial court determined that Mr. Moody's actions were the
proximate cause of Mr. Cook's injuries and allocated 80% of the fault for the accident to
Mr. Moody, with 20% of the fault assigned to Mr. Cook. The defendants timely appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgment with one modification:
we direct the trial court to dismiss Jefferson County as a defendant because the Jefferson
County Board of Education, as the owner of the school bus, is undisputedly the proper
defendant in this action.

Ashley Denson Ex Rel. Bobbie J. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge Et Al.
E2023-00027-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ryan M. Spitzer

This appeal arises from a health care liability action following the death of Ashley Denson
from a cardiac event she suffered after being treated and released from Methodist Medical
Center. Ms. Denson was unmarried and had two minor children at the time of her death.
The statutorily-required pre-suit notice listed Ms. Denson’s mother, Bobbie J. Denson, as
the claimant authorizing notice. The minor children were not identified anywhere in the
notice. The subsequent complaint was filed by “ASHLEY DENSON, Deceased, by and
through her Next Friend and Mother BOBBIE JO DENSON, and BOBBIE JO DENSON,
Individually.” The body of the complaint lists, for the first time, Ashley Denson’s children,
and states that Bobbie Denson “brings this action individually, and on behalf of Plaintiff,
decedent’s surviving minor children … as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.” The
defendants filed motions to dismiss, challenging Bobbie Denson’s standing to bring the
action and contending that the pre-suit notice failed to comply with the requirements of the
Tennessee Health Care Liability Act.1

Ashley Denson Ex Rel. Bobbie J. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge Et Al. - DISSENT
E2023-00027-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ryan M. Spitzer

I agree with the majority’s secondary conclusion that Grandmother held standing to
file suit on behalf of the minor children. I write separately to address the majority’s
dispositive holding that failure to identify the minor children in the pre-suit notice defeats
this cause of action, thereby precluding their claim for health care liability for judicial
review on its merits.

State of Tennessee v. Markettus L. Patrick
W2022-01774-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Markettus L. Patrick, of aggravated
assault by strangulation or attempted strangulation, a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iv), for which he received a sentence of five years to be served on
supervised probation following service of 150 days in confinement. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Amanda Nicole George
W2023-00124-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph T. Howell

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant of aggravated assault for which she
received a four-year sentence to be served on supervised probation after service of eleven
months and twenty-nine days at 75% release eligibility. The sole issue presented for our
review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the serious bodily injury element of
aggravated assault and self-defense. Upon our review, we affirm.

Virgie Lee Parker v. Paul J. Parker
E2022-00720-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael E. Jenne

In this post-divorce action, the trial court denied the husband’s petition for contempt upon
finding that the wife had satisfied a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution
agreement allowing for the husband to retrieve items of personal property from a home
awarded to the wife. The court initially awarded attorney’s fees to the wife, pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), for her successful defense against the petition.
Upon the husband’s motion to alter or amend and following a hearing and supplemental
briefing, the trial court concluded that the statute did not provide for attorney’s fees in an
action involving enforcement of the distribution of property in a divorce. The trial court
granted the husband’s motion to alter or amend, denying the wife’s request for attorney’s
fees. The wife has appealed. Upon consideration, we hold that Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-5-103(c) provides for attorney’s fees solely in matters involving alimony,
child support, permanent parenting plan provisions, and custody of children. We
therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Jeremy Nathaniel Greene v. Laura E. Greene et al.
M2022-01171-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor J. B. Cox

This is a divorce case. Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property and its award of attorney’s fees as alimony in solido to Wife. We affirm the trial court’s valuation and division of marital property. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to wife as alimony in solido based on the lack of findings in the trial court’s order. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. The case is remanded for findings on the issue of whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under the factors prescribed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121 and, if so, whether the amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable.

Victor Lee Hyatt v. Suzanne Lee Hyatt
M2023-00037-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Matthew Joel Wallace,

This appeal arises from a post-divorce petition for contempt. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order failed to resolve all the issues before the court, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Dustin Len Lovelace
W2022-01516-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Brent Bradberry

A Decatur County Jury found Dustin Len Lovelace, Defendant, guilty of facilitation of
aggravated robbery. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the
judgment.

Paul Jerome Johnson, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
E2022-00295-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle A. Hixson

Petitioner, Paul Jerome Johnson, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition,
arguing that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his claim of alleged bias by the
trial court and in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.
Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

William Heath v. State of Tennessee
W2022-01459-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The Petitioner, William Heath, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated
robbery, aggravated assault,1 and reckless endangerment, for which he is serving an
effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred
in “failing to view the cumulative effect of [his] claims as a constructive denial of the right
to counsel.” We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Nicolas Wayna Johnson
W2022-01041-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

A Madison County jury convicted the Appellant, Nicolas Wayna Johnson, of possession
of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver (counts one and two), possession of a firearm
with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (counts three and
four), theft of property up to $1,000 (count five), and possession of unlawful drug
paraphernalia (count six). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged counts
one and two and imposed a concurrent sentence of two years. The trial court also merged
counts three and four and imposed a sentence of three years to be served in the Tennessee
Department of Correction. By operation of law, the trial court ordered the concurrent two year
term for counts one and two to be served consecutively to the three-year term in counts
three and four. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(a), (e)(1), (g)(1). For counts five and
six, the trial court imposed a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be
served concurrently with all other counts, for an effective sentence of five years in
confinement. The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in denying alternative sentencing. Because the Appellant was eligible for probation on the
theft and drug-related offenses, we remand for resentencing.

In Re Skylith F. et al.
M2022-01231-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Step-grandparents Joe K. and Lois K. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Vernetta G. (“Mother”) to her minor children, Skylith F., Zelda F., and Celeste G. (“the Children”). After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit, and persistent conditions. Mother appeals. Mother argues, among other things, that she was thwarted by Petitioners from visiting the Children more often than she did. We find by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that Petitioners proved three grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights. We find further by clear and convincing evidence, as did the Trial Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm.

In Re Skylith F. et al. (Concurring)
M2022-01231-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kathryn Wall Olita

I concur in the majority’s thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion, but I write separately to reflect a variance of view with the majority’s determination as to the appropriate four-month statutory time period for assessing the ground for termination for abandonment by failure to support. In assessing abandonment, the General Assembly has directed Tennessee courts to consider “a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to terminate the parental rights . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) (West July 1, 2021 to May 8, 2022). The majority concludes that the correct four-month period to examine for the ground of abandonment by failure to support in this case is the four months prior to the granting of the motion to amend, running from July 18, 2021, to November 17, 2021, rather than the four months prior to the time the amended petition was filed on September 24, 2021. I do not necessarily disagree with the majority on this point. Where I respectfully diverge is that I do not think it is necessary to decide between these two time periods in this case and would reserve doing so for a more appropriate case.

State of Tennessee v. Taylor Jenkins Littrell
W2022-01433-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bruce Irwin Griffey

The Appellant, Taylor Jenkins Littrell, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court’s order
revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his four-year sentence
in confinement. The Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1)
admitting a blood alcohol report in violation of his confrontation rights; and (2) ordering
him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Loring Justice Et Al. v. Kim Nelson Et Al.
E2022-01540-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Deborah C. Stevens

This appeal is the latest development in a protracted custody and visitation dispute between
Loring Justice and Kim Nelson. After the Juvenile Court for Roane County (“the Juvenile
Court”) entered a judgment awarding Ms. Nelson custody and severely restricting Mr.
Justice’s parenting time, Mr. Justice filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Knox County
(“the Trial Court”). He alleged various claims against Ms. Nelson and the lawyers and law
firms that represented her in the Juvenile Court. Ms. Nelson and her attorneys filed motions
for sanctions, alleging that Mr. Justice’s complaint violated Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. Months later, Mr. Justice filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. After
entering an order of dismissal, the Trial Court granted Ms. Nelson and her attorneys their
Rule 11 motions and ordered Mr. Justice to pay their attorney’s fees and expenses. Mr.
Justice has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment
in all respects.

State of Tennessee v. Marco Luciano Cianfarani
M2022-01200-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howard W. Wilson

The Defendant, Marco Luciano Cianfarani, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; and possession of a weapon by a person with a prior felony conviction, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502(a)(2) (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated rape), 39-13-102(a)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2018) (subsequently amended) (weapon possession by a convicted felon). The Defendant was sentenced to serve an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his aggravated rape and aggravated assault convictions, (2) the trial court erred in permitting the testimony from a witness of whom the defense received late notice, (3) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the Defendant’s prior assault of the victim, and (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jurors to continue deliberating after being notified that one juror disagreed with the other eleven. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.