State of Tennessee v. Gregory Nelson and Tina Nelson
A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellants, Gregory Nelson and Tina Nelson, of the charged offenses of first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. Tina Nelson was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction and to fifteen years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, and Gregory Nelson was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction. In this consolidated appeal, Gregory and Tina Nelson argue that the evidence is insufficient to sustain their convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Wilkerson
Appellant, Danny Steve Wilkerson, was convicted by a jury of three drug-related offenses and received an effective sentence of ten years as a Range I, standard offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the nature and length of his sentences. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Lee Goins
The Defendant, Christopher Lee Goins, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentences and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentences and ordering his original sentences into effect. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry D. Williams v. City of Burns
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether the evidence established that the plaintiff police officer was discharged solely in retaliation for conduct protected under the Tennessee Public Protection Act,Tennessee Code Annotated section 501-304, sometimes called the Whistleblower Act. The chief of police for the defendant municipality had the plaintiff police officer “fix” a traffic ticket for a relative. After the plaintiff officer complained to the mayor that the police chief had pressured him into illegal ticket fixing, the police chief discharged the plaintiff. The defendant municipality claimed that it terminated the officer’s employment because he violated the chain of command by reporting the ticket fixing to the mayor, and also because he undermined the chief’s authority with the other officers in the police department. We hold that the municipality’s assertion that it discharged the plaintiff for going outside of the chain of command amounts to an admission that it retaliated against the plaintiff for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities, conduct that is protected under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. After a review of the record, we also hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the second reason proffered by the municipality for the officer’s discharge, that he undermined the police chief’s authority, is pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff was discharged solely in retaliation for conduct protected under the Public Protection Act. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas William Whited
The defendant, Thomas William Whited, was convicted of nine counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; one count of attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony; thirteen counts of observation without consent, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of attempted observation without consent, a Class B misdemeanor. The defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-two years. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the defendant used a minor in the production of material that included the minor engaging in “sexual activity”; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to provide the jury with his proposed special instructions; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the victims at the sentencing hearing; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas William Whited - dissenting
I must respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority. Let me begin by recognizing that surreptitiously recording a minor in the privacy of her bedroom or bathroom while she undresses is reprehensible, abhorrent, and criminal. See Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-605. However, whether this conduct rises to the level necessary to sustain the convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor is another question. For this offense, the State was required to show that the minor in the videos was engaged in sexual activity. As applicable here, the statutory definition of sexual activity required the State to prove that the video contained the lascivious depiction of the victim’s breasts, buttocks, and/or genitalia. After applying the guidelines outlined in Dost and given the below reasoning and authority, I am unable to conclude that the images depicted in the video were lascivious. Therefore, I would reverse the convictions of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor in this case. In reaching this conclusion, I would apply the sixth Dost factor, whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, objectively rather than subjectively, as this court previously held in State v. John Michael Whitlock, No. E2010-00602-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2184966, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2011) (reviewing whether a videotape constituted “lascivious exhibition” of a girl’s pubic area and concluding that the sixth Dost factor must be analyzed objectively rather than subjectively). Finally, because there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Defendant attempted to capture lascivious images on the video, I would reduce his convictions to attempted especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and remand this matter to the trial court for re- sentencing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry D. Williams v. City of Burns
We granted permission to appeal in this case to address whether the evidence established that the plaintiff police officer was discharged solely in retaliation for conduct protected under the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304, sometimes called the Whistleblower Act. The chief of police for the defendant municipality had the plaintiff police officer “fix” a traffic ticket for a relative. After the plaintiff officer complained to the mayor that the police chief had pressured him into illegal ticket fixing, the police chief discharged the plaintiff. The defendant municipality claimed that it terminated the officer’s employment because he violated the chain of command by reporting the ticket fixing to the mayor, and also because he undermined the chief’s authority with the other officers in the police department. We hold that the municipality’s assertion that it discharged the plaintiff for going outside of the chain of command amounts to an admission that it retaliated against the plaintiff for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities, conduct that is protected under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. After a review of the record, we also hold that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that the second reason proffered by the municipality for the officer’s discharge, that he undermined the police chief’s authority, is pretext for retaliation. Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff was discharged solely in retaliation for conduct protected under the Public Protection Act. |
Dickson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Riley, Jr.
Charles Riley, Jr. (“the Defendant”) appeals as of right from the trial court’s order revoking his probation, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that he violated probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Craig Michael Barbee
The defendant, Craig Michael Barbee, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, which were merged with the aggravated robbery convictions. He received an effective sentence of 106 years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not granting his motion for change of venue and in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian Roberson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brian Roberson, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner previously entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine (counts 1 and 3) and possession of cocaine (count 5). On appeal, he argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because the illegal sentences in counts 1 and 3 were a material, bargained-for element of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. However, we remand this matter to the original court of conviction for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Lee Bray
Defendant, Gregory Lee Bray, was indicted in two separate cases for delivering Schedule IV substances. After pleading guilty in two separate cases to a total of two counts of delivery of a Schedule IV substance, Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. Defendant appeals, challenging the trial court‟s imposition of consecutive sentences and denial of an alternative sentence. After a review, we determine there is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty years or that the trial court improperly denied alternative sentencing. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Deshaun Jantuan Lewis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Deshaun Jantuan Lewis,appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Lee Johnson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kevin Lee Johnson, was convicted of being a habitual motor vehicle offender, driving under the influence, and felony failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of nine years, six months to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to provide him with a copy of the order declaring him to be a habitual motor vehicle offender. The post-conviction court denied relief, and petitioner presents the same issue on appeal. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rutherford Wrestling Club, Inc. v. Robert Arnold, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute over the ownership of both real and personal property located at Blackman Middle School in Rutherford County, Tennessee between the appellant, Rutherford Wrestling Club, Inc., and the Appellees, consisting of Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Board of Education, and the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department. The trial court rejected various theories raised by the appellant regarding its claim of ownership of the property. After conducting a trial, the trial court concluded that the property belonged to the appellees. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that the appellant was merely a booster club and had no ownership interest in either the real or personal property in question. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Community First Bank And Trust v. The Velligan Family Trust, et al
The matters in dispute pertain to four promissory notes. After the Bank filed suit to collect on the notes, Defendants filed counterclaims against the Bank and cross-claims against one of its agents. Following discovery, the Bank and its agent moved for summary judgment on all claims; Defendants opposed summary judgment on several grounds. Finding that the unpaid balances on the notes and the resulting deficiencies were undisputed and that Defendants released all claims against the Bank and its agent when they executed forbearance agreements, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $204,024.25, and summarily dismissed all claims asserted by Defendants. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
Husband was ordered in an earlier proceeding to increase his alimony and child support payments to Wife. The following year, Husband filed a petition to reduce his alimony and child support payments due to a substantial and material change of circumstances. Husband alleged both that Wife was cohabitating with another person and that Husband’s income had significantly decreased. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Mattie H.
The trial court entered an order establishing paternity and setting child support for a non-marital child. The trial court also granted J. W. B.’ s (hereinafter “Father”) oral motion to change the child’s surname from T. H.’ s (hereinafter “Mother”) to Father’s. Mother appeals only the order changing the child’s surname. We reverse. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Robert W. Halliman et al v. Heritage Bank et al
After foreclosing on three lots securing three loans, the mortgagee, Heritage Bank, sought to satisfy the outstanding deficiency by foreclosing on the debtors’ family-owned property that additionally secured these obligations. To prevent the impending foreclosure, the debtors commenced this action contending they are not liable for the deficiency because the properties sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than their fair market value. In its answer, the bank asserted a counterclaim seeking a deficiency judgment and attorneys’ fees. At the close of the debtors’ case-in-chief, the bank moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). The trial court granted the motion, finding that the debtors failed to prove the fair market value of the three properties at the time of each foreclosure was materially less than the foreclosure sale prices; therefore, the debtors failed to overcome the presumption afforded by Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118(b) that the foreclosure sale prices equaled the fair market value. The court then conducted a trial on the bank’s counterclaim for the deficiency and awarded the bank a judgment of $111,115.66. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $55,000, which was substantially less than the bank requested. Both parties appeal. The debtors contend the trial court erred in dismissing their claim because they presented sufficient proof that the sale prices were materially less than fair market value; they also contend the bank was not entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees. The bank contends the trial court erred by reducing its fee application. We have determined the debtors failed to prove that the sales price for each of the foreclosed properties was materially less than their fair market value at the time of each sale, and we find no error with the award of attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Pinnacle Roofs Plus v. William Murphy
Roofing company filed a civil warrant against homeowner for money owed on a written contract after completion of work and homeowner refused to pay. Homeowner countered by filing a civil warrant for breach of contract alleging that roofing company was not licensed as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-603 prior to entering into contract. The circuit court found that roofing company was licensed at all material times and awarded a monetary judgment in favor of roofing company. Homeowner appealed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Destiny W.
This appeal involves the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her child. At ten and one-half weeks old, the Department of Children’s Services placed the child with guardians due to Mother’s drug use. About eighteen months after the child’s placement with the guardians, the Guardian ad Litem filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that the Guardian ad Litem did not have standing to file the petition to terminate parental rights and that clear and convincing evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Alfred Gamble v. Abitibibowater, Inc. et al.
An employee sustained an injury to his knee while attempting to repair a piece of heavy machinery owned by his employer. Because of a staph infection, three separate surgical procedures were required. The knee gradually healed, leaving a thick and sensitive scar. An independent medical examiner, who testified on behalf of the employee at trial, found a permanent impairment of 7% to the lower extremity and added 5% based upon the disfigurement section of the AMA Guides. The orthopedic surgeon who performed the surgery found a permanent partial impairment of 7% to the lower extremity. A second orthopedist authorized by the employer assigned a permanent impairment of 2%. The trial court assigned a 7% permanent impairment to the lower extremity and also ruled that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work, thereby authorizing an award in excess of 1.5 times the medical impairment rating. In this appeal, the employee contends that he is entitled to an increase in the medical impairment rating from 7% to 12%. In response, the employer argues that the trial court erred by finding an impairment in excess of 2% and by ruling that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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McMinn | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Travontay Tremont Berry
A jury convicted the defendant, Travontay Tremont Berry, of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction, arguing that he did not know that an investigation was pending at the time of the offense. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand for correction of the judgment form to reflect the correct classification of the tampering with evidence offense and for reconsideration of the sentence in light of the correction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Brown
The Defendant, Melvin Brown, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”); DUI with blood alcohol more than .20%; violation of the implied consent law; reckless driving; and driving with a license revoked, suspended, or cancelled. The Defendant refused law enforcement’s request to submit to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol content, and his blood was taken, without a warrant and over his objections, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(1) (Supp. 2011). The trial court subsequently granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content. In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the Code section 55-10-406(f)(1) is unconstitutional and that no exception to the warrant requirement existed to justify the warrantless blood draw. Upon review, we conclude that Code section 55-10-406(f)(1) does not dispense with the warrant requirement and reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional. Because no exception to the warrant requirement existed, however, we affirm the order of the trial court suppressing the results of the Defendant’s blood alcohol content. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Claudale Renaldo Armstrong
A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Claudale Renaldo Armstrong, of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine base; delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine base; sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2011). The trial court merged the four alternative counts into two convictions and sentenced Armstrong as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara McGinnis v. State of Tennessee
This is an interlocutory appeal of the Tennessee Claims Commission’s denial of Appellant State of Tennessee’s motion to dismiss the Appellees’ appeal of the denial of her tort claim by the Division of Claims Administration. Appellee filed her notice of appeal with the Commission 91 days after notice of the denial of her claim. Although Tennessee Code Annotated Section 9-8-402(c) allows only 90 days for a party to appeal the denial of his or her claim, the Commission applied Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.05 to enlarge the time by three days and, thus, held that Appellees’ notice of appeal was timely. We conclude that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.05 is inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, we hold that Appellees’ appeal was not timely filed so as to confer jurisdiction over her claim to the Commission. Because the Commission lacked jurisdiction, the State was entitled to dismissal of the appeal. Reversed and remanded with instructions. |
Court of Appeals |