Starlink Logistics, Inc. v. Acc, LLC, et al
M2014-00362-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

This appeal stems from an environmental dispute involving the Appellant, StarLink Logistics Inc. (“StarLink”), the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“TDEC”), and Appellee ACC, LLC (“ACC”). StarLink appeals the trial court’s affirmance of an order of the Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board (“Board”), which had adopted a consent order entered into between TDEC and ACC. We affirm in part, and remand the case to the trial court for further remand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Stephanie J. Solima v. David J. Solima
M2013-01074-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

This appeal arises out of Mother’s and Father’s opposing motions to modify a parenting plan. Both of the parties and the court agreed that there had been a material change in circumstance warranting a modification of the plan. After a hearing, the court largely adopted Mother’s proposed parenting plan and reduced Father’s residential parenting time. The court also denied Mother’s request for attorneys’ fees. Shortly after the new parenting plan was entered, Mother filed a motion for a one-time modification of the plan to allow the child to attend a school trip that coincided with both parties’ parenting time. After a hearing, the court granted Mother’s motion. Father appealed the new parenting plan and the one-time modification. We find the modification issue moot and, therefore, dismiss that portion of Father’s appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. 

Williamson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Lee Carey, Jr.
M2013-02483-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Mark J. Fishburn

1998, Thomas Lee Carey, Jr. (“the Defendant”) was indicted in connection with the 1996 death of Michael Dickerson. The State entered a nolle prosequi as to the charges in 1999. In 2010, the Defendant was re-indicted for the same incident. After a trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The Defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for felony murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for speedy trial; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a medical examiner who did not conduct the autopsy of the victim; and (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to recall a witness. After a review of the M2013-02483-CCA-R3-CDrecord and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Lee Carey, Jr. - Concurring
M2013-02483-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge: Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Mark J. Fishburn

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I do not join in that portion of the opinion which holds that admission into evidence of the autopsy report itself was not a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Dennis Smith v. George Testerman, M.D. et al.
E2014-00956-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor E.G. Moody

This is a case alleging negligence by the defendants which resulted in injury to a patient, Dennis Smith. Following hernia surgery, Mr. Smith was fitted for a wound vacuum because an infection had developed at the surgical site. A sponge was placed to absorb the infection. The defendants removed the wound vacuum when the infection dissipated, but they failed to remove the sponge, which later caused the wound to burst. Mr. Smith filed suit, and the defendants asserted that dismissal was appropriate because Mr. Smith had not complied with the filing requirements of the health care liability statute. Mr. Smith 1 responded that his complaint sounded in ordinary negligence, not health care liability. The trial court agreed and denied the motions but also granted permission for the defendants to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the application for permission to appeal and now reverse the decision of the trial court.

Sullivan Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. James Stubblefield, III
M2014-01178-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

The defendant, James Stubblefield, III, appeals the sentencing decision of the trial court following the revocation of his community corrections sentence. The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary, forgery, and driving on a revoked license. He was subsequently sentenced to an effective four-year community corrections sentence as a Range I, standard offender. A violation warrant issued alleging that the defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his community corrections agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court found the defendant to be in violation and revoked the community corrections sentence, ordering that the balance of the four-year sentence be served in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant does not contest the revocation of community corrections itself. Instead, he challenges only the trial court’s decision to order service of the entire sentence in confinement. Following review of the record, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Robertson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Lemaricus Devall Davidson
E2013-00394-CCA-R3-DD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

The defendant, Lemaricus Devall Davidson, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, and one count of facilitation of aggravated rape that he received for his role in the January 2007 deaths of C.N. and C.C. The defendant claims that: the trial court 2 erred by refusing to suppress evidence obtained during the searches of his residence, his statements to the police following his arrest, and evidence obtained during searches of his person; the trial court erred by admitting into evidence postmortem photographs of the victims; the trial court should have excluded testimony and evidence regarding fingerprint examination and ballistics testing; the trial court erred by permitting courtroom spectators to wear buttons emblazoned with photographs of the victims during the guilt phase; the State violated his constitutional rights by intercepting and examining privileged communications to and from his attorneys; structural constitutional error occasioned by the out-of-court behavior of the trial judge entitles him to a new trial; the second successor trial judge erred by concluding that he could fulfill the statutory duty of thirteenth-juror review; the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; errors related to the presentment require dismissal of the charges; the trial court erred by permitting jurors to submit questions for the witnesses; the trial court erred by allowing spectators to remain in the courtroom while jurors reviewed the defendant’s videotaped statement as part of their deliberations; the trial court should have dismissed the presentment due to constitutional deficiencies in the jury venire; the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence of the economic costs associated with the implementation of the death penalty; and the trial court erred by excusing those jurors who were not “death qualified.” The defendant also raises a number of challenges to the death penalty in general and its application in this case specifically. Because we conclude that no reversible error attends the convictions or sentences in this case and because it is our view, after a mandatory review, that the sentences of death imposed in this case were not disproportionate, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. We detect, however, clerical errors that require that the case be remanded for entry of corrected judgment forms.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Stephen Michael West, et al v. Derrick D. Schofield, et al
M2014-00320-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

We granted the State of Tennessee permission to appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision on interlocutory appeal in which the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order compelling discovery in this declaratory judgment action. The Plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that the lethal injection protocol in place for the execution of convicted criminal defendants sentenced to death is unconstitutional. In conjunction with pursuing their claim, the Plaintiffs sought to discover the identity of persons involved in facilitating and carrying out executions. Over the State’s objection, the trial court ordered the State to provide these identities to the Plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. Upon due consideration, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and in compliance with the timelines set forth in the judgment order filed contemporaneously with this Opinion.

Davidson Supreme Court

Stephen Michael West, et al v. Derrick D. Schofield, et al - Concurring in the judgment only
M2014-00320-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

I concur in the conclusion reached by my colleagues that the identities of the John Doe defendants are not discoverable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02(1). In my view,however, the majority opinion contains dicta that unnecessarily addresses several issues with far-reaching implications in death penalty litigation. Therefore, I must respectfully concur in the result only.

Davidson Supreme Court

Leisa Reed v. Randell Thurman et al.
E2014-00769-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

This appeal stems from the trial court’s finding that an implied partnership existed between Plaintiff and one of the Defendants with respect to a cattle-raising venture. Despite finding that the parties had already entered into a complete settlement regarding the partnership checking account and remaining partnership cattle, the trial court found that certain partnership assets had not been settled. The trial court’s final decree directed that Plaintiff be paid one- half of the fair market value of these assets, and stated that if no agreement could be reached concerning their value, the items should be sold and the proceeds divided equally. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this Opinion.

Rhea Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Donnell Tunstall
W2014-00257-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

Defendant, Donnell Tunstall, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and aggravated assault. He received an effective sentence of thirty-two years for these crimes. Defendant now appeals his convictions, claiming insufficient evidence and improper admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence regarding his previous arrest for the murder of the victim’s brother. After careful review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support all of the convictions but that the admission of specific pieces evidence was improper and not harmless. Accordingly, the convictions are reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Edwin P. Osborne v. Tennessee State Board of Accountancy
M2014-01050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

An accountant appeals the dismissal of his petition for judicial review of an order of the Tennessee State Board of Accountancy. The trial court dismissed the petition for review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because we find the petition for review was not timely filed, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Frank Manning, et al v. Amy Emmitt Manning
M2014-01149-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

In this grandparent visitation case, the trial court awarded grandparents visitation with the child at issue, finding that there was “some deprivation” of visitation by the child’s mother. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings to determine whether the child’s mother opposed visitation, as that phrase is defined in Huls v. Alford, No. M2008-00408-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4682219 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008).

Maury Court of Appeals

William Hunter Babcock v. Sonnia Elizabeth Babcock
E2014-01672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth


A married couple entered into a business partnership prior to their marriage. This is a consolidated appeal from the parties’ divorce action and their partnership dissolution action. We affirm the trial court’s decision to adjudicate the partnership dissolution action and the divorce action separately, based on Wife’s failure to raise any argument on this issue in the trial court. With regard to the remaining issues, however, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.
 

Hamilton Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Gary D. Scales
M2014-01094-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

Defendant, Gary D. Scales, was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury for one count of robbery.  A jury found Defendant guilty of the charged offense, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 15 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Persistent offender.  Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Having carefully reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Brian Allen Osborne
M2014-00352-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Earl Durham

In October 2011, the Macon County Grand Jury indicted Brian Allen Osborne (“the Defendant”) for aggravated arson, a Class A felony.  Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 20 years in the Department of Correction.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends:  (1) the trial court erred by ruling that proffered testimony from a defense witness was inadmissible hearsay; (2) the trial court provided misleading and prejudicial jury instructions on the defense of intoxication; (3)  the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that aggravated arson was both a result-of-conduct and nature-of-conduct offense; (4) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (5) the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors, resulting in an unjust and improper sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Macon Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. James Allen Ballew
M2014-00378-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leon C. Burns, Jr.

Defendant, James Allen Ballew, was indicted by the White County Grand Jury for one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, from White County Lumber Company.  On January 29, 2013, Defendant entered a guilty plea to theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000, a Class E felony.  Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant received a two-year sentence to be served on probation and agreed to pay restitution, with the amount to be determined at a subsequent hearing.  A restitution hearing was conducted.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and requested that the State provide the court with a revised pecuniary loss list, including items recovered by the victim.  All that is contained in the transcript from the subsequent hearing is a brief colloquy wherein the trial court said, “we’ve agreed that an order will be submitted on restitution?” and the prosecutor replied, “Yes, your honor.”  The appellate record does not contain a separate order for restitution.  However, an amended judgment was entered, which states that Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $11,000 to White County Lumber.  The amended judgment is silent as to the time or manner of payment.  Defendant appeals, arguing that the amount of restitution was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence and that the trial court did not consider Defendant’s ability to pay restitution.  The State argues that the record is inadequate to allow for appellate review, and therefore, the trial court’s order of restitution should be presumed correct.  We conclude that there is nothing in the record to indicate whether the trial court made a ruling as to the amount of restitution or if an agreement was reached.  Defendant’s ability to pay restitution was apparently not considered by the trial court, and the trial court failed to include the repayment terms on the judgment form.  It is problematic that there is no indication that Defendant’s counsel was present in open court when the trial judge and the prosecutor had their brief colloquy.  Restitution, when appropriate, is just as much an integral part of a sentence as the length of sentence and the manner of service of the sentence.  See T.C.A. § 40-35-104(c)(2).  Thus, there must be something more in the record setting forth restitution other than what is contained in this record.  Moreover, the amended judgment incorrectly states that Defendant was convicted of a Class D felony.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as to restitution and remand this case for a new restitution hearing and entry of an amended judgment that reflects the amount of restitution and the manner of payment, as well as that Defendant’s conviction offense as a Class E felony.

White Court of Criminal Appeals

William Hunter Babcock v. Sonnia Elizabeth Babcock
E2014-01670-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth

A married couple entered into a business partnership prior to their marriage. This is a consolidated appeal from the parties’ divorce action and their partnership dissolution action. We affirm the trial court’s decision to adjudicate the partnership dissolution action and the divorce action separately, based on Wife’s failure to raise any argument on this issue in the trial court. With regard to the remaining issues, however, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Betsy Stibler v. The Country Club, Inc.
E2014-00743-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Douglas T. Jenkins

Betsy Stibler ("Plaintiff") sued The Country Club, Inc. ("Defendant") alleging, among other things, that Defendant had created a nuisance by planting trees on Defendant's real property adjacent to Plaintiff's real property. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing the Chancery Court for Hamblen County ("the Trial Court") granted Defendant summary judgment after finding and holding that Plaintiff could not prove that the trees planted by Defendant constituted a nuisance. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and we affirm.

Hamblen Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Rico Vales
W2014-00048-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

Appellant, Rico Vales, stands convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He received concurrent sentences of fifteen years for each aggravated assault conviction and six years for the handgun conviction. Appellant raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of aggravated assault against one of the victims and (2) whether his right to a trial by an impartial jury was violated by pre-trial contact between a juror and one of his witnesses and the prior acquaintance of the juror and that witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Charles D. Sprunger
E2011-02573-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ronald Thurman

This appeal challenges the civil forfeiture of the appellant’s house after he was convicted of possessing child pornography on his home computer. We hold that, in forfeiture proceedings, the seizing authority is required to present affirmative proof that it complied with both the procedural and the substantive provisions of the applicable forfeiture statutes. In accord with prior decisions of this Court, we also hold that both the procedural and the substantive provisions of the forfeiture statutes must be strictly construed. The State in this case failed to show that it complied with the procedural requirements in the forfeiture
statutes. Therefore, we vacate the forfeiture.

Cumberland Supreme Court

Gregory Glen Phillips v. State of Tennessee
E2014-00544-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barry A. Steelman

The Petitioner, Gregory Glen Phillips, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 guilty plea to felony reckless endangerment and his two-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

Ophelia Carney v. Santander Consumer USA
W2014-02228-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle Atkins

The order appealed is not a final judgment, and therefore, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Madison Court of Appeals

Diaz Construction v. The Industrial Development Board of The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, et al.
M2014-00696-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

A subcontractor filed suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien. The subcontractor, which was also a remote contractor, was required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-11-145(a) to serve a notice of its claim of nonpayment on the owner of the project as well as on the “prime contractor in contractual privity with the remote contractor.” The subcontractor notified the owner, but it did not notify the prime contractor. The subcontractor asserted it was not required to notify the prime contractor because it had no contractual relationship with the prime contractor. The defendants moved to dismiss the subcontractor’s complaint due to its failure to comply with the statute and notify the proper parties. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the subcontractor’s lien claims. The subcontractor appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The subcontractor is required by statute to notify both the owner and the prime contractor of the project of nonpayment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re: Kim C., et al
M2014-00215-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donna Scott Davenport

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellants/Parents’ parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide suitable housing; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans; and (3) persistence of conditions. Because the grounds for termination of Appellants’ parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the Children, we affirm and remand.

Rutherford Court of Appeals