Larry Sneed v. The City of Red Bank, Tennessee
We granted review in this interlocutory appeal to determine whether the analysis the Court of AppealsemployedinYoung v.Davis,No.E2008-01974-COA-R3-CV,2009 WL 3518162, at *6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009), to conclude that Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”) claims against governmental entities must be tried without a jury in the manner prescribed bythe Governmental Tort LiabilityAct (“GTLA”), should be applied to determine whether a Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claim against a governmental entity is controlled by the GTLA. We reject the analysis Young applied and overrule it to the extent it may be interpreted as holding that the GTLA governs all statutory claims against governmental entities. The analysis used in Cruse v. City of Columbia, 922 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1996), controls the determination of this issue. Applying Cruse, we hold that the THRA is an independent and specific statute, which removed governmental immunity and which controls the adjudication of THRA claims. We further hold that the provisions of the THRA clearly establish legislative intent to afford a right to trial by jury to persons who bring THRA claims against governmental entities in chancery court. Accordingly, based on these holdings, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The trial court’s order transferring this case to circuit court is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Lucian Alan Green
In a two-count indictment, appellant, Lucian Alan Green, was charged with burglary of a building other than a habitation and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, both Class D felonies. The jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him as a standard offender to concurrent terms of three years, six months at thirty percent release eligibility for each offense to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s sentencing decision. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth James Morris
Kenneth James Morris (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of manufacture of a Schedule II controlled substance within a drug-free zone and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and claims the jury improperly weighed certain testimony and incorrectly assessed the credibility of a witness. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Caleb Wayne Dehoog
The defendant, Caleb Wayne DeHoog, was convicted by a Madison County Criminal Court jury of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies; and one count of aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to three years for the attempted aggravated burglary, five years for each count of aggravated assault, and eleven months and twenty nine days for the aggravated criminal trespass. The court ordered that the sentences for the two aggravated assault convictions be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with the sentences on the other convictions, for an effective term of ten years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tamekia Shantell Jones
Defendant, Tamekia Shantell Jones, was charged with Class A misdemeanor theft from Macy’s store in an indictment returned by the Madison County Grand Jury. Following a jury trial, she was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Madison County jail, to be served consecutively to a sentence for convictions in Hardeman County. In this appeal, Defendant’s sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
J. L. Fralix v. The University of Tennessee
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry D. McCoy
The defendant was indicted for seven counts of rape of a child. Prior to trial, the State sought permission to offer as evidence a video-recorded statement made by the child victim to a forensic interviewer. At the conclusion of a pre-trial hearing, the trial court refused to allow the video-recorded statement as proof at trial. We granted the State an interlocutory appeal to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123 (Supp. 2014) violates the separation of powers,whether the video-recorded statement qualifies as inadmissible hear say evidence, and whether the use of the statement at trial would violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses. Because section 24-7-123 does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary and is a valid legislative exception to the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence, the ruling of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial. The State will be permitted to offer the video-recorded statement as evidence at trial, provided that the evidence is relevant and otherwise comports with the requirements of section 24-7-123 and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Scott Elmer McCarter v. Debra Lynn Walker McCarter
In this divorce action involving the dissolution of a thirty-six year marriage, the wife appeals the trial court’s distribution of the marital estate and the amount of alimony in futuro she was awarded by the court. She also contends that the trial court judge erred by denying multiple motions for his recusal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry Juanita Carter Berkshire v. Edwin Carl Berkshire, III
The primary issue in this divorce case is whether the trial court erred in failing to find that Sherry Juanita Carter Berkshire (Wife) was entitled to long-term alimony in futuro from Edwin Carl Berkshire, III (Husband). Instead, the court awarded four months of transitional alimony. Wife, who was sixty at the time of the divorce, has numerous health problems and is totally and permanently disabled. Husband, who is twenty years her junior, is able-bodied and works as an automobile mechanic, with an earning capacity of at least $62,000 per year. Taking into account the relevant statutory factors and the totality of the circumstances, we modify the trial court’s alimony judgment to make it an alimony in futuro award in the amount of $150 per week. We decline Wife’s request to increase the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to her, but we do award Wife a reasonable attorney’s fee for professional services rendered, plus expenses, in connection with this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the trial court on remand. Further, we modify the trial court’s decree requiring Wife to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence. As modified in the ways indicated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re E.L.R.
S.R. (Mother) and D.M.S. (Father) challenge the order (1) terminating their parental rights with respect to their minor son, E.L.R. (the Child) and (2) approving the adoption of the Child by his legal custodian and maternal grandmother, E.W. (Grandmother) and her husband, T.C.W. Jr. (T.W.) (collectively, Grandparents). After a trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist as to both Mother and Father and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the adoption of the Child by Grandparents is in the Child’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. They contest the finding of grounds for termination as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Phyllis Louise Bige v. City of Etowah
Phyllis Louise Bige, a former police officer with the City of Etowah, brought this retaliatory discharge action against the City, alleging that she was fired because of her failure to meet a quota for citations. Her claim was predicated on Tenn. Code Ann § 39-16-516 (2014). The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that an earlier judgment of the United States District Court dismissing plaintiff’s federal claims – including a claim that her substantive due process rights were violated because defendant required her to commit an illegal act – collaterally estopped plaintiff from proceeding with her retaliatory discharge claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (2014). We affirm the summary judgment of the trial court, but on different grounds. We hold that defendant demonstrated plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to two essential elements of her claim – (1) that she refused to participate in an illegal activity, and (2) that defendant fired her solely because of her refusal to participate in an illegal activity. We affirm the grant of summary judgment. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Christine Jones Calloway v. Willard Randall Calloway
This appeal arises from a divorce. Sheila Christine Jones Calloway (“Wife”) sued Willard Randall Calloway (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of adultery by Husband. The Trial Court equally divided the parties’ marital residence but awarded Husband’s onehalf interest in the marital residence to Wife as alimony in solido. The Trial Court also awarded Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. Given the parties’ relative earning capabilities and other relevant circumstances of this case, we affirm the Trial Court’s award to Wife of Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence as alimony in solido. However, once Wife was awarded Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence, she no longer was financially disadvantaged relative to Husband, and, therefore, the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Lance Peterson v. Tiara Blanco (Peterson)
This matter arises from post-divorce proceedings regarding the parties’ minor child. Mother filed an application for extraordinary appeal after the trial court designated Father as Temporary Primary Residential Parent and ordered that Father could enroll the parties’ child in a school in his school district. Mother’s application submitted three issues for review, but we grant extraordinary review only as to the issue regarding the trial court’s order designating Father as Temporary Primary Residential Parent and ordering that Father could enroll the parties’ child in a school in his school district. We vacate and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Tremelle Hunt
In this delayed direct appeal, the defendant, James Tremelle Hunt, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault. Because the defendant failed to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the delayed appeal in this case. As a result, the appeal must be dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Paige A.F., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Joann P.F. (“Mother”) and Gary A.M. (“Father”) to the minor children, Paige A.F., Tristan J.A.M., and Gaige D.W.M. (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court for Anderson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding that clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights for substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Desmond O'Brian Anderson and Camillia Harrison
A Madison County jury convicted Desmond Obrian Anderson of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Camillia Harrison of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the defendants to serve effective sentences of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Anderson asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever after his codefendant had testified; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him as an Especially Mitigated Offender. Defendant Harrison asserts that: (1) the trial court should have admitted the transcript of the preliminary hearing into evidence; and (2) the trial court should have severed the defendants’ charges in this case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy A. Baxter v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury found the Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, guilty of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Timothy A. Baxter, No. W2012-00361-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1197867 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, March 25, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 13, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, which he later amended with the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion requesting that the post-conviction judge recuse himself. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to recuse and the petition for post-conviction relief, after which it denied both. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his post-conviction petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and he further contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to recuse because there was a reasonable basis for questioning the post-conviction judge’s impartiality. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Renee Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carl Renee Brown, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2013 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1987 convictions of criminal attempt to sell cocaine pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417 (1982) (repealed 1989). Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Echols
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Echols, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court merged the theft of property conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction, and it ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the admission of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine itnesses against him; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence an unsigned statement of the Defendant; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Jones
The defendant, Brandon Jones, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of a deadly weapon with intent to employ it in the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to mandatory consecutive sentences of two years and four years for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by allowing evidence regarding the defendant’s custodial statements; (2) the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony regarding statements made by the passenger in the defendant’s car; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as an expert and offer opinion testimony; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the two convictions. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Rapier
Defendant, Billy D. Rapier, and two co-defendants, Cassandra Haynes and Leveris Keller, were charged with aggravated robbery. Mr. Keller was also charged with felony evading arrest, and Defendant was charged with evading arrest. Pursuant to a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges and received concurrent sentences of eight years for aggravated robbery and eleven months, twenty-nine days for evading arrest. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the defense of duress barred his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric D. Brooks, et al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Plaintiffs filed suit against their property insurer for breach of their homeowner’s insurance policy to recover for damages sustained to their home as a result of a tornado; Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendant violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). A jury found that Defendant’s actions violated the TCPA and awarded damages to Plaintiffs. Finding Defendant’s conduct to be willful, the trial court doubled the jury’s award; the court also awarded Plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs. Defendant appeals. We modify the award of costs to Plaintiffs; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: MacKeznie N., et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, contending that any failure to support or visit her children was not willful.Mother argues that her failure to support her children was a result of poverty and that her failure to visit was caused by obstruction on the part of the children’s grandmother/guardian. We find that the children’s grandmother/guardian failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination. We therefore reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Louis Pinkava v. Tawania Leigh Kovacs-Pinkava
This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). Wife filed suit to clarify the terms of the MDA regarding the apportionment of Husband’s future military retirement. The trial court held that the MDA granted Wife twenty-five percent of Husband’s retirement benefits at the rank of captain, his rank at the time of divorce, including cost-of-living adjustments that will be in effect when he elects to retire. Husband appeals and argues that the award of retirement benefits was intended to be alimony in solido and was ascertainable at the time of divorce rather than at the time he elects to retire. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation and affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John Wayne McDonald v. Jamie Rhea McDonald Bunnell
John Wayne McDonald (“Father”) and Jamie Rhea McDonald Bunnell (“Mother”) had two children during their marriage before divorcing in 2012. The permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce named Mother the primary residential parent. After Mother remarried and relocated with the children, Father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan and asked the court to designate him the children’s primary residential parent. Father argued that the behavior of Mother’s new husband (“Stepfather”) around the children constituted a material change in circumstance and that the modification would be in the children’s best interest. At a hearing, Father presented evidence that Stepfather used foul language around the children and had, in jest, referred to them using a racial slur. The trial courtfound thatStepfather’sbehavior,though “distastefuland ill-advised,”did not constitute a material change in circumstance. Father appealed. After careful consideration, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals |