This is a dispute involving the usage and subdivision of real property in McMinn County.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that a restrictive covenant contained in the
deed to their property applied to other parcels originating from the same parent tract.
Upon competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing
the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The trial court determined that the language in the
plaintiffs’ deed was not sufficient to create an express restrictive covenant upon the
property subsequently conveyed to the defendants and that the plaintiffs did not produce
sufficient evidence of a “common plan” for the original tract such as would warrant
imposition of an implied negative reciprocal easement. The plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm
Court of Appeals
Alyssa Vandyke v. Lilly Cheek ET AL. M2022-00938-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Adrienne Gilliam Fry
We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-307 and 29-20-313(b), requires severance in cases involving both non-governmental and governmental entities. Following the legislature’s amendment of these statutes in 1994, we conclude that, when a jury is demanded, the entire case against both non-governmental and governmental entities shall be tried to a jury without severance.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Ronnell Barclay v. State of Tennessee W2022-00406-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jennifer Johnson Mitchell
Petitioner, Ronnell Barclay, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for
rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic
means. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel
because counsel (1) did not communicate to Petitioner that the victim made a new
disclosure on the first day of trial; (2) failed to request a continuance after the State
informed the trial court and Petitioner of the new disclosure; and (3) incorrectly informed
Petitioner of his potential exposure at trial as a result of the new disclosure. Following our
review, we affirm in part; however, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to the exposure issue.
The Defendant, Jasmine Lashay Bland, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court
jury of leaving the scene of an accident, assault, and burglary of a vehicle. She was
sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years
for the felony burglary of a vehicle conviction, six months for the assault conviction, and
thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with the sentences suspended
after thirty days of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error by not allowing her to cross-examine the victim about a
potential source of bias related to the victim’s alleged insurance claim for personal injuries.
Based on our review, we conclude that this issue is waived because it was not raised in the
trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Tipton
Court of Criminal Appeals
Emma Glover v. Paul Duckhorn W2022-00697-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Samual Weiss
At issue is whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of
limitations for a personal injury action to two years when a traffic citation for the violation
of Memphis City Code Ordinance § 11-16-3 for Failure to Maintain Safe Lookout is issued
to the driver alleged to be at fault. Stated another way, is an exception created to the oneyear
statute of limitations for personal injuries if a person involved in an automobile
accident receives a ticket for the violation of a municipal ordinance from that accident?
The trial court ruled in the negative. We affirm.
This is a divorce action filed by Meredith Lee Taylor (“Mother”) against Christopher Bryan Taylor (“Father”). The trial court divided the marital estate nearly equally and granted Mother primary residential custody of the parties’ child. Father was granted 130 days per year of parenting time. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its valuation of several marital assets. He also asserts that the trial court should have awarded him more parenting time. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Shaquil Murphy E2022-00605-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword
The Defendant, Shaquil Murphy, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of
attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted second degree murder, unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, two counts of aggravated assault, and two
counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal,
the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the attempted murder and
employing a firearm convictions and argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the
employing a firearm counts of the indictment and by including duty to retreat language in
the jury instruction on self-defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
In Re Nevaeh S. E2022-00959-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp
A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child on the ground of
severe child abuse. She concedes the ground for termination, but challenges the trial
court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We
affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the
aforementioned ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.
The defendant, Joel Michael Guy, Jr., appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony
murder, and two counts of abuse of a corpse, challenging the denial of various motions to
suppress evidence, the admission of certain evidence, the constitutionality of the statute
prohibiting abuse of a corpse, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions of abuse of a corpse and arguing that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles
him to a new trial. Because the defendant did not have standing to challenge the
warrantless entry into the house where the murders occurred, we affirm the denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the crime scene on grounds different
than those upon which the trial court relied. Even if the defendant had standing to challenge
the entry into the house, the entry was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances, and the evidence was in the officers’ plain view. The trial court correctly
concluded that the search of the backpack was an appropriately-conducted inventory
search. The trial court did not err by refusing to suppress surveillance video obtained using
the receipts discovered from the unlawful search of the defendant’s Louisiana residence
because the trial court correctly concluded that the police would have inevitably discovered
the surveillance video during the course of the investigation. The trial court did not err by
admitting evidence that the victims intended to stop providing financial support to the
defendant. The proscriptive statute criminalizing the abuse of a corpse is not void for
vagueness, and the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s
convictions of these offenses. Finally, because we conclude that the trial court did not
commit any error, no error obtains to accumulate. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court.
A father appealed an order requiring his children to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.While the appeal was pending, both children received the vaccine.Because we determine that the appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal.
The Defendant, Rickey Haymer, appeals his convictions of crimes involving the attempted unlawful purchase or possession of a firearm. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because his actions in seeking to purchase a firearm did not constitute a “substantial step” toward the completed crimes. He also argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting various text messages showing his contact with the putative seller. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The Defendant-Appellant, Justin Darnay Graves, was convicted as charged by a Madison
County jury of simple possession of cocaine, felon in possession of a firearm, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received an effective sentence of six years’
plus eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to
several unrelated convictions including case numbers 20-330 (sale and delivery of heroin),
20-331 (sale and delivery of heroin and sale and delivery of methamphetamine), 20-332
(sale and delivery of heroin and sale and delivery of methamphetamine),1 20-334
(possession of drugs; traffic offense; introduction of contraband into a penal facility;
driving without a license; tampering with evidence), 2 and 20-335 (leaving the scene of
accident resulting in death), two of which were committed while the Appellant was
released on bond. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b). Prior to trial, the Appellant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop which formed the basis of
his convictions. As grounds for the motion to suppress, the Appellant argued that “the
amount of time between the initial traffic stop and the arrival of the [canine] unit [was]
unreasonable” and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion to suppress. In this appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress and the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentencing. Because the State failed to establish that the otherwise lawful traffic stop was
not unreasonably prolonged in time and scope, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court,
vacate the judgments, and dismiss the case.
This health care liability action was brought against a hospital and a physician. The
plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to three1 potential defendants prior to initiating the action. The
trial court found, however, that the plaintiff failed to include as part of the pre-suit notice
a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization because one of the six core elements was
incorrect on the authorization. Following a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02(6), the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action against the
defendant hospital due to noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. The plaintiff
argues, among other things, that he should have been allowed to conduct limited discovery
in order to determine whether the defendant hospital had been prejudiced by his failure to
provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We vacate the trial court’s grant of the
motion to dismiss and hold that the plaintiff should have been permitted to conduct limited
discovery regarding whether prejudice existed for the trial court to consider in its
determination of whether the plaintiff substantially complied with the pre-suit notice
requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121.
All of the claims asserted in this action arise from a prior healthcare liability action in which Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) sued Dr. John Rosdeutscher and his medical group for damages resulting from breast reduction surgery. In the action now on appeal, the complaint asserts claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract against Dr. Rosdeutscher, his medical group, and the attorneys who represented them in the prior healthcare liability action. All of Plaintiff’s claims pertain to the fact that the defendants filed Plaintiff’s medical records in the healthcare liability action, which included nude photographs of Plaintiff and details about her sexual and mental health history—information that Plaintiff contends had “nothing to do” with her healthcare liability claims. The defendants responded to the complaint by serving a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 notice on Plaintiff’s counsel. Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss all claims on various grounds. The trial court granted the Rule 12 motion, dismissed all claims, and assessed $10,000 in damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119 against Plaintiff. The trial court also assessed Rule 11 sanctions against Afsoon Hagh, Plaintiff’s attorney, in the additional amount of $32,151.67. Plaintiff appealed; her attorney did not. Finding no error, we affirm. We also find this appeal to be frivolous and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the defendants in defending this appeal and entry of judgment thereon.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In Re Conservatorship of Kimelah M. W2022-00292-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Karen D. Webster
Appellant appeals the decision of the probate court to name other parties as the conservators of her daughter on the basis that the trial court improperly placed time limitations on the presentation of proof at the final hearing. Because Appellant has failed to show any reversible error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.
The Appellant, Christopher M. Black, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.
Two law firms seek accelerated interlocutory review of the denial of their motion to
disqualify the trial judge. Because there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s
impartiality, we reverse and remand for reassignment.
This case involves a dispute over a parcel of real property. Because of the profound
deficiencies with Appellants’ brief, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial
court for a determination of damages under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.
Court of Appeals
Dora Bannor v. Philip Bannor E2022-00507-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ward Jeffrey Hollingsworth
This appeal arises from a divorce case. The wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging
irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted a
divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the marital
estate, awarded alimony, and entered a judgment for unpaid child support. The husband
appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
The trial court clerk notified this Court that a final judgment has not been entered. This
Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed.
Appellant failed to respond to our show cause order. As no final judgment has been
entered, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
A mother relocated less than fifty radial miles, but more than fifty driving miles, from the father. The trial court held that the parental relocation statute applied because the mother relocated more than fifty miles away and, even if she had not, she moved close enough to fifty miles that application of the relocation statute was appropriate. We find that the radial distance should be used to determine whether the relocation statute is triggered. By that standard, the mother did not move more than fifty miles away, and the relocation statute does not apply. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
A mother appeals an order setting aside a default judgment. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Betty Fry, et al. v. Nancy Neely, et al. W2021-00870-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins
After the trial court issued a temporary injunction affirming a trust’s appointment of a new
trustee, the former trustee’s attorney in other matters sent a letter to financial institutions
holding trust assets. The letter stated that the attorney represented the trust, construed the
trial court’s order as being without factual basis or legal authority, and requested the
institutions freeze the trust’s assets. Trust beneficiaries and the new trustee brought a
motion to hold the former trustee and the attorney in civil contempt. Finding that the former
trustee was unaware of the letter, but that the attorney meant the letter to thwart the efforts
of the new trustee in violation of the trial court’s order, the trial court granted the motion
only as to the attorney, who was ordered to pay attorney’s fees related to remedying the
effects of the letter. Discerning no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
In Re B.D.M. E2022-00557-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge Brian J. Hunt
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court found multiple grounds
for termination, including abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, failure to manifest a
willingness and ability to assume custody, and mental incompetence. The trial court also
found that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate Father’s parental rights. We
conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports each of the grounds for termination
found by the juvenile court and the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the
best interest of the child. Accordingly, we affirm.
