State of Tennessee v. Mark Elihu Cooper
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Mark Elihu Cooper, pled guilty to sexual battery by an authority figure, statutory rape by an authority figure, incest, and rape, and the trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence for those convictions. In this appeal as of right, he contends that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentences above the range minimums “without the support of a single enhancement factor.” He also argues that consecutive sentencing was improper due to the absence of proof of “residual[] physical and mental damage” to the victim presented at the sentencing hearing. Finally, he submits that the trial court used an “inappropriate consideration[,]” specifically, an ex parte communication with the police chief, in rendering its decisions in both of these regards. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of an eighteen-year sentence. |
Weakley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dominique Davon Holmes
The Defendant-Appellant, Dominique Davon Holmes, entered guilty pleas to aggravated burglary, robbery, aggravated criminal trespass, and two counts of assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective five-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his five-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Davis
The defendant, Steven Davis, was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. He is currently serving an effective twenty-six year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress statements he made to police while in custody. Following review of the record, we conclude that the defendant has waived review of that issue by failing to provide an adequate record to establish that he adequately raised the issue before the trial court. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barry L. Price v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Barry L. Price, appeals the denial of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis. In 1991, the petitioner pled guilty to three counts of the sale of cocaine, one count of driving on a revoked license, and one count of obtaining money by false pretenses. Adopting the State’s recommendation, the trial court imposed an effective ten-year sentence. In 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for the writ of error coram nobis alleging that his sentence was unlawfully imposed because the trial court did not engage in the appropriate sentencing colloquy or make appropriate sentencing findings. The coram nobis court denied the petition finding that it was time-barred and failed to raise issues cognizable in a coram nobis petition. The petitioner contends that the denial was error. Following review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devon Brown
A Shelby County Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Devon Brown, Defendant’s brother, Kenneth Brown, and David Richardson, charging them with first degree premeditated murder, thirteen counts of attempted first degree murder, thirteen counts of aggravated assault, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of reckless endangerment. Orders of dismissal were entered as to one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated assault. He was convicted of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was convicted as charged of the remaining offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder and imposed a mid-range sentence for each of the remaining convictions. The court merged the convictions for aggravated assault into the convictions for attempted first degree murder. The trial court further found Defendant to be a dangerous offender and ordered all sentences to run consecutively for an effective sentence of life plus two-hundred and forty-four years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for first degree murder and the attempted first degree murder and aggravated assault of Kenneth Baker and Chymia Baker; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced him by ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Ra'niyah T.
This is a child custody and visitation case. After protracted litigation, and the entry of several temporary orders on visitation, the trial court implemented a permanent custody and visitation schedule. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Appellee/Father as the child’s primary residential parent, and also appeals the trial court’s award of Father’s attorney fees. Discerning no error, we affirm. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Scarlett Robbins Goodman v. Temitope "Michael" Bamiji Ogunmola
This appeal involves Defendant’s motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him in a divorce action. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Morris Marsh
The Defendant, Morris Marsh, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement given to an investigator; (2) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the presentment against him; (3) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s pro se motion to remove his appointed trial counsel; (4) that the State failed to disclose an incriminating statement made by the Defendant to a witness; (5) that the trial court erred in admitting audio recordings of prison phone calls made by the Defendant; (6) that the trial court erred in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim; (7) that the trial court erred in determining that a witness was unavailable and allowing the witness’s preliminary hearing testimony to be presented at trial; (8) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction; and (9) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. 1 Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Lipton
The Defendant, Mark Lipton, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of aggravated assault and received a five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction, citing to the inconsistencies in witnesses’ testimony and to the “physical facts rule”; (2) whether the trial court erred in the admission of improper character evidence, alleging both procedural and substantive errors in that ruling; and (3) whether the trial court properly denied his petition for error coram nobis relief by concluding that the new witness’s testimony was not credible.1 After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Alfred Reed, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
A Monroe County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Alfred Reed, Jr., of one count of the sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school and one count of the sale of less than one-half gram of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender and ordered the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of forty years. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. James Alfred Reed, Jr., No. E2010-01138-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2766766, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 18, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 13, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to compel the State to disclose its confidential informant at trial and that his Momon hearing was improperly conducted. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville-Davidson County, TN v. The Board of Zoning Appeals of Nashville and Davidson County, TN, et al
Company which builds and manages billboards applied to the Metropolitan Department of Codes and Building Safety for permits to convert two static billboards to digital billboards. When the applications were denied by the Zoning Administrator, the company appealed to the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, which reversed the administrator’s decision and granted the permits. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Board’s decision; the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Metropolitan Government did not have standing to bring the proceeding. We reverse the decision and remand for further proceedings |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Caldwell Hancock v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
A federal bankruptcy court entered judgment denying a Nashville attorney’s application for approximately $372,000 in attorney’s fees and expenses. Nine months later, the attorney emailed the bankruptcy judge who denied his fee application, calling the judge a “bully and clown” and demanding that he provide a written apology for denying the fee application. The Board of Professional Responsibility instituted a disciplinary action against the attorney, and a hearing panel of the Board found that the attorney violated several Rules of Professional Conduct by sending the email and recommended that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law for thirty days. The chancery court modified the hearing panel’s judgment to include additional violations for misconduct associated with the attorney’s briefs filed in the district court but affirmed the remainder of the hearing panel’s judgment. The attorney timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the hearing panel’s conclusion that the attorney’s email violated the rule against ex parte communications and was also sanctionable as “conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” We conclude, however, that the hearing panel erred by finding the attorney in violation of the ethical rule that prohibits attorneys from making false statements about the qualifications or integrity of a judge. We also reverse the chancery court’s modification of the hearing panel’s judgment. We affirm the attorney’s thirty-day suspension from the practice of law. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
William Caldwell Hancock v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee - Concur
I concur in the lead opinion’s conclusions that Mr. Hancock violated Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 3.5(b) and 3.5(e) and that “an attorney may be disciplined pursuant to [RPC]8.2 only if the false statement is communicated to a third party.” I disagree, however, with the lead opinion’s conclusion that “the record lacks any indication that Mr. Hancock sent the email to anyone other than Judge Paine.” I would instead hold that the record contains substantial and material evidence establishing that Mr. Hancock sent an email to third parties. As a result, I would affirm the hearing panel’s judgment that Mr. Hancock violated RPC 8.2(a)(1). In all other respects, I concur in the lead opinion’s decision affirming Mr. Hancock’s thirty-day suspension from the practice of law. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
William Caldwell Hancock v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee - Concur
I concur in the lead opinion’s conclusions that (1) Mr. Hancock violated Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 3.5(b); (2) the disciplinary authority of this Court is not preempted by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure; (3) discipline imposed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 8.2 requires that the false statement about a judicial or legal official be communicated to a third party; and (4) the chancery court erred by modifying the judgment of the hearing panel to include violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 3.2, 3.4(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). I disagree, however, with the conclusion that Mr. Hancock violated Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, RPC 3.5(e), and the imposition of a thirty-day suspension. Because I cannot find a basis to suspend Mr. Hancock for his offensive misbehavior, I would hold that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction in this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Cody Burnett
The Defendant, James Cody Burnett, pleaded guilty to one count of vehicular homicide by intoxication with an agreed sentence of eight years and the manner of the service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant filed a Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence, which the trial court denied. The Defendant filed an appeal of both the trial court’s sentence of confinement and its denial of his Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentence. We consolidated those two appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing of the Defendant and its denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Gregg Barker
Appellant, Steven Gregg Barker, pleaded guilty to 23 counts of the initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine and received an eight year sentence, suspended to supervised probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify three questions of law challenging the trial court's denial of a |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennesee v. Troy James Keith Reynolds
The defendant, Troy James Keith Reynolds, appeals his Blount County Circuit Court jury convictions of burglary, theft, and possession of burglary tools, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Because the judgment in count two erroneously reflects a conviction of Class C felony theft, we remand that judgment to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting a conviction of Class D felony theft. In addition, we remand for correction of other clerical errors in the judgments. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Hayden L.E.B.
Rebecca H. and Christopher H. (“Petitioners”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kayla H. (“Mother”) and Aaron B. (“Father”) to the minor child Hayden L.E.B. (“the Child”). After a trial the Juvenile Court for Knox County 1 (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child after finding clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) for abandonment by willful failure to pay support and abandonment by wanton disregard and clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Chesteen
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, James Chesteen, of rape of a child, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the trial court’s decision to admit a photograph of the victim taken by a nurse practitioner at the Our Kids Center. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient but that the trial court’s admission of the photograph was reversible error. Accordingly, the appellant’s conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Faulkner v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Faulkner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting sentence of death. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the jury foreperson demonstrated bias and violated the Petitioner’s right to a fair and impartial jury; (2) he is intellectually disabled and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty; (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases of trial; (4) the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence; (5) the prosecution presented false and misleading testimony; (6) the trial court demonstrated bias; (7) the “acquittal-first instruction” violated his due process rights; (8) Tennessee’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional; and (9) cumulative error warrants a new trial. We conclude that due to the jury foreperson’s false statements about past domestic violence, the Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate the Petitioner’s conviction and death sentence, and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carolyn M. Heaton v. Jason Barrett Heaton
This case focuses on whether the trial court properly enforced and interpreted the parties’ prenuptial agreement when equitably dividing their assets incident to a divorce and whether the trial court properly set child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. The plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on May 30, 2012. The parties proceeded to trial in May 2013 on the issues of property division, child support, and attorney’s fees. An agreement was reached concerning a co-parenting schedule for their daughter. The court found that the parties’ prenuptial agreement was enforceable but that it did not require that the parties’ jointly owned marital residence be divided equally. The trial court did, however, divide the parties’ jointly owned personalty equally. In making findings with regard to the parties’ respective annual income amounts, the court set child support accordingly. The trial court also declined to award attorney’s fees to either party. Husband timely appealed. We vacate the trial court’s rulings regarding division of the real property, the award of child support, and attorney’s fees, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn M. Heaton v. Jason Barrett Heaton - Dissent
I cannot concur in the majority’s treatment of the marital residential property as joint property. The majority concludes that it was, in the language of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, “Co-Owned Property.” The trial court held that a finding of “Co-Owned Property” would be “inconsistent with the intent and conduct of the parties, not compelled by the pre-marital agreement.” The court went on to say that such a finding “would result in an unequivocally inequitable windfall.” Hence, in my judgment, the issue for us is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings on this subject. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Justin Michael Nunnery v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Justin Michael Nunnery, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that it failed to state a colorable claim. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the petition because if Petitioner’s claims are true, they would entitle him to post-conviction relief. Following a review of the record, we agree and accordingly reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to all provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-107 and Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 6(B)(2)-(3). Furthermore, the trial judge is recused from further proceedings in this case. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Asher S.C.
This is a termination of parental rights case concerning A.S.C. (“the Child”), the son of A.G.S. (“Mother”) and C.D.T. (“Father”). Mother and Father were never married. Two years after the Child was born, Mother, as the sole plaintiff, filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights based on his alleged abandonment of the Child. After Mother and C.R.S. (“Stepfather”) were subsequently married, Mother filed a motion to join Stepfather and an amended petition to terminate Father’s rights and allow Stepfather to adopt the Child. Father objected and filed a counterclaim in which he requested that he be designated as the alternate residential parent and granted traditional visitation rights. After a bench trial, the court terminated Father’s rights based on its finding, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple forms of abandonment exist. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. He challenges the four-month period of time used to establish abandonment by failure to visit or support the Child; the sufficiency of the evidence of grounds for termination; and the trial court’s best-interest determination. We conclude that the trial court erred in its calculation of the four-month period for consideration of abandonment pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i)(2010). As a result, we vacate the trial court’s finding of abandonment by failure to provide child support as a ground for termination. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Everette Ivey v. CRS Exteriors
The appellant, Everette Ivey (“Plaintiff”), appeals from an order of the trial court which granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the appellee, CRS Exteriors (“Defendant”), entered judgment in favor of Defendant on its counterclaim and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for relief in the original complaint. The order held in abeyance “[t]he remaining issues with regard to the damages due [Defendant], along with the issue of attorneys’ fees recoverable by [Defendant] under the terms of the contract” at issue in the proceedings below. Because it is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |