Alex Stevino Porter v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Alex Porter, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because both trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at trial by (1) failing to adequately investigate, develop, or present a theory of self-defense; (2) allowing a witness to improperly assert Fifth Amendment protection after a prior admonition from the trial court; (3) failing to properly advise the petitioner of his right to testify on his own behalf and failing to preserve Petitioner’s right to appeal Momon defects in the trial court proceedings; (4) announcing to the jury that Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of trial; and (5) failing to challenge the expert witness testimony of the State’s firearms examiner or presenting rebuttal evidence to her testimony. Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective on appeal by failing to adequately communicate with him during the appellate process. Petitioner further contends that he was denied due process during the post-conviction proceedings. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lawrence Holt v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, David Lawrence Holt, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dawn Alish Black
The Defendant, Dawn Alish Black, entered a nolo contendere plea to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012). She was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but 48 hours. On appeal, she presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
David Allen Lackey v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Allen Lackey, appeals the determination of the post-conviction court that due process did not mandate a waiver of the statute of limitations. The petitioner is currently serving a life sentence in the Department of Correction following his conviction for first degree murder and theft of property valued under $500. Following a direct appeal, the petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. After the petition was denied by the post-conviction court, this court remanded the case for a determination of whether the petitioner’s due process rights required that the statute of limitations be tolled. After a hearing, the post-conviction court determined that the petitioner had failed to carry his burden of establishing his right to a tolling of the statute of limitations and dismissed the petition. The petitioner contends that the court’s determination was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fred Morgan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Fred Mogan, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery in 2008 and was sentenced to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In September 2012, the petitioner filed what appears to be his second petition for post-conviction relief in this case. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court should have considered his petition because due process requires tolling the statute of limitation. Following review of the somewhat scant record before us, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for relief. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dickie Ray Bain
The appellant, Dickie Ray Bain, pled guilty in the DeKalb County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years to be served at sixty percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by referring to the wrong offense during the sentencing hearing and that his sentence constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demetrius D. Walton
The appellant, Demetrius D. Walton, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to one count of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court and the trial court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the length of the sentence imposed. However, we must remand to the trial court for a correction of the judgment to reflect that the appellant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender who was to serve a minimum of thirty-five percent of his sentence in confinement before being eligible for release. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David G. Housler, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David G. Housler, Jr., filed petitions for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, seeking relief from his convictions for four counts of felony murder and resulting consecutive sentences of life in confinement. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted the petitions. On appeal, the State contends that the court erred by finding that the Petitioner was entitled to any relief. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the post-conviction court’s granting the petition for post-conviction relief but conclude that the court erred by granting the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Nevertheless, because the Petitioner has shown that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based upon his receiving the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Diggs v. LaSalle National Bank Association, et al.
This appeal results from the trial court’s dismissal of a complaint on the basis of res judicata. However, in his appellate brief, the Appellant fails to raise as an issue the trial court's application of the doctrine of res judicata, or the resulting dismissal. Because the Appellant’s brief fails to raise and argue the dispositive issue in this case and does not otherwise comply with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rick P. Newman v. The Kroger Company
This is a slip and fall case. Plaintiff sued The Kroger Company after he fell in a puddle of water near a freezer at a local Kroger store. The trial court granted Kroger’s motion for summary judgment, but failed to include findings indicating the reason for its decision. We find that summary judgment was inappropriate and therefore reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald D. Graham, et al. v. Bradley County, Tennessee
This is a negligence case in which the Grahams were severely injured when the top portion of a tree collapsed, hitting their car while they were driving in Cleveland, Tennessee. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that the County’s failure to maintain and inspect its roadways caused the accident. The County alleged that it could not be held liable pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-10-101, et. seq. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The Grahams appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jamontez S., Timothy S., Janiya S., Montique S., Ann'Dreona S. K., and Shacariah S. K.
Mother of six children appeals termination of her parental rights, contending that the evidence does not support the court’s holding that she abandoned the children within the meaning of the applicable statute, that she failed to comply with the requirements of permanency plans, that the conditions which led to the removal of the children from her custody persisted, and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Jayne Adams v. James Earl Adams, III
This is an appeal from a “Final Decree of Divorce.” Because the decree does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Echols v. City of Memphis
A twenty-year veteran of the Memphis Police Department was terminated based upon his involvement with a private security company, in violation of departmental policies, and his untruthfulness during the department’s investigation. The officer filed a petition for review in chancery court, and the chancery court upheld his termination. The officer appeals, arguing that the chancery court should have allowed him to introduce evidence of another officer who was treated differently, in violation of his equal protection rights. He also argues that he was impermissibly punished twice for the same conduct. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Connor S. L.
In this second appeal of a child custody decision, Father argues that the trial court erred in naming Mother primary residential parent and in fashioning the permanent parenting plan. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to either the custody or parenting time decisions, and therefore, affirm the decision of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie Christmon Leeper v. Keith Anthony Leeper
This is a post-divorce appeal. In this second appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's ruling on his obligation as to certain expenses. After a careful review of the record, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Hepburn v. Corrections Corporation of America, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Tyrone E. Montgomery v. State of Tennessee, et al
In this consolidated appeal, the pro se petitioner, Tyrone E. Montgomery, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court and the Morgan County Circuit Court’s orders denying his petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In case number E2011- 2629-CCA-R3-HC, the State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. Because the petitions raise identical claims, we also affirm the judgment of the Morgan County Circuit Court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ladarius Devonte Maxwell
The Defendant, Ladarius Devonte Maxwell, challenges his jury convictions for two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a thorough examination of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kwane Morris
The Defendant, Kwane Morris, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of facilitation of first degree murder and received a twenty-two-year sentence for that conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police that was involuntary and coerced; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a State’s witness for possible bias; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on accomplice testimony. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Daylon Demetric Roberts v. David Sexton, Warden
Petitioner, Daylon Demetric Roberts, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus regarding his convictions for first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions into one judgment and sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment. State v. Daylon Demetric Roberts, No. 03C01-9403-CR-00117, 1994 WL 540555, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 6, 1995). Petitioner argues that the judgment of the trial court was void due to a defective indictment. The State filed a motion to dismiss asserting that petitioner’s indictment was legally sufficient. The habeas corpus court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lesa C. Williams, et al. v. Renard A. Hirsch, Sr.
The trial court awarded partial summary judgment to both parties in this dispute over the division of attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s holding that Tennessee law, and not the “modern rule” is applicable to this case as a matter of law. We reverse the trial court’s awards of summary judgment to both parties on the remaining issues, and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Glenn Hasaflook
The Defendant, Robert Glenn Hasaflook, was indicted for one count of promotion of the manufacture of methamphetamine, and filed a pretrial motion to suppress all his statements made to the police. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to the indicted offense reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Ray Grooms v. City of Trenton, Tennessee, et al.
The employee, a sanitation worker, was struck in the groin area when he fell onto a bed frame. Within a few days, he developed swelling and infection of same. His treating physician testified that the condition was not caused by the work injury, and an evaluating physician testified that the employee’s condition was consistent with the injury. The trial court found that the swelling and infection were not related to the work injury and dismissed employee’s complaint. The employee appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jeffrey Matthew Brown v. Jennifer Lindsey (Williams) Brown
Husband filed a petition pursuant to Rule 60.02 to set aside a provision of the parties’ divorce decree that required him to pay $80,000 to Wife in accordance with an antenuptial agreement. He sought relief under Rule 60.02(2) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and “confirmed” the divorce decree. We find that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, and as a result, it did not properly exercise its discretion. We also find that Wife’s conduct constituted misrepresentation or other misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60.02(2). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying Husband’s Rule 60 petition and we vacate the challenged portion of the divorce decree. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals |