State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Ray Massey, Jr.
The defendant, Jimmy Ray Massey, Jr., pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to felony failure to appear, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years at 60% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kelly Ruth Osteen
The Defendant, Kelly Ruth Osteen, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft of property valued under $500.00, fraudulent use of a credit card or debit card, and illegal possession of a credit card or debit card. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of three years, to be served on supervised probation. This sentence was to run concurrently with another sentence, number II-CR084354. After each of two subsequent arrests for additional criminal offenses in case number II-CR065737 and case number II-CR085803, a probation violation warrant was issued. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation , ordering her to serve seventy days and then return to supervised probation with an additional condition that she successfully complete the 21st Judicial District Drug Court program. Thereafter, another probation violation warrant was issued for the Defendant’s failure to complete the drug court program, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke her sentence and seeks jail credit for time she spent participating in the drug court program. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Martin Dean "Cub" Meeks
The defendant, Martin Dean "Cub" Meeks, was convicted by a Grundy County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty as thirteenth juror; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to establish premeditation; and (3) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony Von Carruthers v. State of Tennessee
In 1996, Petitioner, Tony Von Carruthers, was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death on each count by a Shelby County Jury. See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Tenn. 2000). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief for, inter alia, ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel for failing to retain an expert in the field of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) analysis. See Tony Carruthers v. State, No. W2006-00376-CCA-R3-PD, 2007 WL 4355481, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 12, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 27, 2008). After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Id. In December of 2011, Petitioner sought to have DNA analysis performed on a vaginal swab and a blanket pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The Shelby County Criminal Court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied relief. Because Petitioner did not establish the criteria for ordering DNA analysis under the Act, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carletha Jefferson
Appellant, Carletha Jefferson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of six years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated assault and that the trial court erred in denying her requests for judicial diversion and probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Ray Walker
Appellant, James Ray Walker, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury in January of 2011 for one count of official misconduct and one count of theft of property valued at less than $500. The events that gave rise to the indictments occurred in May of 2010 while Appellant was employed by the United States Postal Service in Jackson, Tennessee. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of both offenses. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years for the conviction for official misconduct. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve 90 days of the sentence in incarceration and the balance of the sentence on probation. Appellant was sentenced to thirty days for the theft of property conviction, to be served concurrently with the sentence for official misconduct. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant presents various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, he asks this Court to determine if the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and whether his sentence was “unfair.” After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant has waived any issues with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to support the issues with argument, citations to the record, or citations to authority. Moreover, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Proposed Conservatorship of Mary F. Stratton
Mary Fern Smith (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the trial court seeking the appointment of a conservator for her 90-year-old mother, Mary F. Stratton (“Mother”). Mother filed a motion to dismiss citing the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction of the petition because Mother was not a resident of Roane County. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-101 (2007). It dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Stephen B. et al
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the minor children (“the Children”) of Tammy S. (“Mother”). Upon order of the Campbell County Juvenile Court entered September 19, 2011, the Children were taken into emergency protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) due to unsanitary conditions in the family home and concerns regarding inappropriate supervision and medical neglect of one of the Children. DCS filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights on July 11, 2012. The petition alleged several statutory grounds for termination, including abandonment based on willful failure to visit the Children, abandonment based on failure to provide a suitable home, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial conducted October 4, 2012, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children due to her failure to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan, and (3) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal persisted. The trial court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Kendall Foster, et al v. Federal National Mortgage Association, et al
The plaintiffs brought this action alleging wrongful foreclosure after a judgment against them became final in an earlier, separate unlawful detainer lawsuit filed by Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”). The trial court dismissed the action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because the plaintiffs could and should have raised the issues pertaining to the alleged wrongful foreclosure in the earlier detainer action. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A.
The Circuit Court dismissed this appeal from General Sessions Court based on the Appellant’s failure to file a surety bond. Appellant paid costs in the General Sessions Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i), but did not submit a surety bond under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-5-103. The circuit court held that failure to post the surety bond under Section 27-5-103 resulted in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the circuit court. Based on this Court’s holding in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, L.L.C., No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wilma Griffin v. Campbell Clinic, P.A. - Dissenting
Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Lafayette Insurance Company v. Jerry S. Roberts, et al.
In this appeal we must determine whether an injured worker was an “employee” or a |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Main Street Market, LLC v. Emily V. Weinberg
This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Williams v. Katie Singler
This appeal involves the modification of a parenting plan. The father filed a petition alleging a material change in circumstances and seeking to be designated primary residential parent for the parties’ minor son. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the mother had violated the parenting plan and held that this constituted a material change in circumstances. It changed the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father, held the mother in contempt, and awarded the father attorney fees as punishment for the contempt. The mother now appeals. The trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm the finding of a material change in circumstances, but hold that the trial court erred in holding that it was in the child’s best interest to change the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father. We also vacate the holding of contempt against the mother and the award of attorney fees as punishment for the alleged contempt and remand for additional findings. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Brandon Tate
Appellant, Joshua Brandon Tate, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for seven counts of sexual battery, eight counts of rape, and one count of solicitation of a minor. A jury found Appellant guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. The trial court granted a portion of Appellant’s motion for new trial, vacating the rape convictions in counts seven through twelve, and the conviction for sexual battery in count thirteen. As a result, Appellant’s effective sentence was reduced to eleven years. On appeal, the following issues are raised for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the recordings of the victim’s interview; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about Appellant’s failure to attend voluntary interviews with the police; and (4) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony about Appellant’s failure to attend voluntary interviews with the police. After a review of the record, we determine: (1) the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court properly admitted prior consistent statements of the victim in order to rehabilitate her testimony following cross-examination. However, the trial court erred in admitting testimony to the effect that Appellant failed to attend voluntary police interviews, and this error requires reversal for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlon Sontay
Appellant, Marlon E. Sontay, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for four counts of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of rape. Appellant was convicted by a jury of all counts. Appellant was sentenced to twenty five years for each count of rape of a child, eight years for each count of aggravated sexual battery, and eight years for rape. The trial court ordered Count Two for rape of a child to run consecutively to Count One for rape of a child. The remaining counts were ordered to run concurrently to each other, for a total effective sentence of 50 years at 100%. Appellant filed a timely motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (2) whether the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony of statements made by the victim during the testimony of the nurse practitioner who performed the victim’s medical examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (4) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant; and (5) whether the trial court erred in declining to find Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-504, 39-13-522, and 39-13-523 unconstitutional. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we hold that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress where Appellant voluntarily confessed to detectives; (2) Appellant has waived any issue with regard to the admission of hearsay testimony by failing to object to the testimony at trial and raise the issue in a motion for new trial; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant within the range of punishment for his convictions; and (5) the trial court did not err in refusing to find Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-504, 39-13-522, and 39-13-523 unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Joseph G., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Joseph G., Trinity G., and Stephen G. (“the Children”), the minor children of a married couple, J.G. (“Father”) and E.G. (“Mother”). The Children, then ages four, two and one respectively, were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) following the incarceration of both parents. The Children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected by stipulation of the parents. A year after the Children entered foster care, DCS filed suit to terminate the parents’ rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted DCS’s petition. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother separately appeal. As to both parents, we reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Hancock | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Chill et al v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
Donald Chill and his wife, Martha Chill, brought this action against their homeowner’s insurance carrier, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), alleging breach of contract by virtue of its refusal to pay for their loss caused by an earthquake. The insurance policy required suit to be brought within one year of the loss. The Chills filed their complaint almost seven years after the loss and over three and a half years after the Chills refused to accept Insurer’s offer to settle the claim for $88,086.49. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome R. Flanigan
A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it denied him the opportunity to discover past allegations and cross-examine the victim about them; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request to access the victim’s mother’s diary regarding the events; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Perry Hyde v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Perry Hyde, has appealed from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his Petition for Forensic DNA Analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section Title 40, Chapter 30, Part 3. After review of the entire record, we conclude that the analysis sought by Petitioner is not included within the statutory definition of “DNA analysis.” We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Commissioners of the Powell-Clinch Utility District v. Utility Management Review Board
Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Beaver v. Ford Motor Company
In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Rennee N. Dhillon v. Gursheel S. Dhillon
The trial court granted Mother’s petition to waive mediation and modify custody, and modified the parties’ parenting schedule upon finding a material change of circumstance. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
H. Preston Ingram Et. Al. v. Scott T. Sohr, Individually and As Trustee of the Scott T. Sohr Family 2007 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust et al
This complex litigation arises out of a series of disputes between two former partners and members in more than twenty partnerships and limited liability companies that were in the business of real estate development. Following a tumultuous six year business relationship, in an attempt to extricate themselves from their business relationships, the parties executed a Membership Interest and Exchange Agreement, which distributed the entities so a portion were solely owned by one former partner/member and the others were solely owned by the other former partner/member. After closing on the Exchange Agreement, the plaintiff commenced this action against his former business partner alleging fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent transfer of which most, but not all, of the claims arose from the Exchange Agreement. The complaint was later amended to add additional claims. The defendant filed a Counter-Claim alleging that the plaintiff was also in breach of the Exchange Agreement. The trial court dismissed several of the plaintiff’s claims on summary judgment. The remaining issues were tried. At the close of the plaintiff’s proof during the jury trial, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant on some, but not all, of the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury entered a verdict for the defendant on the remaining claims. Although the jury found the defendant in breach of three provisions of the Exchange Agreement and a partnership agreement of a jointly owned company, the jury awarded no damages based upon the plaintiff’s prior knowledge and acquiescence of the breaches. Thereafter, each party sought to recover their respective attorney’s fees pursuant to § 11(l) of the Exchange Agreement. The trial court held that defendant was the prevailing party; therefore, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to recover his attorney’s fees pursuant to § 11(l) of the Exchange Agreement and awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. The trial court also awarded the defendant indemnity under the bylaws of one corporation and the partnership agreement of another.The trial court also assessed discretionary costs against the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff raises numerous issues relating to the dismissal of his claims on summary judgment and directed verdict, the instructions given to the jury, the trial court’s ruling on a post-trial motion to amend the defendant’s answer, attorney’s fees and costs, and indemnity. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on summary judgment and directed verdict in all respects. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on attorney’s fees and costs under the Exchange Agreement, holding that as the trial court correctly determined the defendant was the prevailing party for those purposes. We also affirm the trial court’s determinations that the defendant was entitled to indemnification under the provisions of the Partnership Agreement and indemnification under the bylaws of IS Investment, Inc. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Leenhouts v. Gert Jan Leenhouts
This appeal involves a motion to set aside a default judgment. The wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband was served with process. After the husband failed to file an answer, the wife filed a motion for a default judgment. The husband filed no response to the motion. The trial court granted the wife a default judgment and held a hearing on the wife’s divorce complaint. The husband did not appear at the hearing. Based on the evidence wife presented at the hearing, the trial court divided the marital estate. The husband then filed a motion to set aside both the default judgment and the divorce decree. The trial court denied the husband’s motion, and the husband now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |