Craig Beene v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Craig Beene, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for attempt to commit first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated assault, for which he is serving an effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Earl Borner
A McNairy County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Robert Earl Borner, of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the recording of the transaction; that the trial court erred by failing to enter a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the indictment against him was defective; and that he was denied a jury of his peers. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Sorrell v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Derrick Sorrell, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first-degree murder conviction, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaiah Lawler
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Isaiah Lawler, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, a Class E felony; possession of an open container of beer while operating a motor vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the implied consent law. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -403(a)(1)(A)(vi), -406, -416. As a result of these convictions, the Defendant received an effective two-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, fourth offense; and (2) that the trial court, by accepting the jury’s guilty verdict with respect to the charge of DUI, fourth offense, failed to fulfill its duties as the thirteenth juror. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Butler
Antonio Butler ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to one count each of robbery and aggravated assault. In his plea agreement, he agreed to concurrent sentences of five years for each count, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the manner of service of his sentence is improper. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrea Blackwell and Frederick Blackwell, Co-Conservators for the Estate and Person of Robert Blackwell v. Comanche Construction, Inc. and Comanche Construction of Georgia, Inc.
This interlocutory appeal concerns the statutory employer rule under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act. The defendant subcontractor rented a crane from a construction rental company. The crane rental company sent its employee to the job site to operate the crane. On the job site, the crane rental company’s employee sustained crippling injuries. The employee’s co-conservators sued the subcontractor in tort. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was a statutory employer of the crane rental company’s employee, pursuant to the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically T.C.A. § 50-6-113, and thus was immune from liability under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, T.C.A. § 50-6-108. The trial court held that the subcontractor was not a statutory employer and therefore was not shielded by the exclusive remedy provision. The subcontractor was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether it is a statutory employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act. We hold that, to reach the issue of whether the subcontractor is a statutory employer, it is first necessary to determine if the crane rental company was a subcontractor within the meaning of the Act, an issue not addressed by the trial court. Consequently, as we are unable on this record to consider the issue raised on appeal, we hold that this Court improvidently granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Tenn. R. App. P. 9 and dismiss the appeal. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Pledged Property II, LLC v. Maurice Morris
The trial court dismissed this matter on appeal from general sessions court upon finding that Appellant failed to perfect his appeal where he failed to file a bond for good surety or pauper’s oath. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Glenn Tipton
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant- Appellant Kevin Glenn Tipton agreed to enter a guilty plea to one count of felony driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) in exchange for a sentence of one year, which was suspended after service of the mandatory minimum sentence of 150 days in confinement. At the plea submission hearing, the trial court accepted Tipton’s guilty plea and imposed the agreed upon sentence but reserved judgment until October 6, 2010. On October 5, 2010, Tipton’s newly retained counsel filed a notice of appearance. On October 22, 2010, Tipton, through his newly retained counsel, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Tipton argues that the trial court erred by (1) applying the “manifest injustice” standard under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f)(2), and (2) denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randall S. Rogers v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusion of law. The Employee alleged that he sustained a gradual injury to his back in 2007 as a result of his work as a maintenance technician. His employer denied that a compensable injury had occurred and denied that employee had provided timely notice. The trial court found the Employee had sustained a compensable injury and that timely notice had been given. The trial court also found that the Employee had been terminated for cause and limited the award to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The Employer has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding on compensability. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Leo Holt v. Alma Jean Holt
This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. The trial court refused, however, to order Husband to pay for the costs of providing COBRA benefits for Wife. Husband and Wife appeal. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Holly D. Butler v. Timothy K. Vinsant
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Holly D. Butler v. Timothy K. Vinsant - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent in part from the majority opinion in this case. I agree with the majority’s holding on whether Father presented a meritorious defense in support of his Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the default judgment. However, I must disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’ s finding that Father’s failure to respond or appear in the default proceedings was willful, and its affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside.. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Holly Geneace Garrett v. Mark Anthony Garrett
This post-divorce appeal concerns the agreed-upon parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent. When Mother registered the Children in a new school district, Father objected. The trial court entered an order requiring the Children to remain in their current school district, despite the Cumberland County Board of Education’s policy providing otherwise. The Cumberland County Board of Education filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. Following a limited hearing, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent, allowing the Children to remain in their current school district per the applicable policy. Mother appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Collins v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Michael Collins, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded conviction for second degree murder and the resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because of the ineffectiveness of counsel. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Snipes
The Defendant, James Snipes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder, second degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated criminal trespass of a habitation, a class A misdemeanor, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-210, 39-14-406, 39-17-1324 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that mutually exclusive verdicts require dismissal of the felony murder conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Tyre
Appellant, Mark Tyre, entered a guilty plea to violation of the sex offender registry act, a Class E felony, and received a two-year sentence as a Range I offender. He was subsequently placed on probation. While appellant was on probation, the State indicted him for sexual exploitation of a minor based on criminal conduct that pre-dated the guilty plea and judgment in the instant case. After the State requested revocation of the suspended sentence, the trial court held a hearing and revoked appellant’s probation. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation based on criminal conduct that pre-dated his guilty plea. We discern no error in the proceedings and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tennessee Department of Health and the Division of Health Related Boards v. Kandala Chary, et al
The Tennessee Department of Health appeals from the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to four doctors following the dismissal of its administrative action against the doctors. Following a contested case hearing in which all material facts were stipulated, the Board of Medical Examiners dismissed all charges upon the finding that “the Department had not proven facts sufficient to establish that Respondent[s] violated Tenn.Code Ann.§§ 63-6-101 et seq., 63-6-214, and Tenn Comp. R. [and] Regs.” When the Department did not seek judicial review of the dismissal, the doctors requested and were awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs. The Department then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of the award. The chancery court affirmed the award and this appeal followed. Finding there is substantial and material evidence to support the administrative law judge’s decision to award the attorneys’ fees and costs under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Keith A. Davis v. Shaw Industries Group, Inc. et al
Plaintiff was terminated from his at-will employment for violating company policy by allegedly lying during an investigation into whether he was involved in a romantic relationship with a human resources manager. Plaintiff filed this action against his former supervisor, and his former employer, for intentional interference with his employment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, the corporate employer cannot be held liable for intentionally interfering with its own employment contracts, and that the undisputed facts established the supervisor did not act outside the scope of his authority in assisting in the investigation; thus, he could not be held liable. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. We affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Paul J. Frankenberg, III v. River City Resort, Inc., et al
The former president and chief operating officer of a corporation brought this action against the corporation and its CEO, alleging that Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101, which grants “employees and laborers of any corporation . . . a lien upon the corporate and firm property . . . for any sums due them for labor and service performed for the corporation,” provided him a lien in the amount of his alleged unpaid bonus and severance payments. The trial court dismissed the statutory lien claim, holding that the claimant was not included in the statutory definition of “employee.” The claimant has appealed. We hold that the Supreme Court’s ruling in State ex rel. McConnell v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 296 S.W. 12 (Tenn. 1927) that a corporation’s “managing officers” are not “employees” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-13-101 controls. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sylvia Susana Marquez v. Pedro Marquez
This appeal arises from a post-divorce dispute over custody of five children. Sylvia Susana Marquez (“Mother”) and Pedro Marquez (“Father”), divorced in 2003, are mother and father of the five minor children (“the Children,” collectively). Father was designated the primary residential parent of the Children. Mother filed a petition in the Probate and Family Court for Cumberland County (“the Trial Court”) to modify the parenting plan and for emergency custody based on allegations of violence involving Father. In her petition, Mother also argued that a material change of circumstances had occurred such as to justify her being designated the primary residential parent of the Children. The Trial Court found an emergency had arisen and awarded temporary emergency custody of the Children to Mother. Later, after a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order restoring custody to Father after stating that the emergency had been “removed by [Father].” Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Morris L. Marsh v. NECX Disciplinary Board, et al
The order from which the pro se incarcerated appellant, Morris L. Marsh, seeks to appeal was entered on November 28, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 28, 2012 order, even considering the date upon which the appellant placed the Notice of Appeal in the mail for filing with the trial court clerk (February 10, 2013). See Tenn. R. App. P. 20(g). Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
Mackenzy Ruth Murdock, et al. v. Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center, et al
After a defense verdict in this medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the trial court, sitting as the thirteenth juror, to determine that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and grant them a new trial. The court denied the motion. The plaintiffs appeal, arguing that the trial court’s remarks from the bench show that it did not properly perform its role as the thirteenth juror. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Hazel N. Ledford
Hazel N. Ledford died on June 22, 1991. Her will (“the Will”) was a joint holographic one made with her husband, Wilson A. Ledford, who predeceased her. Her stepdaughter, Martha Ledford Powell, became the sole personal representative (“the Personal Representative”) and executor of her stepmother’s estate (“the Estate”). The Will was admitted to probate in July 1991, but the Personal Representative did not file her first accounting until 2009. The final accounting was filed in February 2010. The final accounting revealed that the Estate had paid approximately $350,000 toward remediation of soil contamination caused by underground petroleum storage tanks (“the USTs”) on a parcel of land Mr. Ledford conveyed before his death to a family trust. While Mrs. Ledford was never a title owner of the property, she did join in the execution of the deed to the trust. The Will left a portion of Mrs. Ledford’s residuary estate to a charitable trust. The charitable trust and the Tennessee Attorney General (sometimes referred to collectively as “the Objectors”) objected to the final accounting on the ground that the remediation payments were not a proper expense of the Estate. The court denied the objections and approved the final accounting. The court also approved, in part, the Personal Representative’s request for attorney’s fees. The Objectors appeal. We reverse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Lue Holcomb v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Lue Holcomb, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that his discovery of a written statement containing the victim’s recantation of her allegations against him constitutes newly discovered evidence of his innocence of aggravated assault. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jaiden C.W. and Caiden J.W.
This is the second appeal of this case, involving the issue of child support and arrears. In In re Jaiden C.W., No. M2010-01105-COA-R3-JV, 2011 WL 2306057 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7, 2011), this Court vacated the trial court’s determination of Appellant Father’s child support obligation because the trial court did not base its determination on Father’s actual income. Upon remand, the trial court interpreted the law of the case to limit its review only to Father’s income,and to negate any consideration of other variables affecting child support. Because the trial court misinterpreted the law of the case to limit its review of the parties’ actual circumstances, we vacate the order on child support and remand for reconsideration. Vacated and remanded. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |