State of Tennessee v. Edy Chavez Pantaleon
The defendant, Edy Chavez Pantaleon, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. In addition, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. v. Jenkins, Habenicht & Woods, PLLC, et al.
Edward Joseph Warwick, Sr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Jenkins, Habenicht & Woods, PLLC, Daniel K. Habenicht, and Rebecca S. Woods (“Defendants”) alleging legal malpractice, among other things. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment after finding and holding, inter alia, that several of Plaintiff’s claims were completely unsupported by expert testimony and that for the remaining three claims Plaintiff had suffered no harm. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising an issue about whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel. We find that there are genuine disputed issues of material fact as to one of Plaintiff’s malpractice claims, a claim relative to a stipulation. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to this claim. We affirm the grant of summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s other claims and Defendants’ counterclaim for attorney’s fees. Because we are unable to determine at this stage whether Plaintiff’s complaint completely lacked merit, we vacate the award of Rule 11 sanctions. We also vacate the award of discretionary costs. This case is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Evonne Rodriguez v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christopher Evonne Rodriguez, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from an aggravated burglary conviction. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing "to raise any defense . . . of a crime spree." Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC, et al
In this malpractice action, the plaintiff failed to attach proof of service of the statutory notice and the required affidavit with the complaint. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm. |
Montgomery | ||
In Re Logan M. S. et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Marta Vandall v. Aurora Healthcare, LLC d/b/a Allenbrooke Nursing & Rehab
An employee fell while working for her employer and sustained a shoulder fracture. The employer contends that the injury did not arise out of her employment and was an idiopathic fall. The trial court held that the employee sustained the burden of proving that her injury arose out of her employment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Marta Vandall v. Aurora Healthcare, LLC - Dissent
I respectfully disagree with the Court’s decision to affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Marta Vandall sustained a compensable work-related injury. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Renita Dulaney v. Karla Davis, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Federal Express
This case involves a claimant’s right to unemployment compensation benefits. After initially being awarded such benefits, claimant was denied benefits based upon a finding that she had refused to return to her former position after being medically released to do so. The chancery court, however, reinstated her benefits concluding that her due process rights had been violated when a telephone hearing–as opposed to a face-to-face hearing–was conducted. We reverse the chancery court’s conclusion that the telephonic hearing violated claimant’s due process rights and we dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
O'Rane M. Cornish, Sr. v. Bennie G. Nunn, et al.
Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and therefore, this appeal must be dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic
This appeal sought under Tenn. R. App. P. 3 is from an Order to Register Foreign Decree entered by the trial court on December 14, 2012, which order gave “full faith and credit for enforcement and modification purposes” to the parties’ New Jersey divorce judgment and subsequent consent orders entered by the New Jersey court on the issue of child custody. Subsequent to the entry of the December 14, 2012 order, the appellee (“Father”) filed a petition to modify the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and consent orders. The trial court entered an emergency order on January 9, 2013, temporarily modifying the child custody provisions of the New Jersey judgment and orders to change custody of the parties’ minor children from the appellant (“Mother”) to Father. Pursuant to Rule 10 of Tenn. R. App. P., Mother then sought and was granted an extraordinary appeal from the January 9, 2013 order. See order in Michael Miljenovic v. Sherri E. Miljenovic, No. E2013-00238-COA-R10-CV, (Tenn. Ct. App., Knoxville, Feb. 5, 2013). That case is now pending in this Court. She also sought this Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal as to the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012. Since the trial court’s order of December 14, 2012, is not a final order, we have no jurisdiction to consider her Tenn. R. App. P. 3 appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dakota D., et al
The order from which the appellant, Charlie D., seeks to appeal was entered on November 30, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was filed on January 4, 2013, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the November 30, 2012 order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Beverly Lynn Durham (Hess) Cook v. James Preston Hess, III
Father of adult child with spina bifida and other impairments challenges the trial court’s order requiring him to continue to pay child support. We have concluded that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case. We further find no error in the trial court’s determination that the adult child is severely disabled, in its calculation of child support, or in its determination of the amount owed by Father for past uncovered medical expenses. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Eric J. P. et al
The parents of three minor children appeal the termination of their parental rights. The trial court found the Department of Children’s Services established two grounds for termination: 1) severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(4); and 2) persistence of conditions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3). In a previous dependency and neglect proceeding, the Franklin County Circuit Court found that Father severely abused the children’s half-sister and that Mother knew of the abuse but did nothing to protect her child. Neither parent appealed that judgment; as a consequence, the severe abuse findings are res judicata. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1113(g)(4), a court may terminate parental rights when the parent is found to have committed severe child abuse under any prior order of a court against any sibling or half-sibling. The trial court also found that termination of both parents’ rights was in the children’s best interests. We therefore affirm. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arthur T. Rogers
Arthur T. Rogers ("the Defendant") was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to two concurrent terms of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shantha Grace Pandian v. Juan Francisco Rodriguez
This appeal arises from a dispute over a parenting plan. Shantha Grace Pandian (“Mother”) sued Juan Francisco Rodriguez (“Father”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce. The case then proceeded to focus on a parenting plan for the parties’ two children, Christopher and Ethan (collectively, “the Children”), both boys with different special needs. Father requested equal time with the Children on a weekly alternating basis. Mother, on the other hand, wanted to have the Children most of the time, and argued that Father’s plan would be too disruptive for the Children. The Trial Court entered a parenting plan designating Mother as the primary residential parent and granting her most of the time with the Children. Father appeals, arguing that the Trial Court should have adopted his proposal for equal custodial time with the Children. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Duff L. Brumley v. City of Cleveland, Tennessee
A detective with the City of Cleveland filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari with the Circuit Court, seeking review of the City Manager’s ruling affirming the City’s decision to terminate his employment. At the hearing before the trial court, the petitioner proffered new and additional evidence that was not presented to the City Manager. The trial court sustained the City’s relevancy objection and allowed the petitioner to make an extensive offer of proof. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the new and additional evidence, that there is material evidence supporting the City Manager’s decision, and that the City Manager did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding to uphold the City’s decision to fire the petitioner. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie D. Turner v. Kevin Turner
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Tina L. Milam, et al. v. Titlemax of Memphis and Dealer's Automobile Auction of the South, LLC
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey Paul Bengs v. Amy Dawn Bengs
Husband and wife entered into a post-nuptial agreement detailing the division of their marital estate. Upon Husband’s subsequent filing of a complaint for divorce, wife moved for a declaratory judgment that the post-nuptial agreement was valid and enforceable. Husband appeals the trial court’s holding that the agreement is enforceable and implementing its provisions. We affirm, holding the post-nuptial agreement is sufficiently definite to be enforced and that the agreement is fair and equitable. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Landen P.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Landen P. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Kevin P. (“Father”) and Ciera P. (“Mother”). The Child was born in 2007, while the parents were residing in Florida. In 2008, Mother left Father and the Child and moved to Utah. Thereafter, she maintained sporadic contact with the Child only by telephone. Father subsequently moved with the Child to Cleveland, Tennessee in 2009. In 2011, Father’s mother and stepfather, Judy and Todd R., obtained custody of the Child through proceedings in the Bradley County Juvenile Court. Judy and Todd R. filed the instant petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 1, 2011, for the purpose of adopting the Child. Having been arrested in May 2011, Father was incarcerated at the time of trial. Father consented to the adoption, and his parental rights were terminated on February 24, 2012. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition and terminated Mother’s parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to visit and support her during the relevant four-month time period and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Britany P. D.
The dispositive jurisdictional issue in this case is whether the underlying juvenile court proceeding was merely a custody action or a part of a dependency and neglect proceeding wherein custody was also at issue. The pleading that was tried in the juvenile court was Father’s Amended Petition for Custody and to Determine Parenting Plan and, in the Alternative, Petition for Dependent and Neglect. Following the trial on the amended petition, the juvenile court judge found the evidence insufficient to prove dependency and neglect; however, the juvenile court awarded custody of the parties’ child to Father on a best interest determination. Mother appealed the judgment of the juvenile court to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal on the motion of Father, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the juvenile court did not find the child dependent and neglected. The appeal was then transferred to this court. Although the juvenile court did not find the child dependent and neglected, the juvenile court awarded custody to Father following a trial which was part of a dependency and neglect proceeding. Therefore, as In re D.Y.H., 226 S.W.3d 327 (Tenn. 2007), instructs, the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear Mother’s appeal because the juvenile court’s custody decision arose from and was part of a dependency and neglect proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this appeal to the circuit court for a de novo hearing. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Michael Myers et al.
Defendants appeal from an order of the trial court enjoining them from operating a wrecker service in Davidson County without a license. The trial court found that the ordinances at issue applied to Defendants’ wrecker services and that Defendants violated the provisions of the Metropolitan Code of Laws by their operation of a wrecker service without a license in Davidson County. The trial court also rejected Defendants’ arguments that the ordinances were preempted by federal law and violated the equal protection guarantees of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The trial court then enjoined Defendants from operating a wrecker service in Davidson County. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alton Flatt v. State of Tennessee
The Departmentof Safety, acting pursuant toTennesseeCode Annotated § 39-17-1352(a)(1), revoked Petitioner’s handgun carry permit based upon the Department’s independent determination that Petitioner had been convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33). The revocation arises out of an incident in which Petitioner was charged with two counts of aggravated assault, one count that pertained to his ex-wife and one count that pertained to her male companion. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to one count of simple assault under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-101. When Petitioner received notice that his handgun permit had been administratively revoked, he filed an appeal in the general sessions court, which reversed the Department’s decision and ordered reinstatement of Petitioner’s permit. The Department then appealed to the circuit court, which also ordered reinstatement of the handgun permit. This appeal followed. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), requires a use of force and a domestic relationship. In the underlying criminal case, Petitioner was charged with assaulting two people, Petitioner’s ex-wife and her male friend. Petitioner pled guilty to only one count of misdemeanor assault and the record does not establish whether Petitioner pled guilty to assaulting his ex-wife or her male companion. A “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” includes an offense “committed by” a person who had a specified domestic relationship with the victim, whether or not the misdemeanor statute itself designates the domestic relationship as an element of the crime and, pursuant to United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), the victim’s domestic relationship with the defendant must be established beyond a reasonable doubt for the offense to constitute a crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). The record in this case does not establish that the victim of the count of simple assault to which Petitioner pled guilty was his ex-wife. Therefore, the record does not support the Department’s determination that Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Accordingly, we affirm. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Hooper Climer, Jr.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to the police on the grounds that they were elicited in violation of his constitutional right to counsel and were involuntary. We have determined that the defendant did not unequivocally request counsel and therefore did not invoke his constitutional right to counsel. Nevertheless, we have also determined that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant waived the rights enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Thus, we hold that the defendant’s statements were erroneously admitted into evidence, but the physical evidence discovered as a result of his statements was properly admitted because the totality of the circumstances shows that the defendant’s statements were voluntary and not coerced. We also hold that the State failed to establish that the erroneous admission of the defendant’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the defendant’s convictions of second degree murder and abuse of a corpse are vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Gibson | Supreme Court | |
Tyrin Ross Price v. Sandra Ellen Price
This appeal involves the child support obligation of a man who is not the biological father of the children at issue. The wife gave birth to two children during the parties’ marriage. The husband filed for divorce, and subsequent DNA tests confirmed that the husband was not the father of either child. The trial court held that the husband had no legal obligation to pay child support. The wife now appeals, arguing that the husband should be required to pay child support because he is the children’s “legal father.” Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |