Craig L. Beene v. State of Tennessee and Joe Easterling, Warden
Petitioner, Craig L. Beene, appeals Dickson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the failure of Petitioner to file a complete copy of the petition for habeas corpus relief or the judgments from which he is appealing violate the requirements for seeking habeas corpus relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zacheriah Holden
Appellant, Zacheriah Holden, was indicted by the Warren County Grand Jury for over thirty offenses as a result of a drunk driving accident in which two people were killed. He pled guilty to several offenses before trial and was found guilty of the remaining charges. After the proper merger of offenses, Appellant’s convictions were two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, one count of reckless endangerment, driving on a revoked license, evading arrest, resisting arrest, leaving the scene of the accident, five counts of failure to render aid, failure to obey a traffic device and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of thirty years and eight months. Appellant appeals his convictions and his sentences. Appellant raises several issues on appeal. He argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his request for change of venue; (2) the trial court erred in denying his request for sequestration of the jury; (3) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s various motions to suppress his statements to law enforcement and his seizure in a car; (4)the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of the State’s accident reconstructionist as an expert witness; (5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to present a photograph of the victims’ car; (6) the trial court erred in failing to sever DUI, fourth offense from aggravated vehicular homicide; (7) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Travis Battles who was going to testify to updates to the traffic light since the accident; (8) the State did not sufficiently prove the chain of custody of Appellant’s blood sample submitted for blood alcohol testing; (9) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (10) the sentencing scheme for aggravated vehicular homicide is unconstitutional; (11) the trial court erred in imposing the length of his sentences, as well as imposing consecutive sentences; and (12) the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings on various pieces of evidence. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the issues raised do not warrant reversal of the judgments below. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy Ward v. Dell Products, L.P. et al.
In this worker’s compensation case, the employee alleged that his job caused a compensable aggravation of arthritis in his knees. The trial court found that his employment had caused only an increase of symptoms, and, therefore, he did not sustain a compensable injury. The employee has appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Oscar Torres v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Oscar Torres, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective twenty-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his conviction for two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to object during jury-out hearings to recalling the victim as a rebuttal witness; and (2) failing to call an expert witness pertaining to the faultiness of the memory of a child witness. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
A. Julian Ahler v. Walter Stephen Stewart, et al.
This is an appeal from an order transferring the action below from the Circuit Court for Roane County to the Chancery Court for Roane County. Because the order appealed from does not resolve any issues raised in the proceedings but merely transfers those claims to another court, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estefani Y.M., et al.
This is an appeal by Elvira N. M. from an order terminating her parental rights to her two minor children, Estefani Y. M. and Vanessa N. M. The order terminating the appellant’s parental rights was entered on October 15, 2012. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until November 15, 2012, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the October 15, 2012 order. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Telly Romeras Robertson
Appellant, Telly Romeras Robertson, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in October of 2008 for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of more than ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, and one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. In January of 2009, Appellant was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of ecstacy with the intent to sell or deliver, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to prepare a controlled substance, one count of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, and casual exchange of marijuana. Appellant pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell ecstacy and possession with intent to deliver between .5 ounce and ten pounds of marijuana in exchange for sentences of ten years and two years, respectively. The sentences were to run consecutively to each other and to an eight-year sentence Appellant was already serving for conspiracy to commit money laundering, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied an alternative sentence. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying an alternative sentence where: (1) Appellant was sentenced to a Class B felony, rendering him ineligible for probation; (2) probation was denied in order to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense; and (3) Appellant was incarcerated at the time of sentencing, rendering him ineligible for a sentence of Community Corrections. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Williams
Appellant, Charles L. Williams, was indicted in October of 2003 for one count of rape of a child and two counts of rape. In November of 2005, the case proceeded to trial. Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in incarceration. Appellant appealed the convictions and sentence. See State v. Charles L. Williams, No. M2005-00836-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3431920 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 29, 2006) ("Williams I"). On appeal, this Court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. Id. at *1. On remand, Appellant was again found guilty of rape of a child and two counts of rape. This time, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of seventeen years, merging the two convictions for rape with the conviction for rape of a child. Appellant appeals his convictions after retrial, arguing: (1) that the trial court should have dismissed the indictment with prejudice because the State committed violations of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to provide audible videotapes of interviews with Appellant and the victim until three days into the second trial; (2) that the trial court failed to follow the mandate of this Court with respect to expert testimony; (3) that the trial court permitted improper testimony of experts; and (4) that the remedy for the trial court’s errors is a dismissal of the indictment. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the State did not commit a Brady violation where the information in the videotapes was not material; Agent Johnson’s testimony was not in contravention of this Court’s opinion on direct appeal; and the expert testimony elicited at trial was based on information actually perceived by the expert in his examination of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frances Kaylanicole Grech
Appellant, Frances Kaylanicole Grech, pled guilty to one count of facilitation of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery. As a result of these convictions she was sentenced to ten years and ordered to serve 180 days with the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant was charged with assault while in jail and felony escape shortly after her release. A probation violation warrant was filed based on the two charges. She subsequently pled guilty to assault and an amended charge of resisting arrest. The trial court held a probation revocation hearing and at the conclusion determined that she had violated the rules of her probation and imposed her original sentence. On appeal, she argues that the trial court did not use conscientious judgment. We conclude that Appellant clearly violated the rules of her probation and we find no abuse of discretion. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Edward Wilbourn v. State of Tennessee
Appellant, Charles Edward Wilbourn, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for sale in a drug-free zone. On February 19, 2010, Appellant pled guilty in a negotiated plea to the charge and an eight-year sentence to be served at 100 percent. Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. After appointment of counsel, an amended petition was filed. One of the issues raised was that trial counsel afforded Petitioner ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not adequately investigate whether the incident actually occurred in a drug-free non-school zone. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred with respect to the above issue. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in denying the petition. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Doris Nell Jones v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Doris Nell Jones, was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to eighteen years in incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on an untimely notice of appeal and the absence of a motion for new trial in the record. State v. Doris Nell Jones, No. M2007-00791-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 544576, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 27, 2008), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. June 1, 2009). The supreme court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its opinion in State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 220 (Tenn. 2009). On remand, this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Doris Nell Jones, No. M2009-01102-CCA-RM-CD, 2009 WL 2633026, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 26, 2009) (not for citation), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 22, 2010). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief because Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that she is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Ragland v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Donald Ragland, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that the post-conviction court erred by not forcing the Petitioner to testify at the post-conviction hearing; and (2) that the Petitioner received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel because trial counsel withdrew a motion to suppress a photographic identification of the Petitioner. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Owsley v. Con-Way Truckload, Inc., et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee alleged that he injured his back as a result of a fall from his tractor trailer during the course and scope of his employment. The employer contended that the employee’s workers’ compensation claim was barred by the affirmative defense of misrepresentation of his physical condition, that a compensable injury had not been sustained and that his permanent partial disability award was excessive. The trial court found that the employee did not intentionally misrepresent his physical condition, that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and that the award should be 70% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against each of the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Linda Lou McDougal v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that she injured her neck in a forklift accident. Her employer did not deny that the event occurred but contended that her symptoms were caused by preexisting degenerative changes. The employee eventually had surgery and sought workers’ compensation benefits. In addition to causation, the employer asserted that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and made a finding concerning the extent of her permanent disability. However, it held the record open to permit the taking of additional proof concerning the statute of limitations. After considering that evidence, the court found that the claim was timely and awarded benefits pursuant to its original ruling. The employer has appealed, challenging the trial court’s rulings on the statute of limitations and causation. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Timothy L. Wilson v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division
The employee alleged that he sustained an on-the-job injury in June 2004. The settlement of that claim was approved in December 2004. The employee alleges in this case that he suffered additional compensable injuries in June 2005 and July 2006. The employer contends that the new allegations pertain not to new injuries but rather a continuation of symptoms from the 2004 injury. The employee also filed a third-party tort action arising from the 2004 injury. The employer intervened in the tort case to protect its medical subrogation lien. The parties settled all claims at a joint mediation that resulted in the tort defendant paying a sum of money, the employee dismissing with prejudice this workers’ compensation case, and the employer reducing its medical subrogation lien. Accordingly, the workers’ compensation case was dismissed with prejudice. More than a year later, the employee moved to vacate the dismissal, contending that he had not authorized it, and the employer moved to strike that motion. While these motions were pending, the employee sought to depose the mediator, the third party’s attorney, and the employer’s attorney. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the employee had agreed to the dismissal, and it granted the employer’s motion to strike. The trial court also quashed the deposition subpoenas issued at the employee’s request. The employee has appealed from these orders, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray McKee
The Defendant, Michael Ray McKee, contends that his right to a speedy trial regarding his probation revocation hearing was violated and, as a result, the trial court erred in revoking his probation. After reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated and that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the trial court’s revocation; we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of a male child Z.J.D.
Mother and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights to his fourteen year old son to allow Stepfather to adopt the child. Mother and Stepfather asserted Father abandoned the child because his visits constitute nothing more than “token visitation.” Father lives in Massachusetts and usually visits the child once a year. Father’s most recent visit was one month before Mother and Stepfather filed their petition. The trial court denied the petition and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Father presented evidence that he has tried to communicate and visit more with the child but that Mother has thwarted his efforts. Based on the particular facts of this case we conclude Father has not abandoned the child by failing to visit, or engaging in “token visitation” as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102, in the four months preceding the filing of the petition for termination. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Nashville Education Association and James Fuller v. The Metropolitan Board of Public Education
A teacher at Overton High School, who was also a sports coach, challenged the nonrenewal of his coaching contract, claiming the nonrenewal was not in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-510. The trial court found the contract was not renewed because the teacher refused to follow the guidelines for handling money collected at the sporting events and that the former coach had not met his burden of proof under the statute. We conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling and affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Cheyenne E. H. and Robert L. H.
Mother’s parental rights to two children were terminated on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support, substantial non-compliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. The court also concluded that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interests of the children. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence does not support the statutory grounds or that termination is in the children’s best interest and asserting that the Departmentof Children’s Services did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. We affirm the judgment terminating her rights. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Pruitt
Defendant was convicted of possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell, a felony, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He received a total effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, and numerous evidentiary rulings. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by failing to find mitigating factors and by sentencing him for a Class C felony with respect to his conviction for possession of hydrocodone with intent to sell or distribute, when the crime at issue was in fact a Class D felony. After review, we conclude that the trial court committed no reversible error with respect to the defendant’s convictions. However, the trial court erroneously sentenced the defendant with respect to at least one of his offenses. Consequently, we remand the case to the trial court for re-sentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Bomar Wenzler
Defendant, Christopher Bomar Wenzler, was indicted by the Fayette County Grand Jury for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) in Count 1, and for DUI, third offense, in Count 2. Defendant pled guilty to DUI as charged in Count 1, and waived a jury trial and submitted to a bench trial as to the issues in Count 2. Count 2 alleged two prior DUI convictions: (i) in the Justice Court of DeSoto County, Mississippi on June 7, 2006, and (ii) in the General Sessions Court of Shelby County on February 9, 2006. Defendant argued in the trial court that the Mississippi conviction could not be lawfully used to enhance his current offense to DUI, third offense, but the trial court found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court merged the conviction in Count 1 with the conviction in Count 2, and sentenced Defendant to serve 11 months and 29 days, with all but 120 days suspended as a third offense DUI offender. Defendant appeals, arguing that he should have been sentenced for DUI, second offense, because the judgment form used to prove Defendant’s prior conviction in DeSoto County, Mississippi is silent as to whether he was represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeremy Dathan Port v. Veronica L. Hatton
The trial court granted the parties a divorce, named the father as the primary residential parent of their one and a half year old child, and permitted him to return with the child to North Carolina, where both parties originally came from and where their families still resided. The mother was granted three days of supervised visitation with the child each month in North Carolina. She argues on appeal that the trial court’s decision was flawed because the court failed to analyze the best interest of the child in accordance with the appropriate statutory factors. She also argues that by allowing Father to take the child to North Carolina and limiting her visitation so severely, the court deprived her of her right to maintain the parent-child relationship, and that its actions were inconsistent with case law stating that “the least restrictive visitation limits are favored in order to encourage the parent-child relationship.” We affirm the trialcourt’s designation of the father as the primary residential parent, and its finding that it was in the child’s best interest that the father be permitted to relocate with the child. We also affirm the parenting plan. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
William H. Richardson et al. v. Bates Show Sales Staff, inc. d/b/a Bates RV Exchange
Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their action for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation arising out of the purchase of a recreational vehicle from Defendant, a business located and incorporated in the State of Florida. The trial court dismissed the action on the finding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant because the corporation had not purposely availed itself of doing business in Tennessee and did not have sufficient contacts with Tennessee. The trial court further found that the choice of venue clause in the purchase contract between the parties was enforceable and, thus, the proper venue for the action was Florida. Plaintiffs appealed arguing that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. We affirm the finding that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant as Plaintiffs did not establish the prima facie case of jurisdiction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Frieda Lindy Freedman Harold Freedman, As Executor v. Anita Taradash
A beneficiary of the decedent’s estate contends the Executor should be held personally liable for paying two debts of the decedent for which no claim was filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-307. The Executor insists that Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2318(b) afforded him the discretion to pay debts of the decedent because the estate was solvent and the time in which the claims could have been filed had not expired. The probate court ruled in favor of the Executor, finding the payment of the debts was authorized pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 30-2-318(b). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Brown, Sandra McCulley, and Shawn McCulley v. Samir Shtaya
In this case, we address the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff property owners were leasing commercial space to the defendant. The plaintiffs filed a forcible entry and detainer action against the defendant in General Sessions Court. During the pendency of the proceedings, the plaintiffs allegedly locked the defendant out of the property prematurely, causing property damage to the defendant. The defendant then filed a cross-claim in the original General Sessions Court lawsuit for unlawful ouster. The defendant also filed a separate action in the General Sessions Court based on the same allegations of unlawful ouster. The General Sessions Court consolidated the two cases for trial. Ultimately, the General Sessions Court held in favor of the plaintiffs on their forcible entry and detainer claim and awarded attorney fees under the lease. As to the defendant’s cross-claim and separate lawsuit based on unlawful ouster, the General Sessions Court found in favor of the defendant and awarded damages. The plaintiffs sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court of the rulings in favor of the defendant on his cross-claim and separate claim; the defendant appealed the Circuit Court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. In doing so, all of the appellants — the plaintiffs and the defendant — filed notices of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). None of the appellants filed any further bond at that time. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeals, arguing that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because they had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The Circuit Court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeals. The Circuit Court also dismissed the defendant’s appeal sua sponte based on the same reasoning. The plaintiffs now appeal to this Court. We reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ appeals in light of our recent decision Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |