State of Tennessee v. James R. Troxell
A Campbell County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, James R. Troxell, of two counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 56 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the trial court’s allowing witness testimony which, the defendant alleges, improperly bolstered the victim’s testimony. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Ann Caudle, Next of Kin and Co-Executor of Estate of Louise K. Fite, Deceased, and on Behalf of Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Louise K. Fite v. Columbia Operations, LLC d/b/a Life Care Centers of Columbia and Life Care Centers of America, Inc.
This is an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s grant of a motion to compel arbitration. The mother executed a power of attorney in favor of the plaintiff daughter. Subsequently, the daughter signed documents on her mother’s behalf for admission into the defendant nursing home. The documents included an agreement to arbitrate any disputes with the nursing home. After the mother died, the daughter filed this wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home. The nursing home filed a motion to stay the lawsuit and compel arbitration; this motion was granted. The daughter was then granted permission for this interlocutory appeal, on the issue of whether the power of attorney gave the daughter authority to sign the arbitration agreement and waive her mother’s right to a jury trial. Interpreting the language in the power of attorney document, we find that the daughter had authority to execute the nursing home admission documents, including the arbitration agreement, only if, in the opinion of her physician, the mother was “incompetent or incapable of action” for herself. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Haas & Wilkerson, Inc. v. Geren Rides, Inc., a/k/a Mega Midways v. Azalea City Amusements, Inc.
Intervenor in a suit to domesticate a foreign judgment and to levy on property of the judgment debtor appeals the failure of the trial court to grant its Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion and set aside an order dismissing its claim. Finding that Intervenor should have been granted relief, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Deola Miller, et al. v. Jim Rice
Administrator of decedent’s estate who was also the sole heir-at-law of decedent asserted |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Chris Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Chris Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and being a felon in possession of a handgun, for which he is serving an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly made. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayne Donaldson
An officer stopped the defendant for a traffic violation. When the officer ordered the defendant out of his vehicle to sign the citation, he observed what appeared to be a bag of cocaine on the floorboard of the driver’s side. Charged with possession with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the product of an unlawful seizure. The trial court sustained the motion, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. Because an officer, after making a lawful stop for a traffic violation, may routinely direct the driver outside of the vehicle, the order of suppression is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Christopher A. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Davidson County Criminal Court denied the Petitioner, Christopher A. Davis, post-conviction relief from his convictions on two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, but granted relief from his sentence of death and ordered a new capital sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the denial of a new trial and the State appeals the granting of a new sentencing hearing. Having discerned no error, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Jarod Ford
The Defendant, Mitchell Jarod Ford, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of arson and aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-301, 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to two concurrent fifteen-year terms. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively to three previous sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by imposing fifteen years’ confinement for each conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Edward Lynch
A Marshall County Grand Jury returned two indictments against Defendant, John Edward Lynch, charging him with violation of the Habitual Motor Offenders Act (count one), eleventh offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) (count two), and violation of the implied consent law (count three) in Case No. 08-CR-16 and felony failure to appear in Case No. 08-CR-98. Following two jury trials, Defendant was convicted of the offenses. He was sentenced to four years for violation of the Habitual Motor Offenders Act, three years for eleventh offense DUI, eleven months, twenty-nine days for violation of the implied consent law, and four years for felony failure to appear. The trial court ordered count three of case no. 08-CR-16 to run concurrently to count one,and the remaining counts in case nos. 08-CR-16 and 08-CR-98 were ordered to run consecutively with each other for an effective eleven-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on necessity; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance in case no. 08-CR-98; and (4) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denny James McAbee
Defendant, Denny James McAbee, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for the offenses of aggravated burglary, evading arrest, and criminal impersonation. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,he pled guilty to aggravated burglary as a persistent offender with a range of punishment of not less than 12 years nor more than 15 years. According to the plea agreement, the exact length of the sentence and the manner of its service would be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The other charges were dismissed. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 14 years, rejected Defendant’s request to receive the only alternative sentence legally available, which was community corrections, and thus ordered Defendant to serve the sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court should have ordered the sentence to be served in the community corrections program. Defendant does not contest the length of the sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thanath Sayadeth v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Thanath Sayadeth, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Kenneth Womble
Defendant, James Kenneth Womble, pled guilty to driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUI), first offense, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. He properly reserved a certified question of law for appeal. The question of the law is dispositive of the case. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Danny Smith v. Nestle Waters North America, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. After the employee sustained a compensable back injury, he filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for Macon County. During the bench trial, the trial court admitted, over the employer’s objection, testimony from a physician selected through the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) stating that the employee’s impairment arose from a work-related injury. The trial court thereafter awarded the employee permanent disability benefits based on a 6% impairment. We affirm the judgment. |
Macon | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Travis Jay Woods v. David Osborne, Warden
Travis Jay Woods (“the Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the indictment underlying his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder contains a fatal variance entitling him to habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the Petitioner’s claim for relief. The Petitioner has appealed. We affirm the habeas corpus court’s ruling. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Burris
Ricky Lee Burris (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to one count of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, suspended to supervised probation. After his second probation violation, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen Vowell v. St. Thomas Hospital et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. An employee, who was rendered permanently and totally disabled following a compensable back injury, suffered severe depression after his employer informed him that his employment had been terminated. He filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the employee’s depression was compensable and, therefore, that the employee was entitled to receive medical benefits for treatment. The employer asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the employee’s evaluating psychiatrist and that the award of benefits is inconsistent with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15) (2008 & Supp. 2011). We affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Donald Robinson v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority
Petitioner, a police officer for the Memphis Airport Police Department (“MAPD”), was terminated by the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority (“MSCAA”) for violating several of its policies and procedures. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner argues that MSCAA’s policies, and its application of those policies, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Petitioner also argues that MSCAA violated his equal protection rights by applying its policies and procedures in a disparate fashion. After throughly reviewing the record, we find no basis for Petitioner’s claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Omer Stidham
The Bureau of TennCare filed a petition to appoint an administrator of Omer Stidham’s estate in order to file a claim against the estate for medical assistance rendered. The court appointed an administrator, and the Bureau of TennCare filed its claim. The administrator found that the estate was insolvent but moved the court to determine whether real property held in a revocable trust could be used to satisfy the debts of the estate. The heirs objected, arguing that the claim was untimely and that the property could not be reached because it was held in a revocable trust. The court authorized the use of the property to satisfy the debts of the estate, finding that the claim was not untimely and that the revocable trust was subject to claims against the estate. The heirs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Gary R. Bunton v. David Sexton, Warden and State
The Petitioner, Gary R. Bunton, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is being illegally restrained because his probation and community corrections sentences expired before revocation warrants were filed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ophelia L. Lomax v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ophelia L. Lomax, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from her convictions for aggravated child abuse by causing serious bodily injury and aggravated child abuse by neglect or endangering a child. On appeal, she contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) meet with her or discuss with her the nature of the charges and her potential defenses, (2) call an expert witness at the trial to contest the issue of serious bodily injury, and (3) raise an issue of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Patrick Stout v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Patrick Stout, was convicted of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. At the sentencing hearing for the felony murder conviction, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another; and (3) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any robbery or kidnapping. T.C.A. § 39-13-204(1)(2), (6) (Supp. 1995). The jury also found that the evidence of these aggravating circumstances outweighed evidence of the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death for the Petitioner’s felony murder conviction. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to forty years for each of his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping, to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to the death sentence. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. See State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was later amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order in which it denied the Petitioner post-conviction relief from each of his three convictions and his sentences for the convictions of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The post-conviction court’s order granted the Petitioner post-conviction relief from his sentence of death, ordering that the Petitioner have a new sentencing hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s order denying relief regarding the guilt phase of trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Edward Church, Jr.
Appellant, James Edward Church, Jr., pled guilty to eleven counts of theft of property valued at less than $500, three counts of burglary, one count of resisting arrest, four counts of auto burglary, and one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 in Bedford County. The trial court was to determine the manner and length of the sentences at a sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of approximately twelve years and six months. Appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record and the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Anthony Graham
The Defendant-Appellant, Kevin Anthony Graham, entered a guilty plea in the Hawkins County Criminal Court to the charged offense of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and requested that the trial court grant him judicial diversion or an alternative sentence. At that time, the State informed the court that the parties agreed Graham would be sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a sentence of three years with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the court, in the event that the court denied judicial diversion. Graham was subsequently sentenced to three years’ incarceration. On appeal, Graham contends that the trial court erred in denying: (1) judicial diversion and (2) an alternative sentence. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying a sentence of split confinement. Although the trial court properly denied judicial diversion, full probation, and a community corrections sentence, we reverse the judgment and remand the case with instructions to the trial court to enter an order sentencing Graham to serve 90 days’ confinement in the Hawkins County Jail before serving the remainder of his three-year sentence on supervised probation. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kim Brown v. Mapco Express, Inc.
This appeal involves claims arising from a verbal exchange at a gas station. The plaintiff customer gave cash to a clerk employed at the defendant gas station to pay for gas. After a verbal exchange between the clerk and the customer, the customer left the gas station. The customer promptly filed this lawsuit, alleging a variety of tort claims, including defamation, false light in the public eye, and infliction of emotional distress. The complaint sought damages in excess of a billion – with a “b”– dollars. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant gas station. The customer appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Garrison et al. v. Rita Bickford et al.
Following an accident which claimed the life of their teenage son, the deceased’s parents filed claims for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the driver and owner of the car that struck their son. The parents also sought to recover from their own insurance company under the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. The driverof the car settled, paying the deceased’s parents $25,000 for their wrongful death claim and $25,000 for their negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. The parents’ insurer paid them an additional $75,000 for the wrongful death claim but refused to pay any damages for their emotional injuries. The insurer contended that (1) emotional distress did not constitute “bodily injury” as defined in the policy, and (2) the “Each Person” limit in the policy had been met, here by exhausting any available coverage. The parents maintained that recovery for emotional harm was not precluded under the policy definition of “bodily injury” and that the “Each Person” limit had not been met. The trial court agreed with the parents and ruled in favor of coverage. The Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the parents’ application for permission to appeal to decide whether “bodily injury” as defined in the policy includes mental injuries standing alone. It does not. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Supreme Court |