Fred T. Hanzelik v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
This direct appeal involves a disciplinary proceeding against a Chattanooga lawyer arising out of his representation of two clients. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility determined that the lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for forty-five days. Following the lawyer’s appeal to the Chancery Court for Hamilton County, the trial court upheld the lawyer’s forty-five-day suspension after finding that the record supported the hearing panel’s findings that the lawyer had attempted to bill one client twice, had breached his ethical obligations to another client, and had failed to cooperate with the Board of Professional Responsibility during its extended investigation into his conduct. On this appeal, the lawyer insists (1) that the evidence does not support the hearing panel’s findings, (2) that the hearing panel erred by receiving into evidence a videotaped deposition given by one of his clients, (3) that the hearing panel failed to properly apply the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and (4) that the hearing panel failed to consider the discipline imposed on other lawyers for similar infractions. Based on our review of the record, we, like the trial court, affirm the hearing panel’s decision to suspend the lawyer’s license to practice law for forty-five days. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
Aldrick D. Lillard v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Aldrick D. Lillard, appeals as of right from the post-conviction court’s denial of relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court committed reversible errors by (1) refusing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition for postconviction relief during the evidentiary hearing; (2) finding that the post-conviction hearing testimony from the assistant district attorney regarding his discussions during trial with the Petitioner’s trial counsel was irrelevant; and (3) concluding that the Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his trial attorneys were ineffective. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court merged the Petitioner’s two conspiracy convictions but found that the Petitioner failed to prove any additional allegations in his petition for relief. Following our review, we reverse the post-conviction court’s ruling prohibiting the Petitioner from amending his petition during the evidentiary hearing.We also conclude that the post-conviction court’s finding that the prosecutor’s testimony was irrelevant was in error, albeit harmless. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phillip A. Corbitt et al. v. Rolanda Amos
The sellers of real estate brought this action against the successful bidder at a real estate auction after the bidder failed to close because she was unable to obtain a loan sufficient to purchase the property. The sellers later auctioned the property for a substantially lower price. It is undisputed that the buyer breached the contract by not closing and that the sellers are entitled to recover certain special damages; the buyer challenges the trial court’s award of $55,300 for the seller’s general damages for their loss of the benefit of the bargain. We have determined the trial court’s decision is not supported by competent evidence in the record and that the sellers failed to prove the fair market value of the property on the date of the breach was less than the contract price. Therefore, we reverse the award of $55,300 for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. We, however, affirm the award of special damages, specifically the expense of conducting a second auction and sale, property taxes paid between the date of the breach and the second sale, and prejudgment interest, which shall be calculated based upon the judgment as modified. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Chas Alan Sandford v. Kristine Elaine Sandford McKee
Husband and Wife were married for eight years when Husband filed for divorce. Husband had purchased 63 acres of real property before marrying Wife and split the property into two parcels. When dividing the property between the parties, the trial court determined the house and ten acres was Husband’s separate property, but the appreciation on that parcel was marital property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(b)(1)(B). The trial court determined the remaining 53 acres was Husband’s separate property and that Wife had no interest in that parcel. Wife appealed, claiming both parcels transmuted into marital property during the marriage. In the alternative, Wife argued that the increase in value of the other 53 acres was marital property due to work she performed on a guesthouse located on the 53-acre parcel. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Christopher L. B.
Mother appeals the finding that termination of her parental rights to her son was in the son’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of her rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dixie M. M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights upon finding that four grounds for termination had been established – the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the provisions of the permanency plan, abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, and failure to establish parentage, and that termination of Father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We have determined that three grounds for termination were established by the requisite proof and that termination of his rights is in the child’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Darion X. Y., Darius D. Y.
Father’s parental rights to his son were terminated on the ground that Father is confined in a correctional facility for more than ten years as a result of a criminal act and that the child was under the age of eight at the time of Father’s sentencing. Father contends that the trial court should have considered the possibility of his receiving parole in determining whether grounds for termination of his rights were present and whether termination was in the child’s best interest. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Orlando Ladd v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board
Appellant, an inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his appeal for review of disciplinary actions taken against him by the prison, and affirmed by the TDOC Commissioner. The trial court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 27-9-102. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Seth Haley
On March 6, 2008, the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Seth Haley, was indicted in case number 199-2008 for violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender’s Act (MVHOA), evading arrest, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and conviction of two or more prior offenses of simple possession or casual exchange of a controlled substance thatcould be used to enhance his punishment for the third offense of simple possession of a controlled substance pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-418(e). On June 6, 2008, Haley was indicted in case number 4502008 for possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver. On March 30, 2009, he entered guiltypleas in case number 199-2008 to the offenses of violating the MVHOA and evading arrest, Class E felonies, and in case number 450-2008 to the offense of possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining charges in case number 199-2008. On June 10, 2010, Haley was indicted in case number 439-2010 for felony escape and two counts of felony failure to appear. On September 30, 2010, Haley entered a guilty plea in case number 439-2010 to one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony, and the State entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts in that case number. On December 10, 2010, the trial court sentenced Haley as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of two years for violating the MVHOA conviction, two years for the evading arrest conviction, and ten years for the possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II drug with the intent to sell or deliver conviction. The court also sentenced Haley as a Range II, multiple offender to a consecutive sentence of four years for the felony failure to appear conviction, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haley contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider any mitigating factors before imposing his sentence and erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antwain Tapaige Sales v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner,Antwain TapaigeSales,appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting forty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to satisfy the threshold burden to warrant an additional hearing regarding whether the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to his mental incompetence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aldrick D. Lillard v. State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the post-conviction court erred in failing to allow the Petitioner to amend his petition during the evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner sought to amend his petition to allege another ground for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the amendment would have raised the issue of trial counsel’s failure to assert the trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial in the Petitioner’s motion for new trial or on direct appeal. The motion for a mistrial related to the admission of impermissible character evidence regarding prior, uncharged bad acts during the prosecutor’s opening statement. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Elizabeth Willis
The Defendant-Appellant, Robin Elizabeth Willis, was convicted by a Hawkins County jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender and ordered her to serve three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Willis argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Elizabeth Willis - Concurring in part, Dissenting in part
JOSEPH M. TIPTON, P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant. I respectfully disagree, however, with its conclusions that the victim was particularly vulnerable and that the three-year sentence should be served in confinement |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Blake Ball
The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Blake Ball, was convicted by a Greene County jury of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Ball challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Jones
A Hamilton County jury convicted Defendant, Mario Jones, of possession of more than 50 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years as a Range I standard offender. In his appeal, Defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the stop of Defendant’s vehicle and the subsequent detention of Defendant violated his constitutional rights, and the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion tosuppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction; (3) the trial court improperly allowed Lieutenant Queen to testify concerning the calendar, notes, and pills found in Defendant’s vehicle; (4) the trialcourt erred in finding that chain of custody had been established; and (5) the trial court erred in rejecting Defendant’s proposed mitigating factor. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Heather Junghanel v. Andres Hernandez
Andres Hernandez (“Father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate his child support obligation. The Trial Court held a hearing and entered an order on March 17, 2011 awarding a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages but also providing for further hearing for a full review and calculation of arrearages. The case subsequently was heard before a Special Master who found that Heather Junghanel (“Mother”) was entitled to a judgment against Father of $21,976.27 in child support arrearages. Father appealed the Special Master’s report to the Trial Court. The Trial Court found that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order and awarded a judgment against Father of $5,726.47 in child support arrearages. The State of Tennessee ex rel. Mother appeals to this Court arguing that the Trial Court improperly retroactively modified Father’s child support obligation. We find and hold that the Trial Court erred in holding that the March 17, 2011 order was a final order. We vacate the Trial Court’s September 20, 2011 order and remand this case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Father’s objections to the Special Master’s report. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherri Mathis
The defendant, Sherri Mathis, appeals her Warren County Circuit Court jury convictions of two counts of felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006); two counts of aggravated child abuse of a child six years of age or less, see id. § 39-15-402(a)(1), (b); two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child six years of age or less, see id.; one count of child abuse of a child six years of age or less, see id. §39-15-401(a); and two counts of aggravated child abuse, see id. § 39-15-402(a)(1). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus 32 years’ incarceration. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erroneously denied her motion for continuance, (2) the trial court erroneously admitted photographs of the deceased victim, (3) the trial court erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the indictment based upon a fatal variance, (4) the trial court erroneously denied a motion for mistrial, (5) the trial court erroneously allowed the State to call the defendant’s civil attorney as a witness knowing that the attorney would claim privilege, (6) the trial court erroneously limited testimony of defendant’s expert witness,(7)the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening statements and closing arguments, and (8) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Additionally, the defendant contends that the trial court erroneously dismissed her petition for writ of error coram nobis and erroneously denied her the right to depose Doctor Bruce Levy concerning the claims contained in the coram nobis petition. We discern that the trial court failed to merge certain counts and failed to enter judgments as corrected at the hearing on the motion for new trial. We further conclude that the State failed to establish serious bodily injury with respect to the defendant’s convictions of aggravated child abuse in Counts Eight and Nine and direct the trial court on remand to enter judgments reflecting convictions of child abuse and three-year sentences. Accordingly,the case is remanded for the trial court to enter modified judgments in Counts Eight and Nine, judgments effectuating proper merger, and judgments reflecting modified sentences, and we affirm the judgments in all other respects. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise
Following a burglary in Greene County, the defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilt for one count of facilitation of aggravated burglary and for two counts of theft of property. After finding the presence of one enhancement factor, the trial court imposed concurrent three-year sentences for each offense. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the enhancement factor did not apply and reduced each of the sentences to two years. Because we find that a sentence imposed by a trial court should be upheld so long as it is within the appropriate sentencing range and is otherwise in compliance with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statute, we reverse the sentence modification by the Court of Criminal Appeals and, upon review under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness, reinstate the sentence imposed by the trial court. |
Greene | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Paul Lewis
The Defendant, Joshua Paul Lewis, was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years on each of the rape convictions and to ten years on the attempted rape conviction, all sentences to run concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal due to variances between the bill of particulars and the proof at trial; and (3) he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. After a review of the record and relevant authorities, we have determined that the Defendant’s issue are waived for failing to preserve them in a timely filed motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Gabriel Carter
Appellant,Terrance Gabriel Carter,pled guilty in Marshall County to five counts of violating the sex offender registration act in two separate cases with the length and manner of service of sentence to be determined by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of five years. Appellant appeals his sentence, arguing that it is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Parham
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Randy Parham, of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. On remand for resentencing following Parham’s first appeal, State v. Randy Parham, No. W2009-02576-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 5271612 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2010), the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-five years. In this appeal, Parham argues that the trial court erred by (1) ordering the sentences for attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery to be served consecutively, (2) ordering the sentence for attempted first degree murder to be served at one hundred percent release eligibility as a “violent” offense, and (3) failing to state on the record which enhancement factors it applied to which offenses while at the same time applying a non-statutory enhancement factor. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in part and reverse them in part. We also note the need for entry of corrected judgments. The case is remanded for entry of judgments in accordance with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Allison Louise Battles v. Andrew Bruce Battles
This is an appeal of an alimony award. On appeal, Husband contends that the trial court |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl Larkins v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Darryl Larkins, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated rape, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court . |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elijah Truitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Elijah Truitt, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion to correct his sentence, claiming that his sentence is illegal. The petitioner’s claim that the trial court erroneously imposed a day-for-day service requirement to his 11-year effective sentence is without merit. Thus, the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petitioner’s motion to correct his sentence is affirmed. The record suggests, however, that the trial court failed to grant him credit for time spent on community corrections as required by law. In consequence, we remand the case to afford the pro se petitioner the opportunity to amend his original pleading to a petition for writ of habeas corpus and for the trial court to determine whether the petitioner was given credit to which he is statutorily entitled. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Myron Lee Webb
Following the defendant’s open guilty pleas to two counts of driving under the influence ("DUI") (fifth and sixth offenses), see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(2008); three counts of driving while his license was revoked ("DWLR") (one fourth and two fifth offenses),see id.§ 55-10504; one count of violating the implied consent law, see id. § 55-10-406; one count of violating the open container law, see id. § 55-10-416; and one count of reckless driving, see id. § 55-10-205, the Lincoln County Circuit Court imposed an effective sentence of eight years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and alignment of the sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals |