State of Tennessee v. Myron McNeal
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury found the appellant, Myron McNeal, guilty of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during a felony. For the convictions, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty-eight years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Shane Springer
The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and reserved the following certified question: “Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss alleging the State violated the provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (T.C.A. 40-31-101 et seq, U.S. Code Title 18-App) and the anti-shuttling provisions therein pursuant to Alabama v. Bozeman, 5[3]3 U.S. 146 (2001).” For differing reasons, the majority of this panel affirms the Defendant’s convictions. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Shane Springer - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I agree with the portion of the lead opinion by Judge Bivins which holds that Defendant is not entitled to relief pursuant to Article III of the IAD. I also agree and concur with the section of the lead opinion headed “Other Arguments.” I disagree with and therefore dissent from the remaining part of the lead opinion, which addresses Defendant’s claim pursuant to Article IV of the IAD. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Shane Springer - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
I agree with the conclusion of the lead opinion that certain of the issues raised by the defendant are beyond the scope of this certified question. However, I would go a step further and hold that the certified question itself is deficient, meaning that this court is without jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Thomas W. Meadows
The Defendant, Thomas W. Meadows, appeals as of right from his conviction for one count of indirect criminal contempt. The Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth Stewart v. Westfield Insurance Company
The appellant insurance company asserts on appeal that the employee failed to prove that his spinal infection was causally related to any work-place injury and that he also failed to provide the employer with timely notice of his injury. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the expert medical proof establishes causation and that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the employee gave timely notice of his injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Marsha McDonald v. Paul F. Shea, M.D. and Shea Ear Clinic
This is a medical malpractice appeal. The plaintiff patient was treated by the defendant physician for ear problems. After the treatment, she had a complete loss of hearing in one ear. The plaintiff patient filed this lawsuit against the physician, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. After potential experts in Tennessee and contiguous states declined to testify against the defendant physician, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to use an expert physician witness from a non-contiguous state. At the jury trial, after the jury was sworn and counsel gave opening statements, a juror notified the trial judge of the her concern about an upcoming social event she planned to attend, at which a relative of the defendant physician would be present. After voir dire, the trial judge noted that the plaintiff patient had unused remaining peremptory challenges and excused the juror. The trial court denied the defendant physician’s motion for directed verdict on informed consent. The jury awarded the plaintiff substantial compensatory damages. The defendant physician now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to obtain an expert from a non-contiguous state, in allowing the plaintiff to exercise a peremptory challenge after trial was underway, in permitting the informed consent claim to go to the jury, and in denying the defendants’ motion to exclude the expert retained by the plaintiff. We affirm on all issues except the dismissal of the juror. We hold it would be error to permit the exercise of a peremptory challenge after the trial is underway, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. Therefore, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Marsha McDonald v. Paul F. Shea, M.D. and Shea Ear Clinic - Concurrence/Partial Dissent
I agree with the result reached in this case, but I disagree with the majority’s statement that “it is unclear whether Juror H was excluded based on a peremptory strike or for cause.” The record is unequivocally plain in this case that the trial judge permitted the exercise of a |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Kenneth Hale v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell and struck both knees on a concrete landing in the course of his employment with the employer. His left knee required surgery and his right knee received limited medical treatment. The treating physician assigned 8% permanent impairment to the left leg. Employee’s evaluating physician assigned 13% impairment to the left leg and 20% impairment to the right leg. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician’s opinions and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to both legs. Employer argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding that Employee sustained a permanent injury to his right knee, by adopting the impairment rating of Dr. Landsberg over that of Dr. Gavigan for the left knee injury, by failing to find that Employee had a meaningful return to work, and by granting an excessive award of benefits. We affirm the judgment. |
Wilson | Supreme Court | |
Danneil Edward Keith v. Western Express, Inc., et al
The employee, a truck driver, was injured in the course and scope of his employment when his vehicle left the road and turned over. His employer denied his claim for workers’ compensation benefits, contending that the accident and resulting injuries were the direct result of the employee’s willful violation of the employer’s safetyrules. The trialcourt found that the employee had willfully and intentionally disregarded the safety rules and entered judgment for the employer. On appeal,the employee contends that the trial court erred because the evidence did not establish the perverseness of his conduct, a necessary element of the misconduct affirmative defense. We affirm the judgment. |
Houston | Supreme Court | |
James Coleman v. Lauderdale County, Tennessee, et al., Steve Sanders, Sheriff of Lauderdale County; and Harry R. Hopkins, Jr., Deputy Sheriff of Lauderdale County
This is a malicious prosecution case arising out of a dispute between neighbors. A dispute arose when the plaintiff neighbor hired a tree service to trim the branches of a tree near the border between the two neighbors’ properties. After a confrontation, the police were called. After they arrived, the police cited both neighbors on charges of disorderly conduct. After the charges against the plaintiff neighbor were dismissed, he filed this malicious prosecution action against the defendant county and two of the police officers involved. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff neighbor now appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashlee N. Appleton
A Marion County jury convicted the Defendant, Ashlee N. Appleton, of tampering with evidence, and the trial court sentenced her to four years, to be served on community corrections after six months of incarceration. The Defendant appeals, contending that the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime for which she was convicted. The State concedes the error, and both parties assert that this case be reversed. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the Defendant’s conviction. |
Marion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emoe Zakiaya Mosi Bakari
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Emoe Zakiaya Mosi Bakari, of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) allowing a State witness to testify about “delayed disclosure” in child sexual abuse cases; (2) allowing a police detective to give testimony suggesting the appellant was uncooperative during the investigation; (3) allowing the State to introduce a photograph of the victims into evidence; and (4) allowing the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument to give personal examples in an attempt to vouch for the victims’ credibility. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing a State witness to testify about “delayed disclosure,” by allowing a police detective to give testimony suggesting the appellant was uncooperative during the investigation, and by allowing the prosecutor to give personal examples in an attempt to vouch for the victims’ credibility. Moreover, we conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal of the appellant’s conviction. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction of attempted rape of a child is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Allison Elizabeth McLean
In this extraordinary appeal, the Defendant, Allison Elizabeth McLean, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s order affirming the Assistant District Attorney’s (“ADA”) denial of pretrial diversion and the trial court’s refusal to grant an interlocutory appeal of it’s denial of her pretrial diversion request. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari because the Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) abused her discretion by (a) failing to support her decision with “substantial evidence;” (b) failing to consider and give proper weight to the Defendant’s amenability to correction; (c) giving weight to the circumstances of the case and the need for deterrence without supporting it with evidence; (d) considering improperly the victim’s age to “enhance” the circumstances of the offense; and (e) giving “little or no weight” to the Defendant’s lack of criminal record and her eight-year marriage; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s application for interlocutory appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the ADA’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ian Zraik McClellan
The Defendant, Ian Zraik McClellan, pled guilty to an indictment against him. The State alleged that the indictment charged the Defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide, and the Defendant contended the indictment sufficiently charged him with only vehicular homicide. At the time he entered his plea, the Defendant agreed to allow the trial court to determine whether the indictment sufficiently charged him with aggravated vehicular homicide. After a hearing, the trial court determined the indictment sufficiently charged the Defendant with aggravated vehicular homicide. On appeal,the Defendant contends first that the indictment was not sufficient to charge him with aggravated vehicular homicide and only sufficiently charged him with vehicular homicide and second that his guilty plea was not validly entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Doyle Allen Castle v. Sullivan County Sheriff's Department
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a sheriff’s deputy, alleged that he sustained a mental injury as a result of a confrontation that occurred while he was serving an eviction warrant. His employer denied the claim and filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the injury was not compensable because the alleged precipitating event was not unusual or abnormal for a deputy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred by concluding that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the incident in question was sufficiently extraordinary or unusual to support a mental injury claim. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the injury qualified as extraordinary and unusual or was merely the result of stress ordinarily experienced in the line of duty, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial. |
Sullivan | Workers Compensation Panel | |
George McGowan v. State of Tennessee
An employee was exposed to smoke as a result of a fire at his workplace. Testing revealed the presence of bullous emphysema, a dangerous condition caused by cigarette smoking. Surgery was required to treat that condition. The Claims Commission ruled that the smoke exposure at work had aggravated and advanced his preexisting lung disease and awarded permanent total disability benefits. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s finding of causation. We agree and reverse the judgment. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Larry D. Williams v. City of Burns, Tennessee
A former employee broughta retaliatorydischarge action againstthe employer city,asserting a claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in the city’s favor and the employee appealed. Because genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Masquerade Fundraising, Inc. v. Steve Stott
The Trial Judge held that venue for the cause of action was not in Knox County. Plaintiff, on appeal, contends that defendant either waived the issue of venue, or the record establishes that Knox County was the proper venue for the cause of action. On appeal, we hold that venue is properly in Knox County and reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Pee Wee Wisdom Child Development Center and Vivian Braxton v. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General & Reporter for the State of Tennessee
This extraordinary appeal involves proceedings to dissolve a nonprofit corporation. After the case had been pending in the trial court for seven years, with a court-appointed receiver in control of the nonprofit corporation’s assets, the trial court dismissed the case in its entirety based upon a motion to dismiss that was filed early in the proceedings but never heard. We conclude that the trial court erred in doing so, and therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings, to include an orderly winding up of the nonprofit corporation’s affairs and a proper termination of the receivership when appropriate. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pee Wee Wisdom Child Development Center and Vivian Braxton v. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., in his official capacity as Attorney General & Reporter for the State of Tennessee - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I would hold that the Shelby County trial court properly found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a lawsuit against the Attorney General. Because the lawsuit named the Attorney General as the defendant and sought substantial relief against the Attorney General, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity and Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-4-104, I would hold that only the Davidson County court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit. I would hold that the trial court erred only in declining to transfer the case to Davidson County in the interests of justice. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Romalis Gray v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Romalis Gray, pled nolo contendere to attempted second degree murder and received a sentence of 8 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977) and Rule 11 (c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. He argues the trial court failed to: (1) advise him that if he pled guilty, the court could question him under oath, and those answers could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury if the statements were false; and (2) advise him of the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daryl J. Carter
The defendant, Daryl J. Carter, was convicted after a trial by jury of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a statement made to police and by prohibiting his defense counsel from cross-examining the defendant’s ex-wife concerning her love life. In addition, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during its closing argument. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that: (1) the trial court did not err by declining to suppress the defendant’s pretrial statement; (2)the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the defendant’s cross-examination of his ex-wife; and (3) the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. While we agree with the defendant that the prosecutor made an inappropriate statement in his closing argument, we do not believe that this inappropriate statement prejudiced the defendant to the degree necessary to warrant the reversal of his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Newby
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Brandon Newby, of carjacking and evading arrest, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eight years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jon Logsdon
A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Jon Logsdon, of two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class C felony, two counts of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony, and four counts of solicitation of the sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of four years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for review on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of Logsdon’s reasonable belief that undercover officers posing as minors were under eighteen years of age. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals |