State of Tennessee v. Victor D. McMiller
Defendant, Victor D. McMiller, was charged with two counts each of the sale and delivery of dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III controlled substance. Defendant was convicted on all four counts. His convictions for delivery of a controlled substance were merged into his convictions for sale of a controlled substance, and Defendant was sentenced to 12 years for each conviction, and his convictions were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of 24 years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred by allowing testimony of Defendant’s prior bad acts; 3) the presentment was facially invalid because it states that sale or delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance is a Class C, rather than Class D, felony; and 4) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie D. Robinson v. David R. Osborne, Warden
The Petitioner, Willie D. Robinson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery and received a sentence of life imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Morgan County CriminalCourt, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the indictment charging him with first degree felony murder was so defective as to deprive the convicting court of jurisdiction to impose judgment. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick Thurmond v. David Sexton, Warden
The Petitioner, Patrick Thurmond, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated burglary (count 1), two counts of aggravated rape (counts 2 and 3), one count of attempted aggravated rape (count 4), and one count of aggravated sexual battery (count 5). He subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Johnson County Criminal Court, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues: (1) the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing, and (2) his judgments for counts one, three, four, and five are void because they violate the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angela Colley
The Defendant-Appellant, Angela Colley, entered guilty pleas to selling 0.5 grams or more of cocaine on June 9, 2008 (count one), delivering 0.5 grams or more of cocaine on June 9, 2008 (count two), selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine on June 17, 2008 (count three), and delivering less than 0.5 grams of cocaine on June 17, 2008 (count four) in the Sullivan County Criminal Court. Pursuant to her plea agreement, count two merged with count one and count four merged with count three, and Colley received a sentence of eight years at thirty percent for count one and a concurrent sentence of three years at thirty percent for count three, for an effective sentence of eight years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing. On appeal, Colley argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of judgments sentencing Colley to community corrections and for consideration of other terms and conditions that the trial court deems appropriate pursuant to the Community Corrections Act. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angela Colley - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I feel the defendant has not included an adequate record for review. Here, as the majority has noted, the defendant has failed to include the plea submission hearing transcript. I concluded this failure precludes our de novo review of the defendant’s sentences and requires this court to presume that the evidence supports her sentences. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jackie Darrell Messer
The Defendant-Appellant, Jackie Darrell Messer, was indicted by the Cocke County Grand Jury for rape of a child, a Class A felony. He subsequently entered a guilty plea as a Range I, standard offender to the offense of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class D felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Corrections. On appeal, Messer argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna F. Smith Thompson v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to set aside the foreclosure sale of her property. The trial court dismissed the case based on Plaintiff’s failure to effect service of process on the Defendant. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Isaac Thomas
The appellant, Isaac Thomas, pled guilty to aggravated assault and received a probationary sentence of three years. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and imposed a sentence of split confinement, with eleven months and twenty nine days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the revocation of his probation and the trial court’s imposition of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Harris, Jr.
On appeal, the appellant, David Harris, Jr., complains that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his two-year probationary sentence for the promotion of methamphetamine manufacturing and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. He contends that after revoking his sentence, the trial court should have granted him a sentence of split confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marease Antonio Crawford
Marease Antonio Crawford, Appellant, was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury in July 2010 in a multi-count indictment. Appellant entered an open plea to the indictment with sentencing to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of twelve years. Appellant appeals the imposition of consecutive sentences and the failure of the trial court to merge two of the convictions. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant did not waive the issue of double jeopardy by virtue of his guilty plea but that double jeopardy does not bar the convictions for Count Three, sale of marijuana, and Count Seven, possession of marijuana for resale. However,we conclude that double jeopardy bars Appellant’s convictions for both simple possession and possession of marijuana for resale where the offenses arose out of one incident of possession. We affirm the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing on the basis that Appellant had an extensive criminal history. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s conviction for simple possession. Appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy Steven Cathey
The defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), first offense, and reserved the following two certified questions: (1) “Whether a magistrate that conducts field sobriety tasks upon a defendant prior to issuance of a warrant is qualified as [a] ‘neutral and detached’ magistrate for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or its laws and/or in violation of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and its laws”; and (2) “Whether the issuance of a warrant after the administration of field sobriety tasks by a magistrate to a defendant [was] in violation of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee and/or its laws.” After the challenged warrant was issued,the Grand Jury indicted the defendant, charging him with one count of DUI. We hold that the certified questions are notdispositive of the defendant’s case because the subsequent indictment cured any defects in the warrant. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chanda Keith v. Regas Real Estate Company, et al.
This is a negligence case in which Chanda Keith (“Ms. Keith”) filed suit against Regas Real Estate Company (“Regas”) and LDB Corporation operating in Tennessee as Mr. Gatti’s Incorporated formerly doing business as Mr. Gatti’s and/or Mr. Gatti’s, L.P. (“Mr. Gatti’s”). The trial court dismissed the suit against Regas. Approximately ten years after the initial suit was filed, the trial court dismissed the suit against Mr. Gatti’s without prejudice, finding that Ms. Keith failed to comply with an order. One year later, Ms. Keith filed a new suit against Regas and Mr. Gatti’s. The trial court dismissed both suits. Ms. Keith appeals. We affirm the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Regas but reverse the trial court relative to the dismissal of the suit against Mr. Gatti’s. The case is remanded. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Hannah M. N.
This is an appeal from a child support action. A juvenile court magistrate found the father to be willfully and voluntarily unemployed and imputed income to him for the purposes of calculating his child support obligation. The magistrate refused to consider a motion to modify or vacate. On appeal to the juvenile court judge, the father was refused review on the basis that the magistrate had heard the motion to modify or vacate pursuant to Rule 34(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Juvenile Procedure. The father appealed. We vacate the judgment of the juvenile court and remand for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Smith, as Devisee of Ronnie Crabtree v. Linda D. Hatfield
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant seller entered into a contract to sell a mobile home to the plaintiff’s decedent. The contract required the decedent to make monthly payments by a date certain for eighty-four months, and if he failed to do so, all of his payments would be forfeited as rent. The decedent failed to make all of his payments in a timely manner. Later, the decedent died. The plaintiff, the decedent’s sole devisee, offered to pay the contract off by making a lump-sum payment to the defendant. The defendant rejected this offer. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, seeking to require the defendant to accept the lump-sum payment and convey the property to her. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims upon the close of her proof, because the undisputed evidence showed that she had not made the required monthly payments under the contract. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Burdick
Appellant, Robert Jason Burdick, was indicted for several offenses by the Davidson County Grand Jury in May of 2008. At issue herein is Appellant’s indictment for aggravated rape allegedly occurring on March 1, 1994. After a trial in October of 2009, Appellant was found not guilty of aggravated rape but guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted aggravated rape. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to ten years in incarceration, to be served consecutively to sentences for other convictions that are unspecified in the record herein. On appeal,Appellant argues that the issue before this Court is whether his conviction is barred by the statute of limitations. We hold that the affidavit of complaint in this case establishes probable cause and that a John Doe warrant with a DNA profile as identifying information is sufficient to commence a prosecution. Therefore, from the record before us it appears that the prosecution against Appellant commenced with the issuance of a valid arrest warrant, well within the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Kirby v. Memphis Jewish Nursing Home
An employee sustained a compensable injury to his shoulder. While he was recovering from surgery, he reinjured his shoulder when his dog pulled his arm while he was holding the dog by its collar. The trial court found that the reinjury was a direct and natural result of the earlier compensable injury and that the reinjury caused an increase in impairment. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly applied the intervening injury rule and incorrectly adopted the evaluating physician’s impairment. We affirm as to the reinjury but conclude that the trial court erroneously based its award upon an incorrect impairment rating, and we modify the judgment accordingly. |
Chester | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Timothy A. Moore v. Hugh A. Butler, Individually and as Agent and Servant of Anthony Wommack d/b/a Wommack Trucking, and Anthony Wommack d/b/a Wommack Trucking, and McCoy's Heating & Air, Inc.
This appeal involves summary judgment in a vehicular accident case. In a line of vehicles, the defendant service vehicle was first, followed by the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer, and then by the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer. The defendant’s service vehicle allegedly made a left turn without braking or using a turn signal, forcing the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer to brake quickly. This resulted in the co-defendant’s tractor-trailer rear-ending the plaintiff’s tractor-trailer. The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant tractor-trailer for rear-ending him, and against the defendant service vehicle that turned in front of him. The defendant service vehicle owner filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the defendant service vehicle owner had negated the element of proximate cause. The defendant tractor-trailer owner appeals. We reverse under the summary judgment standard in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Judy Kilburn ex rel Estate of Charles Kilburn v. Granite State Insurance Company et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was seriously injured in the course of his employment in an automobile accident in November 2008. He suffered fractures of his neck and back and underwent a surgical fusion of his neck. Over the course of the next year, he suffered severe pain and was eventually referred to a pain management physician, who prescribed oxycodone. He filed suit against his employer for workers’ compensation benefits. He died in January of 2010 of an accidental overdose of oxycodone over 14 months after his injuries. His widow was substituted as plaintiff in his workers’ compensation suit and filed a motion to amend the complaint to allege that his death was related to his work injury and that she was entitled to death benefits. The employer opposed the motion to amend, contending the death was not compensable because it was not the “direct and natural result of a compensable injury” but rather, the result of an intervening cause, i.e., the employee’s negligence in consuming an overdose of medicine. The trial court denied the motion to amend. The parties entered into a series of stipulations concerning the remaining issues in the case, and judgment was entered. The widow has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. We agree, reverse the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Judy Kilburn ex rel Estate of Charles Kilburn v. Granite State Insurance Company, et al
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was seriously injured in the course of his employment in an automobile accident in November 2008. He suffered fractures of his neck and back and underwent a surgical fusion of his neck. Over the course of the next year, he suffered severe pain and was eventually referred to a pain management physician, who prescribed oxycodone. He filed suit against his employer for workers’ compensation benefits. He died in January of 2010 of an accidental overdose of oxycodone over 14 months after his injuries. His widow was substituted as plaintiff in his workers’ compensation suit and filed a motion to amend the complaint to allege that his death was related to his work injury and that she was entitled to death benefits. The employer opposed the motion to amend, contending the death was not compensable because it was not the "direct and natural result of a compensable injury" but rather, the result of an intervening cause, i.e., the employee’s negligence in consuming an overdose of medicine. The trial court denied the motion to amend. The parties entered into a series of stipulations concerning the remaining issues in the case, and judgment was entered. The widow has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. We agree, reverse the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings |
Williamson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
W. Turner Boone et al v. Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of The Tennessee Department of Revenue
W. Turner Boone and wife, Sally-Bruce M. Boone (“the Taxpayers”), are Tennessee residents who own stock in South Carolina corporations. In 2001, the Taxpayers paid South Carolina income tax of $43,328 based on pass-through income of $623,941. The Taxpayers received dividend distributions of $204,988 on the same income. They filed a 2001 Tennessee Hall Income Tax return reporting the dividends with a resulting tax of $12,288, against which they claimed a credit for a like amount based upon their payment of the South Carolina income tax. Their claimed credit is based upon a deduction allowed by statute for “tax paid to [another] state . . . provided, that there exists a tax credit reciprocity agreement between Tennessee and the other state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-2-122 (2011). Loren L. Chumley, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue (“the Commissioner”) declined to allow the credit. She gave notice of an outstanding tax liability for 2001 in the amount of $15,017.93, including penalties and interest. The Taxpayers paid the assessment under protest and filed this action against the Commissioner after they demanded and were denied a refund. The trial court upheld the Commissioner’s denial. The Taxpayers appeal. We affirm. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Osmond Hines
Appellant was convicted following a jury trial of two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated assault. At a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-two years as Range I, violent offender, for each second degree murder conviction and to five years for the aggravated assault conviction. The trial court merged one of the second degree murder convictions and the aggravated assault conviction into the remaining second degree murder conviction. On appeal, Appellant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; (2) the trial court erred in excluding a drawing from evidence; (3) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request for a mistrial; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by suborning perjury of one of its witnesses; (5) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by making inappropriate comments during closing argument; (6) the cumulative effects of errors at trial precluded a fair trial; and (7) the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that Appellant cannot be successful on any of the above issues. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Madkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Richard Madkins, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is being illegally restrained because his sentence is void and expired. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Norris E. Ray v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Norris E. Ray, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nicolle Elizabeth Anderson v. Donald W. Anderson
In this divorce action, the husband appeals the entry of a default judgment and the resulting Order of Divorce and Permanent Parenting Plan. The husband was properlyserved but never filed an answer. Months later, upon motion of the wife, the trial court granted a default judgment against the husband as he had not filed an answer to the complaint for divorce when the motion was heard. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Walton Cunningham & Phyllis Cunningham ex rel. Phillip Walton Cunningham v. Williamson County Hospital District, et al.
Defendants, Williamson Medical Center and five of its employees, appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action. They contend the action is time barred because it was filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued, in violation of the one year statute of limitations applicable to Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act actions, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-305(b). The trial court, however, found that the action was timely filed because it was commenced within the 120-day extension afforded to the plaintiffs pursuant to an amendment to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(c) (2009). We have determined that the amendment codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a)-(c) applies, notwithstanding the one-year statute of limitations provision under the Governmental Tort Liability Act, that the plaintiffs’ compliance with the pre-suit notification provision in Tennessee Code Annotate § 29-26-121(a) extended the statute of limitations by 120 days, and that this action was timely filed within the 120-day extension. Therefore, were affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |