In Re: A'Mari B.
This is termination of parental rights case involving A’Mari B. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Troy B. (“Father”) and Rebecca S. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Child as an infant into state custody after both Father and Mother were arrested and jailed. The Child was promptly placed with Christopher N. and Dean N. (collectively, “the Custodians”), the prospective adoptive parents, where she has remained. Five months after obtaining legal custody, the Custodians filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother in order to facilitate their adoption of the Child. Following a bench trial, at which Mother appeared, the court terminated both natural parents’ rights to the Child based on the court’s finding of multiple forms of abandonment. Over Father’s objection, his case was tried without his presence or participation. Father and Mother, by separate notices of appeal, challenge the termination order. As to Father, the judgment is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial – our action being based on the fact that Father was denied due process in the termination proceeding. As to Mother, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that there is clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned the Child and that termination of her rights is in the Child’s best interest. Accordingly, as to Mother, the judgment is affirmed |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Matthew Jackson , appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Deangelo Lee aka Marcus Deangelo Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee , appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Murff v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Anthony Murff, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Osborne Wade v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, George Osborne Wade, appeals the Circuit Court of Obion County’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Madison K. P.
This application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9 arises from the trial court’s decision to stay the implementation of the parenting plan that the trial court was directed to adopt pursuant to our decision in In re Madison K.P., No. M2009-02331-COA-R3-JV, 2010 WL 4810665 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010). The Supreme Court denied the father’s application for permission to appeal on April 14, 2011 and the mandate of this court was issued on April 27, 2011. Despite this, the ruling of this court has yet to be put into effect, because the parenting plan that was to be approved and entered by the trial court, and which was approved and entered, was immediately stayed by the trial court following its entry, rendering our decision and the parenting plan of no effect. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Ann Winn v. Welch Farm, LLC, et al.
The buyer of unimproved real property sued the sellers for breach of implied warranties, imposition of a permanent nuisance, and diminution in value of the property; buyer also sought damages for alleged violations of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act, the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and negligence. The trial court held that Tennessee does not provide a cause of action for breach of implied warranty in the sale of unimproved real property; the court also held that buyer had not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the lot was “unbuildable.” The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the buyer appealed. Buyer asserts that the sellers had a duty to disclose “possible adverse soil conditions.” She also urges this Court to adopt a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of suitability for residential construction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Hartman v. Tennessee Board of Regents d/b/a Tennessee Tech University
In this employment dispute, a former employee claims she was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of her gender. The plaintiff, a long time employee, was terminated after failing to adhere to her employer’s policies and procedures concerning the purchase of inventory and equipment. Claiming this reason was pretextual, she filed this action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. After discovery, the employer moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding the employer demonstrated that the plaintiff could not establish that a similarly situated male employee was treated more favorably. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
John Griff Lucas v. City of Waverly, Tennessee, et al.
In this inverse condemnation action, the trial court granted summary judgment to condemning authority on ground that statute of limitations barred suit; landowner appeals. Condemning authority urges affirmance of the dismissal on alternative grounds. Finding that the action is not barred by the statute of limitations and that genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment, we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Roger Washington Bouldin
Daughter of decedent filed claim against estate. The probate court dismissed the daughter’s claim on the ground that it was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Ronell Jones
The appellant, Ricky Ronell Jones, pled guilty to rape, incest, and two counts of sexual battery relating to his eldest daughter and was convicted at trial of rape of a child and incest relating to his youngest daughter. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latasha Reid
The appellant, Latasha Reid, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to nine counts of identity theft and one count of felony theft. She received an effective four-year probation sentence for the identity theft convictions and a two-year probation sentence for the felony theft conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of six years. Almost six years later, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered her to serve her entire sentence anew. On appeal, the appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her effective six-year sentence anew because part of the sentence had expired. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s expired four-year probation sentence. The trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s two-year probation sentence is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alisha J. Glisson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alisha J. Glisson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. She was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and three counts of attempted aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to subpoena a co-defendant at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hector Alonzo v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Hector Alonzo, appeals pro se from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone, a Class A felony.The petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he claims: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting him from raising a selective prosecution claim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
D'Angelo Marquez Jenkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, D’Angelo Marquez Jenkins, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to facilitation of aggravated robbery and being a felon in possession of a handgun. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a total effective sentence of nine years and six months. Thereafter, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, the petitioner complained that trial counsel failed to interview or subpoena witnesses on the petitioner’s behalf or pursue DNA evidence. The petitioner also contended that his guilty pleas were the result of counsel’s ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Ray Adkins et al v. Bluegrass Estates, Inc. et al
The purchasers of lots in a “subdivision known as Timberlake Estates, Phase One” – described in a plat and restrictive covenants as a twenty-lot subdivision – acquired with their deeds the right to use a boat ramp and parking area to be located in a common area within the subdivision. When they learned that additional lots – not located within the combined acreage of the twenty lots – were being advertised for sale along with the right to use the same boat ramp and parking area, they filed this action against their predecessor in interest.1 After a trial on the merits, the court held that only the purchasers of lots in “Phase One” were entitled to use the boat ramp and parking area. The defendants appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Alfie Tucker v. Tabitha Finch
In this legal malpractice case, Alfie Tucker filed suit against his attorney, Tabitha Finch, alleging that she had negligently represented him in his lawsuit against his former employer by failing to timely file his claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission (“TCC”). Ms. Finch filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the applicable statute of limitations had passed. The trial court granted Ms. Finch’s motion and dismissed the case. Mr. Tucker appeals. We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Tri Am Construction, Inc. et al v. J & V Development, Inc. et al
This interlocutory appeal stems from a lien enforcement action. Tri Am Construction, Inc. (“Tri Am”) filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Rhea County (“the Trial Court”) against J & V Development, Inc. (“J & V”), Randall E. Vick, Brenda B. Jung, and Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) to enforce a lien. BB&T moved to dismiss Tri Am’s complaint, citing alleged fatal procedural defects. The Trial Court denied BB&T’s motion to dismiss and allowed Tri Am to amend its complaint to cure the procedural defects. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in liberally construing the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes to permit Tri Am to amend its complaint in order to cure the procedural defects. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in declining to hold that BB&T’s rights would be retroactively impaired by the liberal application of the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property ( Martin Goss)
A show cause order was entered in this case on July 15, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time specified. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3 a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy O'Neal
On October 1,2007, Appellant, Jeremy O’Neal, pled guilty in Blount County to one count of felony robbery. He was originally placed on judicial diversion. On April 5, 2010, the trial court set aside Appellant’s judicial diversion for violating the terms thereof. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six years with split confinement of thirty-five days with the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant’s probation officer subsequently filed a violation of probation report in September 2010. After conducting a probation revocation hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation and revoked Appellant’s probation. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the balance of his six year sentence in incarceration. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration. We conclude that there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Appellant’s probation and to order him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of probation and the order that Appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carol D. Davis v. Kolo Lynn Davis, et al
In this post-divorce case, Kolo Lynn Davis (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s classification of an agreement to maintain health insurance through his company, Cleveland Building Materials (“CBM”), as alimony in futuro. Husband and Carol D. Davis (“Wife”) were married in 1964 and divorced in 1995. Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties, Wife was given the option of maintaining health insurance through CBM. In furtherance of this agreement, Wife was given a paid position as a non-voting member of CBM’s board of directors, which allowed her to maintain health insurance through CBM. Wife was tasked with reimbursing CBM for all costs associated with the health insurance coverage. Husband later sold CBM to Kolo Lynn Davis, II (“Son”). Son, through CBM, continued to pay Wife for her services as a board member. In 2005, CBM discontinued its group health insurance, thereby removing Wife from the plan and ceased paying Wife for her services as a board member. Wife filed suit, naming Husband and CBM as parties. Following a hearing, the trial court classified the payments from CBM as alimony in futuro, held Husband personally liable for CBM’s non-payment, and instructed Husband to continue with future payments pursuant to the agreement. Husband appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin B. Smith, et al v. Gary Hankins, et al
This appeal involves a boundary line dispute raised by the plaintiff, Melvin B. Smith and his wife, Charlotte E. Smith (“the Smiths”) and a request for an easement by the defendants, Gary Hankins and Stanley Hankins (“the Hankinses”). After a trial, the court entered rulings in favor of the Hankinses as to both the establishment of the boundary line and the easement. The Smiths appeal. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Tate, a/k/a James Moore, a/k/a Larry Moore
Appellant, Billy Tate, a/k/a James Moore, a/k/a Larry Moore, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for burglary of a business and theft of property. Appellant was convicted of burglary of a business and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration as a Career Offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. On appeal, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial; and the trial court erred in admitting testimony about “bootprints” left at the scene of the crime. Because Appellant has failed to provide an adequate record for review on appeal, these issues are waived, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. v. Ralph McNabb
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ralph McNabb (“Employee”) sustained a right rotator cuff tear as the result of a motor vehicle collision while employed as a truck driver by Everhart Transportation (“Employer”). Employer was insured for workers’ compensation by Cherokee Insurance Company, Inc. (“Insurer”). Employee underwent surgical repair of his right rotator cuff and was returned by Employer to a different, part- ime position. Employee suffered a recurrent rotator cuff tear and thereafter retired. It is undisputed that Employee was not returned to employment at the same or greater wage than prior to his injury. Employee’s treating physician and his evaluating physician both assigned him an anatomical impairment rating of 10% to the body as a whole, but with different restrictions. The trial court awarded 60% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. Insurer has appealed, asserting that the award was excessive. We affirm the judgment. |
Greene | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Shaun Alexander Hodge v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, was convicted of first degree murder in 2001 and sentenced to life in prison. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. The petitioner appeals, claiming constitutional violations arising from the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and the State’s failure to disclose certain exculpatory evidence. The petitioner also seeks relief based on newly discovered evidence. After careful review of the record and the arguments of both parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |