Charles Edward Graham v. State of Tennessee
A Knox County jury convicted Petitioner, Charles Edward Graham, of reckless aggravated assault, tampering with evidence, possession of marijuana, and failure to provide proof of financial responsibility, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twentyseven years. State v. Charles Edward Graham, No. E2005-02937-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 199851, at *1, *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 24, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sep. 15, 2008). Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal to this Court. Id. at *1. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner now appeals this denial. We determine that the post-conviction court’s denial was proper because trial counsel did not coerce or unduly influence Petitioner with regard to his decision not to testify at trial; trial counsel was employing a reasonable trial tactic by not requesting jury instructions on any lesser included offenses; and trial counsel was not deficient with regard to attempting to obtain a plea bargain. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Robert Sadler Bailey
This appeal arises from an action for criminal contempt. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion upon determining Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. The State appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Douglas Spivey v. David N. King et al.
The plaintiff Brian Douglas Spivey (“the Plaintiff”) alleges that the defendants, his former business partners, David N. King and Anthony G. Brown (collectively “the Defendants’), engaged in a conspiracy, and, pursuant to that conspiracy, took actions that include forcing him into bankruptcy and harassing him in the bankruptcy case, expelling him from a business entity, defaming him, and initiating unwarranted criminal charges that were dismissed. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that this was simply an attempt to relitigate issues that had been determined in the Plaintiff’s bankruptcy and in a chancery court case the Defendants had pursued. They also filed a motion for sanctions. It turns out that the bankruptcy court did not issue its opinion until after the complaint in this case was filed and that the chancery court action was stayed as to the Plaintiff as a result of his bankruptcy filing. The trial court dismissed the complaint in an order that states that the dismissal was for “failure to state a claim.” The trial court also awarded sanctions against the Plaintiff and his attorney. The Plaintiff appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment dismissing the claims related to forcing the Plaintiff into bankruptcy and harassing him in bankruptcy as well as the claims related to expelling him from the business entity. We vacate that part of the judgment dismissing claims related to defamation and the allegedly unwarranted criminal prosecution. We also vacate that part of the judgment sanctioning the Plaintiff and his attorney. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antwan Deemeek Hudson
Appellant, Antwan Deemeek Hudson, was convicted by a Sullivan County Jury of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced him to two, concurrent sentences of twenty-five years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred in allowing a doctor to testify as to a statement made to him by the victim’s parents, and the trial court erred in excluding Appellant’s testimony regarding the results of a medical test. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is actually a plea for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we are precluded from doing. In addition, we conclude that the evidence is more than sufficient to support his convictions. We also conclude that the statement made by the parents to the doctor was erroneously allowed into evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule, but the error was harmless. Due to errors on the judgment forms, we remand for the correction of the judgment forms to reflect that Count 1 and Count 3 will run concurrently to each other. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary Paul v. Dennis Watson and Darlene Watson d/b/a Double D Lawn Care and Landscaping
This case involves an alleged oral contract for landscaping work. The homeowner paid a |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bethany Jean O'Donnell
The defendant, Bethany Jean O’Donnell, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probationary sentence. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to multiple charges, the defendant was sentenced to five consecutive terms of eleven months and twentynine days, to be served on supervised probation. A violation warrant was subsequently issued and, at the following hearing, the defendant acknowledged that she had committed the violation. The trial court then found the defendant to be in violation of the terms and conditions of her probation and ordered that the remainder of her sentence be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that the decision was error and, further, that the court erroneously concluded that she would not be entitled to good conduct credits when serving her misdemeanor sentences at seventy-five percent. Because we conclude no error has occurred and because the case holds no precedential value, we affirm the ruling of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eagles Landing Development, LLC v. Eagles Landing Apartments, LP, et al.
This is a breach of contract case. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Appellee Developer the remaining balance due under a Development Agreement that was entered by and between Appellee and the Appellants, a partnership and its limited liability partners, for construction of an apartment complex. Appellants contend that Appellee was not entitled to final payment because the general partner, who is not a party to this appeal, had not funded the development fees that were contemplated under a Partnership Agreement, to which Appellee was not a party. Specifically, Appellants argue that the payment under the Development Agreement is contingent upon satisfaction of the funding requirements specified in the Partnership Agreement. We conclude that the conditions precedent under the Development Agreement were met, and that the Appellee was, therefore, entitled to its full fee under the Development Agreement. The trial court assessed judgment against the limited liability partners and the partnership. Under the Tennessee Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Appellants’ status as limited partners protects them from liability for the debts of the partnership. Appellee contends that it is a third-party beneficiary under the Partnership Agreement and may, therefore, have judgment against the limited partners who were parties to that agreement. We conclude that the third-party beneficiary issue is waived and that the trial court erred in entering judgment against the limited partners. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Thomas Hepburn v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, three counts of attempted burglary, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, eight counts of felony vandalism, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, and three counts of felony theft. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on January 13, 2011. State v. Tracy Thomas Hepburn, No. M2008-01979-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2889101 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, July 23, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. January 13, 2011). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that: (1) his convictions were based on a coerced confession; (2) his convictions were based on a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination; and that (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim. The Petitioner appealed, and, on appeal, both parties agree that the post-conviction court erred and that the case should be reversed and remanded. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we agree with the parties that the petition for post-conviction relief raises a colorable claim. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Katie J. Rountree v. Joshua Rountree
This is a divorce case involving issues related to the permanent parenting plan and the divisionofmarital property. The trial court adoptedMother’s proposedpermanent parenting plan, which provided that the child would attend preschool, against Father’s wishes, even though prior to trial Father had been the primary caregiver of the child while Mother worked. The trial court also adopted Mother’s proposed division of marital property. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Father’s desire to care for the child during the day was based on a self-serving motive. Accordingly, we vacate the parenting plan and remand for the establishment of a new permanent parenting plan. We further conclude that Mother was improperly assigned her attorney fees as a marital debt, and we reverse that award. In addition, we reverse portions of the trial court’s findings regarding the marital property, but affirm the overall division as equitable. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Lee Rose
A Sullivan County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Dennis Lee Rose, of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life for the murder conviction and three years for each of the aggravated assault convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b), Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to use the prosecutor’s notes for impeachment and by refusing to allow the defense to make an offer of proof regarding the State’s failure to provide the notes to the defense before trial; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to present surrebuttal testimony; and (5) the appellant’s convictions for premeditated murder and one count of aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Wayne Brewer
The defendant, Dennis Brewer, was convicted by a Madison County jury of DUI and DUI per se. He then pled guilty to DUI, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, with a minimum of nine months to serve prior to release into a rehabilitative program. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lester Paul Doyle
The defendant, Lester Paul Doyle, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to three counts of aggravated burglary based on offenses he committed while serving a community corrections sentence for drug convictions in a prior case. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s community corrections sentence in the drug case and sentenced the defendant to serve concurrent terms of four years in the Department of Correction in the aggravated burglary case, with the aggravated burglary sentences to be served consecutively to the sentences in the drug case. The defendant now appeals the trial court’s sentencing determinations, arguing that his community corrections sentence in the drug case should not have been revoked and that the trial court should have sentenced him to some form of alternative sentencing in the aggravated burglary case. He does not challenge the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court but remand for correcting clerical errors and the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect that the aggravated burglary sentences in case number 9354 are to be served consecutively to the drug sentences in case number 9201. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shree Krishna, LLC d/b/a Quizno's Classic Subs v. Broadmoor Investment Corp.
This case involves the breach of a commercial lease. The plaintiff leased property from the defendant for a franchise restaurant. The lease granted the plaintiff options to renew for two additional lease periods. The parties’ agreement with the franchisor provided that the lease and the options were assignable, and that the landlord’s consent to the assignment could not be unreasonably withheld. The plaintiff sought to assign the lease and the renewal options to a third party. The defendant landlord refused to consent to the assignment and attempted to negotiate a new lease with the prospective assignee on different terms. After the assignee withdrew its offer to purchase the plaintiff’s franchise, the plaintiff agreed to sell it to the assignee for a reduced price. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the defendant landlord for breach of contract, alleging that it unreasonably withheld consent to the original proposed assignment. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant landlord now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant landlord unreasonably withheld consent in order to extract an economic concession or improve the landlord’s economic position. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glyn Dale
The appellant, Glyn Dale, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s ordering him to serve concurrent twenty-five-year sentences for two convictions of rape of a child. On appeal, the appellant contends that his sentences are excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marie Akins v. Whirlpool Corporation
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Marie Akins (“Employee”) alleges that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist while employed as a factory worker by Whirlpool Corporation (“Employer”), prior to the closure of Employer’s plant in August 2008. Employer denies that Employee’s carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist was caused by her employment with it. The trial court found that Employee’s left-wrist carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused by her employment with Employer and that Employer therefore is not liable for this injury. Employee has appealed, contending both that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding and that Employer is estopped from denying liability based on delay in the diagnosis of Employee’s carpal tunnel syndrome in her left wrist. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Tammy L. Lee v. Dura Operating Corporation, et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Tammy L. Lee (“Employee”) alleges that she suffered an injury to her cervical spine while she was employed as a factory worker by Dura Operating Corporation (“Employer”). Employer denies that Employee’s cervical spine injury was caused by her employment with Employer. The trial court determined that Employee’s cervical spine condition was a work-related aggravation of her pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The trial court awarded Employee temporary total benefits from November 8, 2007, to February 8, 2008. Finding that Employee had not been able to return to work, the trial court refused to apply the statutory cap and awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits of 69% to the body as a whole, three times her anatomical impairment rating of 23% to the body as a whole. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's determination of causation, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Lawrence | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey I. Parsons
Following the Wilson County Circuit Court’s denial of hismotion to suppress,the defendant, Jeffrey I. Parsons, pleaded guilty to one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), first offense, see T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401 (2006), seeking to reserve a certified question of law concerning the legality of the stop leading to his arrest. Because the certified question was not properly reserved for review, we dismiss the appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Haven T.
Haven T. is the daughter of Clint T. (“Father”) and Jennifer G. (“Mother”). The parties were never married. Father initiated the present litigation by filing a petition for custody after Mother notified him she would be moving from Chattanooga to Johnson City to attend college. At the hearing that followed, the parties stipulated that this was the “initial” custody determination for Haven although the juvenile court had entered an order in 2003 adopting a “parenting plan” that, by agreement, gave the parties equal time with Haven. The court awarded custody to Father. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Gail Stephens
The Defendant, Susan Gail Stephens, was charged with two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The Defendant applied for pretrial diversion and has twice been denied. In the instant appeal, the Defendant challenges the prosecutor’s second denial of her application for pretrial diversion. Specifically, she claims that the prosecutor erred on remand by: (1) declining to consider any new information submitted by the Defendant since the date of the original application—information allegedly relevant to her amenability to correction; and (2) failing to properly consider and weigh her amenability to correction as instructed by this court in its previous decision. Following a careful review of the record and the applicable authorities, we agree with the Defendant that the prosecutor should have considered any evidence on remand, whether favorable or unfavorable, that was relevant to the Defendant’s current status for amenability to correction. Accordingly, we hold that an abuse of prosecutorial discretion occurred and once again remand the case to the prosecutor for consideration of all relevant factors. The judgment of the trial court upholding the prosecutor’s denial of diversion is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to remand to the prosecutor for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Laraiel Winton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Laraiel Winton, aggrieved by his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted aggravated robbery, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that successor counsel committed ineffective assistance, that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during argument, and that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance in several instances not previously raised on direct appeal. Determining that the allegations concerning trial counsel’s performance were previously determined, that the prosecutorial misconduct claim is waived, and that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice concerning successor counsel’s ineffective assistance, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Adelaida Fielding et al. v. The Metropolitan Government of Lynchburg, Moore County, Tennessee et al.
The plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate a re-zoning ordinance on the grounds that it constitutes illegal “spot zoning,” and that the re-zoned area was improperly classified in violation of the local general zoning ordinance. The trial court upheld the re-zoning ordinance, finding it was enacted in furtherance of public safety goals and that the re-zoning classification was reasonable and rational. We affirm. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Pitts Bradford v. David Wilson Pitts
This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case in which David Wilson Pitts (“Father”) petitioned for suspension or termination of his child support obligation owed to Jennifer Pitts Bradford (“Mother”). The trial court denied Father’s request, holding that Father failed to prove that a substantial variance in his income was present. Father appealed, and this court directed the trial court to consider Father’s tax return in determining whether a substantial variance existed. On remand, the trial court found that a substantial variance existed between Father’s income at the time of the divorce as reflected in the tax return and his income at the time of the request for suspension or termination. The trial court modified Father’s support obligation and imposed court’s imposition of sanctions against Mother but affirm the decision of the trial court in all other respects. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Webb v. Mark Thomas Webb
Father in divorce action appeals trial court’s designation of Mother as primary residential parent and division of marital property. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Roger Lee Neal v. Kelli Jean Hayes
This case arises from a long-running legal dispute between Roger Lee Neal (“Neal”) and Kelli Jean Hayes (“Hayes”) concerning their minor child (“the Child”). Neal and Hayes disputed, among other things, custody matters relating to the Child. In March 2011, the Circuit Court for Knox County, Fourth Circuit (“the Trial Court”), entered an order confirming findings of the Special Master, Sarah Higgins (“the Special Master”) and resolving numerous contested issues. In the same order, the trial judge, Judge Swann, stated, in effect, that he no longer could be neutral towards Neal because of Neal’s villainous statements about the Special Master and Neal’s “admitted perjury” and recused himself from any further participation in these cases. Husband appeals, arguing, in part, that Judge Swann could not simultaneously rule on the Special Master’s findings and recuse himself because of lack of neutrality. We hold that as both the Special Master and Judge Swann expressed an understandable lack of neutrality in their findings and order, respectively, the Trial Court’s March 2011 order is vacated, and we remand for further proceedings to be held before a neutral court. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
George Arthur Lee Smith v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, George Arthur Lee Smith, appeals from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for the following reasons: 1) for failing to move to suppress a recorded conversation between Petitioner and a co-defendant; 2) for failing to argue at trial the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay as rebuttal to the State’s theory of motive; 3) for failing to call Petitioner’s mother and stepfather as witnesses at trial; 4) for failing to move to strike the testimony of Petitioner’s sister at trial; 5) for failing to request a jury instruction regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; 6) for failing to request a limiting instruction concerning evidence of Petitioner’s prior bad acts; 7) for failing to assert intoxication as a defense; and 8) for failing to object to improper comments by the prosecutor during voir dire and closing argument. Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred by not allowing hearsay testimony from Petitioner’s mother at the post-conviction hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals |