Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the movant, attorney Martin Seiler, shifted the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff Joseph Barna for purposes of summary judgment. Admittedly, Mr. Barna did not refute the affidavit of Mr. Seiler, but I submit he did not have to because Mr. Barna was not obliged to come forward with countervailing evidence to create a dispute of fact. This is due to the fact that Mr. Seiler failed to provide a sufficient affidavit or other proof. Specifically, Mr. Seiler’s affidavit, which is the only evidence to support his motion for summary judgment, is insufficient because he failed to provide any specific material fact for this court to consider that pertains to the legal services he actually rendered. Mr. Seiler only informed us of the fact that he has many years of experience as a lawyer in the field of security litigation, which is a relevant and material fact, but by itself is insufficient to refute the specific allegations in the complaint as to what Mr. Seiler failed to do in his representation of Mr. Barna. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Frank Peake, III v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Frank Peake, III, appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2004, the Petitioner was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault and was, thereafter, sentenced to six years as a Range II, multiple offender. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. The Petitioner later filed a post-conviction petition and, following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure (1) to investigate and interview witnesses that would have corroborated his self-defense theory and (2) to request a limiting instruction as to the prior threat made by the Petitioner. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney Buford v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rodney Buford, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to obtain a medical expert to testify at trial and failed to file a motion to suppress his statement to police. He further argues that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal and that the trial court erred by not finding that he was illegally sentenced. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Neal Davis
Defendant, David Neal Davis, was originally indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury on four counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery. In a trial on these charges, Defendant moved for a mistrial, after the victim testified that she had been digitally penetrated by Defendant. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. In a superceding indictment, Defendant was indicted on two counts of rape of a child, eight counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of solicitation of a minor, and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Following a jury trial on these charges, Defendant was convicted of rape of a child, attempted rape of a child, seven counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of child abuse, and one count of attempted solicitation of a minor. He was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of twenty years confinement. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts the following errors by the trial court: 1) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the indictment on the basis of double jeopardy, or alternatively, on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct; 2) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to introduce evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct by the victim; 3) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Counts five and seven of the indictment, charging aggravated sexual battery, based on the State’s failure to prove venue in those counts; and 4) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Count one of the indictment, charging rape of a child, based on the State’s failure to prove an element of the offense. After a thorough review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie J. Baucom, III
The defendant, Eddie J. Baucom, III, was convicted by a Dickson County jury of one count of fourth offense of driving while under the influence and one count of resisting arrest. He was subsequently sentenced to two years probation for driving under the influence and thirty days incarceration in the Dickson County jail for resisting arrest. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for the driving under the influence. Based upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tommy Earl Jones
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Tommy Earl Jones, was convicted of rape, a Class B felony, theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony, aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-304(b), -13-503(b), -14-103, -14-105(3), -14-404(c). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for his rape conviction, three years for his theft conviction, ten years for his aggravated kidnapping conviction, and twelve years for his especially aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that the Defendant’s sentences for rape and aggravated kidnapping be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of twenty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) The trial court erred when it excluded the Defendant from jury selection, trial, and the return of the verdict in the absence of any waiver; (2) The State presented insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of especially aggravated burglary; (3) The trial court erred when it allowed a forensic expert to testify about opinions based on possibilities; and (4) The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s fundamental right to be present during his trial was violated. As a result, we must reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Davis, as Next Friend of Eloise Gwinn, an Incapacitated Person v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., et al.
This is a nursing home abuse case. The trial court denied Appellant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration based upon an alternative dispute resolution agreement that was executed by Appellee, the niece of the patient being admitted to Appellants’ nursing facility. The patient had executed a power of attorney in favor of her niece and her niece’s husband, but only the niece had signed the admission papers on behalf of the patient. The trial court determined that the power of attorney created a joint agency, whereby the signatures of both the niece and her husband were required in order to bind the patient, as principal, to arbitration. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donald L. Seiber v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald L. Seiber, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the case should be remanded because the post-conviction court failed to make adequate factual findings and that the post-conviction court erred by denying post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bennie Joe Poteet, II, Individually and by and Through Evelyn Poteet, as Conservator of Bennie Joe Poteet, II v. National Healthcare of Cleveland, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a claim of medical malpractice. Bennie Joe Poteet, II, individually and by and through his mother, Evelyn Poteet, as his conservator (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), sued Adam E. Fall, M.D. (“Dr. Fall”) and National Healthcare of Cleveland, formerly doing business as Cleveland Community Hospital (“the Hospital”) (collectively “the Defendants”) for medical malpractice after Mr. Poteet suffered a stroke while admitted at the Hospital which rendered him completely paralyzed from the nose down. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on Mr. Poteet’s later added claim of negligence per se based on a bonus incentive plan allegedly maintained by the Hospital that indirectly set forth the reduction of MRIs ordered by Dr. Fall as a factor in his annual bonus determination. The trial court granted the Hospital’s dispositive motion on the issue, as well as the Hospital’s motion to dismiss on the bonus issue. Prior to trial, the court also granted the Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude any evidence of the bonus incentive plan offered to Dr. Fall, but denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude all testimony of one of the Plaintiffs’ neurology experts. At the close of the case, the trial court submitted a special verdict form to the jury which instructed that the question regarding the Hospital’s negligence based on insufficient neurology coverage was to be disregarded if neither Dr. Fall nor the treating nurses were found to be negligent. The jury subsequently returned a verdict favorable to the nurses and Dr. Fall, leaving the question on the adequacy of neurology coverage unaddressed. Judgment was entered on the jury’s findings. The Hospital thereafter filed a motion for directed verdict on the neurology coverage issue while the Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on multiple grounds. The trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial but granted the Hospital’s motion for directed verdict as well as the Defendants’ motions for discretionary costs. The Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Darryl Suggs as Administrator of the Estate of Billy Ray Suggs v. Gallaway Health Care Center, et al.
This appeal arises out of a complaint filed against various healthcare providers. Before the trial court, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with an identical lawsuit he had filed against the same defendants in another county. The motion to consolidate was denied. The trial court later dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim against one of the defendant physicians for improper venue, and the other defendants were dismissed for various reasons not relevant to this appeal. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim against the physician for improper venue, and he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to consolidate. We affirm. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Hermes Gomez
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jose Hermes Gomez, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-402(b), -14-403(b). The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for each aggravated robbery conviction and five years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered that his five-year sentence and two of his ten-year sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) The trial court erred when it denied two of the Defendant’s challenges for cause to potential jurors; (2) The State presented insufficient evidence to convict the Defendant of three counts of aggravated robbery; and (3) The trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand solely for the entry of corrected judgment forms for each of the Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenny Lamont McGee
In January 2009, the Moore County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Kenny LaMont McGee for three counts of aggravated sexual battery. Appellant pled guilty to two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to the plea agreement Appellant was ordered to serve an effective sentence of twelve years on community corrections. In January 2010, the Moore County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. In February 2010, Appellant’s community corrections officer filed an affidavit alleging that Appellant had violated the conditions of the community corrections sentence. Appellant pled guilty to the violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the twelve-year sentence in confinement. In addition, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years and six months for his violation of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of the community corrections sentence. However, we vacate the consecutive sentence, order the new sentence to be served concurrently to the prior imposed sentence and remand for entry of a corrected judgment. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael W. Kemp
The defendant, Michael W. Kemp, was convicted by a Smith County Criminal Court jury of three counts of reckless vehicular homicide and three counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years for each vehicular homicide conviction and one year for each reckless endangerment conviction. The court merged the reckless endangerment convictions into the vehicular homicide convictions and ordered that the terms run consecutively with all but one year served on probation. The defendant appealed and, on direct appeal, this court remanded for reconsideration of the consecutive sentences because the trial court failed to make the proper findings. Upon remand, the trial court again imposed consecutive sentences, which the defendant now appeals. After review, we conclude that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing and order that the defendant’s sentences be served concurrently. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Deshawn Smith
The Defendant, Michael Deshawn Smith, pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-three years’ confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Phyllis A. Polk
The Defendant, Phyllis A. Polk, was convicted by a jury in the Madison County Circuit Court of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with credit for time served and the remainder in community corrections. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barry Ogle v. Ben Seigler, d/b/a Ben's Bobcat
In this breach of contract action, the defendant appealed the Judgment of the Trial Court, who entered a monetary judgment against defendant and awarded attorney's fees. Defendant has appealed, and on appeal we reverse the award of attorney's fees, vacate the Trial Court's Judgment and remand, with directions for the parties or the Court to prepare a complete Statement of Evidence. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John M. Bailey
The Defendant, John M. Bailey, pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and failure to appear, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 39-16-609 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years’ confinement for aggravated assault and a consecutive four-year sentence for failure to appear. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by affording undue weight to enhancement factors and by failing to apply mitigating factors supported by the evidence. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Williams, aka Paul Williams El
The defendant, Paul Williams, a/k/a Paul Williams El, was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second offense, and was sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court’s method for selecting the alternate juror resulted in the exclusion of the only African-American on the panel; (2) there is newly discovered evidence that should be considered; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in revoking his probation on a previous conviction and in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
4215 Harding Road Homeowners Association v. Stacy Harris
The Homeowners’ Association of a high-rise condominium building filed this action against an owner/occupant of a condominium unit alleging she was in violation of the Master Deed and Bylaws due to grossly unsanitary conditions in the defendant’s unit and extremely offensive odors that emanated from her unit into common areas. The Association requested that the defendant’s condominium unit be sold at a judicial sale and that it be awarded its attorneys’ fees. The trial court found the defendant’s acts and omissions violated the Master Deed and Bylaws and that the Association was entitled to the relief it requested; accordingly, the court ordered that the unit be sold and awarded $116,037.77 in attorneys’ fees against the defendant. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dawn A. Moss v. William Barry Moss
At issue is when Husband shall pay $250,000 in cash awarded to Wife in the division of the marital estate and whether post-judgment interest shall accrue. In the Final Decree, payment of the $250,000 was deferred pending Husband’s receipt of an expected inheritance from his recently deceased uncle. The Decree, however, expressly provided that Wife could petition the court for relief in the event the deceased uncle’s estate was not closed within one year. As authorized by the trial court, one year later, Wife filed a motion requesting that Husband be ordered to pay the $250,000 award. The trial court denied Wife’s request for immediate payment of the money and denied her request for post-judgment interest. Wife appeals contending that the trial court erred in not awarding the immediate payment of the full amount and post-judgment interest. Finding it inequitable for Husband to have the use and benefit of the marital estate, much of which is income producing, while Wife is deprived of the bulk of her share of the marital estate, we reverse and remand with instructions for the entry of a judgment in favor of Wife of $250,000 plus post-judgment interest from the filing of the motion for relief. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Melanie T. et al.
This dependent and neglected action involves the defendant’s minor biological child and two minor stepchildren. The defendant appeals the finding by the circuit court that he severely abused his two stepchildren. He contends that DCS failed to state a claim against him upon which relief could be granted because he is not the biological or legal father of the children. He also contends the evidence is insufficient to find that he committed severe child abuse. We have determined the petition states a claim against the defendant, and that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings that all three children are dependent and neglected, and that the defendant severely abused the two stepchildren children. Thus, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Vivian Kennard v. Arthur M. Townsend, IV, M.D., et al.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee healthcare provider after its determination that Appellant patient’s medical expert did not meet the locality requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-115(a)(1). Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan K. Howard
The Defendant, Bryan K. Howard, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, with the length of his sentence and manner of service left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing and sentenced the Defendant to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying all forms of alternative sentencing. Following our de novo review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gwen Shamblin, et al. v. Rafael Martinez
This defamation action arises out of the publication of a statement to an internet website. The trial court held that plaintiffs were unable to show actual malice in order to sustain defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Blankenship v. Ace Trucking, Inc., et al
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In 2002, the employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the course and scope of his employment. The employee filed suit for benefits. The employer disputed the claim, asserting that the employee had failed to give proper notice and had not sustained any permanent injury as a result of the accident. The trial court awarded benefits, and the employer has appealed. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Humphreys | Workers Compensation Panel |