Porsha Perkins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
A social worker employed by an agency of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County was discharged from her job following an allegation that she had pinched a child attending a Head Start program. She then filed a discrimination and wrongful termination claim with the Metro Civil Service Commission. After the allegations against her proved to be baseless, she settled her claim with Metro for $45,000 and agreed not to be reinstated in her former job. She subsequently filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Davidson County for retaliatory discharge and for employment discrimination. The discrimination claim was eventually dismissed by agreed order. Metro filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning among other things that because of the settlement of her claim and her agreement not to be reinstated, she could not prove, as a matter of law, that she was “adversely affected” in any material way by the termination of her employment. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Peggy Diana Schroer v. Richard Michael Schroer
The trial court granted both parties an absolute divorce after a marriage of twenty-four years, divided the marital property equally between them, and declared that neither party was to be awarded alimony. The husband appeals, arguing that the property division was inequitable because he came into the marriage with $500,000 worth of separate property while the wife only owned a negligible amount of separate propertyat the time of the parties’ marriage, and also because he was also the primary wage earner during the marriage. He also argues that the trial court should have awarded him alimony. The wife asserts that the husband’s separate assets became maritalpropertyover the years through the processesof commingling of assets or transmutation, and that the equal division of that property was equitable. She also denies that the husband is entitled to alimony. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Paul Scott v. James Kevin Roberson
Plaintiff injured in automobile accident died while his negligence action was pending. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a suggestion of death but neglected to move to substitute a party for the deceased plaintiff within 90 days, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(1). Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which led plaintiff’s estate to file a motion to enlarge time within which to move to substitute pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 6.02. The trial court determined plaintiff’s counsel’s neglect in moving to substitute within 90 days was not excusable and granted defendants’ motions, dismissing the action. On appeal we affirm the trial court’s judgment because we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the neglect was not excusable. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Shannon Lee Jarnigan v. State of Tennessee
A Hamblen County Jury convicted Petitioner, Shannon Lee Jarnigan, and her co-defendants of one count each of first degree premeditated murder. They were each sentenced to life in prison. State v. George Arthur Lee Smith, et. al., No. E2009-00984- CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4117603, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 19, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008). Petitioner was unsuccessful on direct appeal to this Court. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that she was afforded the ineffective assistance of counsel and her constitutional rights were violated by various means. The post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals this decision. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not proven her allegations. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harrison A. Azari v. Greyhound Bus Station, Nashville, Tennessee
Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 against the owner of a bus line alleging security guards assaulted him while he was waiting for a bus in 2003. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff’s action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-104(a)(1) requires a plaintiff suing for personal injuries to file his complaint within one year of the date of the alleged assault resulting in injuries. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Damien Neely
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Damien Neely, of facilitation of second degree murder, and the trial court ordered him to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to exclude recorded telephone calls he made from jail; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in applying to his sentence enhancement factor (9), pursuant to T.C.A. § 40-35-114, that the Defendant possessed or employed a firearm during the commission of the offense. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marlow Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Marlow Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated robbery conviction, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), challenge to the trial court’s use of enhancement factors in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danthony Michael Pender
Appellant, Danthony Michael Pender, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery in August of 2008. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in incarceration. Appellant seeks a review of his conviction after the denial of a motion for new trial. On appeal, the following ssues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the jury verdict was contrary to the law and evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal; and (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for new trial. after a review, we determine that all of appellant’s issues involve the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeanette Hill v. Michael Lester Hill
This is a post-divorce action. Appellant/Father, who is incarcerated for sexually abusing his step-daughter, appeals the trial court’s: (1) grant of Appellee/Mother’s petition to change the surnames of the two minor children that were born to the marriage; (2) denial of Appellant/Father’s petition to grant him visitation with the minor children; and (3) entry of an order requiring Appellant/Father to execute a qualified domestic relations order to effectuate the trial court’s award of assets as child support. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Shea (Matheny) Coyle v. Gregory E. Erickson, et al
Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action to have the Court declare that she was entitled to the proceeds of a trust fund, as she was the legitimate child of her father. The Trial Court granted partial summary judgment on the grounds that all the records of her birth, baptismal records, and the parents divorce, and the father never questioning her legitimacy, established her legitimacy, and the defendant's son who challenged her right to the proceeds had no standing to question her legitimacy. On appeal, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Randall D. Kiser v. Ian J. Wolfe, et al.
The plaintiff, an employee of the insured, was injured while driving the insured’s tow truck. He filed suit against the defendant and later sought to invoke the insured’s uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed on the first page of the policy rather than the amount otherwise fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, holding that the insured was entitled to a partial summary judgment. When the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits, but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the “in writing” requirement under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201(a)(2) (2008) has been satisfied. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the entry of partial summary judgment and such other proceedings, as may be necessary. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
Randall D. Kiser v. Ian J. Wolfe, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that our review should include all three pages of the insurance application appended to the summary judgment motion. I, however, would construe Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1201 (2008) to require more than merely the insured’s signature at the end of an application for insurance in order for the insured to effectively reject “in writing” the amount of uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage otherwise mandated by the statute. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. James Earl Garrett, Jr.
The defendant appeals the 20-year effective sentence imposed for his Dickson County Circuit Court convictions of two counts of the facilitation of second degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by misapplying the enhancement factors and by imposing consecutive terms. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sandy L. Binkley
A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant,Sandy L.Binkley,of two counts of statutory rape by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six years in prison for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for a twelve-year effective sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred: (1) when it excluded testimony from her expert witness; and (2) when it improperly sentenced her to the maximum sentence within her range and improperly imposed consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude the trial court properly excluded the expert’s testimony and also properly sentenced the Defendant. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Trevor Moore, et al. v. Houston County Board of Education, et al.
This matter arises from an assault of a student which occurred at Houston County Middle School. The parents of the victim sued the Houston County Board of Education, two HCMS students who participated in the assault, and the mothers of the students involved in the attack. Following a bench trial, the court granted Plaintiffs a judgment for $50,578.97. The court determined that the school board was 25 percent at fault; the court also found that the school board was immune pursuant to the discretionary function exception of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and dismissed the case against the board. The court then granted plaintiffs judgment against the non-governmental defendants jointly and severally for 75 percent of the monetary award. We affirm the trial court’s holding that the Board was negligent, reverse the trial court’s ruling that the school board was immune, and modify the judgmentto hold the defendants jointlyand severallyliable for the entire amount of damages awarded. |
Houston | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Vice, et al. v. Elmcroft of Hendersonville, et al.
The daughter of an eighty-seven year old woman was looking for an assisted living facility for her mother, who was suffering from dementia. Elmcroft of Hendersonville assured the daughter that it could care for her mother and admitted her after the daughter informed it of her concern about her mother’s risk for falls. Three weeks following her admission the mother fell, and then fell three more times before the daughter moved her out of Elmcroft. The final fall resulted in a broken clavicle, which caused the mother pain and decreased mobility for the rest of her life. The daughter, as her mother’s representative, sued Elmcroft and its administrator for negligence and negligent admission and retention of her mother. A jury awarded a judgment against the defendants for $250,000. There was evidence the Elmcroft staff did not follow Elmcroft’s fall prevention policies and procedures. Elmcroft argued that all claims filed against it involved matters of medical science or art requiring specialized skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons, and, therefore, this was a medical malpractice which should have been dismissed since the statutory requirements for such a claim had not been met. We conclude, based on the evidence herein, that the claims were ordinary negligence claims. Elmcroft also argued (1) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the negligence of the daughter and a physician from another state who indicated the mother may be cared for by an assisted living facility and (2) that the jury award was excessive, contained a punitive component, and was the result of passion, prejudice and caprice. We conclude the court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on the physician’s comparative fault or the daughter’s comparative negligence. We also conclude there was material evidence to support the jury’s award of damages. Consequently, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph A. Patterson
The Defendant, Joseph A. Patterson, was found guilty at a bench trial before the Williamson County Criminal Court of driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008) (amended 2010). He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with fifty-five days of the sentence to be served. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tabitha Layne, et al. v. Tyron Layne Adkins, et al
Tabitha Layne, individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Freddie Steven Layne, and as Next Friend of Stephanie Layne and Teddy Layne “Plaintiff”) sued Tyron Layne Adkins, Kenneth Rowe, and a certain tract or parcel of Property Identified as Map #089, Parcel 060.01 (“the Property”) alleging, in part, that Ms. Adkins and Mr. Rowe had committed fraud with regard to deeds of conveyance of the Property. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that four specific deeds with regard to the Property were void; that legal title to the Property is held by the heirs of Ted Layne with the Estate of Freddie Steven Layne holding title to one-third interest, Nancy Bolton Layne holding title to one-third interest, and Tyron Layne Adkins holding title to onethird interest; and awarding Mr. Rowe a judgment against Tyron Layne Adkins of $139,000 as a result of a cross-claim. Mr. Rowe appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie L. Coleman v. Jim Morrow, Warden
The petitioner, Leslie L. Coleman, pled guilty to one count of felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison and fifteen years. He now appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the court below erred in concluding that the trial court had the authority to sentence him to life in prison. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his judgment is void or that he is otherwise entitled to relief, we affirm the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. |
Bledsoe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Evans and Michael Daniels
A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellants, Timothy Evans and Michael Daniels, of first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder. In addition, the jury convicted Evans of carrying a dangerous weapon. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Evans to concurrent sentences of life for the murder conviction, sixteen years for the conspiracy conviction, and thirty days for the carrying a dangerous weapon conviction. The trial court sentenced Daniels to consecutive sentences of life for the murder conviction and twenty-three years for the conspiracy conviction. On appeal, the appellants argue that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant their motions to sever, (3) the trial court erred by using extreme and unnecessary security measures that prejudiced the jury against them, and (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant their motions for a new trial because the State’s gang expert committed perjury. In addition, Daniels argues that (5) the trial court erred by failing to redact the indictments properly and (6) the trial court failed to control a witness adequately while the witness was testifying. Finally, the appellants contend that the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Korey Bradley
Defendant, Korey Bradley was charged with attempted second degree murder of Brandon Williams, aggravated assault of Brandon Williams, and felony reckless endangerment of Jarvis McDaniel. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder, and guilty as charged on the aggravated assault and felony reckless endangerment. He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for misdemeanor reckless endangerment, eight years for aggravated assault, and three years for felony reckless endangerment. The trial court ordered the eight-year and three-year sentences to be served consecutively with each other and concurrently to the sentence for misdemeanor reckless endangerment for an effective elevenyear sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) his conviction for aggravated assault should be merged into his conviction for misdemeanor reckless endangerment resulting in one conviction for misdemeanor reckless endangerment; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on aggravated assault as a lesserincluded offense of attempted second degree murder; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for felony reckless endangerment; and (4) his effective sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we remand for the trial court to merge the conviction for misdemeanor reckless endangerment of Brandon Williams with the conviction for aggravated assault of Brandon Williams. All other aspects of the judgments are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Fielder
Defendant, Christopher Fielder, was indicted along with his co-defendants Korry Hernandez and John Karcher for the class A felonies of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping of Jason Seitz. Defendant proceeded to be tried by a Shelby County jury. His co-defendants testified against him pursuant to negotiated plea agreements. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years for each of the Class A felony convictions, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with each other. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the sentences are excessive because (1) the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors; (2) the trial court erroneously failed to apply appropriate mitigating factors; and (3) his sentences are excessive and disproportionate when compared with the sentences received by his co-defendants. We find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred Gettner - Concurring
I concur in results because, respectfully, I disagree that we should per se presume the correctness of the sentencing judgment based upon the absence of the plea submission hearing transcript. I believe that the presentence report contained in the record provides this court with an understanding of the nature and circumstances of the offenses such that we can perform our mandated duty of conducting a de novo review upon the record. On the other hand, I believe that the trial court’s judgment is supported in the record and should be affirmed on that basis. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Baron H.S.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case regarding Baron H.S.M. (“the Child”), the son of Sandra M. (“Mother”). Mother maintained a long-term relationship with Ray C., before and since the Child’s birth. She contends that Ray is the Child’s biological father.1 Mother was incarcerated when the Child was born. She arranged to transfer the Child to the care of Ray’s sister, Peggy V. and her husband, Ronald V. collectively, “the Guardians”). Over two years after they took custody, the Guardians filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and adopt the Child. After a bench trial, the court terminated Mother’s rights upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that Mother had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit or support him and (2) that termination is in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deshawn Wentz
The defendant, Deshawn Wentz, was convicted bya Montgomery County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and was sentenced bythe trial court to concurrent terms of eleven and seven years, respectively, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals |