Phillip Lowell Bledsoe v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phillip Lowell Bledsoe, appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to pursue potentially exculpatory evidence; failed to impeach a detective's credibility based on his police misconduct in a different case; failed to object to numerous references to the petitioner's gang membership; and failed to file a motion in limine, make an objection, or request a limiting instruction regarding references to a polygraph examination. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rick D. Hanebutt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Rick D. Hanebutt, appeals the Carroll County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving concurrent sentences of life and twenty years for his convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to continue the postconviction hearing; and (2) denying his petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that the court erred in denying relief because he claims he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to: (1) investigate the case and present viable witnesses, proof, and argument as to self-defense; (2) obtain a ballistics expert; (3) obtain unadulterated copies of phone records and obtain the phone records of another witness; (4) properly impeach a witness with inconsistent evidence, statements, and testimony; (5) contest the search warrant; (6) renew a motion to change venue; (7) object to statements made by the prosecution during voir dire; and (8) request additional jury instructions on drug usage and witness credibility. He further contends that the cumulative effect of all the alleged errors supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a thorough review of the record before us, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Beverly Angel v. Diane Nixon
The paternal grandmother of a three-year-old child filed a petition seeking visitation pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-6-306. The grandmother contended that the child's mother prevented the grandmother from seeing the child following the death of the child's father. Grandmother also contended that she had a significant existing relationship with the child and that the loss of this relationship was likely to cause severe emotional harm to the child. The trial court granted the petition and awarded the grandmother three hours of visitation every third Sunday at the grandmother's home. The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in making the award to the grandmother, because the mother did not oppose visitation. Alternatively, she argued that the proof did not support a finding that the grandmother had a significant existing relationship with the child or that the child would be severely emotionally harmed from severance of that relationship. We affirm the trial court's determination that the grandmother is entitled to three hours of visitation every third Sunday. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Foust, Jr. v. Larry E. Metcalf, et al.
Plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to a strip of land along a former railroad line. Defendant, an adjacent landowner, asserts that plaintiff has no interest in the disputed property because the deed that purportedly conveyed the property to plaintiff was champertous and void due to the fact defendant was adversely possessing the property under color of title at the time of the deed. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous or that defendant had acquired title by seven years of adverse possession under color of title for thirty years. We have determined the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard by holding that defendant had to prove seven years of adverse possession to establish that plaintiff's deed was champertous. Instead, defendant need only prove that he was in adverse possession at the time of the deed to plaintiff. Defendant established he was in adverse possession under color of title of the disputed property at the time of plaintiff's deed; accordingly, the deed is champertous. Champertous deeds are void; therefore, plaintiff never acquired a legal interest in the disputed property. We reverse the judgment of the trial court quieting title in favor of plaintiff. As for defendant's prayer that he be declared the owner of the disputed property, we have determined that an indispensable party is missing, the grantor of the deed to plaintiff; therefore, we make no ruling concerning defendant's claim that he owns the property by adverse possession of at least seven continuous years under color of title pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-105. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Ray Sender
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Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. April Jennifer Warren
The defendant, April Jennifer Warren, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant agreed to a sentence of ten years a Range II, multiple offender, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Domonte O. Briggs
A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Domonte O. Briggs, of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of two years' incarceration to be served consecutively to previously imposed sentences from North Carolina. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is dismissed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy L. Gladden, Jr.
The defendant Jimmy L. Gladden Jr., appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentence in confinement. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state's motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Ray Sender
The Defendant, Jonathan Ray Sender, pled guilty to reckless aggravated assault, with an agreed sentence of four years and the trial court to determine the manner of service. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion, and ordered the defendant to serve thirty days of his four-year sentence in confinement, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred when it denied him judicial diversion and ordered a sentence of split confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ladarius Tyree Springs
The defendant, Ladarius Tyree Springs, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Hamilton County Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to six years incarceration suspended to intensive probation after the service of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement. While on probation, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault. A violation of probation warrant issued and, following a revocation hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lanny Wayne Waddell
A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Lanny Wayne Waddell, of domestic assault, see T.C.A. _ 39-13-111(b) (2006), and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Michael C. M., Shania M. J., and Jania M. J.
The trial court terminated Father's parental rights upon a finding of abandonment and upon determining termination was in the best interests of the children. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sean Terrell Horton
The defendant, Sean Terrell Horton, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of possession with the intent to deliver or sell 26 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Earl Brown, Jr.
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Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Nelson
The defendant, Joseph Nelson, was convicted by a Madison County jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years, to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Anthony Jones
A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, William Anthony Jones, of aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erroneously prohibited him from"argu[ing] that the defendant lacked the mental state of intentionally or knowing[ly] with respect to causing serious bodily injury." Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer (Pitts) Bradford vs. David Wilson Pitts
The father was paying child support, became disabled and filed a Petition to suspend child support payments until his disability insurance began paying. By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his disability insurance began paying a monthly amount. The Trial Judge ultimately refused to lower the child support payments, finding that the father established no variance between his income before and after his disability. The father tendered his income tax return for the year when the child support obligation was set, but the Trial Court refused to consider this evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Quint Bourgeois vs. McCurdy and Candler, LLC, et al
The pertinent order in this case was entered by the trial court on August 25, 2010. Therefore, the thirtieth day from and after the date of entry of the order was Friday, September 24, 2010. The date of September 24, 2010, was not a legal holiday and there is nothing before us to indicate that it was a day when "weather or other conditions have made the office of the court clerk inaccessible." Tenn. R. App. P. 21(a). The appellant's notice of appeal was received and filed by the trial court clerk on Monday, September 27, 2010. As can be seen, the notice was not filed and received by the trial court clerk within 30 days of the date of entry of the order from which the appeal was taken. Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction of this appeal due to the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aubrey Tremaine Eisom and Cedric Moses
A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Aubrey Tremaine Eisom, of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery and convicted the defendant, Cedric Moses, of two counts of the facilitation of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced Mr. Eisom to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for both of the felony murder convictions and a consecutive sentence of 40 years' incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court sentenced Mr. Moses to 25 years' incarceration for each of his three convictions and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of 25 years. In this appeal, Mr. Eisom contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bill of particulars, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his trial from that of Mr. Moses, that the trial court erred by prohibiting him from presenting a "third party defense," and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Mr. Moses also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claiming that the State failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of accomplice Ewan Dewayne Anthony. Mr. Moses additionally asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to sever his trial from that of Mr. Eisom and that his sentence is excessive. Discerning no error in the judgments of the trial court in Mr. Eisom's case, we affirm Mr. Eisom's convictions and the accompanying sentence. Because the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony relative to Mr. Moses' involvement in the crimes, we reverse Mr. Moses' convictions and dismiss the charges against him. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billy J. Coffelt v. State of Tennessee
In Davidson County Criminal Court, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of felony escape, two counts of aggravated assault and three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. State v. Lyle T. Van Ulzen, No. M2004-02462-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 2874654, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 31, 2005); State v. Billy J. Coffelt, No. M2002- 01214-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22116628, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 11, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 2, 2004). After direct appeal to this Court and resentencing, Petitioner's effective sentence was ninety years. Lyle T. Van Ulzen, 2005 WL 2874654, at *6-7. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition. Petitioner specifically argues that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel: (1) refused to allow Petitioner to testify at trial and failed to request a Momon hearing; (2) failed to request Pattern Jury Instruction 8.02 and an instruction on the elements of false imprisonment as a lesser included offense of especially aggravated kidnapping; (3) failed to request a jury instruction for the natural and probable consequences rule; (4) failed to raise in either the motion for new trial or on direct appeal the issue of stipulation of the offense for which Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of his escape; and (5) failed to request a severance from the co-defendant. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Thomas Pardue
Appellant, Jeffrey Thomas Pardue, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for burglary of a motor vehicle and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. A jury found aAppellant guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years for burglary and three years for theft, and the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court suspended the sentences and placed appellant on probation. Appellant was also ordered to receive alcohol treatment and pay restitution in the amount of $1,184. After the denial of a motion for new trial, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for burglary of a vehicle and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Catherine M. Love et al vs. Doris Lakins Woods
This case arises from the trial court's denial of Plaintiff/Appellants' motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Appellants, the surviving children of decedent, filed a wrongful death claim against the Appellee herein, the driver of a car involved in the accident that killed decedent. During negotiations, Appellee/Defendant's attorney proposed a settlement in the amount of Appellee's insurance policy limit, which Appellee's attorney misstated to be $100,000, when, in fact, the policy limit was $50,000. The trial court denied Appellants' motion to enforce the $100,000 settlement finding that the settlement was not enforceable, as it failed to contain certain material terms of the agreement. We conclude that the trial court failed to determine whether an agency relationship existed between the Appellee's attorney and the insurance company and also whether the insurance company is required to be a party to this litigation. Vacated and remanded. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Szemborski, et al vs. Roger Sayner
The order from which the appellant Roger Sayner seeks to appeal was entered in the trial court on August 18, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed with and received by the trial court clerk on September 21, 2010. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction of this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Michelle Fowler v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kathy Michelle Fowler, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in one indictment for domestic assault, harassment, and aggravated criminal trespass. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to domestic assault. The remaining two charges were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. Petitioner filed a petition to expunge the dismissed charges pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that the plain language of the statute excluded expungement of "cases in which the defendant has been convicted of a charge within the case." Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. We granted the petition in order to determine if the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted illegally. After a review of the record, we determine that based on this Court's decision in State v. Gerald Gifford, No. E2006-02500- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1813105 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 23, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2008), the trial court herein improperly denied the petition to expunge the dismissed charges where petitioner was indicted in a multi-count indictment, pled guilty to one count of the indictment, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including granting petitioner's petition to expunge the dismissed charges of harassment and aggravated criminal trespass. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patsy Freeman, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John R. Freeman, Deceased v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a Florida Corporation, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that Rutherford County was an appropriate venue for this action and, consequently, that the Rutherford County court had subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s statement that “unless the plaintiff and at least one ‘material defendant’ reside in the same county and that county is where the cause of action accrued” the common county rule does not apply. Essentially, the majority holds that the venue statute does not apply, a conclusion that I believe is erroneous. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |