William Coley v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Coley, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his convictions of first-degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that the post-conviction court violated his due process rights by conducting his post-conviction hearing jointly with the post-conviction hearing of his then co-defendant, now Petitioner Markreo Quintez Springer. He additionally claims ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a pretrial severance motion based on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-137 (1968), and trial counsel’s failure to challenge the chain of custody regarding the State’s DNA evidence.1 Upon our review, we affirm.
|
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jason Steven Molthan
The Defendant, Jason Steven Molthan, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of one count of stalking and one count of harassment. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent service. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have merged his convictions and that the trial court erred by failing to file a consecutive sentencing order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c). Upon our review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to provide this Court with an adequate appellate record and has not prepared a sufficient brief. Because we cannot conduct a meaningful appellate review of his issues, we conclude that the issues are waived. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Cayson C., Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Grainger County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Pamela C. (“Mother”) to her minor children Cayson S.-C. and Chaston C. (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing on the termination petition, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children. Mother appeals. We vacate the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody because the Juvenile Court failed to make specific findings regarding the second prong of that ground. We find that all other grounds found by the Juvenile Court were proven by clear and convincing evidence. We find further, as did the Juvenile Court, that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. We affirm as modified. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
Jessica Marie Forsythe, et al. v. Jackson Madison County General Hospital District, et al.
The trial court granted the defendant medical providers summary judgment on the basis of the plaintiff s failure to comply with the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act's pre-suit notice and good faith certificate requirements. On appeal, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendants, argues that her claim does not relate to the provision of health care services and that she was therefore not required to give pre-suit notice or file a good faith certificate. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that the claim is related to the provision of health care services, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Suzanne R. Vance v. Sally Ann Blue et al.
Co-owners sought partition of their real property. They agreed that the property, a singlefamily home, could not be partitioned in kind. But they disagreed on the appropriate remedy. One owner asked the court to order a public sale and divide the proceeds between the parties. The other owner sought permission to buy out her co-owner’s interest. The court declined to order a sale. Instead, based on the equities, it directed one owner to buy out the other owner’s interest at a fixed price. Because the court’s decision contravened the partition statutes, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
|
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Melvin M. et al.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of five statutory grounds for terminating his parental rights. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. On appeal, although we conclude that there is not clear and convincing evidence to support three of the grounds, clear and convincing evidence supports the remaining grounds for termination and the best interest determination. So we affirm.
|
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Martigous Malone v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Martigous Malone, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel and entered a voluntary guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorenta Hogue v. P&C Investments, Inc. et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict holding a real estate agent liable for common law negligence, intentional misrepresentation and fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act for his failure to disclose flooding and water intrusion issues at a home he had listed for sale. The jury awarded the plaintiff, a first-time home buyer, compensatory and punitive damages. The real estate agent appeals the jury’s verdict holding him liable for intentional misrepresentation and fraud, the admission of certain expert testimony, the admission of opposing counsel’s alleged prejudicial statements during closing argument, the amount of compensatory damages, and the award of and amount of punitive damages. Finding that the trial court failed to follow the appropriate procedures in reviewing the jury’s award of punitive damages, we vacate the award of punitive damages and remand the case for further proceedings. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Courtney Watkins
The petitioner, Courtney Watkins, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roddarous Marcus Bond v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Roddarous Marcus Bond, appeals the summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Madison County Circuit Court, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because his sentence is illegal. After our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Betty Sparks
A Hardeman County jury convicted the defendant, Betty Sparks, of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, aggravated assault with serious bodily injury, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which she received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. She also contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms in counts one and two |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Dale Pitts
Larry Dale Pitts, Defendant, was convicted of aggravated assault after a jury trial. The trial court denied his request for judicial diversion and sentenced him to split confinement, with one year of incarceration, and the remainder on supervised probation. He now appeals the sentencing determinations of the trial court, arguing that it abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion, denying full probation, and sentencing him to the maximum within-range sentence of six years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr., BPR #011451
This is an attorney discipline proceeding concerning Tennessee attorney Joseph H. Crabtree, Jr. and his representation of several clients with varying legal issues. The Board of Professional Responsibility ("the Boare) filed formal petitions for discipline against Mr. Crabtree in February 2019. A Hearing Panel of the Board ("Hearing Panel") adjudicated the petitions and rendered a judgment suspending Mr. Crabtree for two years and ordering him to serve six months as active suspension and the remainder on probation. It also directed Mr. Crabtree to pay restitution to two clients, to reimburse one client for any costs assessed against her upon the dismissal of her case, and to reimburse the Tennessee Lawyers Fund for Client Protection ("TLFCP") for any money it pays to the complainants in this matter. Mr. Crabtree failed to perfect an appeal from the Hearing Panel's decision, and the Board petitioned this Court for an order enforcing the Hearing Panel's judgment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, sections 15.4(d) and (e), we determined that the punishment imposed by the Hearing Panel appeared inadequate. Thus, we proposed to increase it. Based on our careful consideration of the entire record, "with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case," we modify the judgment of the Hearing Panel to impose a three-year suspension, with one year served as active suspension and the remainder on probation. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b), (d). During the first year of the probationary period, Mr. Crabtree shall engage a practice monitor at his own expense to supervise his compliance with trust account rules and office management procedures in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 12.9. Finally, as a condition of reinstatement, Mr. Crabtree shall complete twelve hours of continuing legal education ("CLE"), with six hours focused on ethics and six hours on law office management, in addition to the annual fifteen-hour CLE requirement. In all other respects, including payment of restitution to his clients and reimbursement to TLFCP, the decision of the Hearing Panel is affirmed.
|
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
In Re Legion S.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her daughter based on severe child abuse and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the two statutory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Dale Crass
The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Tony Dale Crass, Defendant, with driving |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Masson S.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her son based on abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, failure to remedy persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child. The trial court granted the petition, finding that the five statutory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We affirm. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Darin Woods v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Darin Woods, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted second degree murder, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he is serving an effective twenty-seven year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Randolyn Laferney v. Kim Livesay Et Al
Plaintiff Randolyn Laferney filed a tort action against several defendants, alleging causes of action for, inter alia, libel, civil conspiracy, and malicious prosecution. The allegations arose primarily out of social media comments and posts made by the defendants regarding Ms. Laferney. On December 10, 2020, the trial court dismissed the legal action as to some, but not all, of the defendants pursuant to Tennessee’s anti-SLAPP statute, the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“the TPPA” or “the Act”). Several months later, after the trial court awarded the dismissed defendants their attorney’s fees, Ms. Laferney appealed to this Court. Because we conclude that the notice of appeal was untimely pursuant to the TPPA, the appeal is dismissed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
City of Knoxville, Tennessee v. Netflix, Inc. et al.
This is a case about fitting new technology into a not-so-new statutory scheme. Exercising our power to answer questions certified to us by federal courts, we consider whether two video streaming services—Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC—provide “video service” within the meaning of a Tennessee law that requires such providers to obtain a franchise and pay franchise fees to localities. Netflix and Hulu say they do not provide “video service” and therefore do not owe franchise fees; the City of Knoxville says they do. We agree with Netflix and Hulu. |
Supreme Court | ||
Abraham A. Augustin v. Bradley County Sheriff's Office Et Al.
This is the second appeal of this forfeiture action. Appellant seeks the return of seized property and damages under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-215(b). In Augustin v. Bradley County Sheriff’s Office, et al., 598 S.W.3d 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2019), this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Augustin’s claim for return of the seized property but remanded the case for further proceedings on the section 40-33- 215(b) question. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for damages under section 40- 33-215(b). Because Appellant is not a prevailing party, he does not meet the threshold requirement for an award of damages under section 40-33-215(b). Affirmed and remanded.
|
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Family Trust Services LLC et al v. Green Wise Homes LLC et al
This appeal involves claims by four plaintiffs against an attorney, his business partner, and the attorney’s and partner’s limited liability company. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants fraudulently redeemed properties sold via tax sales, utilizing forged or fraudulent documents. Following a bifurcated jury trial, the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed except for the claim of one plaintiff against the attorney defendant, which resulted in a verdict for damages in the amount of $53,450. The trial court subsequently denied a motion for new trial filed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for new trial should be reversed. However, we affirm the trial court’s pre-trial determination that judgment on the pleadings was appropriate concerning the plaintiffs’ claims of unjust enrichment and “theft” of the right of redemption. We further affirm (1) the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants concerning the plaintiffs’ claim based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 66-22-113 and (2) the court’s denial of the defendant company’s motion to dissolve the lien lis pendens on its property. The remaining issue raised by the defendants is pretermitted as moot. We remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial.
|
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estrella A. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on five grounds, including severe child abuse. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interests, we affirm.
|
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lancaster Steed, Jr.
In 2019, the Defendant, Robert Lancaster Steed, Jr., pleaded guilty to evading arrest, false imprisonment, domestic assault, and theft. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, by agreement of the parties, to an effective sentence of six years of probation. After several violations, the trial court ultimately revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his poor performance on probation was due to his drug addiction, so the trial court should have ordered a period of confinement followed by intensive outpatient substance abuse and mental health treatment. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker
Tyshon Booker challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender. In fulfilling our duty to decide constitutional issues, we hold that an automatic life sentence when imposed on a juvenile homicide offender with no consideration of the juvenile’s age or other circumstances violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Mr. Booker stands convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery—crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. For the homicide conviction, the trial court automatically sentenced Mr. Booker under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-501(h)(2) to life in prison, a sixty-year sentence requiring at least fifty-one years of incarceration. But this sentence does not square with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. When sentencing a juvenile homicide offender, a court must have discretion to impose a lesser sentence after considering the juvenile’s age and other circumstances. Here, the court had no sentencing discretion. In remedying this constitutional violation, we exercise judicial restraint. We need not create a new sentencing scheme or resentence Mr. Booker—his life sentence stands. Rather, we follow the policy embodied in the federal Constitution as explained in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) and grant Mr. Booker an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be properly considered. The timing of his parole hearing is based on release eligibility in the unrepealed version of section 40-35-501(h)(1), previously in effect, that provides for a term of sixty years with release eligibility of sixty percent, but not less than twenty-five years of service. Thus, Mr. Booker remains sentenced to sixty years in prison, and after he has served between twenty-five and thirty-six years, he will receive an individualized parole hearing where his age and other circumstances will be considered. Our limited ruling, applying only to juvenile homicide offenders, promotes the State’s interest in finality and efficient use of resources, protects Mr. Booker’s Eighth Amendment rights, and is based on sentencing policy enacted by the General Assembly. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyshon Booker (Concur)
Not so long ago, it was commonplace for states to require juveniles convicted of homicide to serve sentences of over fifty years. Now, that practice has vanished. A review of sentencing statutes enacted by state legislatures and court decisions shows that there is now only one state where juvenile offenders face a mandatory non-aggregated sentence of more than 50 years for first-degree murder with no aggravating factors—Tennessee. In the entirety of the nation, Tennessee stands alone.
|
Knox | Supreme Court |