Kimberly Byars v. Earl Young
This is an appeal from a juvenile court custody proceeding. The mother filed a petition for legitimation in the Juvenile Court. The Juvenile Court entered an order finding that the defendant father is the child’s natural father, designating the mother as the child’s primary residential parent and granting weekend parenting time to the father. After a protracted dispute over parenting time, the Juvenile Court entered an order designating the father to be the child’s primary residential parent, with no provision for parenting time for the mother. The mother then appealed to the Circuit Court. After several years of Circuit Court proceedings, the case was transferred to another Circuit Court judge who ultimately entered an order dismissing the appeal. The mother appealed the Circuit Court’s order. After remand, the Circuit Court transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals. We affirm the designation of the father as the primary residential parent but find that the Juvenile Court erred in not providing for parenting time for the mother, and remand the case to the Juvenile |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Schiefelbein v. State of Tennessee
A Williamson County jury convicted the petitioner, Mark A. Shiefelbein, of seven counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to ninety-six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions but modified his sentence to thirty-two years. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he (1) did not object when the trial court ordered the spectators to move so they could not see the presentation of video evidence; (2) did not object when the trial court ordered that part of the defendant’s testimony be stricken from the record; (3) did not obtain a copy of the audio-taped conversation between the petitioner and the victim, object to the recording’s admission as evidence, or properly prepare the petitioner for cross-examination about the recording; (4) did not properly object or move for a mistrial during the state’s cross-examination of the petitioner; (5) did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of expert testimony; (6) did not object to the trial court’s questioning of state witnesses; (7) did not seek an extraordinary appeal when the trial court refused to compel the state to provide copies of videotape evidence; and (8) did not object to the state’s use of the term “vaginal shots.” Additionally, the petitioner avers that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s deficient performance post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Franke Elliott, et al. v. Icon in the Gulch, LLC
Purchasers of pre-construction condominium units sued the developer seeking rescission of their contracts to purchase the units. The developer filed a motion to compel mediation and/or arbitration pursuant to the contract. The trial court denied the motion and the developer appeals. Finding error, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry B. Brinton, Jr. v. Lisa A. Brinton
Father and Mother divorced in 1989 with the marital dissolution agreement obligating Father to pay all expenses for four years of college and graduate school for both son and daughter. Father refused to pay the entire cost of college for both but did pay $20,000 a year for each, deeming that reasonable. Mother sued. The trial court found that the children's choices of college were reasonable and that Father could afford the college costs. The trial court awarded Mother the costs she incurred in sending the children to college, interest and attorney's fees. Father appealed. We affirm and, based on the attorney fee provision of the MDA, remand for a determination of attorney's fees for Mother on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Discover Bank v. Joy A. Morgan
This lawsuit began as a collection claim filed by Discover Bank ("Discover") against Joy A. Morgan ("Morgan") for $16,341.52. Discover claimed Morgan owed this amount on a credit card originally issued to Morgan's husband, now deceased. Morgan filed an answer and counterclaim, asserting a claim for libel as well as claims pursuant to the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. _ 1681, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 47-18-101, et seq. Morgan's attorney gave Discover's original attorney an extension of time in which to file an answer to the counterclaim. After this extension of time had run, Morgan's attorney warned Discover's attorney that a motion for default judgment would be filed if an answer was not filed within fourteen days. When Discover failed to file an answer within the fourteen days, Morgan filed a motion for default judgment. Discover's attorney failed to show up for the hearing and a default judgment was awarded to Morgan. Discover filed a Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment "pursuant to Rule 60.02. . . ." This motion was denied. Following a later hearing on damages, Morgan was awarded compensatory damages totaling $125,200, which the trial court then trebled under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After obtaining new counsel, Discover filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was denied. Discover now appeals. We affirm the trial court's Order denying Discover's motion to alter or amend the judgment and set aside the default judgment. We, however, vacate the award of damages and remand for a new hearing on the amount of damages and also to determine reasonable attorney fees incurred by Morgan on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Wlodarz v. State of Tennessee
After entering “best interest” guilty pleas in order to avoid a potential death penalty conviction, Petitioner, Stephen Wlodarz, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The Hawkins County Criminal Court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in finding there was no newly discovered evidence and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Charles Howse
Following a bench trial, Defendant, William C. Howse, was convicted of violating the Sexual Offender Registration, Verification, and Tracking Act of 2004 (the "2004 Act"), a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to one year to be served as ninety days in confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in finding that he knowingly violated the provisions of the 2004 Act, and (2) the 2004 Act violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Wiggins
The defendant, Lisa Wiggins, pled guilty to facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony, and facilitation of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of one year of probation and ordered her to pay $4,874 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant argues that the state presented insufficient proof at the restitution hearing of the amount of restitution, and the trial court did not consider the defendant's financial resources and ability to pay. Following our review, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for consideration of the amount of restitution, the defendant's financial resources, and her ability to pay. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pierre Jackson
The defendant, Pierre Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide, two counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and one count of driving on a revoked license, third offense, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective sentence of fifty-two years, five months, and twenty-nine days. State v. Pierre Jackson, No. W2006-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2053652, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2008), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Dec. 8, 2008). In the first direct appeal, this court affirmed his convictions and the trial court's order of consecutive sentencing, but remanded for resentencing of the aggravated vehicular homicide convictions because the trial court erroneously applied an enhancement factor that was not found by the jury. Id. Upon resentencing, the trial court imposed the same sentence. The defendant now appeals, arguing that his sentence is "neither fair nor consistent" with those received by other defendants with similar records and equal moral culpability whose drunk driving by chance does not result in anyone's death. Following our review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Earnest Banks v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Earnest Banks, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to burglarizing a motor vehicle and was sentenced, as a Range II offender, to a term of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel placed him in “an untenable position of mounting no defense . . . or waiving his privilege against self-incrimination,” based upon trial counsel’s refusal to cross-examine witnesses regarding an unidentified third party. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Paul Clayton v. Andrea Dawn Clayton
Husband appeals the trial court's award of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido to Wife. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Mattie M. Lindsey, et al. v. Mark Lambert, et al.
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed against the attorneys and insurance company involved in the settlement of a personal injury claim. The trial court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs/appellants, Mattie and Edmond Lindsey, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Lindseys did not appeal the original dismissal of their claims but instead moved to set aside the court's judgment nearly one year later. The trial court declined to set aside its judgment and granted a motion for sanctions against the Lindseys. We affirm the trial court's denial of the Lindseys' motion to set aside, vacate its award of sanctions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Uvautai Brooks v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Uvautai Brooks, of one count of aggravated robbery and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the petitioner, as a Standard Range I Offender, to serve an effective ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner’s claim, and the petitioner appeals the decision of the court. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of Shelby R. and Sydnee R.
This appeal involves a custody dispute between a father and maternal grandparents. The father and grandparents initially filed a joint petition to remove custody from the children’s mother. When the father later filed a separate amended petition for custody on his own, the grandparents argued that he should be precluded from seeking custody due to a previous mediation agreement. The father argued that he was entitled to assert his superior parental right to custody against the grandparents. The trial court found the mediation agreement enforceable and did not consider the father’s petition for custody. The father appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Travis A. Bledsoe v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Travis A. Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sherry Tanner v. Whiteco, L.P. and Orangeco, L.P.
This case involves the question of whether Appellee entities are partnerships under Tennessee law. Appellant appeals the trial court’s order, which found that Appellee entities were not partnerships. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dorman O'Neal Elmore, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
A Cumberland County jury convicted the petitioner, Dorman O'Neal Elmore, Jr., of five counts of rape, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner pursued a delayed appeal pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentences. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to file various pre-trial motions, to properly prepare and investigate the case, and to investigate the victim's background constituted deficient performance and prejudiced the defense. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Frith
The defendant, Ricky Frith, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Mandel Moss, Alias Charles Mandell, Alias Pookie Doo
The Defendant, Charles Mandel Moss, alias Charles Mandell, alias Pookie Doo, was convicted of violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, a Class E felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, eleven months and twenty-nine days each for possession of marijuana and evading arrest, and thirty days each for violation of the open container law and violation of the seatbelt law. The court imposed partially consecutive sentences that resulted in an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the Defendant's previous arrests. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joey Lee Goins
A Sullivan County jury convicted the defendant, Joey Lee Goins, of facilitation of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in excluding statements of certain witnesses. The defendant also appeals the court's failure to sequester the jury in light of the media coverage of the trial. Lastly, the defendant argues that the court erred in imposing the defendant's sentences consecutively to each other and to his unrelated federal sentence of life without parole. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rashad G. Robinson
.A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Rashad G. Robinson, of possession of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, two counts of misdemeanor assault, Class A misdemeanors, and vandalism under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively to each other and to case number 07-372. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Hutson v. State of Tennessee
In June 2005, a Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Timothy Hutson, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to provide timely information about a plea agreement, failed to develop a working relationship with the petitioner, and advised the petitioner to wear jail clothes rather than civilian clothes during the trial. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joy Lamberson McNaughten, et al. v. Larry Lunan, et al.
The owners of a piece of commercial property brought an unlawful detainer action against a lessee who had stopped paying rent. The trial court issued a judgment of $33,450 against the lessee for past-due rent, followed by a writ of ejectment. After the lessee moved from the property, the owners sued to collect the rent due on the five-year lease and for damages to the property. The lessee argued that irregularities in the execution of the lease rendered it unenforceable. The trial court determined that the lease was enforceable and that the lessee could be held personally liable for a judgment in the amount of $326,716.74. We find that the parties did not reach the meeting of the minds that is necessary to form an enforceable contract, and we accordingly reverse. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Phedrek T. Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Phedreck T. Davis, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and assault, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. See State v. Phedrek T. Davis, No. M2006-00198-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2007), aff'd, 266S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2790 (2009). He claims that newly discovered evidence proves that the State solicited damaging perjury during his initial trial, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed his claim as having been previously determined. See T.C.A. _ 40-30-106(f). We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Alexander Smith
The Defendant, Andre Alexander Smith, was tried before a jury on an indictment charging one count of first degree felony murder. He was found guilty of one count of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in upholding the State's use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of voluntary manslaughter; and (3) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to certain portions of the State's closing argument. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |