State of Tennessee v. Timothy Scott Rauhuff
The appellant, Timothy Scott Rauhuff, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to manufacturing no less than 20 and no more than 99 marijuana plants. He received a four-year suspended sentence. Subsequently, the State brought a revocation action, alleging that the appellant violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve one year in confinement and the remainder of the sentence on intensive probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of a period of continuous confinement. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's ruling pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant to a period of continuous confinement. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Gazley, D/B/A Personalized Planting, Inc., v. Tulsi Associates, et al., and The Estate of Howard Sexton, for decedent Howard Sexton, et al., D/B/A Precision Construction Company
Plaintiff subcontractor, sued contractor, who constructed a hotel for co-defendant owner of hotel for breach of contract. Construction company cross-filed against defendant hotel owner. The Trial Court, after hearing proof, entered a joint settlement judgment against both defendants on behalf of the plaintiff and based the judgment on the terms of the settlement agreement which had been entered in a prior action in a suit between the defendants. The owner of the hotel appealed. We hold the Trial Court erred in its interpretation of the settlement agreement between the defendants, and set aside the judgment against appellant and direct that the contractor is liable for all the damages awarded, based on appellants' cross-action against the contractor. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Flatt, Attorney in Fact and Next of Kin if Decedent Falnetta Noble v. Claiborne County Hospital and Nursing Home
In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff offered evidence of the standard of care required of defendant by an expert witness, and defendant offered evidence that it complied with the standard of care by an expert witness, who was accepted as an expert by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge ruled in favor of defendant, essentially accepting the defendant's evidence that it had met the standard of care for the deceased. Plaintiff appealed, insisting that the Trial Court did not "correctly weigh the conflicting expert testimony" in its ruling for the defendant. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Wayland-Goodman Properties, LP., v. Southside Package Store, Inc.
Plaintiff landlord brought a detainer action against defendant in Sessions Court. On appeal to the Circuit Court, the Trial Court in its Judgment, awarded possession to plaintiff and awarded plaintiff a Judgment of $17,800.00 for the rent due and one-half of the 2009 ad valorem property taxes. Defendant has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Anderson Charles Carter, III, Deceased
This appeal involves a mother’s claims against her deceased adult son’s estate. The trial court denied the majority of her claims but granted her partial relief on one issue that was not disputed by the son’s estate. The mother appealed. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
James LaFayette Moore v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
Inmate appeals the trial court’s dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari challenging a decision of the prison disciplinary board. Because we have determined that the trial court erred in failing to allow the inmate to amend his petition, we vacate the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
James Morton Burris v. Lisa Estes Burris
This is a divorce case ending a twenty-one year marriage. Following a three day trial, the trial court entered a parenting plan naming Appellee/Father as the primary residential parent, granting Father decision making authority, and providing Appellant/Mother with visitation. The trial court also entered judgment against Mother for retroactive child support since the parties separation and for marital debts that had been paid by the Father during the separation. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jocques Lyons v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jocques Lyons, was charged with one count of first degree premeditated murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. On June 27, 2007, he pleaded guilty to one count of second degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, accepting under the terms of his plea agreement a twenty-five year sentence for each charge, to be served concurrently as a violent offender at 100%. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 24, 2008. A postconviction hearing was held on March 16, 2009, following which the post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief. He now appeals that denial, contending that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because: (1) his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in investigating the petitioner's case. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David A. Phillips
A Washington County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, David A. Phillips, of reckless homicide, vehicular homicide, reckless aggravated assault, felony reckless endangerment, and misdemeanor drag racing. The trial court merged the reckless homicide conviction into the vehicular homicide conviction and sentenced the appellant to six years. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years for the reckless aggravated assault conviction and one year for the felony reckless endangerment conviction with all the sentences to be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of six years. The trial court dismissed the misdemeanor drag racing conviction because it was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant; (3) the trial court erred by allowing two State witnesses to give improper testimony; (4) his sentence is excessive and the trial court should have ordered alternative sentencing; and (5) the trial court erred by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment as to the appellant's felony reckless endangerment conviction. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Hunter Heffel
The Defendant, Andrew Hunter Heffel, was charged with one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Before trial, he moved to suppress certain incriminating statements he made. The trial court granted his motion to suppress. The State was granted an interlocutory appeal from the order of the trial court suppressing the Defendant's statements. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Flint Green
The appellant, Flint Green, was convicted by a jury in the Sullivan County Criminal Court of possession of 26 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for a new trial based upon two jurors observing him "in custody" during trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Myrtle B. Lambert
The defendant, Myrtle B. Lambert, appeals from her guilty-pleaded convictions of several counts of identity theft, forgery, and theft. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that it was without jurisdiction to consider a pro se letter filed with the court on March 4, 2008, which, she claims, should have been treated as a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Although we find the defendant's argument misplaced, we conclude that the court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant's March 4, 2008 letter as a notice that the defendant would proceed pro se until having counsel appointed and her March 25, 2008 letter as a filing challenging jurisdiction. Because the defendant, though technically represented by retained counsel, had expressed that her relationship with counsel had ended, we hold that the trial court should have considered the letter as a pro se motion for an arrest of judgment. Because the record before this court is insufficient to determine whether Sullivan County possessed territorial jurisdiction to convict the defendant, we remand to the trial court for further fact finding. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sidney Terrell Cason
The Defendant, Sidney Terrell Cason, was charged with one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-403(b), -402(b), -304(b)(1). On August 11, 2008, he pleaded guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-210(c). He was sentenced on that day as a violent offender to concurrent sentences of forty years as a Range II, multiple offender for second degree murder and fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender for especially aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of forty years in the Department of Correction. On September 9, 2008, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Criminal Court of Davidson County denied the motion. The Defendant now appeals, contending that this denial was error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Lee Shields
The Defendant, John Lee Shields, pled guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, with sentencing left to the determination of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years suspended to probation after the service of ten months incarceration in the county jail. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him to split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this opinion. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Hunter Williams v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The pro se Petitioner, William Hunter Williams, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. The State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Wayman d/b/a Able Towing Company v. Transportation Licensing Commission of the Metro Government
The Transportation Licensing Commission revoked Petitioner's license to operate a wrecker service. The chancery court upheld the revocation. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Henry Zillon Felts v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Henry Zillon Felts, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-one years in the Department of Correction. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See State v. Henry Zillon Felts, No. M2005-01215-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2563374 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 25, 2006). He subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief. The Criminal Court of Sumner County found that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because: (1) trial counsel failed to fulfill his promise to the jury that the Petitioner would testify; and (2) trial counsel failed to argue attempted voluntary manslaughter as a defense. The post-conviction court thus set aside the Petitioner's convictions and granted him a new trial. In this appeal, the State contends that the post-conviction court erred in granting the Petitioner relief. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James P. Stout v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Stout, of one count of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner, a Range II offender, to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC"). The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, his second such petition, alleging that his conviction is void because: (1) his indictment was void because the grand jury foreperson issuing the indictment was appointed by a Shelby County trial judge; (2) his sentence is unconstitutional because, on the judgment of conviction, the trial judge checked both boxes indicating that his sentence should run at 35% and 100%. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals that judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cook
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Cook, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for his attempted murder conviction and three years for each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographic lineup used by a State's witness to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant's convictions of the two counts of aggravated assault in addition to the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder violates double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to Defendant's conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of twenty years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quortez Deshawn Duncan
The Defendant, Quortez Deshawn Duncan, was convicted by a Maury County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in the Department of Correction, to be suspended after service of one year. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient and that the Defendant's sentence is consistent with our 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act and its amendments, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Cook
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony Cook, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years for his attempted murder conviction and three years for each aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the photographic lineup used by a State’s witness to identify Defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant’s convictions of the two counts of aggravated assault in addition to the conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder violates double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant’s convictions of aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder. Weaffirm the trial court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction of attempted first degree premeditated murder and his sentence of twenty years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl E. Watson v. Robert P. Fogolin, M.D.
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initially brought suit in General Sessions Court against his former physician for defamation (libel and slander), breach of contract, and violation of the privacy provision of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). The General Sessions Court awarded a judgment of $25,000 to the plaintiff. The defendant timely appealed to the Circuit Court and filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff then amended his claims to include an alleged violation of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 and medical malpractice. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician, reversing the Sessions Court judgment and holding that (1) the defamation claim was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Department of Education forms completed by the defendant physician on behalf of the plaintiff did not constitute a contract; (3) HIPAA and Federal Privacy Act of 1974 claims had been withdrawn by the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff was unable to produce expert testimony to prove a claim of medical malpractice. The plaintiff timely appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Stephanie D. Hill v. City of Germantown, Tennessee; Germantown Police Department; Board of Mayor and Alderman of the City of Germantown, Tennessee
This appeal involves the termination of a municipal police officer. The housemate of the petitioner police officer accidentally damaged the police officer’s take-home police vehicle. Although the police officer suspected that her housemate caused the damage, the police officer nevertheless filed accident and insurance loss reports indicating that the damage was caused by an unknown driver. About two months later, the police officer and her housemate had a tumultuous break up. After that, the police officer’s supervisor discovered that the damage to the police vehicle may have been caused by the housemate. After an internal affairs investigation, the police officer was charged with violating police department rules regarding neglect of duty and lack of truthfulness. After a hearing before the municipal board, the police officer was found to have violated these rules and her employment was terminated. The city administrator upheld the termination. The police officer then filed the instant petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the administrative decision. The trial court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rennee N. Dhillon v. Gursheel S. Dhillon
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Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In the matter of: Sydney T. C. H.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals |