Harry Skipper, et ux v. State of Tennessee
Mr. Skipper filed a claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission, alleging that Tennessee Department of Transportation snow plow operator Dennis Burns crossed the center line, striking him. Mr. Burns became ill with cancer, and his deposition was scheduled three times before it was successfully taken. Following Mr. Burns’ deposition, Mr. Skipper failed to advance his claim for a period of one year, and the Claims Commission dismissed his claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(b). Mr. Skipper sought relief from the dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 6.02, 59, and 60.02. Mr. Skipper’s counsel claimed that he failed to act in order to allow Mr. Burns time to recover, so that he could testify live at trial. He further stated that it was his understanding that the State would contact him once such recovery was made. The Claims Commission denied Mr. Skipper relief from the order of dismissal, and Mr. Skipper appealed to this Court. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee ex rel Samelba P. Lewis (Robinson) v. T.J. Robinson, III
In this post-divorce proceeding, the father claims that his child support obligation should have been reduced due to his health and financial circumstances. The chancellor confirmed the child support referee’s recommendation to deny the father’s petition, finding that the father failed to file a timely request for a hearing before the chancellor following the hearing before the referee. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
David Ramey, Former Perry County Sheriff v. Perry County, Tennessee
The sheriff of Perry County sued the county mayor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 seeking additional employees, equipment, and vehicles to properly perform his duties. The trial court ordered the county to provide the sheriff’s office with funding for two additional deputies as well as gasoline, equipment, and uniforms. We have concluded that the trial court erred in ordering the county to fund two new road deputies and in authorizing expenditures to support road deputies. The evidence supports the need for one new detention officer and a part-time detention officer. We remand for a hearing on the reasonableness of the attorney fee award. |
Perry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquette Houston
The defendant, Marquette Houston, was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, but remanded the case for resentencing under the 1989 Sentencing Act with consideration of the constitutional restrictions on enhancing the defendant’s sentence above the presumptive minimum. On remand, the trial court again sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Maggie Barron, et al. v. Emerson Russell Maintenance Company d/b/a ERMC II, L.P., et al.
After being abducted from a mall parking lot, the plaintiff filed suit against the security company that provided security services to the mall. The trial court granted summary judgment to the security company, concluding that only the premises owner, i.e., the mall, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea S. Martin v. Patricia L. Williams, et al.
The central issue in this case is which of two insurance companies is required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the Plaintiff, who was injured in an automobile accident. The trial court granted summary judgment to the company through which Plaintiff had automobile insurance, finding that the company insuring the automobile in which Plaintiff was a passenger held the primary policy. We reverse and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and Wife Deborah Jakes, et al. - Order
In response to an opinion by this Court, filed on May 26, 2009, Alan Jakes Sr. and the other defendants in this case have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 Petition to Rehear. In our opinion, we reversed the Chancery Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ trespass claim and granted the plaintiffs judgment on that claim. The defendants note that the opinion erroneously stated that the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint at the conclusion of all the proof. In fact, the defendants raised an oral motion for involuntary dismissal of the complaint at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proof, and the trial court granted their motion. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Donnie Vaught, et al. v. Alan Jakes, Sr. and wife Deborah Jakes, et al.
A group of Rutherford County landowners whose property abutted one side of a private road which they maintained at their own expense filed a suit for trespass against a neighbor and developer who used the same road for access to houses he was building on the other side. Their suit also included a due process claim against the County for erroneously granting building permits for those houses. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proof, the trial court announced that it agreed that the building permits were granted in error, but it ruled that the county’s action was an innocent error rather than a due process violation. The trial court also granted the developer’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against him, holding that he was entitled to use the road because of a permanent easement he had acquired from his predecessors-in-interest. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the due process claim. However, we vacate its dismissal of the trespass claim because the plaintiff was able to present evidence that the individual who sold the property to the defendant had abandoned the easement and, thus, that the defendant had no right to use the road. We remand this case for further proceedings to give the defendant the opportunity to present evidence. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Jerome Washington, Alias Timothy Jerome Hughlett
The Defendant, Timothy Jerome Washington, alias Timothy Jerome Hughlett, appeals the revocation of his two community corrections sentences by the Criminal Court for Hamilton County. The defendant initially pled guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000, a Class D felony, for which he received a two-year suspended sentence in the community corrections program. While on community corrections, he pled guilty to theft of property valued over $10,000, a Class C felony, and he received a four-year suspended sentence to be served in community corrections consecutively to the two-year sentence. The trial court found that he violated the terms of both community corrections sentences, revoked the defendant’s sentences, and ordered him to serve the effective six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke the two-year sentence and that the trial court erred in revoking the sentences because the defendant did not “willfully” violate the terms of his sentence. We affirm the judgment revoking the defendant’s community corrections sentence in case 258929, vacate the judgment revoking the community corrections sentence in case 255487 because the sentence had expired, and remand the case for correction of the amended judgment in case 258929. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie D. Johnson
The defendant, Eddie D. Johnson, appeals from his Hamilton County bench trial conviction of driving under the influence. He challenges the legal sufficiency of the conviction evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Timothy Preston Russell
The Defendant, Timothy Preston Russell, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony, and three counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. He was sentenced to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender for the Class C felony and six years as a Range II, multiple offender for each Class D felony. Two six-year sentences were to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the eight-year sentence, to which another six-year sentence ran concurrently, for an effective fourteen-year sentence. The trial court denied probation and imposed incarceration. Appealing the denial of his motion to withdraw the four guilty pleas, the Defendant contends that he should be able to withdraw his guilty pleas to correct manifest injustice and that the trial court erred in not advising him that he would not be able to withdraw the guilty pleas if the court did not accept the plea agreement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Baptist Memorial Hospital and Baptist Memorial Health Care Corporation v. Argo Construction Corporation, Hanson Pipe & Products South, Inc., and ETI Corporation and ARGO Construction Corporation v. Hanson Pipe & Products South, Inc.
This appeal involves a cross-claim for indemnity. The cross-plaintiff construction company served as the general contractor on a drainage improvement project for a hospital. The cross-defendant subcontractor manufactured and provided concrete pipe for the project, which was installed by the general contractor. After completion of the project, a sinkhole developed in the hospital’s parking lot. An investigation revealed that the internal steel reinforcement for the concrete pipe was improperly positioned. The hospital sued, among others, the general contractor and the pipe subcontractor. The general contractor then filed a cross-claim against the pipe subcontractor for indemnity in the event the hospital received a judgment against the general contractor. The subcontractor filed a motion for summary judgment as to the general contractor’s indemnity claim, arguing that the claim was barred by (1) the one-year limitations period contained in the parties’ contract, as permitted under Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-2-725, and (2) the exclusive remedy provision in the parties’ contract, which provided that the only remedies available to the general contractor were repair, replacement, or refund of the purchase price of the pipe. The general contractor argued that the one-year contractual limitations period was not applicable to its indemnity claim, and that the exclusive remedy provision did not preclude its indemnity claim. In the alternative, the general contractor argued that, because the defect in the pipe was latent and not discoverable upon reasonable inspection, the exclusive remedy in the contract failed of its essential purpose and the general contractor was not bound by it. The trial court granted the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the indemnity claim was barred by the one-year contractual limitations period and the exclusive remedy provision, and also that the latency of the alleged defect in the pipe did not cause the exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Alfonzo Williams v. State of Tennessee - Dissenting
In the present case, the majority concludes that the trial court’s answer to the jury’s question regarding the self-defense jury instruction fairly instructed the jury and did not mislead them as to the applicable law, and therefore “the Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the performance of counsel in his lack of objection during the trial and failure to preserve the issue on appeal.” For the reasons stated below, I must respectfully dissent from this conclusion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alfonzo Williams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alfonzo Williams, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial in failing to object to the trial court’s self-defense jury instruction, failing to request a supplemental instruction, failing to object to the trial court’s answer in response to a jury question, and failing to raise the issue in his motion for new trial. He also argues that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not address these issues on appeal. We conclude that the Petitioner failed to prove that his counsel was ineffective. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Marlow Williams, et al. - Dissenting
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services v. Marlow Williams, et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue in this case. Finding that the grounds of abandonment, unwillingness to assume custody, and failure to establish paternity are not established by clear and convincing evidence in the record, we reverse in part, affirm in part and dismiss. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
East Ridge Dental Center, Inc., and Drew Shabo, DDS., vs. Joseph D. Prince, DDS.
Plaintiffs sued the defendant, alleging breach by defendant of the contract with defendant to purchase his dental practice. Included in the agreement was a restrictive covenant not to compete. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial Court held that the $75,000.00 that was paid for the restrictive covenant should be returned to the plaintiffs under the theory of unjust enrichment, because the covenant was not enforceable. On appeal, we hold that defendant abided by the terms of the restrictive covenant for five of the seven years that the covenant covered and, as a matter of equity, the Judgment of the trial court should be reduced proportionately. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Orlando Smith
The Defendant-Appellant, Orlando Smith (“Smith”), appeals the revocation of his probation and community corrections sentences by the Madison County Circuit Court. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking both of his alternative sentences. Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the orders of the trial court are affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
T.O.T.S., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corporation
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint for failure to state a claim. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Lena Jaden v. Vanderbilt University
A graduate student at Vanderbilt sued after the university terminated her graduate studies. She claimed that Vanderbilt breached its contract with her. The trial court granted summary judgment to Vanderbilt. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Edwards, et al. v. City of Memphis
The Charter of the City of Memphis provided for automatic promotion of police officers to the rank of captain after thirty years of service. In 2005, the rank of thirty-year captain was abolished, except for pension purposes. Plaintiffs, police officers with the City of Memphis, filed suit stating that they had been denied promotions to which they were entitled under the Charter, and asking the court to require that such promotions be given. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim, finding that the suit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc. et al. v. City of Memphis - Dissenting
At the heart of this case is the operation of the checks and balances that influence and control a municipality’s exercise of its power to annex adjoining property. The controversy involves a duly enacted annexation ordinance that was substantially altered in a negotiated settlement of litigation between some of the affected property owners and the attorney representing the municipality. Other affected property owners filed suit in the Chancery Court for Shelby County seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of the effectively amended annexation ordinance that had not been ratified by the municipality’s legislative body. The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and now this Court have dismissed the complaint because it was not filed within the thirty-day period within which a quo warranto action challenging the reasonableness of the annexation must be filed. I respectfully dissent. The aggrieved property owners are entitled to their day in court. They are not challenging the reasonableness of the original annexation ordinance. To the contrary, they are challenging the legality of the negotiated settlement that effectively amended the original annexation ordinance without the approval of the Memphis City Council. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Highwoods Properties, Inc., et al. v. City of Memphis
The Plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking to set aside a consent judgment entered in a lawsuit between property owners in an area of a proposed annexation and the City of Memphis. The earlier lawsuit, which the Plaintiffs failed to timely join, was a quo warranto challenge to an ordinance purporting to annex certain territory contiguous to the boundaries of the City. The consent judgment provided for the annexation of the territory described within the ordinance in two stages, with a portion of the area having an effective annexation date in 2006 and the remainder having an effective date in 2013. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted permission to appeal in order to determine the propriety of the challenge to the consent decree approving of the two-step annexation. We hold that (1) the Plaintiffs are not authorized to file a declaratory judgment action challenging the consent judgment as violative of the terms of the annexation ordinance; and (2) the consent judgment did not create an unconstitutional taxing structure. The judgment of dismissal is, therefore, affirmed. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Douglas Johnson
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Willie Douglas Johnson, of attempted second degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of unlawful possession of a weapon. After merging the aggravated assault convictions into the conviction of attempted second degree murder and the weapon possession charges into a single conviction, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 25 years for attempted second degree murder and six years for unlawful possession of a weapon. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that the State would be permitted to impeach his testimony through the use of prior felony convictions and that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence on the basis that he showed no hesitation in committing the crimes when the risk to human life was high. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Cruse v. Rollins Truck Leasing, et al.
Employee had a heart attack in 1996. He and Employer entered into a court-approved settlement of the claim, requiring Employer to provide future medical treatment for the injury. In 2000, Employee experienced additional coronary problems, which required bypass surgery. The trial court denied his petition to require Employer to pay for that medical care. We affirm the judgment.1 |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel |