Gene Parish v. Smith Utility District, Et Al.
Plaintiff brought an action against a local utility district for damages allegedly arising from the construction and maintenance of a water line on plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. The utility company moved to dismiss, asserting that it was immune from suit or, alternatively, that plaintiff’s action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the utility company’s motion. The court concluded that plaintiff’s claim for damages were barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The court further concluded that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was barred by the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations. And the court determined that the action would be barred by the one-year statute of limitation applicable to governmental takings. We conclude that the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim was for inverse condemnation, and the action was time barred. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Sylvia Marene Tolbert Et Al. v. State ot Tennessee
Claimants asserted monetary claims against the State of Tennessee for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident with a state employee. The Tennessee Claims Commission found the State liable and awarded compensatory damages. On appeal, the State argues that the Claims Commission erred in awarding damages for medical expenses based on the claimants’ unadjusted medical bills. Upon review, we conclude that the collateral source rule precludes introduction of evidence of insurance adjustments to claimants’ medical bills. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Mark Karsonovich v. Linda Lee Kempe
This case involves the grant of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. Two years after the parties’ final divorce was entered, Mr. Karsonovich lost his job and filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to determine his alimony obligations. Mr. Karsonovich sought a declaration that the alimony provision was void and unenforceable because the provision was ambiguous and against public policy. Ms. Kempe filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the provision was unambiguous and not void against public policy. The trial court agreed with Ms. Kempe and granted the motion to dismiss. The court also awarded Ms. Kempe her attorney’s fees incurred from defending the suit. We reverse the trial court’s decision to dismiss the complaint because there was an actual controversy for the court to decide. However, the trial court also decided the controversy at issue when it determined that the provision was neither ambiguous nor void against public policy, with which we agree. Thus, we affirm the court’s decision on the merits of the complaint. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award Ms. Kempe her attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to determine whether attorney’s fees are still appropriate based upon our reversal of the dismissal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Govindaswamy Nagarajan v. Lonnie Sharpe, Et Al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the pro se plaintiff’s discrimination action against Tennessee State University and certain administrators. The court determined that the plaintiff had requested relief beyond its authority to award and granted the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Regina Montanna Marie Mullins v. Amy Paige Hernandez
Regina Mullins (petitioner) sought an order of protection against Amy Hernandez (respondent), the grandmother of one of petitioner’s children. The parties were living together in an apartment when respondent allegedly threatened petitioner and her mother with a handgun. After a hearing, the trial court found that respondent did threaten petitioner, and that “there was a gun involved,” but held that these facts did not constitute “legally sufficient proof for an order of protection to be issued.” We hold that the facts found by the trial court provide a legal basis for the issuance of an order of protection under the statutes governing such orders, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601 et seq. (2017). Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the issuance of a protective order. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Victoria H.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of: (1) failure to establish/exercise paternity; (2) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (3) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because Appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services did not meet its burden to show that Father has the ability to pay support, we reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
SecurAmerica Business Credit v. Southland Transportation Co., LLC, et al.
This is the fourth appeal in a case primarily concerned with whether two individual defendants are liable on loan guaranties. Following the third appeal, we remanded the case to the trial court to determine: (1) whether one of the defendants is liable under a Guaranty of Validity of Collateral (“GVC”); (2) whether prejudgment interest should be awarded to the lender on personal guaranties both defendants signed; and (3) whether the lender is entitled to recover additional attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing the guaranties since the previous appeal. On remand following the third appeal, the trial court found that the defendant was not liable on the GVC. The trial court also found that the lender was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the lender committed fraud, and it declined to award the lender any additional attorney’s fees. Although the defendants prevailed on all three issues, they appeal, seeking reconsideration of this court’s determination in an earlier appeal that the defendants failed to prove their claim of fraud, which would relieve them of any liability. The lender counters, insisting that this court’s previous decision, wherein we affirmed the trial court’s determination that the defendants failed to prove fraud, is the law of the case. The lender also raises its own issues for our consideration, including whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning fraud, as stated in the final order drafted by counsel for the defendants, reflects the trial court’s independent judgment. A careful review of the trial court’s oral ruling from the bench and the written order, as well as previous findings of fact made by the trial court, leads us to conclude that some of the findings of fact stated in the final order do not reflect the trial court’s independent judgment. Therefore, the presumption under Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) that a trial court’s specific findings of fact are supported by the evidence shall be limited to those findings that appear to reflect the independent judgment of the trial court. We have also determined that the law of the case doctrine precludes us from reconsidering the defendants’ claim of fraud. We affirm the trial court’s determination that one of the defendants is not liable on the GVC, albeit, on different grounds. We reverse the trial court’s decision not to award the lender prejudgment interest and additional attorney’s fees, finding that the lender has a statutory right to prejudgment interest and a contractual right to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that the lender incurred to enforce the guaranties. Therefore, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. Norman C. Loggins v. Continental Apartments, et al.
This complaint is a forcible entry and detainer action. Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment. The order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer subject matter jurisdiction on this Court pursuant to Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Because the trial court entered its order dismissing Appellant’s complaint while the appeal was pending in this Court, we vacate the order of dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Samuel P.
This appeal involves a long-running dispute between unmarried parents over parenting issues concerning their young son. After years of contentious and continuous litigation and eight days of trial, the trial court found the father in criminal contempt and modified the parties’ existing parenting arrangement to reduce the father’s parenting time somewhat and to grant the mother sole decision-making authority for major decisions. The trial court imputed income to the father for purposes of child support and awarded current and retroactive child support. The trial court also awarded the mother a portion of her attorney’s fees. The father appeals, challenging each of these rulings. We vacate the trial court’s imputation of income and child support awards and remand for additional findings regarding Father’s income, but we otherwise affirm the trial court on all other issues. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
April Elaster v. Gary Massey, Jr., et al.
In this legal malpractice case, defendant-attorneys filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that they complied with the applicable standard of care. In response to the summary judgment motion, Appellant failed to offer any expert proof that |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gameel Mesad v. Joseph Yousef
Plaintiff entered into a contract with Defendant for the purchase of a convenience market, whereby Plaintiff purchased the store’s inventory and assumed the lease and other contractual obligations of the business. Three years after the sale, Plaintiff filed suit, alleging fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Trade Mark act of 2000, all in connection with the sale and operation of the business. Following a trial, the trial court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff appeals; we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Ronny Arnold v. Burns Phillips, Commissioner Tennessee Department of Labor And Workforce Development
A state employee who lost his job due to a reduction-in-force was placed on administrative leave with pay and received a severance package. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied his claim for unemployment benefits for the period in which he received administrative leave with pay. As the employee acknowledges, he subsequently received the maximum unemployment benefits allowable for the applicable one-year period. Therefore, the employee cannot receive benefits for the contested period, which is the relief sought in this case. This case cannot provide relief to the employee, and the appeal is moot. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Osborne, Et Al. v. The Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
A patron at a convenience center owned and operated by a metropolitan government fell and injured himself at the center. The trial court found that the metropolitan government breached its duties and was at fault for the patron’s injuries, but that the patron was also at fault in failing to notice the drainage cut that caused his fall. The trial court apportioned eighty percent of the fault to the metropolitan government and twenty percent to the patron. The metropolitan government appeals, arguing that the patron was at least fifty percent at fault. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Jones v. Mortgage Menders, LLC, Et Al.
This appeal concerns an effort to re-assert causes of action under the Savings Statute. In July 2006, David Jones (“Plaintiff”) filed an action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). On February 12, 2016, Plaintiff took a voluntary non-suit. On February 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a purported complaint (“the February 2 Document”) attempting to re-assert his original claims, which featured his typewritten name rather than his handwritten signature. Victor Hazelwood and Advantage Title & Escrow, Inc. (“Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appealed. We hold that Plaintiff’s typewritten name qualified as his signature and that his filing, while quite deficient as a piece of legal writing, was not so deficient as to render it not a complaint in the first place. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Santore, et al. v. Karloss Stevenson, et al.
At issue in this personal injury action is whether the trial court erred by striking the defendant’s affirmative defense that an unknown “John Doe” driver of an Averitt Express truck was comparatively at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries. Relying on Brown v. Wal- Mart Discount Cities, 12 S.W.3d 785 (Tenn. 2000) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, the trial court struck the affirmative defense as to John Doe and Averitt Express upon the finding that the defendant failed to sufficiently identify John Doe so that the plaintiff may serve process on John Doe. We have determined the trial court’s discretionary decision to strike the affirmative defense of comparative fault as to John Doe and Averitt Express was premature because the defendant was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to engage in pre-trial discovery to endeavor as to the identity of John Doe in sufficient detail for the plaintiff to serve process on John Doe. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Daniel Woolbright v. Lee Anna Woolbright
In this appeal, a father challenges the trial court’s award of equal parenting time to the child’s mother. The father contends that he should be awarded more parenting time because the majority of the statutory best interest factors weigh in his favor and he provides the child more stability. We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding equal parenting time to the parties. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
George Metz, Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County, TN, Et Al.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge two administrative decisions by the Planning Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee. The petition was dismissed pursuant to a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The challenge to the first decision was dismissed because the statutory sixty-day period had run from the date the minutes approving the challenged decision had been entered. The challenge to the second decision, the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the final site plan, was deemed untimely because the challenge to a site plan must be filed within sixty days of the entry of the minutes approving the master development plan, not the final site plan, and the statutory period had run. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Evans Wilhoit v. Gary Dennis Wilhoit
This is a post-divorce modification of alimony case. Appellant/Husband contends that the trial court erred by not terminating his alimony in futuro and life insurance obligations. We conclude that Husband’s alimony obligation should be modified to $500 per month so that the parties can retain enough assets to continue to support themselves for a longer duration. Affirmed as modified. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Mark Bentley v. Wood Byrd, et al.
In this case, a judgment creditor pursued enforcement of a foreign judgment. Although the judgment creditor obtained a charging order against the judgment debtor’s interest in a partnership and later moved to foreclose this interest, the judgment debtor subsequently moved to dismiss the case and vacate all prior orders by alleging that he had never been properly served. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and entered an order allowing foreclosure against the partnership interest. Despite filings by the judgment debtor highlighting the absence of personal service, the trial court ultimately left its enforcement orders undisturbed. Because we agree that the judgment debtor never received proper service incident to the judgment creditor’s attempt to enroll the foreign judgment, we vacate the trial court’s orders relating to execution. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Harvey Santee v. Stacy Lynn Santee
This appeal concerns divorce and child support matters. Robert Harvey Santee (“Husband”) sued wife Stacy Lynn Santee (“Wife”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court awarded Husband a divorce based upon Wife’s inappropriate marital conduct. The Trial Court divided the marital estate, awarded Wife rehabilitative alimony, and imputed income to her for child support purposes. Wife appealed to this Court, arguing that, among other things, as a stay-at-home mother in a long-term marriage, rehabilitative alimony is insufficient. Husband argues in response that he has longstanding plans to retire. We find that the Trial Court erred in imputing income to Wife for two years of child support purposes when the Trial Court also found that Wife was capable of going to school for those two years to improve her financial situation and awarded rehabilitative alimony for Wife to do exactly that. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Harvey Santee v. Stacy Lynn Santee - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I concur completely in the majority’s decisions pertaining to (1) the allocation of the parties’ debt; (2) the imputation of income to wife for the purpose of calculating child support; and (3) wife’s request for her attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. In my judgment, there is no error regarding any of these matters. I dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to award wife “rehabilitative” alimony rather than alimony in futuro. I do so because, I believe, the evidence clearly and overwhelmingly preponderates against the trial court’s “rehabilitative” decision. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Bank of New York Mellon v. Chandra Berry
A bank filed a wrongful detainer warrant in general sessions court against a homeowner who defaulted on her loan, and the homeowner raised counterclaims that the foreclosure was wrongful and fraudulent. The general sessions court awarded the bank possession of the property and dismissed the homeowner’s counterclaims as barred by res judicata based on an earlier action in which the homeowner sought to prevent the foreclosure. The homeowner appealed the general sessions court’s decision, and the circuit court also dismissed the homeowner’s counterclaims based on res judicata. The homeowner appealed the circuit court’s judgment to this court, and the bank sought an award of its attorney’s fees as damages for having to defend against a frivolous appeal. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment and deny the bank’s request for an award of its fees. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carter K.
This appeal involves a custody dispute between the unmarried parents of a minor child. Mother filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking custody of the minor child, a determination of Father’s child support arrearage, the establishment of a child support order, the entry of a permanent parenting plan, and an award of attorney’s fees. Mother also sought a temporary restraining order preventing Father from removing the child from her care, custody, and control. Following several pre-trial hearings, the case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court awarded visitation to Father. Within days of the trial, Mother filed a motion to vacate the juvenile court’s ruling based on Mother’s allegation that Father had perjured himself at the trial. Following a hearing at which Father failed to appear, the juvenile court suspended Father’s visitation, and in a reversal of the its prior decision, ordered Father to pay all of Mother’s attorney’s fees incurred throughout the proceedings. Because we find that the juvenile court’s orders fail to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 such that we are unable to determine the basis for the juvenile court’s decisions, we vacate the court’s orders pertaining to the establishment of a permanent parenting plan, the suspension of Father’s parenting time, and attorney’s fees, and we remand for more detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James Kemmler Rogers
This probate action is before this Court on appeal for the second time. Following remand from this Court subsequent to the first appeal, the trial court determined that the petitioner did have standing to file her petition for probate as a “purported creditor” of the decedent. The trial court ultimately denied the petition, however, finding “no basis for either primary or ancillary probate in Tennessee.” The trial court had also previously awarded sanctions against the petitioner and her counsel pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The petitioner has appealed. Discerning no error in the trial court’s denials of both primary and ancillary probate, we affirm such determinations. Although we also affirm the trial court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against the petitioner and her counsel generally, we vacate the specific award granted against the petitioner personally and remand such issue to the trial court for a determination of the proper amount of sanctions to be awarded against the petitioner solely pursuant to Rule 11.02(1). We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother/Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent for willful failure to visit, willful failure to support, and wanton disregard; (2) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the Child’s removal. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Because the proof is not sufficient to establish that the child was removed from Appellant’s home, we reverse the ground of persistence of conditions. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed. |
Chester | Court of Appeals |
