COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Shayla Leanne Guy Brantley v. Cordary Quincy Vernard Brantley
M2016-01999-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Louis W. Oliver, III

In this divorce action, Father contends the trial court erred by adding substantive restrictions to the parties’ agreed upon Permanent Parenting Plan that, inter alia, imposed “paramour” and “lifestyle” restrictions on Father that were not imposed on Mother. We have determined that the trial court unilaterally imposed substantive and material restrictions on Father’s activities during his parenting time without affording him an evidentiary hearing. We have also determined that some of the restrictions placed on Father are too vague to be enforceable and that the Statement of the Evidence does not provide a factual basis for the restrictions placed on Father. For these reasons we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Sumner Court of Appeals

In Re Seth B., et al.
E2017-00173-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dwight E. Stokes

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; (2) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home; (3) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan; and (4) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal from Mother’s home. Mother also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to provide a suitable home; (2) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan; and (3) persistence of conditions that led to the children’s removal from Father’s home. Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because grounds for termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Dialysis Clinic, Inc., et al. v. Kevin Medley, et al.
M2016-02266-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

Appellant appeals the denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene in the underlying lawsuit. Because the order appealed is not final, this Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Appeal dismissed.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Sheridan Nichols (formerly Crockett) v. Richard David Crockett, Jr.
E2016-00885-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Eddie Lauderback

This appeal results from a post-divorce criminal contempt conviction the plaintiff mother received for failing to adhere to a parenting plan that prohibits both parents from making disparaging remarks about the other parent. The trial court held that the plaintiff received sufficient notice under Rule 42(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and that she was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for two separate instances of disparaging remarks made about the father in the presence of their children. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Washington Court of Appeals

Kathleen J. Scobey v. Todd B. Scobey
M2016-00963-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael W. Binkley

In this post-divorce action, Wife filed a Petition for Civil Contempt and Other Relief, including a request to recover her attorney’s fees, alleging Husband violated five provisions in the marital dissolution agreement (MDA). Husband denied the allegations and filed a separate petition to decrease his child support obligation, which Wife opposed. Before trial, but after protracted proceedings, Husband complied with three provisions in the MDA, leaving two to be decided by the court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court found Husband in civil contempt for violating the remaining MDA provisions, denied Husband’s petition to decrease child support, and ordered Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. Specifically, the court found that Husband violated the MDA by refusing to transfer to Wife one-half of the “non-retirement” account at T. Rowe Price and by concealing and withholding two paychecks he earned during the marriage that the parties agreed to divide equally. The trial court found that Husband did not offer sufficient proof of his current income to support a reduction in his child support obligation. The trial court also determined that Wife was entitled to recover her attorney’s fees pursuant to the enforcement provision in the MDA and pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c) as the attorney’s fees pertained to the child support decree. Husband appealed. We have determined that the MDA provision concerning the “non-retirement” account was not sufficiently clear, specific, and unambiguous to sustain a finding of contempt; therefore, we reverse this finding of contempt. However, we affirm the finding of contempt for concealing and withholding two paychecks. We also affirm the trial court in all other respects, including the award of attorney’s fees incurred by Wife in the trial court and the denial of Husband’s petition to reduce child support. As for Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred in this appeal, we find she is entitled to recover her fees and remand this issue for the trial court to determine the amount she is entitled to recover. 

Williamson Court of Appeals

In The Matter of Ian B. et al.
M2016-02504-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howard W. Wilson

This is Father’s second appeal of the termination of his parental rights to the two children he had with his former wife (“Mother”). Father and Mother separated in 2008 when she moved from Alaska to Tennessee with the children, and they were granted a divorce in 2009. Father has not seen nor spoken with the children since 2008, and has not provided any financial support since November 2009. The petition to terminate Father’s parental rights was filed by Mother and her husband in 2012. In Father’s first appeal, we remanded the case in order to obtain a sufficient record for this court to review on appeal. In re Ian B., No. M2015-01079-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 2865875 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2016). On remand, the trial court found that the petitioners had proven grounds of abandonment for failure to visit and support and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. This appeal followed. Having determined that the record in this second appeal is sufficient for this court to conduct a proper review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Rutherford Court of Appeals

ISI Holdings Of TN, LLC, et al. v. Mount Pleasant Regional Planning Commission, et al.
M2016-01607-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

This is an appeal from a successful petition for a writ of certiorari involving land use. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners after finding that the location approved for the proposed power station violated an applicable zoning ordinance. After the trial court’s decision, the City of Mount Pleasant amended its ordinance to clarify that the zoning ordinance did not apply to public utilities. The City of Mount Pleasant Planning Commission thereafter approved the construction of the power station under the amended ordinance. The petitioners filed no writ of certiorari of the approval under the amended ordinance and therefore ask that this appeal be dismissed as moot. Because this case no longer serves to offer any meaningful relief to the parties and no exceptions to the mootness doctrine are present, we dismiss this appeal as moot. 

Maury Court of Appeals

David C. Jayne v. Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair
W2016-02012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

David C. Jayne (“Jayne”) appeals the trial court’s entry of a judgment against him for breach of contract for failure to pay Bass Annie Cosmetic Boat Repair (“Bass Annie”) for repairs made to his boat. Jayne entered into a contract with Bass Annie for the repair of his damaged boat. Before the agreed-upon repairs were completed, Jayne went to Bass Annie to check on the boat. After inspecting the boat, Jayne instructed Bass Annie to stop the repairs and return the boat to him. An argument ensued, and Jayne alleges he was assaulted by a Bass Annie employee. Both parties filed claims in the general sessions court which were subsequently appealed to circuit court. Following a de novo trial in the circuit court, the trial court dismissed Jayne’s claims and awarded Bass Annie damages for breach of contract for the work completed on the boat. Jayne appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Charles E. Cunningham v. Tennessee Department of Commerce And Insurance, Insurance Division
M2016-02231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

This appeal involves the decision of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance (the “Commissioner”) to impose a civil fine and revoke the license of insurance agent Charles E. Cunningham (“Cunningham”), after concluding that Cunningham committed six (6) violations of applicable statutes in connection with his insurance practice.  Cunningham filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Davidson County challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied on by the Commissioner. The trial court found that the record supported the Commissioner’s decision and choice of penalty. Cunningham appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Outloud! INC. v. Dialysis Clinic, Inc., Et Al.
M2016-01528-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

Appellant appeals the circuit court’s dismissal of its petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for a de novo review of an unlawful detainer action originally filed in general sessions court. The circuit court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion, dismissing Appellant’s petition on the ground that it was not timely filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-18-129 and Appellant did not have a sufficient excuse for filing the petition outside the 30 day statutory time period. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Annette Cecile Moore v. Brian Scott Moore
M2017-00229-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley

This is a post-divorce matter. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we observe that the case appealed from is not final. Given the absence of a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Williamson Court of Appeals

Jon Roozbeh Vazeen, AKA Hassan Vazin v. Michelle Smith Vazin
M2016-01133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

The trial court granted Wife a divorce; divided marital assets and liabilities; and awarded Husband five years of rehabilitative alimony. Husband appealed. Due to the deficiencies in Husband’s appellate brief, we do not reach Husband’s substantive issues and dismiss the appeal.  

Davidson Court of Appeals

Jon Roozbeh Vazeen, AKA Hassan Vazin v. Michelle Smith Vazin - Concurring In Part and Dissenting In Part
M2016-01133-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phillip R. Robinson

I concur with the majority’s observation that “[g]iven the deficiencies in Husband[’s] brief,” we do not have the “[]ability to reach the substantive issues.” If we cannot reach the substantive issues — and I agree we cannot — I can only conclude that Husband’s appeal is “devoid of merit or . . . has no reasonable chance of success.” Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Goss et al., No E2010-01710-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1326234 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Apr. 7, 2011) (Susano, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Hence, by definition, this is a frivolous appeal. I would remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of holding a hearing to determine “just damages” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 (2000).

Davidson Court of Appeals

Damon Holland v. Brian Sullivan, et al.
M2016-00538-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph P. Binkley, Jr.

The issues in this appeal arise from two very unorthodox agreements and the defendants’ actions to avoid the consequences of the agreements. The agreements are unorthodox because, inter alia, each purports to be a “Bill of Sale” of an automobile when in fact each is a loan agreement for which the certificate of title is held by the lender as security. To complicate matters, the defendant who signed both agreements only owned one of the vehicles; his wife owned the other, and it is disputed whether the husband was authorized to act on her behalf. When the husband failed to pay either debt, the lender attempted unsuccessfully to possess the vehicles. Immediately thereafter, the husband and wife applied for and obtained new certificates of title and then used one of the duplicate titles to sell one of the automobiles to a third party. Thereafter, the lender commenced this action against the husband and wife for breach of contract, slander of title, and conspiracy to commit slander of title. The lender sought both compensatory and punitive damages. Following a bench trial, the court found the husband liable for breach of contract, and found the husband and wife jointly liable for slander of title and conspiracy to commit slander of title. The court then awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $32,456.89 and punitive damages in the amount of $30,000. The defendants appealed contending the trial court erred in failing to consider their affirmative defenses and in failing to hold that the Tennessee Title Pledge Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 45-15-101 to -120 barred any recovery. They also contend that the evidence does not support a finding that the husband breached the contract or that they were jointly liable for slander of title and for conspiracy to commit slander of title. They further argue the trial court erred in awarding punitive damages. We affirm. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Jordan Franklin-Mansuo, et al. v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc. d/b/a Saint Francis Hospital, et al.
W2016-01623-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Brandon O. Gibson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rhynette N. Hurd

This is a health care liability case. Appellant filed suit against Appellee, a medical doctor, alleging that Appellee’s supervision of a physician assistant fell below the standard of care, which resulted in the injury and death of Appellant’s mother. Appellee moved for summary judgment on the basis that Appellant had not provided competent expert testimony regarding the applicable standard of care or a causal link between Appellee’s actions and the subsequent injury and death of the patient at issue. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion due to Appellant’s lack of expert testimony to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Appeals

In Re Tennessee Walking Horse Forfeiture Litigation
W2016-01000-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

This is the second appeal involving the attempted forfeiture of horses that had allegedly been the victims of animal abuse. The State appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellee owners had standing to contest the forfeiture and the grant of summary judgment to Appellee owners on the ground that the State failed to comply with applicable procedural requirements. We conclude that because Appellees are “owners” as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-702(3), they have standing to contest the forfeiture. We also conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the attempted forfeiture did not comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of the applicable forfeiture statutes. The trial court’s ruling is, therefore, affirmed.

Fayette Court of Appeals

In Re: Savanna C.
E2016-01703-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Neil Thomas, III

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the father, Jason C. (“Father”), to his minor child, Savanna C. (“the Child”), who was two years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2014 to Father and Katie N. (“Mother”). On November 10, 2014, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the maternal grandmother, Kathryn N. (“Maternal Grandmother”). The maternal grandfather, Tommy N. (“Maternal Grandfather”), was later added as a joint petitioner. The juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected on August 20, 2015, and ordered that the Child remain in the custody of the Maternal Grandmother and Maternal Grandfather (collectively, “Maternal Grandparents”). On September 21, 2015, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child in the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Father has appealed.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Kathryn J. Reitz v. City of Mt. Juliet
M2016-02048-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Brandon O. Gibson
Trial Court Judge: Judge John D. Wootten, Jr.

Plaintiff alleged that the City of Mt. Juliet breached a settlement agreement with her by violating a non-disparagement agreement. Because Plaintiff failed to prove the existence of damages, summary judgment was appropriate. We affirm.   

Wilson Court of Appeals

In Re A.L.H., et al.
M2016-01574-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stella L. Hargrove

This is an appeal from an order finding two children of S.B. (mother) and R.H. (father) to be the victims of severe child abuse in the couple’s care and control. On July 24, 2015, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) received a referral alleging, in part, that the parties’ three children, A.L.H., A.G.B., and A.R.B. (collectively the children), were drug-exposed. On August 27, 2015, the children underwent hair follicle drug testing. A.G.B. and A.R.B. tested positive for methamphetamine. A.L.H. was negative for all substances. On September 23, 2015, DCS filed a petition to declare the children dependent and neglected. Mother and father stipulated that the children were dependent and neglected, but they expressly did not agree with the finding of severe child abuse. The Juvenile Court for Wayne County (the juvenile court) entered an order finding A.G.B. and A.R.B. to be the victims of severe abuse. Mother and father appealed to the Circuit Court for Wayne County (the trial court). On July 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order finding A.G.B. and A.R.B. to be the victims of severe child abuse in the care and control of mother and father. Mother and father appeal. We affirm.  

Wayne Court of Appeals

Allstate Insurance Company v. Kaigler & Associates, Inc.
M2016-01003-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ricahrd H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge James G. Martin, III

Declaratory judgment action in which an insurance company seeks a determination of its coverage obligations arising out of a business insurance policy it issued relative to a class action suit brought against the insured for sending unsolicited faxes in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment in part, holding that the insurance company had no duty to indemnify under the “accidental event” coverage or the “personal injury” coverage, that the company had a duty to defend under the “advertising injury” coverage, and that the company had a duty to defend against all claims. The insured filed a motion to alter or amend, which was denied by the court. On appeal, the insured argues that the court issued an improper advisory opinion, erred in holding the company had no duty to indemnify under the “accidental event” coverage, and abused its discretion by failing to consider new evidence proffered in the insured’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

Williamson Court of Appeals

Gregory White, et al. v. Jack Miller, et al.
M2016-00888-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Charles K. Smith

Sellers of home and their listing agent brought suit against a real estate brokerage firm and an agent employed by the firm to recover for alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and Real Estate Broker License Act, undisclosed dual agency, and breach of fiduciary duty, arising from the sale of plaintiffs’ home.  The brokerage firm agent procured a contract whereby the sellers agreed to purchase the buyers’ home, with the purchase price for the buyers’ home to be treated as a credit on the purchase price of the sellers’ home.  Upon learning that the agent was also representing the buyers, the sellers brought suit, seeking forfeiture of the agent’s and brokerage firm’s commission; the sellers’ listing agent joined in the suit to recover the commission the brokerage firm agreed to pay her as a referral fee.  The trial court dismissed all claims filed by the seller husband for lack of standing, granted summary judgment to seller wife on her claim of undisclosed dual agency, and ordered that the brokerage firm and agent forfeit the commission from the sale.  The court awarded the listing agent the commission she sought and granted summary judgment to brokerage firm and agent on the seller wife’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and on the seller wife’s claim that she was entitled to the commission generated by the sale of the buyers’ home.  Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings.    

Wilson Court of Appeals

Kevin Tate v. Tennessee Department Of Correction
M2016-01611-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

Kevin Tate was convicted of a first degree murder that took place on March 22, 1993. On November 22, 1995, he was sentenced to life in prison. In the current litigation, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to review his release eligibility date as calculated by the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Petitioner claimed that TDOC incorrectly calculated his release eligibility date, and, in doing so, violated his rights under the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court found that TDOC correctly calculated his release eligibility date. As a consequence, the court dismissed the petition. We modify the judgment of the trial court by vacating the court’s statement that “as Mr. Tate is serving a sentence of life for first degree murder, in no event can he become eligible for release prior to serving 25 years.” In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re Domingo C. L.
M2016-02383-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor M. Keith Siskin

Obispo C.L. (“the Minor’s Uncle”) appeals the determination of the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”) finding that it lacked jurisdiction to make a finding regarding whether it is in the best interest of Domingo C.L. (“the Minor”) to be returned to his home country of Guatemala. We find and hold that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to make this finding, that the petition specifically requested a finding with regard to this issue, and that it was error to refuse to make a finding with regard to whether it was in the Minor’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala. We, therefore, modify the Trial Court’s October 31, 2016 Order Appointing Guardian Of A Minor by remanding this case to the Trial Court for a determination of whether it is in the Minor’s best interest to be returned to Guatemala. We affirm the remainder of the Trial Court’s order.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

In Re Miracle M., et al.
W2017-00068-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Dan H. Michael

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant Father’s parental rights to two minor children. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination based on the statutory grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal to state custody. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Father appeals. As to the ground of persistence of conditions, we conclude that the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) has not met its burden of proof, and therefore we reverse termination of Father’s parental rights on this ground. The Court affirms the juvenile court’s termination of Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and abandonment by willful failure to visit.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Mary Wagoner-Angelin v. Randall Jon Angelin
E2016-01850-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney, C.J.
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Marie Williams

This appeal concerns post-divorce matters pertaining to a marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”) and a parenting plan. Mary Wagoner-Angelin (“Mother”) filed a petition seeking modification of the parenting plan against ex-husband Randall Jon Angelin (“Father”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Father filed an answer and counterclaim challenging the alimony provision in the MDA. Mother later amended her petition to include allegations of civil contempt for Husband’s alleged failures to abide by the MDA and parenting plan. After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, found Father in contempt. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm the Trial Court in its determination that Father is bound by the provisions of the MDA. We affirm the Trial Court in its finding an upward deviation for the parties’ daughter Rachel’s private school tuition. Regarding the other issues, we remand with instructions. The judgment of the Trial Court therefore is affirmed, in part, vacated, in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Hamilton Court of Appeals