Paul Housewright, et al. v. Dr. Ronald K. McCormack, et al.
This appeal concerns the validity of a warranty deed in which the decedents conveyed a parcel of property for the benefit of a church. The deed contained a reversionary clause requiring the property to revert back if no longer used for the benefit of the church. The same parcel was included in another deed that did not contain a reversionary clause but was recorded before the original deed. The church listed the property for sale approximately 67 years later. The decedents' heirs filed suit. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that ownership of the property was established through the deed recorded first. The court granted summary judgment. We affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Holmes v. Christ Community Health Services, Inc., et al.
The plaintiff filed this action alleging medical malpractice against a physician who examined the plaintiff five days after injury to her shoulder, as well as the facility wherein the physician practiced. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant physician failed to properly diagnose a fracture dislocation in her shoulder, causing a delay in appropriate treatment. The plaintiff‘s subsequent treating physician opined in his deposition and via affidavit that if the plaintiff‘s injury had been diagnosed earlier, the plaintiff would likely have avoided an extensive surgical procedure, resultant infection stemming from such surgery, and residual impairment to her shoulder. The trial court excluded this testimony as speculative, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician and hospital. The plaintiff has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in excluding the causation evidence as speculative. We therefore vacate the court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the co-defendants. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tim Grace v. Jeanna Grace d/b/a Grace Trucking
The plaintiff in a breach of contract action filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement allegedly agreed to by the defendant. The defendant argued that there was no acceptance of the plaintiff's settlement offer; rather, the defendant contended that she responded to the plaintiff's offer with a counter-offer, which she revoked prior to its acceptance. The trial court found that the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement but denied the plaintiff‟s request for attorney's fees. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of David Larry Letsinger
After her husband passed away in 2013, Rose Letsinger filed a petition in the trial court seeking letters of administration for his estate. First Choice Community Credit Union filed a claim against the estate for an unpaid credit card balance. Letsinger1 excepted to the claim and filed a motion to dismiss the claim, asserting that the Credit Union had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2-307 (Supp. 2012) by failing to attach an itemized statement of its claim. The trial court agreed. It held that the Credit Union had failed to include an itemized statement. Accordingly, it dismissed the claim. The Credit Union filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing that it had filed with its claim what appears to be the deceased's last monthly statement. It contended that its filing satisfied the itemized statement requirement. The trial court denied the motion. The Credit Union appealed. Later, it filed a motion to dismiss its appeal. We granted the motion. Following this, Letsinger filed a motion seeking to compel the Credit Union to disburse to the estate the funds in the deceased's account with the Credit Union. The trial court granted the motion. The Credit Union appeals. We affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In re M.E.T.
The Department of Children's Services filed a petition in July 2015 to terminate the parental rights of M.G.H. (Father) with respect to his child, M.E.T. (the child). The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of grounds supporting termination for Father due to abandonment by an incarcerated parent and persistence of conditions. The court also found, by the same standard of proof, that termination is in the best interest of the child. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court's holding as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Michelhaugh, et al v. Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC
This appeal arises from a dispute over vacation benefits. Richard Michelhaugh and John Williams (“Plaintiffs”), employees of Y-12 in Oak Ridge, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) against the contractor, Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (“CNS”), running their work site. Plaintiffs alleged that CNS deprived them of earned vacation time by changing the vacation policy mid work-year. CNS filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find and hold that Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were deprived of earned vacation time, that Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to withstand CNS’s motion to dismiss, and that, therefore, the Trial Court erred in granting CNS’s motion to dismiss. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Dylan Thompson v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.
Plaintiff Christopher Dylan Thompson ingested several doses of a liquid form of a drug, which he says was estazolam, before reporting to work for his employer, defendant Best Buy Stores, L.P. At work, he appeared tired and slow, and a manager told him to clock out and end his shift early. On his way home, plaintiff was involved in a car accident. He brought this negligent entrustment action, alleging that defendant breached a duty by not stopping him from leaving his place of employment in his own vehicle. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding defendant “had no duty to prevent [plaintiff] from leaving the premises driving his own vehicle,” and relying on Lett v. Collis Foods, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001), a factually similar case decided by this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Security Equipment Supply, Inc. v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner Of Revenue, State of Tennessee
At issue is whether a taxpayer’s sales are properly classified as “retail sales” or “wholesale sales” under the Business Tax Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-4-701 to -730, and Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1320-04-05-.47. Following an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue determined that the taxpayer misclassified its sales as “wholesale sales,” when they should have been classified as “retail sales,” and assessed the taxpayer with $74,088.10 in tax liability. After paying the assessment, the taxpayer filed suit seeking a refund. The chancery court held that the sales in question were “retail sales” within the context of the statute and denied the request for a refund. We conclude that the business activities were properly classified as retail sales; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Henderson v. City Of Mount Pleasant, Tennessee et al.
Petitioner, the interim city manager for the City of Mount Pleasant, Tennessee, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the votes of two commissioners to terminate his employment were void due to a conflict of interest. He contends their votes were void because ethics complaints filed by Petitioner against the two commissioners were pending at the time of the vote. The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), upon the finding that the petition failed to allege facts which would show that the commissioners had a personal financial interest in the outcome of the vote on Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner appealed; we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In re Mac L.
This appeal arises from the juvenile court's termination of a biological father's parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the grounds for terminating parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9) and relied upon by the juvenile court were inapplicable to the father in this case. Nevertheless, because there was clear and convincing evidence of two grounds for termination of the father's parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Allen Sprouse v. Tiffany Dotson
This appeal requires us to interpret a version of a juvenile court statute effective prior to July 1, 2016. A juvenile court magistrate held a hearing on competing petitions to modify a parenting plan filed by a child’s parents. The magistrate announced her ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing but did not enter a written order until several days later. Mother, dissatisfied with the magistrate’s ruling, filed a request for a rehearing before a juvenile court judge. Mother filed her request within five days of the entry of the magistrate’s order but ten days after the hearing before the magistrate. The juvenile court concluded that mother’s request for rehearing was untimely and confirmed the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as an order of the juvenile court. Because we conclude that the time for requesting a rehearing ran from the entry of the magistrate’s written order, mother’s request for rehearing was timely. Therefore, we reverse. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Dustin T., et al.
The Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father to their three children. The father was incarcerated in Georgia when the children were determined to be dependent and neglected, and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs and had illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia in her home when the children were removed. DCS developed three permanency plans over the course of eighteen months, with responsibilities set out for each parent. When it appeared that neither parent was in substantial compliance with the third plan, DCS filed a petition to terminate their rights. The trial court found the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the grounds DCS alleged for terminating the parents' rights and determined it was in the children's best interest that their parents' rights be terminated. Both the mother and father appeal the termination. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dustin T., Et Al. - DISSENT
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., dissenting in part. I concur in the majority Opinion with regard to the trial court’s findings on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and abandonment by wanton disregard. I also agree that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because I cannot agree that the State has met its burden to show clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s abandonment by willful failure to support the children, however, I must file this partial dissent. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Debbie Tran v. Manila Bui, Et Al.
This case concerns a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) provides for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the dismissed party. In this case, the trial court granted Appellees the statutory maximum of $10,000 in attorneys' fees. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The trial court rejected Appellant's challenge, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) is remedial in nature and does not violate Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cheryl Ellen Mouton v. Michael J. Mouton
In this parental relocation case, the trial court erred in finding that the mother did not have a reasonable purpose in relocating to another state for her employment. Furthermore, mother's purpose in relocating was not vindictive. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Chas A. Sandford
This appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff bank filed a complaint seeking a judgment against the defendant on a sworn account. After several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process on the defendant and attempted to obtain service of process by mail. The plaintiff’s process server sent the summons by certified mail to the defendant’s residential address, and the mailing was returned marked “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed proof of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11), and filed a motion for default judgment. A copy of the motion for default judgment was sent by mail to the defendant at the same residential address. The defendant filed a response “by special appearance” opposing the bank’s motion for default judgment based on insufficiency of service of process. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court entered a default judgment in violation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10), which expressly provides, “Service by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing personal acceptance by the defendant[.]” We therefore vacate the trial court’s order entering a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Walter Peterson, Jr.
Wife challenges the trial court's decision authorizing the Department of Human Services to take her husband into protective custody pursuant to the Adult Protection Act. Because, after the trial court's decision, the adult taken into protective custody was released from DHS custody and later died, we have determined that this appeal is moot. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
William Gordon Ball v. Marjorie Happy Hayes Ball
This is an appeal from a “Final Hearing Order” in a divorce action. That order, however, did not resolve the issue of whether the husband had improperly deducted amounts he expended for moving services and rental of a storage building from his pendente lite alimony obligation due to the wife. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims presented in the proceedings below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Dillon E.
This appeal concerns termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Autumn N. (“Mother”) to her minor child, Dillon E. (“the Child”). The central issue of this parental rights case is Mother’s alleged prescription drug abuse. After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that four grounds were proven against Mother sufficient to terminate her parental rights to the Child, and that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. DCS argues that the Juvenile Court erred in declining to find one additional ground for termination. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Nance McLucas v. Shawn Michael Nance
Defendant in an unlawful detainer action filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff. Two days later, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit, but the certificate of service on the notice indicated it was placed in the mail the same day that the counterclaim was filed. Based on the notice of voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order dismissing the action without prejudice. Defendant appeals, arguing that he should be permitted to proceed with his counterclaim. We affirm. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Tamera W., et al.
Mother and Father appeal from the trial court‘s finding that clear and convincing evidence exists to establish that the children at issue are dependent and neglected and the victims of severe abuse at both parents‘ hands. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nathan Z. Vinson v. Kristin Denise Ball et al.
This is a child custody action involving two minor children. In 2010, the biological parents of the children entered into an agreed order, which provided that the mother would be the primary residential custodian with the father enjoying visitation rights. Thereafter, the mother sent the children to live with their maternal grandfather. In July 2014, the father filed a petition seeking to modify the prior custody order and establish a permanent parenting plan wherein he would be designated the primary residential parent. The mother opposed this change, and the maternal grandfather sought to intervene in the action for the purpose of seeking custody of the children. The trial court awarded primary custody to the maternal grandfather, determining that a risk of substantial harm would result if custody of the children were awarded to the father. The father has appealed. Determining that there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding of a risk of substantial harm, we reverse the custody award to the grandfather. We remand this matter for a hearing regarding whether a material change in circumstance has occurred since the initial custody award and whether modifying the designation of primary residential parent from the mother to the father is in the children's best interest. We also remand this matter for the trial court to revisit the issue of changing the children's surnames. We affirm the trial court's denial of the grandfather's request for retroactive child support. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In re Tamera W., et al.
Upon petition of the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“the Department”), the trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father. Among other things, the trial court concluded that Mother and Father had committed severe child abuse. The trial court also determined that the termination of parental rights was in the children's best interest. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we reverse the trial court's finding that Mother abandoned the children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Moreover, we reverse the trial court's finding that Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the family permanency plans created in this case. However, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the other grounds for termination relied upon by the trial court, as well as the trial court's finding that the termination of Mother and Father's parental rights is in the children's best interest. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Maddox C.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Father/Appellant, who is incarcerated, appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on two statutory grounds: (1) abandonment, and (2) incarceration for more than ten years, see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and (6), and on its finding that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Primestar Fund 1 TRS, Inc. v. Clarence Arnold Riggs, et al.
Corporate plaintiff filed an action for possession of real property. An individual claiming to be a partner in a limited partnership with an ownership interest in the real property moved to intervene in the action. The trial court granted plaintiff possession of the real property. The individual appeals the judgment for possession. We conclude that, because he was not aggrieved by the adjudication, the individual lacks standing to appeal. Moreover, because he is not a licensed attorney, he may not represent the limited partnership in this action. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |
