In re A.B. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. On December 17, 2014, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of M.L.F. (Mother) and H.W.B. (Father) with respect to their two children, A.M.B. (Child 1) and O.R.F. (Child 2) (collectively the Children). As to Mother, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds supporting termination – abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and persistence of conditions. By the same quantum of proof, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s rights is in the best interest of the Children. As to Father, the trial court held that DCS had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the alleged grounds of abandonment by wanton disregard, substantial noncompliance with permanency plans, and grounds applicable to a putative father. Consequently, the court declined to terminate Father’s parental rights. Mother and DCS appeal. We reverse the trial court’s holding as to Father and affirm the court’s termination of Mother’s rights. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Bettina Luise Lippert Engh v. Daniel James Engh
Father appeals the trial court’s designation of Mother as the primary residential parent for their daughter. Applying the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) to the testimony, the trial court determined, inter alia, that Mother acted as the primary caregiver, formed a stronger emotional bond with the child, and showed a greater willingness to foster a relationship between the child and Father. Following a thorough review of the record, we have determined that the trial court correctly identified and properly applied the relevant legal principles and that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to make Mother the primary residential parent. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Blackwell, As Next Friend To Jacob Blackwell, A Minor v. Sky High Sports Nashville Operations, LLC.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant trampoline park argues that the trial court erred by refusing to enforce a forum selection clause, a choice of law provision, and a waiver of liability and indemnity clause against the minor plaintiff. Additionally, the minor plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to alter or amend his complaint to allow him to claim pre-majority medical expenses. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the minor plaintiff’s motion to amend only to the extent that the minor plaintiff may be permitted to assert pre-majority medical expenses that were paid by him or that he is legally obligated to pay. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Wheeler Mabie, MD v. Carla Jennings Mabie
This case arises out of a divorce action. After fourteen years of marriage, the husband filed a complaint for divorce. Following a brief and unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation, the wife filed a counter-claim for divorce. Throughout the marriage, the husband worked as a medical doctor and was a partner in a highly successful medical practice. The wife's primary role in the family was as a stay-at-home mother. The trial court declared the parties divorced and awarded the wife, among other things, rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, and attorney's fees. The husband appeals the trial court's awards of alimony, the valuation of his interest in his medical practice, the award of attorney's fees to the wife, and the court's decision to not punish the wife for civil contempt of court. The wife seeks attorney's fees for defending this appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We deny the wife's request for attorney's fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Emilio Cisneros v. Lindsey Dianna Cisneros
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right from the denial of a motion for recusal. Because the petition for recusal appeal fails to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In re Yariel S., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her four minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights to all four children on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, the persistence of conditions which led to removal, and substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan. The court also found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of her rights to the youngest child on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals. We reverse the trial court on its finding of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home. On all other findings, we affirm the trial court's rulings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Chazz Alden Hughes, et al. v. R Allen Hughes
This appeal concerns a dispute over the proceeds of a decedent's federal group life insurance policy. The decedent presumably intended to designate his brother, the appellee in this matter, as the sole beneficiary. The appellants, children of the decedent, allege fraud on the part of the brother and seek to impose a constructive trust upon the funds he received. The trial court granted summary judgment for the brother based on the application of the federal preemption doctrine as well as the Tennessee and federal law of fraud and the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. The appellants appeal. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Valerie Israel, et al. v. Bryan York, et al.
The pro se appellants, Bryan York and Anna Eastwood, appeal from a final order entered on October 17, 2016. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until November 18, 2016, more than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of the final order. The appellees, Valerie Israel and Russ Israel, have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal arguing, among other things, that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed. Because it appears from the attachments to the motion that the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal and grant the motion to dismiss. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Greer Craig et al. v. Peoples Community Bank
The plaintiffs, Greer Craig and Lana Kaye Craig, brought an action against Peoples Community Bank (the Bank). Their cause of action is essentially identical to Mr. Craig’s two prior actions, each of which previously had been dismissed with prejudice and not appealed. In the present action, the trial court applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and granted the Bank summary judgment. We affirm. Furthermore, we find this appeal to be frivolous. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court so it can award the Bank its reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses on appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Mae Stanley v. Colin Richard Stanley
This appeal arises from a father’s petition to relocate with his minor children. The father sought to relocate to Oklahoma in order to work on his family’s farm, which he hoped to eventually inherit. The father, as the parent spending the greater amount of time with the children, sent the children’s mother a notice of intent to move. The father then filed a petition to relocate with the minor children to Oklahoma. The trial court concluded that, because he was the petitioner, the father bore the burden of proof on whether the move was for a reasonable purpose. After both parents presented their proof, the trial court denied the request to relocate. The court found the father lacked a reasonable purpose for the proposed move. Because we conclude the burden of proof rested with the mother, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hyundai Motor America v. Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, et al.
This appeal arises from a proceeding initiated by two automobile dealers who challenged the location of a proposed dealership in a contested case proceeding before the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission (the “Commission”); the manufacturer contended that the dealers were not located in the “relevant market area,” as required by statute and moved to dismiss the proceeding for lack of standing. The administrative law judge overruled the manufacturer’s motion, and the manufacturer filed a petition in Chancery Court seeking interlocutory review. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the administrative judge’s ruling on the motion. The motor vehicle manufacturer appeals the dismissal of its petition for judicial review of the denial of its motion to dismiss the contested case proceeding. Concluding that the manufacturer did not meet the threshold requirement for immediate judicial review as set forth in the Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Renaldo M. Jr., et al.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of a Mother to her three children on the grounds of abandonment by engaging in conduct evidencing a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare and persistence of conditions. Mother appeals, contending that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of her rights. Concluding that the evidence of Mother’s pre-incarceration conduct does not clearly and convincingly prove a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare, we reverse the trial court’s finding in that regard. There is clear and convincing evidence supporting holding that the conditions which led to the children’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted and that termination of her rights is in the best interest of the children; accordingly, we affirm the termination of Mother’s rights on that ground. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In re Cheyanna B.
John B. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child Cheyanna B. (“the Child”) after finding and holding that grounds for termination for abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the Child’s best interest. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings made by clear and convincing evidence, and we affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Yariel S., et al.
This appeal arises from a termination of parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Yaron L. (“Father”) to his four minor children Yariel, Yaron, Yariyana, and YariAsia (“the Children”). After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The Juvenile Court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. Father argues that he was not properly notified of the trial, that counsel should have been appointed, and that termination of his parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest. We hold that that the evidence in the record on appeal shows, as found by the Juvenile Court, that Father was notified of trial, that Father failed to appear at trial, and that the Juvenile Court did not err in declining to appoint Father counsel when he failed to appear. We also find and hold that the Juvenile Court’s determinations regarding grounds for termination and the Children’s best interest are supported by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ken Buckner, et al. v. Mike Goodman, et al.
This case involves a contract to purchase a home on the sellers‟ condition that the home be removed from the sellers‟ real property at the buyers‟ expense. The sellers and the buyers entered into a written contract on January 25, 2013, at which time the buyers paid a $2,500 deposit toward an agreed price of $5,000 for the home. The contract did not set forth a deadline for the home to be removed from the sellers‟ property, although the sellers were required to demonstrate to the lender financing their new construction loan that the home had been removed. The buyers contacted several potential house movers to transport the home but did not execute a final written contract with any of them. The sellers subsequently entered into a written agreement with movers who had originally been contacted by the buyers, retaining the movers to “take possession” of the home and transport it but providing the original buyers a first option to purchase. After learning of the agreement between the sellers and the movers, the buyers contacted the movers, “firing” them. The sellers then had the home demolished. The buyers filed a complaint against the sellers, alleging breach of a home sales contract. The sellers filed a counter-complaint, alleging that the buyers had materially breached the contract first by failing to timely remove the home. The buyers subsequently filed a second complaint against the movers, alleging intentional interference with contractual relations. The trial court consolidated the two actions. Following presentation of the buyers‟ proof during a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers had materially breached the contract. The court granted the sellers‟ and the movers‟ respective motions for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. Upon hearing the sellers‟ evidence regarding damages, the court entered a judgment in favor of the sellers in the amount of $5,200, comprised of $7,700 in total damages offset by the $2,500 previously paid by the buyers. The buyers timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Neylan H.
Terri W.H. (“Mother”) and Justin H. (“Stepfather”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of James P. (“Father”) to the minor child Neylan H. (“the Child”) in order to allow Stepfather to adopt the Child. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) entered its order denying the petition after finding and holding, inter alia, that Mother and Stepfather had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by willful failure to provide support. Mother appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings made by the Trial Court, and we affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
William Stuart Davis v. Cathy Denise Davis
This is an appeal from the divorce in a 26-year marriage. The court awarded the divorce to Wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct and awarded Wife approximately 62 percent of the marital estate. The court ordered Husband to pay alimony in futuro and Wife’s attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. Husband appeals the court’s division of the marital estate, the award of alimony in solido, and the amount of alimony in futuro awarded. We have determined that the division of the marital estate, under the circumstances presented, was equitable and that the record supports the determination to award alimony in futuro and alimony in solido; we vacate the amount awarded as alimony in futuro and remand the case for further reconsideration of the amount awarded. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
WM Capital Partners, LLC v. Anthony W. Thornton, et al.
A secured creditor filed suit against a trucking company and two guarantors seeking a deficiency judgment after disposition of the collateral securing payment of the debt. The trial court granted the secured creditor summary judgment in the amount of the deficiency. On appeal, the trucking company and the guarantors argue that (1) the delay in repossessing the collateral rendered its disposition commercially unreasonable and (2) the secured creditor failed to present sufficient evidence of the amount of its damages. We conclude that the requirement of a commercially reasonable disposition found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-9-610 only applies once the secured party has actual or constructive possession of the collateral. The secured creditor’s refusal to repossess the collateral at the trucking company’s request did not amount to actual or constructive possession. Nonetheless, in light of the challenge to the time aspect of the disposition, the secured creditor failed to meet its burden of production on summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Demquarter Healthcare Investors, L.P. v. OP Chattanooga, LLC, et al.
This case involves the lease of a skilled nursing facility. The lessee assigned the lease, and the assignee then subleased the nursing facility. While the appeal raises multiple issues, we have determined that the lessor prevails and that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the case remanded. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Bobby D. Murray, et al.. v. Michael Murphy, et al.
The pro se appellants, Bobby Murray and Loretta Murray, appeal from an order of the Trial Court which does not resolve all the issues and claims raised in the consolidated proceedings below. The appellees, Michael Murphy and Vicki Murphy, have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal arguing that the lack of a final order deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Because the appellants concede in their response to the motion to dismiss that “the case is not over and the Final Order is not yet made,” it appears that the motion to dismiss is well-taken and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Rainbow Ridge Resort, LLC, et al. v. Branch Banking And Trust Co.
The facts in this case implicate the doctrine of res judicata. In 2012, a real estate development limited liability company and its members filed suit in the Sevier County Circuit Court against their mortgage lender, Branch Banking and Trust Company (the bank). In that action, the developers alleged, inter alia, that the bank was guilty of fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. That suit involved four separate parcels of real property. While the case in circuit court was pending, the bank sued three individuals in the Sevier County Chancery Court, seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the priority of a security interest in one of the parcels of property at issue in the circuit court case. In the chancery court action, the bank joined the developers as parties. In response, the developers filed a counterclaim in which they repeated allegations included in the circuit court case and asserted other claims derived from the same set of facts. The two cases were later consolidated. In each case, the bank filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court heard both motions at a single hearing. On June 8, 2015, the trial court filed two orders – one in the circuit court suit and one by interchange in the chancery court action – granting the bank's motions. The developers appealed only the circuit court order. Unchallenged, the chancery court order became final. The bank later moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata barred further litigation. We deferred a ruling on the bank's motion. We now hold that the motion has merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment dismissing this case. We do so based upon the doctrine of res judicata. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Civis Bank v. The Willows At Twin Cove Marina Condominium And Home Owners Association, Inc.
This case involves a residential development on Norris Lake in Campbell County called The Willows at Twin Cove Marina. The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for the development grants certain rights to the individual/entity described in the document as the “Declarant.” As pertinent to this case, those rights include an exemption from payment of maintenance assessments to the homeowner's association under certain circumstances. The original owner of the development defaulted on construction loans, resulting in a foreclosure sale of certain portions of the development property and the personal property of the original owner. Civis Bank, the successor owner of the property sold at foreclosure, brought this action asking the trial court to declare it to be the “Declarant,” and thereby exempted from assessments levied by the defendant homeowner's association. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court held that Civis did not meet the applicable definition of “Declarant” in the Declaration. We agree. Accordingly, we affirm the court's grant of summary judgment to the homeowners' association. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Coffey, et al. v. Hamblen County, et al.
This is a breach of contract action in which the plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of the decedent, who died as a result of suicide in the county jail. The plaintiffs sought damages from the designated emergency medical services provider pursuant to a contract between the provider and the county. The provider filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the contract. The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration provision in the contract was invalid because it did not contain the required notice advising the parties of the waiver of trial by jury and appeal. The trial court agreed and denied the motion. We reverse and remand for arbitration |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Coffey, et al. v. Hamblen County, et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
I fully concur in the majority’s opinion with the exception of the majority’s determination that “we simply cannot agree with the trial court’s classification of the claim at issue as a consumer claim when Plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to a contract between the County and EMS for the failure to provide services as promised in the service agreement.” I instead believe that the language of the AHLA, as set out in the majority’s opinion and applicable to this issue, is broad enough to cover an alleged failure to provide services as promised in the service agreement. Specifically, I believe the definition in the AHLA, as quoted by the majority, defining a Consumer Case to be “a dispute between a Health Care Entity and a Consumer concerning: (a) the delivery of care or treatment by the Health Care Entity. . .” is broad enough to cover a failure to deliver the required care or treatment. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell Hunter Oakes v. Patricia Marie Oakes
In this divorce case, Mitchell Hunter Oakes appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate. Husband’s appellate brief contains no case citations or references to the record. Furthermore, there is no authority cited other than the statute addressing a division of marital property. These multiple deficiencies are clear violations of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a). In addition, Husband’s brief does not contain a table as required by Court of Appeals Rule 7. As we have held on numerous occassions, deficiencies such as these constitute a waiver of any issues raised by the offending party. Because of these omissions, this appeal had no reasonable chance of success. Accordingly, we agree with his former spouse, Patricia Marie Oakes, that his appeal is frivolous in nature. Therefore, Wife is entitled to recover from Husband her reasonable fees and expenses incurred on appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals |
