AT&T Mobility II, LLC et al v. Richard H. Roberts, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Taxpayer filed a claim with the Tennessee Department of Revenue for refund of sales taxes of approximately $24 million that it erroneously collected from approximately 800,000 of its customers and paid to the Department. Over the course of the next three and a half years, representatives of the Department and the taxpayer worked together to identify and provide information in a format that would facilitate the review. While the claim was being reviewed, the taxpayer filed suit in chancery court; the parties continued to work to resolve the claim, and the court extended the disposition date of the suit. In due course, the Department refunded approximately $19 million, plus a portion of the interest sought by the taxpayer; the case proceeded to trial to determine whether the applicable statute permitted the taxpayer to recover additional interest. The court determined that the claim was resolved by the administrative review rather than by the court and awarded interest from the date the taxpayer supplied proper proof to the Department; the court also awarded costs and attorneys’ fees to the Commissioner. Taxpayer appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the Chancery Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Arnold Emmitt Quarles, III
A borrower on a promissory note secured by his home became delinquent in his payments and the bank foreclosed and filed a successful unlawful detainer action in general sessions court. The borrower filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas in circuit court asserting wrongful foreclosure; he also filed a countercomplaint seeking declaratory relief and alleging causes of action for unjust enrichment and wrongful disclosure against the bank. Three defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. The borrower filed a motion for permission to file an amended countercomplaint asserting causes of action for fraud and breach of contract against the bank, and the trial court granted the motion. The trial court further granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and certified the order as a final judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. Because we have determined that the trial court erred in certifying the judgment as final under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Makenzie P., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of a mother's parental rights to her two children. The Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) removed the children from the mother's home due to drug exposure. After finding the children dependent and neglected, a juvenile court awarded custody of the children to mother's parents. The mother's parents then contracted with a nonprofit organization to place the children with a host family while the mother sought treatment for her drug use. Time passed, and the children ultimately spent time with several host families, including, finally, potential adoptive parents. When the health of mother's parents precluded them from retaining custody, mother, mother's parents, and the potential adoptive parents requested that the juvenile court award custody to the potential adoptive parents. The juvenile court granted the request, and several months later the potential adoptive parents filed a petition in chancery court to terminate mother's parental rights and to adopt. Following a trial, the chancery court found clear and convincing evidence of one ground for termination of parental rights and that termination was in the children's best interest. On appeal, Mother asserts a violation of due process because she was unrepresented in the dependency and neglect proceedings after her parents were awarded custody of the children. We affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Long, et al v. Charles D. Ledford, et al.
In this bench trial following a de novo appeal from the general sessions court, the trial court awarded Appellees a judgment of $2,308.28 representing the principal and interest due on a promissory note. Appellants raise several issues concerning the general sessions court proceeding as errors on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
In re: M. D.
This appeal arises from a finding of dependency and neglect. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that M. D. (“the Child”) was dependent and neglected based upon alleged sexual abuse by her father, D. D. (“Father”). The Child’s mother, S. D. (“Mother”), filed a cross-petition to intervene, and she sides with DCS on appeal. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Jackson County (“the Trial Court”) found the Child to be both dependent and neglected and a victim of severe abuse by Father. Father appeals to this Court. We find and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the Trial Court, and the evidence rises to the standard of clear and convincing to prove the Child is dependent and neglected, as well as a victim of severe abuse. We further find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s considering Father’s drug use and troublesome courtroom behavior in assessing his credibility. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Best v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
Appellant, an inmate in the custody of Appellee, the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari in the trial court, seeking review of a prison disciplinary board’s decision finding him guilty of possession and use of a cell phone. Appellees moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the petition was not verified as required by the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 27-8-104(a) and 27-8-106. The trial court granted the dismissal, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Johnson v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al.
An inmate of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking review of his prison disciplinary conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review his petition because the petitioner failed to file the documents required under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102, and failed to comply with the filing requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-805 and § 41-21-807. This appeal followed. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Nicole Aquino Williamson v. Paul Landon Lamm
This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan under which the parents exercised equal parenting time. The mother, who was designated the primary residential parent in the original plan, filed a petition to modify and alleged a material change had occurred in that the child had reached school age and the distance between the parents made the parenting schedule unworkable. The father did not file a counter-petition but filed a competing parenting plan. After a hearing, the trial court changed the primary residential parent for the upcoming school year to the father, established a new residential parenting schedule, and invited the mother to file a new modification petition for the following school year. The mother appealed. We conclude the preponderance of the evidence does not establish a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the primary residential parent but does establish a material change sufficient to meet the lower standard for modification of the residential parenting schedule. Consequently, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for a determination of a residential parenting schedule that is in the best interest of the child. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Murray Owen Wilhoite, Jr. v. Brenda Ruth Wilhoite, et al.
Husband filed a breach of contract action against his Wife while their divorce was pending. When the parties settled the divorce, Husband voluntarily dismissed his breach of contract action. Husband later filed a motion to reinstate his breach of contract action against Wife, which the trial court denied. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Damian M.
This is a dependency and neglect action involving the respondent mother’s two minor children, ages five and six at the time the incident giving rise to this action occurred. After it was discovered that the older child suffered, inter alia, a liver laceration as a result of physical abuse, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court determined that both children were dependent and neglected in the care of their mother. The juvenile court also determined that the older child was a victim of severe child abuse. The mother perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County. The circuit court likewise found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were dependent and neglected and that the mother committed severe child abuse against the older child. The mother appeals the circuit court’s finding of severe child abuse. We have determined that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the circuit court’s findings that the children are dependent and neglected, and that the mother severely abused the older child. Thus, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In re Quadayvon H., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to two of his children. The children’s mother’s rights were previously terminated. In 2010, the older child was adjudicated dependent and neglected due to his mother’s drug use; the father was incarcerated at the time. In 2012, both children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and removed from their mother’s home after an altercation involving the father and another child resulted in father’s arrest and mother’s arrest for drug use. In 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the father’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of persistence of conditions and mental incompetence. The juvenile court found that both grounds were proved by clear and convincing evidence and also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals. We reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Long, et al. v. Charles D. Ledford, et al
James A. Long and Patricia Long (“Plaintiffs”) sued Charles D. Ledford and Vivian Ledford (“Defendants”) with regard to a promissory note. After a trial, the Circuit Court for Unicoi County (“the Trial Court”) entered a Final Order granting Plaintiffs a judgment against Defendants for $21,296.01. Defendants appeal to this Court. The record on appeal contains no transcript and no statement of the evidence. We must assume that the record had it been preserved would contain sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court‟s factual findings. We, therefore, affirm |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
In re Scott H.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving a ten-year-old child, Scott H. (“the Child”). On August 8, 2011, the Shelby County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child's mother, Jill H. (“Mother”), and his father, William H. (“Father”), on April 17, 2015.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to the Child after determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (2) the conditions that led to the removal of the Child from Mother's custody still persisted, and (3) Mother was mentally incompetent to adequately care for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
George Campbell, Jr. v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This is a prisoner complaint filed under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (TGTLA) against the Tennessee Department of Correction, the Commissioner of Correction, Corrections Corporation of America, the correctional facility where the prisoner was housed, and several prison employees, seeking arrearages for unpaid wages, as well as punitive and compensatory damages. The complaint was filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court dismissed the prisoner’s complaint because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. The prisoner now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Adrianna S.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. In 2011, Father was sentenced to serve concurrent fifteen-year and four-year prison sentences. Thereafter, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), which provides grounds for termination when the parent is imprisoned under a sentence of ten or more years and “the child is under eight (8) years of age at the time the sentence is entered by the court.” Father argued that this statute does not provide grounds for termination in this case because the child was not born at the time of Father’s sentencing; therefore, the statutory requirement that there be a “child” under the age of eight at the time of the parent’s sentencing has not been met. The juvenile court determined that the statutory language includes a child in utero at the time of the parent’s sentencing and the evidence clearly and convincingly established grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights. The juvenile court also determined that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child. After review, we affirm the holding of the juvenile court. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. v. Ryan B. Pickens, M.D., et al
Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Ryan B. Pickens, M.D. and University Urology, P.C. (“Defendants”) alleging claims for health care liability. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. While the motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed a notice of and motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice when a motion to dismiss was pending and whether Plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice. We find and hold that Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal even while a motion to dismiss was pending. Our resolution of this issue renders Defendants’ second issue moot. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
William S. Nickels, et al v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County
Two dentists filed this action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) under the Governmental Tort Liability Act to recover damages caused by the allegedly dangerous condition of the sewer and stormwater system behind their office. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims. We have concluded that the trial court erred in several respects. The trial court erred in concluding that the combined line did not present a dangerous condition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-29-204(a), and in applying Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(a)(1) to the dentists’ claims. Moreover, the trial court erred in concluding that Metro did not have a duty to repair a known dangerous condition in the combined line. We further find that the trial court erred in concluding that the dentists were not at fault in constructing the addition to their office. We agree with the trial court that some of the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations and the Act of God defense. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight Douglas et al v. Charlotte Cornwell
At issue is whether an easement for ingress and egress exists. Plaintiffs commenced this action to enjoin the adjacent property owner from using Plaintiffs’ driveway for ingress and egress. Defendant filed a counterclaim asserting that she had an easement by implication; alternatively, she claimed Plaintiffs purchased the property subject to an easement because the easement was apparent upon inspection. The dispositive issue concerning the alleged easement by implication is whether the easement is essential to Defendant’s beneficial enjoyment of her property. The trial court found that Defendant failed to establish that she would incur an unreasonable expenditure to create another means of ingress and egress to her property; therefore, the easement was not a necessity. The court also found that the claimed easement was not apparent upon inspection. Accordingly, the court enjoined Defendant from using the driveway for ingress and egress. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Tom Seaton v. Mona Johnson
The appellee brought a detainer warrant against the appellant. The general sessions court granted the warrant and the appellant appealed to the circuit court, but did not post the required bond. The circuit court dismissed the case and the appellant appealed. We find that appellant’s brief does not meet the argument and citation requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) and, therefore, consider appellant’s issues waived. The circuit court’s decision is affirmed. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In re Dustin L. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on the six minor children of Tonya F. (“Mother”) and Joshua F. (“Father”). On February 9, 2015, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. DCS alleged as a basis for termination the statutory grounds of (1) failure to provide a suitable home, (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and (3) persistence of the conditions leading to removal of the children. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that DCS had proven all three statutory grounds alleged. The court further determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Mother and Father have appealed. Inasmuch as DCS has conceded that the elements of abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home were not proven as to either party, we reverse this statutory ground. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the children. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Clark v. John Werther, et al.
The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint in this health care liability action without attaching a certificate of good faith. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing certificate. The plaintiff responded to the motions and filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Some of the defendants objected to the voluntary dismissal, arguing the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the non-objecting defendants without prejudice but dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the objecting defendants with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed all of the court’s dismissal orders on numerous grounds. Upon review, we conclude that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure afforded the plaintiff the right to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David H. McCord v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, Inc.
Surgeon brought suit against a hospital alleging multiple causes of action, two of which were dismissed upon the hospital’s motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-12-119(c), the hospital filed a motion seeking recovery of costs and attorneys’ fees related to the dismissal of the two claims; the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appeals. We find no error in the award and, accordingly, affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph H. Johnston v. Tennessee State Election Commission, et al.
This appeal requires us to consider whether the plaintiff can bring a declaratory judgment action against the Tennessee State Election Commission in chancery court. We have reviewed the relevant authorities and have determined the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act or the Declaratory Judgment Act. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Arvidson Richards v. Neil Kingsland Richards
In this divorce action, Penny Arvidson Richards (Wife) argues that the trial court’s judgment granting her a divorce and incorporating the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (MDA) should be set aside. Among other things, Wife alleges that she signed the MDA under duress and/or while she lacked the requisite mental capacity to do so. The trial court ruled that Wife failed to prove her defenses to the enforcement of the MDA. Wife appeals. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly E. Lapinsky v. Janice E. Cook et al.
Kimberly E. Lapinsky (“Plaintiff”) appeals the order of the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Janice E. Cook, Kevin D. Cook (“the Cooks”) and Brenda Brewster (“Brewster”) in this lawsuit that arose from the sale of a house by the Cooks to Plaintiff. Plaintiff raises issues on appeal with regard to whether the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to allow Plaintiff to conduct additional discovery prior to ruling on the motions for summary judgment. The Cooks raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in denying their motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery, that the defendants made properly supported motions for summary judgment, and that Plaintiff failed to show that there is a genuine disputed issue of material fact. As the Cooks and Brewster made properly supported motions for summary judgment and are entitled to summary judgment, we affirm the grants of summary judgment. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for attorney’s fees. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals |
