Masquerade Fundraising Inc. v. Patrick Horne et al.
The plaintiff corporation filed this action against the defendant independent contractors, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants violated their contracts and covenants not to compete. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude an email sent to defense counsel that contains privileged information. The email was inadvertently attached as an exhibit on two separate briefs filed with the court by defense counsel and then repeatedly referenced by defendants in later briefs in response to a motion to disqualify counsel and for sanctions. The trial court held that the repeated disclosure of the email operated as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. We affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Mauriello v. Branch Banking and Trust Company
The plaintiff in this action, alleging mutual mistake, sought rescission and nullification of a promissory note and deed of trust related to the plaintiff’s 2005 purchase of multiple parcels of unimproved real property. Upon the defendant bank’s counterclaim and motion for summary judgment, and following a hearing in which the plaintiff participated pro se after the court denied her motion for continuance, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and awarded a judgment to the bank in the amount of $306,392.14, inclusive of the principal owed on the promissory note, accrued interest at the time of the hearing, reasonable attorney’s fees, and expenses. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Unifirst Corp. v. Indus. Fabrication & Repair, Inc. et al.
This appeal arises from confirmation of an arbitration award. The appellants objected to confirmation, arguing that they lacked notice of the arbitration. One of the appellants also claimed that it never agreed to arbitrate. The winning party submitted that the objections were untimely and did not state a cognizable ground for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act. We vacate and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Taylor Brocato (now Dunn) v. Kyle Young
This is a post-divorce partition action in which the ex-wife asked the trial court to order the sale of the former marital residence and to award her, as specified in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”), half of the equity resulting from the sale. The ex-wife relied on the provision in the MDA, which provides that she is entitled to fifty percent of any equity in the former marital residence “when the house sells.” The ex-husband opposed the partition action, arguing that he was awarded the former marital residence pursuant to the MDA and that the ex-wife was only entitled to half of the equity valued as of the date of their divorce in 2019. The ex-husband also contended that the ex-wife’s claims were barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because he had remitted $6,600.00 in monthly payments toward the ex-wife’s equity pursuant to an oral agreement that set her equity interest at $9,750.00. The court granted the partition petition and ordered that the property be sold. The court also found that the MDA was a contract in contemplation of divorce; therefore, acting pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A) (“the Distribution of Marital Property Statute”), the court valued the ex-wife’s equity in the former marital residence based on an appraisal near the date of the final divorce decree. The trial court refused to credit the ex-husband for the payments he made to the ex-wife according to their alleged oral agreement, finding that to do so would be a violation of the statute of frauds. Both parties appeal. For the reasons explained below, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Sue Averwater v. James Paul Averwater
In this divorce, the trial court evenly divided the marital estate and denied the wife’s request for alimony. It also ordered wife to pay the attorney’s fees and costs of a third party. On appeal, the wife challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. After a thorough review, we find that the court erred in not dividing the profit from a business the husband created during the pendency of the divorce as marital property. And the court erred in ordering the wife to pay attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in all other respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adams v. Shavetta Conner, et al.
This case originated in general sessions court with the filing of a pro se civil warrant. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Roberts v. Ramie R. Marston Roberts
This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 17, 2023. The notice of appeal was |
Court of Appeals | ||
Charles Melton, Individually and as Personal Representative for the Estate of Betty Ruth Shaw Morgan v. Michael Melton
This is an action against the former attorney-in-fact of the decedent for breach of fiduciary |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re William W. Et Al.
Mother and Father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their three children. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re Grace F., et al.
This appeal concerns a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and a putative father. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination had been proven and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother and putative father appeal. On appeal, the Department of Children’s Services concedes some of the grounds that the trial court concluded were established. However, DCS maintains that five grounds for termination were sufficiently proven against the |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Ida Steinberg v. Renea Steinberg ET AL.
In denying appellees’ motion to remove an estate’s personal representative, the trial court |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Martha Maxine Childress
In this will contest initiated by four of the testator's grandchildren, the trial court determined that the execution of the testator's will met the statutory requirements for admitting the will to probate and, accordingly, dismissed the will contest. The grandchildren-contestants appealed. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Jetton Developments, LLC v. Estate of Dorothy Huddleston et al.
A limited liability company filed suit in relation to a piece of real property for which the company had executed an agreement to purchase. Although closing did not occur by the time stated in the executed agreement, the trial court ultimately held that the opposing side in this case was estopped from denying that the contract had been extended. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jaliyah S. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellant/Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the three minor children on the ground of severe child abuse and on the trial court’s finding that termination of her rights is in the children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Ransom et al. v. Lakefront Estates Homeowners Association, Inc.
In this real property dispute, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertions that they were |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Lisa Sykes v. Paul Cox
In this child custody case, the record transmitted on appeal creates significant doubt as to whether the trial court’s final order represents its own deliberations and decision. Due to this concern, and because the judge who previously presided over this case has since retired from the bench, we vacate the appealed judgment and remand for a new trial. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Gregoire v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Crystal Gregoire, appeals from the Circuit Court of Lawrence County’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Following review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Bradley v. Catherine A. Pesce
The plaintiff filed a complaint against two parties in general sessions court. One defendant |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of June Swinford Spear
The notice of appeal filed by the Appellant, Myan Joy Spear, stated that the Appellant was appealing the judgment entered on February 15, 2023. As the orders appealed from do not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Midfirst Bank v. Tamika L. Cole, et al.
Appellant appeals the dismissal of his claims related to foreclosed property, asserting that |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Willie Graves v. Irelia Calloway, et al.
This is a negligence and premises liability action. One of the defendants, Appellee property |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly R. Harris v. Lonnie C. Harris
At issue in this appeal is the classification and division of marital property from a nearly |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Long v. Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension
Petitioner/Appellee Matthew Long (“Long”) applied for disability pension benefits due to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) caused by various traumatic events he experienced during his time as a firefighter with the Chattanooga Fire Department (“CFD”). The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) for Respondent/Appellant Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (the “Fund”) denied Long’s application. Long filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”) seeking a reversal of the Board’s decision. Finding that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, the trial court reversed the denial of Long’s application. The trial court also denied a motion to alter or amend filed by the Fund. Following thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Laquitta Carpenter v. Jourdan Richardson
This is an appeal from a default judgment originally entered by the General Sessions Court for Knox County (“general sessions court”) and then appealed to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“circuit court”). Because the defendant did not appear in the circuit court, the circuit court also entered a default judgment against the defendant. The defendant then appealed to this Court. However, because of deficiencies in the defendant’s brief, any issues purportedly raised are waived. We thus affirm the circuit court’s ruling. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Sylvia Cobbins v. Michael Feeney et al.
This appeal involves claims to three disputed areas based on adverse possession and prescriptive easement. We affirm the trial court’s decision denying the plaintiff’s claims. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |