Jay Daniel, et al. v. Allstate Insurance Company
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in an action on a homeowner’s insurance policy that contained a one-year contractual limitations period on actions arising under the policy. The home of the insured parties was damaged by a fire on December 15, 2011. The insured parties submitted a claim with the insurer pursuant to their homeowner’s insurance policy. The insurer submitted an estimate and tendered a settlement check to the insured parties on April 2, 2012. Over a year later, on October 3, 2013, the insured parties filed suit alleging they were owed an additional $75,000 for personal use and construction improvements on a new home. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the insured parties’ claims were barred by the one-year contractual limitations period. After reviewing the record, we find no error in the trial court’s decision and affirm its grant of summary judgment. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Walker v. Bank of America, N. A. et al
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adler v. Double Eagle Properties Holdings, LLC, et al.
This case concerns the proper interpretation of a contract governing an interest in real property. The trial court concluded that the contract unambiguously granted a lease to one party, rather than an easement. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Clifford Swearengen v. DMC-Memphis, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss Appellant’s medical malpractice action against defendants named in Appellant’s amended complaint filed more than one year after the cause of action accrued. The trial court found that Appellant’s claims against the additional parties were time barred because the amended complaint adding these parties was not filed within ninety days of the original answer asserting comparative fault against non-parties. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Neveah W.
This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court’s placement of a minor child while the minor child remains in the legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The minor child was removed by DCS from the home of her Foster Parents, who had cared for her almost since birth, after allegations that the Foster Parents had abused one of their other children. The minor child’s guardian ad litem filed an emergency petition seeking the return of the child to the Foster Parents’ home, or alternatively, for an award of legal custody to the Foster Parents. After a hearing wherein DCS, the Foster Parents, and the GAL presented evidence, the trial court ordered that the child be returned to the Foster Parents’ home, but declined to remove the child from DCS’s legal custody. On appeal, we hold that a trial court may not direct placement of a child in the legal custody of DCS. We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Wanda Joyce Watkins
This is an appeal from an order in a will-construction suit regarding whether certain heirs to the Estate of Wanda Joyce Watkins (“Heirs”), appellants in this appeal, are entitled to inherit under the residuary clause of the Decedent’s will. Because the order appealed from does not resolve the issue of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the Executrix, Kimberly B. Jenkins (“Executrix”), in connection with the filing of the petition for construction of the will, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miracle F.H.
This is a termination of parental rights appeal brought by the mother. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of the mother’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to visit, abandonment for failure to remit child support, and that mother substantially failed to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans. The court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Brooks Monypeny, et al. v. Chamroeun Kheiv
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. Appellant State Farm defended the case as the original plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist carrier. The original plaintiffs subsequently died, one as a direct result of injuries sustained in the accident, the other some two years after the accident. The plaintiffs’ children were substituted as plaintiffs/appellees. State Farm appeals the judgment on the jury verdict on numerous grounds, including: (1) denial of its motion for directed verdict; (2) scope of cross-examination; (3) denial of its motion for mistrial based upon inappropriate closing argument; (4) exclusion of notations on medical records; (5) various acts of alleged wrongdoing on the part of Appellees’ attorneys; (6) jury instructions; (7) admission of medical bills for original plaintiff’s long term assisted living expenses; (8) excessive verdict; (9) incorrect application of statutory cap on non-economic damages; (10) denial of credit for medical and death payments made by State Farm under the insurance policy; and (11) award of discretionary costs. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amresco Independence Funding, LLC et al. v. Renegade Mountain Golf Club, LLC et al.
This appeal presents the issue of whether service of process was properly effected upon a nonresident defendant. The defendant filed a limited appearance and motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, asserting that he had never been properly served with process. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that service of process was never properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jesslyn C.
This parenting dispute arose upon the parents' competing motions for modification of the existing permanent parenting plan as to the parties' minor child. The trial court previously had entered a permanent parenting plan order on May 11, 2010, designating the mother as the primary residential parent and awarding equal residential co-parenting time to both parents in an alternating weekly schedule. Following a hearing, the trial court found that a material change in circumstance warranting modification of the residential co-parenting schedule had occurred since entry of the permanent parenting plan. The trial court further found that reducing the father's co-parenting time to alternate weekends during the academic year, while reversing this co-parenting schedule during the summer break, was in the child's best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Dennis et al. v. Dr. Robert G. Smith et al.
Linda Dennis and Creed Dennis (“Plaintiffs”) filed a healthcare liability action against Dr. Robert G. Smith (“Defendant”) and others. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and 29-26-122. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims to this Court. We find and hold that because Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-122, their action was subject to dismissal with prejudice upon motion. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
James McMillin et al. v. Paul Lindsey McMillin et al.
The plaintiffs are siblings and two of the four adult children of the decedent. The defendants include a third adult child and his wife. In the months preceding her death, the decedent changed her bank accounts, originally titled solely in her name, to become joint accounts with the defendant son with right of survivorship. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant sibling exerted undue influence over the decedent in these transactions. They sought the return of all monies withdrawn from those bank accounts to the decedent's estate. Following a two-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $284,800. The defendants have appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Al M. Williams v. Corrections Corporation of America, et al.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Latony Baugh, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al.
In this wrongful death appeal, the main issue is whether, under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(c)(1), a surviving spouse must have abandoned the decedent for a period of two years to have waived his or her right to institute an action or collect proceeds under that section. We have concluded that the two-year period in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-106(c)(1) applies only to “willful withdrawal.” |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Emma Harris et al v. Amanda B. Aldmon et al.
In this appeal, the Court is asked to determine whether certain provisions of restrictive covenants recorded in 1917 are still in effect and enforceable against certain parcels of subdivision property that lay contiguous to North Broadway in Knoxville. Emma Harris filed a declaratory judgment action seeking the judgment of the trial court that a “used for residential purposes only” restriction is unenforceable as to her property due to changed conditions in the area and the abandonment of the restriction by waiver and/or acquiesence in other violations of the subject restriction. A defendant, Robert A. Whaley, a neighbor to the Harris property, filed a cross-claim seeking the same relief. The trial court, while finding that “it may well be that especially in [the] Harris[ ] case a just and equitable remedy would be the removal of the burden from her,” nevertheless went on to enforce the covenant. We affirm the trial court's judgment as to the property of cross-claimant Whaley, which property is improved with a relatively-large house inhabited by Whaley as his residence since 2001. The Harris property, on the other hand, consists of two contiguous unimproved lots that have never been built on since the subdivision was created in 1917. Considering the totality of the circumstances and equities, it is the judgment of the Court that, with respect to the Harris lots, the “residential purposes only” restriction is cancelled and unenforceable, but this decree is made subject to a restriction that no curb cut will be constructed to allow vehicular access from the Harris property to Gibbs Drive, a thoroughfare leading into the subdivision from North Broadway. Our decree is also subject to the Truan/plaintiffs agreement as reflected in Exhibit 33. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas D. McClure, Sr. v. Linda Bentley McClure
The issue presented in this divorce appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to appoint a guardian ad litem for Thomas D. McClure, Sr. (Husband), and proceeding to trial in Husband's absence after he was duly notified of the trial date. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Conservatorship of Dessa L. McQuinn
Jacqueline D. Cameron filed a petition seeking to be named as conservator of her mother, Dessa L. McQuinn. After a hearing, the trial court declined to appoint Cameron conservator, finding that such an appointment was against McQuinn's wishes and best interest. Exercising the discretion provided it by Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-114 (Supp. 2013), the trial court ordered Cameron to pay the fees and expenses of McQuinn's appointed guardian ad litem. The court also ordered Cameron to return all of McQuinn's personal property to her house, which property Cameron had earlier removed from McQuinn's house without authorization. Cameron appeals. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Sarah Kee, et al. v. City of Jackson, Tennessee
Action under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act against the City of Jackson to recover for injuries sustained in a fall suffered by one plaintiff while she and her husband were walking across a bridge from a parking lot to the fairgrounds operated by the City. Following a bench trial, the court held that the bridge was in a defective and dangerous condition and that the City was not immune from suit; the court determined that the City was 60% negligent and the plaintiff 40% negligent. The court assessed damages at $62,817.35 for plaintiff wife and $8,400.00 for plaintiff husband; applying the comparative fault percentage, the court awarded plaintiff wife $37,690.41 and plaintiff husband $5,040.00. We modify the award of damages to plaintiffs; in all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Cotham v. Judy P. Cotham
This is a Rule 10B appeal of the denial of a petition for recusal. Appellant supported the Chancellor’s opponent in the August 2014 election and contends that her support of the opponent provides cause for the Chancellor’s recusal. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to recuse, and Appellant filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court. We affirm. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Bunch v. Tiffany Jones
This is an appeal from an award of attorney’s fees following settlement of the underlying lawsuit. Appellees, law firm and attorney, represented Appellant in a lawsuit arising from an automobile accident. After protracted mediation, Appellee orally agreed to lower its contingency fee from 33 1/3% to 10% in consideration of Appellant’s agreement to settle her case against the tort defendants for $52,000. Appellant agreed to accept this offer and signed the settlement agreement at the conclusion of the mediation. Thereafter, Appellant allegedly refused to sign the releases drafted by the tort defendants. The trial court, upon the tort defendants’ motion, enforced the settlement agreement reached by the parties at mediation. Appellees assert that Appellant’s refusal to sign the releases drafted by the tort defendants constitutes a breach of the modified fee agreement and now seek to enforce an attorney’s fee lien for the full one-third of the recovery. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion to enforce its lien for the full amount, and Appellant appeals. We conclude that the terms of the modified fee agreement between Appellees and Appellant only required Appellant to settle her case with the tort defendants for $52,000, which she did. Accordingly, the trial court erred in not enforcing the modified fee agreement. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Jean Blake v. Russell Alan Blake
This case requires us to consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear a petition for contempt. Mother and the parties’ child reside in Nevada, and Nevada had exercised jurisdiction over the child pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). Mother filed a petition seeking to hold Father in contempt for his alleged failure to abide by portions of an amended parenting plan and for his failure to pay certain marital debt. Mother also requested to have child support recalculated. Father filed a counter-petition for contempt alleging interference with his visitation. Mother asserted the Nevada court had jurisdiction over Father’s counter-petition. The trial court, sua sponte, dismissed both petitions for contempt, holding that Nevada had jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Father’s counter-petition, but we reverse the court’s dismissal of Mother’s petition, which addresses marital debt, child support, and other issues unrelated to the custody of the children. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kathyrne Kennedy v. Karl E. Childs
This appeal involves Father’s petition for child support modification and his petition for rehearing regarding a magistrate’s finding of criminal contempt. At issue are the juvenile court’s findings that Father failed to demonstrate a significant variance necessary for the modification of child support; the confirmation of the magistrate’s order finding Father guilty of criminal contempt for willful failure to pay child support; and the court’s decision to only excuse three months of Father’s child support arrearages. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating Father’s and Mother’s monthly gross incomes on the child support worksheet but that the record is otherwise insufficient to address the issues raised by Father. Therefore, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa Malone v. Tennessee Department of Safety, et al
This appeal arises out of an administrative proceeding initiated by a former driver’s license examiner. After the examiner was injured on the job, she was absent from work for nearly thirteen months. For some of those months, she was on various forms of approved leave. Eventually, the examiner was terminated for job abandonment. She exhausted the Department of Safety’s grievance process, and both the Commissioner of the Department and the Tennessee Civil Service Commission affirmed her termination. The examiner then appealed to the chancery court, which also affirmed the Commission’s decision. The examiner appealed. Because we find the Commission’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence and was arbitrary or capricious, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jaceton B.
Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights to his minor child. The trial court found the Department proved the ground for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) because the father was sentenced to a prison term of ten or more years when the child was under eight years of age. The trial court also found that terminating the father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. Father appeals. The evidence clearly and convincingly supports the determination that father was sentenced to incarceration for ten or more years when the child was less than eight years old. The evidence also clearly and convincingly supports the determination that terminating father’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest because father did not have any meaningful relationship with the child and that the child had a strong relationship with his foster family, who had cared for his medical needs and wanted to adopt him. Therefore, we affirm the termination of father’s parental rights. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kailee M.G.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in November of 2013 (“the Petition”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Kristen M.C. (“Mother”) to the minor child Kailee M.G. (“the Child”). After a trial the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child after finding that clear and convincing evidence had been proven of grounds to terminate for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to the Child to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was proven of grounds for termination pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated, and we affirm.
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Sullivan | Court of Appeals |
