Daniel J. Wunder v. Karen Ann Wunder
Mother appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for contempt and for child support arrearages in this post-divorce action. We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Hannah M., et al.
This is a child custody and support case. The order appealed is not a final judgment so as to confer jurisdiction on this Court under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case to the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Redmond v. WalMart Stores, Inc., et al
This is a personal injury case. Appellant slipped and fell in a puddle of water while on Appellee’s premises. Appellant’s attorney filed her complaint one day after the statute of limitations had run on her claim. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Appellant’s suit was time-barred. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee. Appellant appeals, arguing that the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations because all of appellant’s injuries could not be discovered on the same date as the fall. Alternatively, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it did not grant an enlargement of the statute of limitations under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Helen B. Goza
This is an appeal from a probate court’s order admitting a will in solemn form. The appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to set aside the order, contending in both that it initiated a will contest prior to the court’s order admitting the will. The probate court determined that the appellant lacked standing to contest the will and therefore denied the motions. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of John J. Goza
This is an appeal from a probate court order denying the request of an estate’s personal administrator to resign and be replaced by his attorney. This matter came to the probate court on remand from the court of appeals for the sole purpose of resolving issues related to an award of attorney’s fees. Before the probate court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees, the personal representative filed a motion seeking to resign as personal representative and have his attorney appointed in his place. The court entered an order denying the motion, and the Estate appealed. We find that the probate court’s denial of the personal representative’s motion to resign was within its discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the probate court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of John J. Goza
This is an appeal from a probate court order denying an Estate’s request to enter a writ of scire facias to show cause why a bank acting as trustee of certain funds should not be divested of those funds. The probate court determined in a prior case that the Estate’s claim to the funds was barred by res judicata. The court of appeals affirmed the probate court’s order and remanded the case for the sole purpose of resolving issues related to an award of attorney’s fees to the bank. On remand, the Estate filed its request for a writ of scire facias before the court addressed the issue of attorney’s fees. The probate court denied the Estate’s motion, stating that it raised the same issues that multiple courts determined were barred by res judicata. The Estate appealed. We affirm the judgment of the probate court and award damages for frivolous appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wall Transportation, LLC, et al.v. Damiron Corporation
This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over the Appellee, an Indiana corporation. After finding a truck for sale on Appellee’s website, Appellant Carl Wall traveled to Indiana and purchased the truck there. After Mr. Wall brought the truck back to Tennessee, he allegedly discovered that Appellee’s agent had made certain misrepresentations about the vehicle’s condition. Appellants sued Appellee in Circuit Court in Robertson County, Tennessee. Appellee filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly Lynn Allbert v. Jason Edward Figueiredo
The trial court found Mother to be in contempt for the willful failure to pay child support and awarded Father past due and retroactive child support. The trial court also denied Mother’s petition to modify custody and awarded Father his attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Matthew J.
This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. Shortly after Matthew J.’s birth, his father pled guilty to twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of aggravated statutory rape. The Department of Children’s Services ultimately filed a petition for the termination of parental rights against Matthew’s parents. His mother surrendered her parental rights, and the matter proceeded to trial against the father only. At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights. The juvenile court concluded that grounds for termination existed because the father had been sentenced to more than ten years at a time when Matthew was under the age of eight. The trial court also concluded that it was in Matthew’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Elm Children's Educational Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
This Court entered an order in September of 2014 directing ELM Children’s Educational Trust (“the Trust”) to show good cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal was signed by a non-attorney, non-party. The Trust failed to show good cause. We hold that a non-attorney trustee may not represent a purportedly pro se trust. As such, the Notice of Appeal signed by the non-attorney trustee was insufficient to initiate an appeal on behalf of the Trust. This appeal, therefore, is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Kem Ralph, et al. v. Scruggs Farm Supply LLC, et al.
This consolidated appeal stems from the attempted foreclosure of real property in Tipton and Haywood County. In commencing the present case, Plaintiffs filed complaints in Chancery Court in both Tipton and Haywood County seeking to enjoin foreclosure and to obtain an accounting of the financial transactions between them and Defendants. Both trial judges found that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth B. Turner v. Selina C. Gaviria
This is the second appeal of this case involving enforcement of an oral loan agreement. Appellant appeals the judgment entered against her. Because the appellate record contains no transcript or statement of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, we conclude that the findings made by the trial court in support of its conclusions of law were based upon sufficient evidence. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Alysia S.
This is the second appeal before this Court involving the minor child at issue. In 2010, the child’s mother sought assistance in caring for the child after she lost her job. She signed a power of attorney and authorization of temporary guardianship stating that the child would reside with another couple for approximately six months. During thatperiod,the couple filed a petition alleging that the child was dependent and neglected and seeking temporary custody of her. The juvenile court found the child dependent and neglected and granted custody to the couple. The mother appealed to the circuit court, which found no clear and convincing evidence of dependency and neglect and ordered the juvenile court to reunify the child with the mother. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Despite these holdings, the child was never reunified with the mother. The couple with the child filed a petition in the juvenile court to terminate the mother’s parental rights on four grounds. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and persistent conditions and determined that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The mother appealed. We find no clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and accordingly reverse and remand this matter to the juvenile court for the entry of an order that implements a plan to expeditiously reunite the child with her mother. Having found that the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights, we dismiss the termination petition, reinstate Mother’s parental rights, vacate the juvenile court orders concerning visitation and guardianship, and designate the current custody and guardianship orders as temporary in nature. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Chelsia J. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Chelsia J. and Jared J., the minor children (“Children”) of Fleesha J. (“Mother”) and Mark F. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on April 28, 2011, upon investigation of the Children’s exposure to controlled substances in the parents’ home. On March 21, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Following a bench trial conducted over the course of four days spanning more than a year’s time, the trial court found that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of both parents upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parents abandoned the Children by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) the parents abandoned the Children by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare, (3) the parents failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans, and (4) the conditions leading to the Children’s removal from the home persisted. At that time, however, the court denied the petition based upon its finding that termination was not in the best interest of the Children. DCS subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. Following a subsequent hearing, the trial court granted the motion to alter or amend the judgment and terminated the parental rights of both parents upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the best interest of the Children. Mother has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Mother abandoned the Children by engaging in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited wanton disregard for the Children’s welfare. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jocelyn L.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Anderson County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to have the minor child Jocelyn L. (“the Child”) found dependent and neglected. The Child’s father, James L. (“Father”), was alleged to have sexually abused the Child. The Juvenile Court entered a restraining order against Father. While both Father and the Child’s mother, Amanda L. (“Mother”), were named respondents in DCS’s petition, Mother was named only so as to require her to uphold the restraining order against Father. After a hearing, the Juvenile Court found that the evidence on the allegations against Father did not rise to the level of clear and convincing. The Juvenile Court dismissed the petition. DCS did not appeal. Mother, however, appealed to the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Circuit Court”) for a trial de novo. The Circuit Court found that Mother lacked standing to appeal and dismissed her appeal. Mother now appeals to this Court. We hold that Mother was not an aggrieved party by the Juvenile Court’s order dismissing DCS’s petition and, therefore, lacked standing to |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Greer Morris v. Patti Deakins Morris
This is a divorce case in which Appellant/Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for alimony and reimbursement of her medical bills. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Lyric J.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights to his daughter (“Child”). Father lives in California and was not present for Child’s birth. Mother died two days after giving birth, and Mother’s mother (“Grandmother”) received temporary custody of Child because Father had not been declared the legal father. The final custody hearing granted custody to Grandmother and Father filed an appeal of the custody order. Grandmother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and adopt Child,and Father filed a counter petition to establish paternity and request custody. The court terminated Father’s parental rights based on its findings that Father willfully abandoned Child and that terminating Father’s parental rights and permitting adoption by Grandmother were in Child’s best interest. We find that it has not been established by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s failure to visit and support was willful; therefore, the judgment of the Smith County Chancery Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Camryne B.
The trial court granted grandparent visitation based in large part on the asserted need to maintain a relationship between the grandchild and her half-sister (who had been adopted by grandmother). Parents opposed the grandchild’s visitation with her grandparents. The trial court made no finding that cessation of the relationship between the grandparents and the grandchild presented a danger of substantial harm to the child. In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306, we reverse. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Channin S. Hughes v. Norman T. Hughes
This case involves a child custody dispute between two parents in the midst of a divorce proceeding with an unusual procedural history. After considering all the evidence presented during the divorce trial, the trial judge orally ruled that the mother would be designated the primary residential parent. About two weeks later, prior to the entry of any written order, the father filed a motion to reopen the proof or, in the alternative, to reconsider the ruling, seeking to present additional evidence about facts that occurred after the final hearing. The trial court denied the motion but instructed the father to present the additional facts via a petition to modify. The father then filed a petition to modify the primary residential parent designation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge dismissed the father’s petition to modify, finding that the facts presented did not “amount to a change of circumstance so great as to remove custody from the Mother.” Thereafter, the trial court entered the final decree of divorce and parenting plan from the divorce trial. Father timely filed separate notices of appeal from these orders. We affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Farmers Mutual of Tennessee v. Jennifer Atkins
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company on the issue of whether the insured’s failure to submit to an Examination Under Oath precluded her recovery. Because material factual disputes exist, we reverse. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
David W. Hamilton et. al. v. Abercrombie Radiological Consultants, Inc. et. al.
This is a health care liability action, arising from the death of Decedent, David Hamilton. Decedent’s surviving spouse, Donna Hamilton (Appellant), filed this action against Appellees, Abercrombie Radiological Consultants, Inc. and Dr. Donna K. Culhane. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121 et seq. Specifically, the Appellees challenged whether the medical release provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). The trial court agreed with Appellees and dismissed the action with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed. We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Gene Lovelace Enterprises, LLC et al. v. City of Knoxville
This case involves the enforceability of an ordinance enacted by the City of Knoxville to impose licensing requirements for owners and employees of sexually oriented businesses. Plaintiffs, Gene Lovelace Enterprises, LLC a/k/a Last Chance Theatre & Musical Club 2000 at Alcoa Highway and Eugene Lovelace d/b/a Bambi’s, filed this action 1 against the City, seeking a judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting enforcement. A similar action was subsequently filed by plaintiffs, Business Financial Services of Knoxville, Inc. d/b/a West Knoxville News and Katch One, Inc. d/b/a Katch One Lounge. The two cases were consolidated. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the City Council had appropriately enacted the ordinance to combat negative secondary effects caused by sexually oriented businesses. The plaintiffs presented evidence that there were no negative secondary effects associated with such businesses in the Knoxville area, including expert opinions and a study based on empirical data from the relevant locality. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that “relevant authorities cited by the City establish that the ordinance in question is of a type which may be validly and constitutionally enacted by a municipality such as defendant.” Gene Lovelace Enterprises, LLC and Bambi’s LLC have appealed that ruling. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the City and remand the case for further proceedings |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kaiden T.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights contending the evidence was insufficient to prove any ground or that it was in the child’s best interest to terminate her parental rights. The trial court found that the petitioners, the father and step-mother, proved two grounds of abandonment, failure to support and failure to visit the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i), and that termination of Mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(c)(2) and (i). We have determined the evidence is sufficient to prove both grounds of abandonment; therefore, we affirm the trial court’s findings on both of these issues. However, we must remand the issue of the child’s best interest, due to the lack of specific findings of fact as mandated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to provide specific findings of fact concerning whether termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child and to enter judgment consistent with its findings. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Blocker v. Nashville Rescue Mission
In this action for conversion of personal property, Plaintiff contends the defendant, the Nashville Rescue Mission,is liable for throwing away his personal possessions that he stored in a locker at the Mission. Relying on the terms and conditions of a written “Locker Use Guidelines and Agreement,” the Mission insists it is not liable because it disposed of the property as authorized by Plaintiff. The Mission submitted interrogatories and requests for admissions to which Plaintiff objected generally. The Mission then obtained an order compelling Plaintiff to respond to the discovery as required by the rules of civil procedure. When Plaintiff responded, but not as required by the rules of civil procedure, the Mission filed a motion to have the requests for admissions deemed admitted; the trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, the Mission filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the admissions and the relevant terms and conditions of the Locker Use Guidelines and Agreement. Based upon the Agreement and other facts that were deemed admitted, the court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate as Plaintiff could not establish an essential element of his claim for conversion. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy W. Bilbo, Et Al. v. Ocoee Place Condominium Homeowners Association, Et Al.
Jimmy W. Bilbo and Mildred D. Bilbo (“Plaintiffs”) sued Ocoee Place Condominium Homeowners Association (“Defendant”) for, among other things, negligent 1 construction which allegedly caused flooding that damaged Plaintiffs’ property. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging, in part, that Defendant did not own the relevant real property, that Defendant exercised no input or control over the construction, and that Plaintiffs’ action was barred by the statute of limitations and the statute of repose. The Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend, which the Trial Court denied. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to alter or amend the grant of summary judgment pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 or Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. We find no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 or 60.02 motion, and we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |
