John Daniel Rudd v. Debra Ann Gonzalez
This appeal involves post-divorce parental relocation. The mother notified the father that she intended to relocate outside Tennessee with the parties’ minor daughter. The mother asserted that the relocation was for purposes related to her career as a surgeon. The father filed a petition opposing the relocation on the grounds that the mother’s motive for the relocation was vindictive and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose under Tennessee’s parental relocation statute. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the father had not carried his burden of proving the mother’s motive was vindictive or that the relocation was not for a reasonable purpose, and so permitted the mother to relocate with the parties’ child. The father now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Denise L. Heilig v. Roy Heilig
Years after the parties divorced, they agreed to entry of a consent order requiring the mother to cooperate with the father in obtaining passports for the parties’ two minor children. Months later, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had refused to cooperate in executing the necessary documents. The trial court found the mother in contempt for willfully refusing to execute the documents. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order finding her in contempt, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the parties no longer live in Tennessee. She also argues that the trial court erred in holding her in contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Denise L. Heilig v. Roy Heilig - Partial Separate Concurrence and Partial Dissent
I concur in most of the majority opinion, with the exception of its decision to deem waived Mother’s stated issue of whether the trial court erred in holding her in contempt when the order she was accused of violating had no deadline. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kaliyah S. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Kaliyah S. and Jaya P. (“the Children”), the minor children of Kayla S. (“Mother”). In November 2010, the Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Jaya’s father, Josh P., on November 30, 2010. The petition alleged severe child abuse as the sole ground for termination. DCS filed an amended petition in May 2011, which also named Kaliyah’s father, Rontez L. (“Father”), and alleged that his parental rights should be terminated on the statutory ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. Father was incarcerated at the time the amended petition was filed. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to Mother and Josh P. upon finding that DCS had proven the ground of severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned Kaliyah by engaging in conduct exhibiting wanton disregard for her welfare prior to his incarceration. When making its ruling, the trial court concluded that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to assist Father in reunification because DCS sufficiently proved the statutory ground of abandonment alleged against him. The court also found that termination of the parental rights of all three respondents was in the Children’s best interest. Father has appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that DCS was relieved of the requirement of making reasonable efforts of reunification with regard to Father and remand for further proceedings. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Riannah M.F.
The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re T.F.H. et al
A.F.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor children, T.F.H. and P.F.H. (“the Children”). After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. He challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but not the best-interest determination. We affirm the judgment in all respects. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Lataynia Jones v. Sharp Electronics Corporation
Plaintiff filed an action alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the Tennessee Disabilities Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Employer on the basis that the Act does not require employers to make “reasonable accommodations,” as were required by Plaintiff at the time she was discharged. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield
This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Dwight O. Satterfield v. Margaret H. Satterfield - Concurring
I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Richard A. Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc. et al.
The issue on this appeal is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The trial court, applying the principles promulgated in Taylor v. Butler, 142 S.W.3d 277 (Tenn. 1996), held that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it requires the plaintiff to submit to arbitration virtually all of his claims, while allowing the defendants access to a judicial forum for some of their potential claims. We agree with the trial court that the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor is controlling and that Taylor mandates a holding that theagreement is unconscionable and unenforceable. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory Traylor, by and through his parent, David Traylor, and David Traylor, Individually v. Shelby County Board of Education
This is a slip and fall case under the GTLA. The plaintiff high school student slipped on a patch of ice on the sidewalk at his public high school and sustained injuries. The student filed this action against the county board of education alleging negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the defendant school board had constructive notice of the ice on the sidewalk and thus was liable under the GTLA. The school board now appeals. After carefully reviewing the record, we find insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of constructive notice and so reverse the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re J.B. Jr. et al
J.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor children, J.B. Jr. and J.B. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) was involved with the family going back to 2006. In 2009, the Children were taken into emergency, protective custody predicated on allegations of illegal drug use, failure to protect from sexual abuse, and domestic violence. The Children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and placed in foster care. A year later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. It alleged that Mother abandoned the Children and that she failed to resolve the issues that led to their removal. Following a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. On this appeal, Mother challenges only the best interest determination. We affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Kendra Kuebler Vachon v. Claude Vachon
This is a divorce appeal. Husband appeals the classification, valuation, and division of certain items in the marital estate, the award of alimony in futuro, and the requirement that he pay a portion an expert witness fee. We vacate the classification and valuation of the furniture which is at issue, vacate the valuation of the stock and the 401(k), and remand those matters for further consideration. We affirm the court’s decision to award alimony, but vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the type, amount and duration of the award. We affirm the court’s ruling in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Aubrey E. Givens, Administrator of the Estate of Jessica E. Givens, Deceased, et al v. The Vanderbilt University D/B/A Vanderbilt University Hospital, et al
This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to this court, and we vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that section 29-26-121 did not mandate dismissal for noncompliance with its terms. Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2013-00266-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5773431, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013). Defendants filed an application for permission to appeal our decision. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application for purposes of remanding the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care, Inc., – S.W.3d –, 2013 WL 6158000 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2013). Upon our reconsideration, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Lyndle Curtis, et al. v. Kathy Parchman et al.
Plaintiffs appeal a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Tennessee Right to Farm Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 43-26-101 et seq. (“the TRFA”). Plaintiffs own an express ingress/egress easement, a gravel road, that passes through Defendants’ farm. In what Plaintiffs titled a “COMPLAINT FOR ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE AND DAMAGES”, they alleged, inter alia, that Defendants substantially destroyed the utility of their ingress/egress easement by driving heavy farming equipment across and allowing cattle to walk upon the easement. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss contending that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted because the nuisance claim was barred by the TRFA. More specifically, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants violated any “generally accepted agricultural practices” or a “statute or regulation” in the use or operation of the farm upon which the easement lies. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the TRFA pertains to nuisances alleged to arise from a farm or farm operations but not to claims of unreasonable interference with the use of an ingress and egress easement. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim, for the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted for a nuisance arising from a farm or farm operation. However, we have determined the complaint states a separate claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress easement, a claim that is not subject to the TRFA. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint for it states a separate and viable claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress/egress easement. Further, this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
James H. Wilkins, et al. v. GGNSC Springfield, LLC DBA Golden Living Center-Springfield, et al.
This appeal stems from a case of alleged nursing home abuse and neglect and involves a dispute as to whether a health care power of attorney executed by decedent was effective to authorize the agent to execute an optional arbitration agreement on the decedent’s behalf. The trial court denied the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the attorney-in-fact did not have authority to sign the optional arbitration agreement on the principal’s behalf. The nursing home appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Davis H. Elliot Construction Company, Inc. v. Commisioner Of Labor and Workforce Development, et al
This appeal involves review of an administrative decision. Chattanooga‟s local utility company hired the Appellant construction company to perform preliminary work on the utility company‟s fiber-optic internet infrastructure. One of the Appellant‟s employees was injured while performing this work. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development‟s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“TOSHA”) conducted an investigation of the incident. Thereafter, on recommendation of the inspector, TOSHA cited the Appellant for violations of the telecommunications safety regulations. Appellant contested the citations before the Division of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“the Commission”), which upheld the citations. Appellant then appealed the Commission‟s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which also affirmed the citations. Appellant now appeals the Chancery Court‟s decision to this Court. We conclude that TOSHA erred in applying the telecommunications regulation instead of the construction regulations. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and vacate the citations issued to Appellant construction company. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kristine Blankenship v. Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C.
Kristine Blankenship (“Plaintiff”) sued Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C. (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that as a result of Defendant’s failure to properly treat a surgical patient Plaintiff suffered injuries including “a severe and disabling injury to her back.” Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment after finding that Plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 by filing her complaint less than 60 days after sending the notice letter. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether Defendant waived the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 and whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 conflicts with Rule 18.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to this case. We hold, as did the Trial Court, that Defendant did not waive the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, and that Plaintiff waived her second issue by not raising it in the Trial Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman v. Bobby Spencer Hickman
In this post-divorce case, Rita Grace Tidwell Hickman (“wife”) appeals the trial court’s reduction of her transitional alimony and its refusal to grant her attorney’s fees, expenses and discretionary costs. The trial court granted the petition of Bobby Spencer Hickman (“husband”) to reduce alimony based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(g)(2)(C) (2010), which allows a suspension of transitional alimony when the recipient lives with a third person and the recipient fails to rebut the statutory presumption that the third person is either contributing to, or receiving contribution from, the alimony recipient, and, therefore, the alimony recipient does not need the amount of alimony previously awarded. The third person was the parties’ son, Ethan, who had turned eighteen shortly before husband filed his petition. Wife continued to allow Ethan to live with her, and provided food and other necessities to him, after he turned eighteen. We hold that wife rebutted the statutory presumption by showing that her financial situation had not significantly changed, and actually had deteriorated, since the award of transitional alimony. Wife demonstrated a continuing need for alimony notwithstanding her willingness to allow her son to continue living with her and to support him after his eighteenth birthday. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for the court to determine wife’s fees and expenses at the trial court level and her discretionary costs. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jack E. Miller v. Boyd Wyatt
Jack E. Miller, a former City Manager of Crossville, filed this defamation action against Councilman Boyd Wyatt, based on Wyatt’s statement during a City Council meeting that Miller had been “discharged from City Manager up here because of misappropriating funds and not following procedures.” Wyatt moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was protected by legislative privilege under the common law and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(b)(2) (2012), which statute provides that “[a]ll members of boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, and other governing bodies of any governmental entity . . . shall be immune from suit arising from the conduct of the affairs of such board, commission, agency, authority, or other governing body.” The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that Wyatt had immunity under § 29-20-201(b) because the alleged defamatory statement arose “from the conduct of the affairs of” the Crossville City Council. We agree with the trial court that Wyatt’s statement was made in the course of conducting the affairs of the City Council and, therefore, was protected by legislative privilege. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Norfolk v. Tennessee Civil Service Commission
State trooper challenges his termination for the good of the service. We find substantial and material evidence to support the decision of the Civil Service Commission and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Director, TVHS, Murfreesboro Campus v. Lawrence Hartman
The trial court ordered a sixty-eight year old army veteran to be involuntarily hospitalized because it found that he suffered from a mental illness that rendered him “unable to avoid severe impairment or injury from specific risks.” See Tenn.Code Ann. § 33-6-501. The only evidence of actual risk, however, was that others might easily be able to take financial advantage of his confusion or his trusting nature. We reverse the trial court and order the defendant’s release, because it is not constitutionally or statutorily permissible to deprive an individual of liberty when he poses no danger to others, and when the only danger he poses to himself is danger to his own property or potential for financial loss. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Jacqueline Wall Farthing, Dickson County Register of Deeds v. Dickson County, Tennessee by and Through Bob Rial, Mayor for Dickson County, Tennessee
Register of Deeds filed petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. seeking an increase in compensation for her three deputy clerks and seeking an award of her costs, including attorney’s fees. The trial court denied Register the relief she sought, and she appealed. Based on the evidence presented and the language of the statute, we hold the trial court was required to determine the appropriate salary for Register’s assistants. Register is entitled under the applicable statute to have her costs, including her attorney’s fees, paid out of the fees collected by her office. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Keenan, Sr. and Debra B. Keenan v. Barry C. Fodor and Deborah A. Fodor
The Keenans and the Fodors are neighbors who share access to their respective properties through an elaborate stone and metal gate that had been constructed on an easement of way over the Keenans’ property by the prior owner of the Fodors’ property. After a period of relative harmony, a dispute over the ownership of the gate led to a lawsuit. The trial court and this court ruled that the gate was personalty, not a fixture, and belonged to the Fodors, who were given authority to move it. The trial court’s order also set out some ground rules for the shared use of the gate pending its removal. Disagreements over the gate continued, resulting in two additional legal actions. The first was a motion for civil contempt filed by the Fodors alleging that the Keenans had violated the judicially-ordered ground rules for the use of the gate. For their part, the Keenans filed a motion to compel the Fodors to remove the gate from the easement and place it on their own property. In one proceeding, the court found that the Keenans were in contempt of its orders. In the other, it declined to order that the gate be removed. We reverse the finding of contempt, but we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Fodors are not obligated to remove the gate. We also hold, however, that the Fodors are not entitled to exclude the Keenans from the free use of their own property by keeping the gate locked. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Keenan, Sr. and Debra B. Keenan v. Barry C. Fodor and Deborah A. Fodor
The Keenans and the Fodors are neighbors who share access to their respective properties through an elaborate stone and metal gate that had been constructed on an easement of way over the Keenans’ property by the prior owner of the Fodors’ property. After a period of relative harmony, a dispute over the ownership of the gate led to a lawsuit. The trial court and this court ruled that the gate was personalty, not a fixture, and belonged to the Fodors, who were given authority to move it. The trial court’s order also set out some ground rules for the shared use of the gate pending its removal. Disagreements over the gate continued, resulting in two additional legal actions. The first was a motion for civil contempt filed by the Fodors alleging that the Keenans had violated the judicially-ordered ground rules for the use of the gate. For their part, the Keenans filed a motion to compel the Fodors to remove the gate from the easement and place it on their own property. In one proceeding, the court found that the Keenans were in contempt of its orders. In the other, it declined to order that the gate be removed. We reverse the finding of contempt, but we affirm the trial court’s determination that the Fodors are not obligated to remove the gate. We also hold, however, that the Fodors are not entitled to exclude the Keenans from the free use of their own property by keeping the gate locked. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals |