Jennifer E. Patterson v. Natalie D. Grant-Herms
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer E. Patterson v. Natalie D. Grant-Herms - Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gayle Connelly v. Peter Napolitano
The trial court in this case entered two identical final judgments fifteen days apart. The appellant filed her notice of appeal within thirty days of the second judgment, but not the first. Because the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal runs from the entry of the first judgment, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Although the appellant may seek relief from the trial court pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.60, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kathleen Baker and Rick Baker v. Deborah A. Snedegar
Plaintiff filed suit against a medical legal examiner alleging the medical legal examiner was negligent in failing to inform her of certain preventative medications. The medical legal examiner contended she was a government employee protected from liability by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion because the medical legal examiner could not prove she was paid by the payroll department of the governmental entity at issue, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20107(a)(2). The medical legal examiner appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Karen Lesley and City of Memphis Civil Service Commission
A Memphis police officer’s employment was terminated without a pre-termination hearing because the City of Memphis was of the opinion that she was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer sought review of her termination, and the Memphis Civil Service Commission agreed with the City’s position that the officer was a probationary employee and not entitled to a hearing. The officer filed a petition for review before the chancery court, and the chancery court reversed the Commission, finding that the officer had already completed her probationary period, and as a non-probationary employee, she was entitled to due process protections including a pre-termination hearing. This order was not appealed. On remand to the Commission, the City stipulated that the officer was not given a pre-termination hearing and sought to relitigate the issue of whether she was a probationary employee. The Commission declined to reconsider the issue and determined that the officer was denied procedural due process. The Commission reinstated the officer to her previous position of employment. The chancery court affirmed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adcock, et al. v. Cheatham County Board of Education
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order awarding the plaintiffs an easement across the defendant’s property. Because the order does not dispose of the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
Martha Elaine Weaver Carter v. David Ray Carter
Mother appeals the trial court’s decision on her petition to modify parenting time. While we find no error in the trial court’s ruling on parenting time, we have concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying mother’s attorney from representing her in future proceedings and in ordering mother to produce bank records. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mary E. P. et al
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and father on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, and willful abandonment by failure to visit, and upon the determination that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Both parents appeal. Finding the evidence clear and convincing, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Mark A. L.
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Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Moses v. Jayanta K. Dirghangi, MD
This case involves allegations of medical battery and medical malpractice surrounding an exam performed on a patient while she was admitted to a hospital to give birth. The trial court dismissed any allegations for medical battery for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, finding that the patient’s complaint failed to include allegations that the exam was performed without the patient’s authorization. The trial court further dismissed any remaining malpractice claims for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act notice requirements. Discerning no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Amanda Turner (Short) v. Jessie Lee Short, Jr.
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
FirstBank v. Landview Construction, LLC, et al.
Firstbank (“Plaintiff”) sued Landview Construction, LLC, Winston D. Cox (“Defendants”), and Beverly Linkous with regard to promissory notes secured by deeds of trust on three parcels of real property located in Knoxville, Tennessee. The parties attempted to enter into stipulations in lieu of presenting testimony at trial and informed the Trial Judge of these purported stipulations. After what passed as the trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff be awarded a judgment in the amount of $149,192.22 against defendants Landview Construction, LLC and Winston D. Cox jointly and severally. Defendants appeal to this Court alleging that the Trial Court misconstrued the stipulations and as a result erred in the amount of the judgment. We find and hold that the purported stipulations were insufficient to show that the parties reached any agreement as to the stipulations. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Ann Bell v. James Dale Trull
This appeal arises from Defendant’s erection of barricades between Plaintiff’s property and Johnson Street in Benton County, Tennessee in order to block Plaintiff’s access to the street from her property. Defendant contends that Johnson Street does not extend to Plaintiff’s property and that he owns the land between the two. Plaintiff contends that Johnson Street does extend to her property and that she has a right of unimpeded access to it. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment establishing Plaintiff’s right of access to Johnson Street, compensatory relief for damage caused to her land as a result of Defendant’s barricades, and that punitive damages be assessed against Defendant. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted Plaintiff unimpeded access to Johnson Street, awarded her $5,100 in compensatory damages, and assessed punitive damages of $10,000 against Defendant. Defendant appealed. On appeal, we are unable to effectively review the record and must remand for further findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Court of Appeals | ||
S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D.
Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s post-divorce modification of Appellee/Father’s child support obligation, and its finding that Appellant was guilty of various acts of criminal contempt. Appellant/Mother also appeals the trial court’s admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court erred in addressing, sua sponte, the issue of modification of Appellee/Father’s child support obligation in the absence of a petition for modification as required by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-5-101(f)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the modification of child support. The order of the trial court is otherwise affirmed. Father’s request for attorney’s fees incurred in defense of this appeal is granted based upon provisions in the parenting plan and marital dissolution agreement. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jeremiah I. R.
Spenser R.S. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor son, Jeremiah I.R. (“the Child”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the Child from his mother’s custody after a babysitter took the Child and two siblings to the emergency room for injuries to the siblings. Father’s whereabouts were then unknown and his paternity of the Child had not yet been established. The Child’s mother entered into an agreed order with DCS stipulating that the Child was dependent and neglected in her care. Thereafter, the mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights. Some 18 months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights. The trial court granted the petition based on its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Clendenon
This case involves a claim filed against the Estate of Todd Clendenon. Elite Oncology Medical Group filed the claim seeking payment for medical treatment and services rendered to the decedent. Barbara Jean Clendenon, the decedent’s wife and his Personal Representative, moved the probate court to designate as “exempt funds” the monies paid to the decedent under his health insurance policy. The payments included those pertaining to the treatment and services the decedent received from Elite. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The court determined that payments made by the health insurance carrier that were deposited into the Estate’s bank account after the death of the decedent were exempt from the claims of creditors pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-1-110 (2010). Elite appeals. We affirm. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Mullins v. Alfred L. Locke, et al
This is a suit by Terry Mullins seeking a declaration that the Defendants, the Lockes (who are brothers) and the Gillespies (who are husband and wife) – whose properties lie near to, and south of, the Plaintiff’s property – have no right to the use of a driveway across the Plaintiff’s property to Vera Drive in Rhea County. The Defendants claim that they have a prescriptive easement, measuring some 47 feet long and 50 feet wide, enabling them to access Vera Drive over the Plaintiff’s property. This matter was before us at an earlier time. Because the statement of the evidence presented to us on the first appeal was, in our words, “a one-sided argumentative presentation of the evidence favorable to the Plaintiff,” we remanded this case to the trial court, pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-3- 128 (2000). (Emphasis in original.) In our remand, we advised the parties that we were taking this action “so a proper statement of the evidence c[ould] be prepared.” (Footnote in original omitted.) Such a statement has now been filed. Upon consideration of the very thorough statement prepared by the trial court, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s judgment finding and holding that the Defendants have a prescriptive easement over the property of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Sharon Clayman Sitz v. William Grant Sitz
After some 16 years of marriage, Sharon Clayman Sitz (“Wife”) sued William Grant Sitz (“Husband”) for divorce. Following a bench trial, the court awarded Wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. The court adopted Wife’s proposed parenting plan, which made Wife the primary residential parent of their minor child and divided the marital property. The court further determined that Husband was voluntarily underemployed and imputed additional income to him in order to calculate his child support obligation. Husband appeals. We affirm with one modification. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
4215 Harding Road Homeowners' Association v. Stacy Harris
In suit brought by condominium Homeowner’s Association, former owner of condominium unit which was ordered sold after being determined to constitute a nuisance, appeals the trial court’s order granting the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tonya Andrews, As Admin. for the Estate of James Christopher Sprinkle & Jacob Colton Sprinkle a minor by next friend and Guardian Tonya Andrews v. Amy Sprinkle and Frank Wray
The basic issues in this appeal involve the valuation of a decedent’s business at the time of his death. After the decedent died, the decedent’s mother was appointed administratrix of his estate. She filed this lawsuit against the decedent’s wife and the decedent’s wife’s brother, alleging that they had wrongfully disposed of virtually all of the decedent’s property after his death, including his business assets, therebyrendering a proper administration of the estate extremely difficult if not impossible. Following a four-day bench trial, the trial court concluded that the defendants had wrongfully taken possession of the decedent’s business assets and converted them to their own personal use. Relevant to this appeal, the court valued the decedent’s business at $75,000, and it held that the defendants were jointly and severally liable to the estate for that amount. The defendants appeal, challenging only the amount of damages awarded by the trial court for the value of the business. After a careful review of the record, we affirm |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Lillian F. W.
This is an appeal from orders entered by the Circuit Court in an appeal from a juvenile court’s judgment finding a child dependent and neglected and establishing custody and visitation. These proceedings are part of a custody struggle between the biological father of the child, who lives in California, and her maternal grandparents, who live in Tennessee. Both parties have participated in proceedings in the courts of Tennessee and California. Although the substantive orders of the two courts were very similar, each of the parties decided at some point not to follow the orders of the court in the state of the other party’s residence, resulting in conflicting orders of custody and a jurisdictional battle in which both parties have invoked the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. We have determined that the only type of subject matter jurisdiction at issue here is the temporary, emergency jurisdiction that the juvenile court exercised to determine Grandparents’ petition for dependency and neglect. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Christopher S. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Christopher S., Jr. (“C.J.”) and Lilly S., the minor children (“Children”) of Tawana S. (“Mother”) and Christopher S., Sr. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on October 14, 2010. On September 22, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Following a bench trial held on April 27, 2012, and July 11, 2012, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents had committed severe child abuse and were mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. Father and Mother have appealed. We reverse the finding that Father and Mother were mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Steven A. Pugh, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to waive all fines and costs related to the nolle prosequi of all charges in Hamblen County Criminal Court case number 03CR212. Because it is clear from the record that no court costs or fines were assessed against the appellant as a result of the nolle prosequi entered in the proceedings below, there appears to be no judgment of the trial court adverse to the appellant’s interests and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Barbara Ann Hernandez v. Jose Emmanuel Hernandez
The issues in this divorce case are whether the trial court correctly ordered husband to pay wife $600 per month in transitional alimony for 36 months, child support in the amount of $253 per month, and $4,000 of the wife's attorneys fees, the latter as alimony in solido. At the time of trial, husband had been unemployed and actively seeking work for about one year. The trial court found that his income was zero. Wife did not argue that husband was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, and the trial court made no such findings. The proof at trial establishes that many of the statutory factors supporting an award of alimony in futuro - including the need of the wife, duration of the marriage, i.e., 20 years, the parties' relative earning capacities, wife's contributions to the marriage as homemaker and parent, and wife's health - were demonstrated. Husband's current ability to pay, however, is quite limited because of his involuntary unemployment and zero income. Consequently, we modify the transitional alimony award to $50 per month, but designate it as alimony in futuro. The difference in husband's income, i.e., $1,191.66 per month, at the time his child support obligation was set and his income, i.e., zero, at time of trial likely supports a finding that there is a significant variance between the current support order of $253 and the amount of the proposed presumptive modified support order. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order refusing to modify his child support obligation and remand for a recalculation of child support. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Sara Eigen Figal v. The Vanderbilt University
A professor denied tenure at Vanderbilt University brought suit against the university asserting causes of action for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the university. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
