Susan Crosby Wilkinson v. Bradley Webb Wilkinson
This is a post-divorce case. Appellee Wife and Appellant Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement, which was incorporated, by reference, into the final decree of divorce. The agreement provided for transitional alimony payments, which would “self-terminate” upon the occurrence of certain conditions, including cohabitation. Husband developed a belief that Wife was cohabitating and, relying on the self-termination clause, ceased payment of spousal support without court intervention. Wife subsequently filed a petition for civil contempt, seeking a monetary judgment in the amount of alimony arrears and attorney’s fees. The trial court determined that Husband was not in contempt, but awarded alimony arrears and attorney’s fees in favor of Wife. Husband appeals. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norma Ellington and Clifton Ellington, Individually and as next friend and natural parents of Jerome Ellington, Deceased, v. Jackson Bowling & Family Fun Center, L.L.C., Jackson Bowling & Recreation Center, Inc., and John Doe
This is a wrongful death action predicated on premises liability. The lawsuit arose out of a fight in the parking lot of a bowling alley owned by the defendants. After the plaintiffs’ 19-year-old son punched a member of a rival gang, another member of the rival gang drove up and shot the plaintiffs’ son in the chest, killing him. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the defendant bowling alley owners for the wrongful death of their son; they asserted that the defendants acted negligently or recklessly in failing to provide adequate security on their premises. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion on two bases: (1) the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs’ son to protect him from the criminal acts of others, and (2) the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ son was at least 50% at fault for his death. The plaintiffs now appeal. We reverse, finding that the standard for summary judgment under Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Company has not been met in this case. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC
In this case, we address the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiffs did not file any further bond at that time, but later filed a $500 cost bond. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. 27-5-103. The plaintiffs now appeal. After careful review of the statutes and caselaw, we overrule this Court’s prior decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug 10, 2012), and conclude that payment of a cash bond in the amount of the statutory court costs set out in Section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i) satisfied the plaintiffs’ obligation to “give bond with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal” under Section 27-5-103(a), and so the Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the action and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC - Concurring Opinion
I fully concur in Judge Kirby’s well-reasoned analysis, and also agree with Judge Stafford that the word "costs" contained in the statute is ambiguous. I write separately to offer additional historical perspective and to more fully address the implications of the conclusions reached in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC - Concurring Opinion
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize my reasoning in concluding that an ambiguity exists, in direct contradiction to our earlier decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3–CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012) (perm. app. denied Dec. 12, 2012). |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Durrett Investment Company, LP v. The City of Clarksville, TN
City enacted an ordinance imposing a temporary moratorium on development of land within a 250 foot corridor abutting land owned by developer. Developer sued City asserting claims forinverse condemnation,wrongfultaking,tortious interference with businessrelationships, and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the trial court granted. Developer appeals, contending that the temporary moratorium constituted a taking and that the tortious interference with business relationships and interference with contract rights claims were allowed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s tort claims and reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation and takings claims. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Zamorah B.
The Juvenile Court Referee named Mother as the child’s primary residential parent and awarded visitation rights to Father. Mother requested a rehearing of the Referee’s decision before the Juvenile Court Judge, alleging that “visitation was unfairly decided.” Prior to the rehearing, the parties filed numerous petitions and motions related to visitation and custody, including requests for orders of protection and petitions for contempt. After a ten-day hearing, the Juvenile Court found that it was in the best interest of the child that Father be named her primary residential parent. Mother argues on appeal that the Juvenile Court should have applied the “material change of circumstances” standard to the evidence before it, and that, in any case, naming Father the primary residential parent was not in the child’s best interest. We find, however, that the court was correct to decide the question of custody solely on the basis of the best interest of the child since this was not a modification action. Because the Mother has attempted to prevent Father from having any relationship whatsoever with his child, we also affirm the trial court’s judgment naming Father as the primary residential parent. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dacia S., et al.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Sheila W. (“Mother”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W., and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Charles Thomas James
This appeal concerns the administration of an estate. Decedent died testate, leaving all of his non-marital property to his surviving spouse and appointing his daughter as executrix. Executrix and Beneficiary initially agreed that administration of the estate was unnecessary. After Beneficiary suffered an injury and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, Executrix attempted to parcel out the property to Beneficiary’s intended heirs. Shortly thereafter, Beneficiary sought administration of the estate. The trial court admitted the estate and following lengthy hearings regarding which items belonged in the estate, directed Executrix to pay the expenses and close the estate. Beneficiary did not appeal. Over Beneficiary’s objection, Executrix organized an auction of the items held in the estate to satisfy the expenses. Following the auction, Beneficiary filed a petition in which she alleged that Executrix breached her fiduciary duty to the estate by organizing an auction that resulted in waste and mismanagement of estate funds. The trial court denied the petition. Beneficiary appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Selena V. and Liliana V.
The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for McMinn County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer K. (“Mother”) to the minor children Selena V. and Liliana V. (“the Children”), born in 2007 and 2008 respectively. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Mother to the Children after finding that the ground of persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Celia Moody Rodgers and Sherry Moody Gonzalez, Sole Survivors of Joan Lois Moody v. GCA Services Group, Inc., and Weakley County Tennessee
This appeal involves injuries allegedly sustained by an employee as a result of her employment. The heirs of the deceased employee filed this lawsuit asserting numerous common law tort claims against the deceased employee’s employers. The employers filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that the exclusive remedy for the alleged injuries was pursuant to the workers’ compensation law, and that the plaintiffs’ common law tort claims were barred. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Shonda Kay Finchum v. Danny Wayne Finchum
Wife and Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement whereby Husband agreed to pay Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years. Husband terminated these payments and filed a petition to modify when Wife remarried and her employment situation improved. Wife filed motion for summary judgment on the issue asserting that the alimony payments could not be modified or terminated. The trial court ruled the alimony payments could not be modified because they were contractual in nature and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Husband appealed both the court’s ruling as well as the award of fees. We reverse the trial court’s judgment that the rehabilitative alimony payments are unmodifiable because the applicable statute expressly provides that a court may modify this type of alimony upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the language of the parties’ agreement providing for the award of these fees. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Kelsie M.P., et al
This case involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to three children who had been placed in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The mother had made some progress in complying with the permanency plan developed by the Department, but was still experiencing “instability.” Nearly two years after the mother relinquished control of the children, the Department petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court granted the petition, terminating the mother’s parental rights on the ground that the conditions that led to the children’s removal continued with little likelihood of remedy. The mother appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Diane West, et al. v. Shelby County Healthcare Corp., d/b/a Regional Medical Center at Memphis
This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to quash Appellee’s hospital liens, which were filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-22-101 et seq. In each Appellant’s case, the hospital filed a lien and then recovered adjusted amounts for services rendered pursuant to the hospital’s agreements with the Appellant’s respective insurance providers. Despite having received payment, the hospital argues that it may return these adjusted payments to the insurance provider and may, instead, seek to recover its full, unadjusted bill from the Appellants’ third-party tortfeasors by foreclosing its liens. We conclude that: (1) a lien, under the HLA, presupposes the existence of a debt; (2) Appellants are third-party beneficiaries of their respective insurer’s service contract with the Appellee hospital; (3) having chosen to accept a price certain for services as “payment in full” and having, in fact, accepted payment from Appellants’ insurance providers, the underlying debt is extinguished; (4) in the absence of an underlying debt, the hospital may not maintain its lien; (5) the right to subrogate belongs to the insurance provider and a hospital lien does not create a subrogation right in the hospital. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Holly Castle, Individually and as next friend of Emily Castle, a minor child, and Jana Clark v. David Dorris Logging, Inc., et al.
This case involves a post-trial dispute between one party to a personal injury case and their former counsel. After a jury verdict was entered in favor of Appellants, their former law firm filed an attorney lien and a motion to recover its attorney fees in the trial court. Appellants asserted that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the former firm’s motion. The trial court disagreed and awarded the former firm its full requested fee. Appellants appeal both the award of attorney fees to its former law firm, and also the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ request to release funds held by the clerk. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the post-trial dispute and reverse the award of attorneys fees in this case. However, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to release funds. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pam Lowery and Debbie Nelson v. Robert McVey
This case involves monetary damages for contempt of court. The respondent owned a parcel of land as tenants in common with his brother. When the brother died, the deceased brother’s children inherited his interest in the property. The deceased brother’s daughters filed this petition against the respondent to partition the property. The trial court entered an order equitably dividing the property between the respondent and the two petitioner sisters and requiring the respondent to remove personal property, junk, and debris he had placed on the parcel awarded to the sisters. The respondent was found in contempt for failing to remove the debris, and again ordered to do so. Apparently unhappy with this order, the respondent proceeded to remove, damage, or destroy fixtures and structures on the property awarded to the sisters, including a pole barn, several sheds, and a garage with an apartment. He also failed to remove the junk and debris as specified in the trial court’s order. The petitioner sisters filed a second petition for contempt and sought contempt damages for the harm done to the buildings, fixtures, and structures. The trial court found the respondent in contempt a second time, based on his continued failure to remove the junk and debris. However, the trial court declined to award contempt damages to the petitioner sisters under T.C.A. § 29-9105 for the destruction of the structural improvements on the property, finding that it was not within the parameters of the trial court’s initial order. The petitioner sisters appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas E. Holub, Jr. v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. d/b/a First Tennessee Home Loans et al.
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff on claims that a mortgage company and a title company erroneously encumbered a tract of his property. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in declining to award more than nominal damages. Because there is no appellate record for this court to review on the issue of damages, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Anthony R.
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his son on the ground that Father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. On appeal, Father contends that the petition to terminate parental rights did not allege wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought. Because we conclude that the petitioner did not plead wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon that ground. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Molly Rika Hatfield v. Rodney G. Hatfield
In this appeal from a divorce decree, husband asserts that the trial court erred in its property division and award of alimony. We have determined that the trial court erred in awarding almost all of the marital property to wife and, therefore, modify the property division to award the 401k to husband. We further modify the trial court’s decision in order to change the alimony in futuro to transitional alimony and to reduce the monthly amount. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
John Lowell Gulley v. Tammy Lynn Fletcher
In this child support dispute, the trial court erred in dismissing father’s petition to reduce child support and in finding him to be in criminal contempt. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Leah Wade v. Mark Wade
The appellant (“Mother”) appeals from an order of the trial court entered on November 27, 2012, which granted the counter-petition to alter or amend the parties’ Permanent Parenting Plan and to relocate to Indiana filed by the appellee (“Father”). The November 27, 2012 order stated that “[a]ll other issues raised” in Mother’s response in opposition to the petition to relocate and counter-petition to modify custody as well as Mother’s initial Motion for Contempt were “reserved for further hearing.” It is clear that the order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the proceedings below. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Mary Jane Bridgewater v. Robert S. Adamczyk, et al.
This appeal arises out of a boundary line dispute. On appeal, the landowners argue that the trial court erred in finding that the disputed property was owned by their adjoining landowner. The landowners further argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their thirdparty complaint against the individuals that sold them the property, and for refusing to award them an abatement in the purchase price based on the deficiency in acreage. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Yolanda Uria v. Steve Uria
This appeal involves post-trial motions in a divorce case. Several years after the divorce decree was entered, the father filed a petition to modify the parenting plan to seek more parenting time, and he filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had prevented him from exercising his parenting time. The father later filed a motion asking the trial court to alter or amend the original divorce decree’s child support provision in order to reduce his child support obligation retroactive to the date of the decree, and the arrearage that he had accrued over the years. The trial court modified the parenting plan, found the mother in contempt, and altered the portion of the original divorce decree pertaining to child support, thereby reducing the father’s child support arrearage. The mother appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Hilda Porter, Administratrix of the Estate of Louella May Sparks v. Larry Melton
Plaintiff was awarded a $100,000 judgment against Defendant in the trial court. In a prior appeal, this Court reversed the damage award, and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the parties entered into an Agreed Order for a $100,000 judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Ten years after entry of the Agreed Order, Plaintiff moved to renew the unsatisfied judgment, and Defendant claimed that the renewal motion was untimely. The trial court granted the motion to renew the judgment, and we affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Jeffrey v. City of Memphis
Decedent’s spouse brought an action to recover HHL benefits for the death of her firefighter husband. The City of Memphis denied her claim and decedent’s spouse appealed to an ALJ. The ALJ, likewise, denied the claim for benefits finding that the City of Memphis had rebutted the statutory presumption of causation and that decedent’s spouse had then failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that decedent’s cardiac condition was caused by his employment. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the ALJ, and we affirm the decision of the chancery court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |
