COURT OF APPEALS OPINIONS

Sammie Netters v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
M2012-01591-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia Bonnyman

This appeal involves an inmate’s petitions for writ of certiorari challenging the Board of Probation and Parole’s decisions to deny him parole on two separate occasions. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s claims related to one parole hearing but requiring further proceedings as to his claims related to the second parole hearing. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al.
M2012-00356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

Former police officer sought certiorari review of the City of Clarksville’s decision to terminate his employment, contending that the City failed to follow the disciplinary procedure set forth in the City Code and that, as a consequence, his termination deprived him of due process of law. The trial court held that there was material evidence to support the decision to terminate petitioner and returned the case to the City to have the head of the human resources department conduct a review of the investigation and appropriateness of the penalty; following a report from the head of the human resources department, the court entered a final order granting judgment to the City. Concluding that the failure of the City to follow its disciplinary procedure deprived petitioner of his due process right, we reverse the judgment, vacate the termination and remand the case for further proceedings.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Jimmy Dill v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, et al. - Concur
M2012-00356-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones


I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the disciplinary action taken by the city must be set aside because of the failure to follow its own procedures for such action. However, I want to make clear that, in my opinion, Constitutional due process was not implicated. I believe relief is appropriate under the petition for other reasons.

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Debbie Sikora ex rel. Shelley Mook v. Tyler Mook et al.
M2011-01764-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Franklin L. Russell

This is a custody action in which the father and paternal grandparents appeal the trial court’s designation of the maternal grandmother as the primary residential parent of the father’s seven-year-old daughter following the disappearance of the mother of the child, who was the primary residential parent. The trial court found that the father was unfit to parent the child and that he posed a substantial risk of harm to the child due to his history of domestic violence and the danger from exposure to the father’s drug activities and father’s associates. On appeal, the father and the paternal grandparents raise numerous issues relating to the trial court’s decision. They argue, inter alia, that the trial court erred in considering evidence of the father’s conduct that occurred prior to the entry of the Final Divorce Decree, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to overcome the father’s superior parental rights, that the decision to award custody to the maternal grandmother was not in the best interest of the child, that the trial court erred in awarding custody to the maternal grandmother, and that the trial court erred in allowing the maternal grandmother to relocate to Pennsylvania. We have concluded that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s factual findings and that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that designation of the father as the primary residential parent would expose the child to the risk of substantial harm. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s designation of the maternal grandmother as the primary residential parent of the father’s seven-year-old child.

Bedford Court of Appeals

Jolyn Cullum, et al v. Jan McCool, et al
E2012-00991-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge L. Marie Williams

This is a negligence case in which Jolyn Cullum and Andrew Cullum sued Jan McCool, William H. McCool, and Wal-Mart for injuries arising in a Wal-Mart parking lot. Wal-Mart filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Cullums had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court dismissed the suit against Wal-Mart. The Cullums appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Paul Shearer et al. v. Fred McArthur et al.
M2012-00584-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jeffrey F. Stewart

This appeal involves an option contract under which the defendants agreed to buy a piece of property from the plaintiffs at any time. We find no error in the trial court’s determination that the option contract was supported by consideration, that the plaintiffs exercised the option within a reasonable time, and that the plaintiffs did not waive the option by pursuing an inconsistent remedy. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Marion Court of Appeals

John Brockman v. Wesley Wolfe, et al.
W2011-02204-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn Peeples

Plaintiff sued multiple parties after trees on his property were allegedly erroneously removed during the development of an adjacent subdivision. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment to a subdivision developer, who was sued in his individual capacity, finding that it was his limited liability company which had developed the property, and that the developer had not instructed that Plaintiff’s trees be removed. The trial court also granted summary judgment to the developer’s limited liability company, finding the claims against it were time-barred. A trial was held against the remaining defendant and a judgment was entered against him. However, the trial court then reduced the judgment against the remaining defendant based upon the comparative fault of the limited liability company. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Gibson Court of Appeals

Tasha Dayhoff v. Joshua D. Cathey
W2011-02498-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chirsty R. Little

Father appeals the Madison County Juvenile Court’s judgment, entering a permanent parenting plan, setting child support, awarding a child support arrearage, awarding attorney fees to Mother, and granting a wage garnishment. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that Father is the legal and biological parent of the children at issue. However, having determined that no testimony was elicited at the hearing on this cause, and thus no evidence was presented from which the trial court could make a determination, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for an evidentiary hearing on all other issues in this case.

Madison Court of Appeals

John Albert Cordell, Jr. et al. v. Burl Bruce Snyder et al.
E2011-02312-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor G. Richard Johnson

This is an action for breach of warranty of title. The court found, after a bench trial, that the defendants breached the warranty by conveying an easement which they did not own. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

Johnson Court of Appeals

Sherry Hutson v. Safe Star Trucking et al.
E2012-00651-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Maddux, Jr.

In this case, Sherry Hutson filed a complaint in which she alleged her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer (“the tractor”) that left the scene of the accident. She seeks to recover under the uninsured motorist (“UM”) provisions of a policy providing coverage to the vehicle she was driving. The jury found that no “actual physical contact ha[d] occurred between” the plaintiff’s vehicle and the vehicle that left the scene. She appeals. We affirm.

Cumberland Court of Appeals

James Todd Harris v. Amy Price Harris
E2012-00300-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Vance

This appeal arises from a dispute over the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a magistrate’s order on child support. Amy Price Harris (“Mother”) filed a petition to increase child support from her former husband, James Todd Harris (“Father”), for their minor child. Two hearings were held before a magistrate, resulting in, among other things, an increase of child support. The trial judge did not confirm the magistrate’s order. This case later was transferred from the Fourth Circuit Court for Knox County to the Circuit Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”). Several months later, Father filed a motion to correct the magistrate’s order concerning child support. The Trial Court held that it lacked jurisdiction at that point to change the prior child support arrearage judgment or hold a rehearing on that issue. Father appeals. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Brenda Griffith, next of kin of Decedent, Bob Griffith v. Dr. Stephen Goryl and Upper Cumberland Urology Associates, P.C.
M2011-02730-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Amy V. Hollars

In this medical malpractice, wrongful death action the plaintiff alleges the defendant physician, a urologist, failed to timely diagnose and treat the decedent’s bladder cancer which caused his death. At the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The trial court held that the plaintiff’s only medical expert witness erroneously defined the standard of care and, upon that basis, excluded his testimony concerning the standard of care and breach thereof. With the exclusion of the plaintiff’s only expert testimony, the trial court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for medical malpractice and granted the motion for a directed verdict. We have determined the plaintiff’s medical expert did not erroneously identify the standard of care, he is competent to testify and, thus, the trial court erred in excluding his testimony and directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. We, therefore, reverse and remand for a new trial.

Putnam Court of Appeals

Tommy Wright, et al. v. The City of Shelbyville Board of Zoning Appeals, et al.
M2011-01446-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Larry b. Stanley, Jr.

This case involves a prolonged dispute over a proposed stone quarry that the plaintiff landowners, the Wrights, wished to establish on their property. While their application was pending, the city changed the zoning ordinance to rezone the Wrights’ property so that a quarry was no longer permitted as a conditional use. The Wrights filed suit, and on appeal this court held that the notice of the zoning amendment had been defective and that the zoning change was therefore void. The Wrights subsequently asked the Board of Zoning Appeals to consider their application under the property’s original zoning, but the BZA refused to put the application on its meeting agenda. The Wrights filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court found that the BZA’s action was arbitrary and illegal, but ruled that the Wrights were nonetheless precluded from obtaining any relief because of the operation of res judicata. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the petition on the basis of res judicata, because we find that doctrine inapplicable. We agree with the trial court that the BZA’s actions were arbitrary and capricious.

Bedford Court of Appeals

Joseph J. Levitt, Jr. v. City of Oak Ridge, et al.
E2011-02732-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William Everett Lantrip

This appeal involves the efforts of Oak Ridge’s Board of Building and Housing Code Appeals to demolish buildings in Applewood Apartment Complex pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-21-101, Tennessee’s Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Statute. Owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari when the Board voted to demolish the buildings. The trial court granted the petition but granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment. Owner appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether the Board acted without material evidence but affirm the grant of summary judgment on all other issues. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Anderson Court of Appeals

Dennis R. Massengale et al. v. City of East Ridge
E2012-00526-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor W. Frank Brown, III

The plaintiffs in this case allege that they are adversely affected by a statute that legalizes the sale of fireworks inside the city limits of East Ridge, despite a general ban on the sale of fireworks in any county with a population of greater than 200,000, e.g., Hamilton County. They allege that the statute is unconstitutional. There are two distinct groups of plaintiffs (both groups being collectively referred to as “the Plaintiffs”). One group alleges that they are residents of the city and own property or businesses in the city (“the Citizens” or “the Citizen Plaintiffs”). The Citizen Plaintiffs allege that the sale of fireworks will result in diminished property values and an increased risk of fire or explosion with attendant increases in fire insurance premiums. The second group alleges that they are either in the business of selling fireworks, or are members of a purported “association” of persons or entities in the business of selling fireworks (“the Sellers”). They allege that they have put forth much effort and expense to establish businesses outside East Ridge, where fireworks sales are legal, only to see their efforts thwarted by the enactment of an unconstitutional statute permitting illegal competition. The Plaintiffs moved the trial court to enter judgment on the pleadings by decreeing the statute to be unconstitutional on its face. Instead, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, but did so without prejudice. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Bradley County, Tennessee v. The City of Cleveland, Tennessee
E2012-00634-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri S. Bryant

The plaintiff in this action is Bradley County (“the County”). The sole defendant is the City of Cleveland (“the City”). The County’s complaint seeks a determination that the proceeds of a 2009 local option county sales tax increase, enacted shortly after an identical increase by the City, is to be distributed between the parties according to a contract (“the Contract”) the parties signed in 1967 as opposed to a statutory provision for distribution based on the site of collection of the tax. The City filed a counterclaim which, as amended, seeks a determination that the Contract is void; that the Contract does not control distribution of the proceeds of a 1982 tax increase; that the Contract does not control distribution of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase; and that, by statute, the City is entitled to all of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase on sales made inside the city limits through the City’s 2010 fiscal year. The trial court upheld the validity of the Contract and further held that the Contract, as amended twice, i.e., in 1972 and in 1980, controls distribution between the parties of the proceeds of the County’s 1982 tax increase. The court held that the applicable statute, rather than the Contract, controls distribution of the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase; this latter holding is not at issue in this appeal. The court further held that the City’s statutory right to the proceeds of the 2009 tax increase on sales in the City ended June 30, 2009, which equates with the City’s 2009 fiscal year. The City appeals. We affirm that part of the judgment upholding the validity of the Contract and that part applying the Contract to the distribution of the 1982 tax increase. We reverse that part of the judgment that held the City’s statutory right to proceeds from the 2009 tax increase ended June 30, 2009. We hold that the City is entitled to the 2009 tax increase on sales in the city through the City’s 2010 fiscal year.

Bradley Court of Appeals

Pediatrix Medical Group of Tennessee, P.C., v. Victor J. Thomas, M.D., et al
E2011-02421-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel Pickens Franks
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

This action arises out of a dispute between the parties on issues arising out of an employment contract. The parties have been before this Court previously on this contract, and we ruled that they were required to arbitrate the issues, and remanded the case. Plaintiff employer filed a declaratory judgment action as a dispute arose over the selection of arbitrators. The employer had selected its arbitrator, and the Trial Judge ruled that its selection was appropriate and that the Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the selected arbitrator was proper under the American Health Lawyers Association rules of procedure for arbitration. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Candace Young v. Washington County, Tennessee
E2011-02189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas J. Seeley

The plaintiff, a probationer, charged Washington County with negligent oversight and supervision, after she was sexually assaulted and raped by a private entity’s probation officer. The trial court ruled in favor of the county, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Washington Court of Appeals

Mulugeta Abebe, et al. v. Solomon Haile Birhane, et al.
M2011-01987-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia C. Bonnyman

Mulugeta Abebe , Eshetu Yalemwossen, and Girma Ejegu (“Plaintiffs”) sued Solomon Haile Birhane and Frehiwot Tesfagzi (“Defendants”) seeking, in part, a declaration of the parties’ rights with regard to a Raceway Service Station (“the Raceway Store”) located in Hermitage, Tennessee. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Order on October 18, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs and Defendants are partners in the Raceway Store with each one of the five partners holding a 20% interest in the partnership, and that the parties had an agreement that once overhead was met the Raceway Store would repay Plaintiffs their capital contribution. Defendants appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Harold Tolley v. Attorney General of Tennessee, et al.
M2012-00551-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia Bonnyman

Appellant inmate filed a petition for Declaratory Judgment in the Davidson County
Chancery Court, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-35-501(i) is
unconstitutional as applied to life sentences with the possibility of parole. The Appellee
Department of Correction filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Appellant’s failure to
seek a Declaratory Order from the Department of Correction constituted the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Discerning
no error, we affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Philip Wayne Hamby v. Myra Renee Wheeler
E2011-00872-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jerri Bryant

This appeal arises from a petition for contempt related to an underlying divorce judgment. Philip Wayne Hamby (“Hamby”) and Myra Renee Wheeler (“Wheeler”) were divorced by decree of the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). As part of the terms of the divorce, Hamby was required to turn over to Wheeler a publishing company (“the Business”) the two then owned. Wheeler later filed a motion for contempt alleging that Hamby had failed to pay certain necessary taxes on the Business and should be responsible for that tax debt. Wheeler also alleged that, because of the resulting tax lien, the Business was encumbered and Hamby, therefore, owed alimony arrears pursuant to the Trial Court’s divorce judgment. The Trial Court held Hamby responsible for the IRS tax debt, and also ordered him to pay back alimony. Hamby appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

Knox Court of Appeals

Lori Gregory, in her capacity as personal representative of the Estate of James ballentine v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
M2011-02061-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This is a negligence claim under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. The decedent was involved in a serious vehicular accident. A witness called the defendant municipality’s 911 emergency communications center for help. The 911 responders went to the accident scene and transported the decedent to a local hospital, where he died. The decedent’s mother filed this lawsuit against the municipality, alleging that the 911 operator was negligent in failing to summon emergency personnel from a neighboring county, because those responders were closer to the scene of the accident and could have provided aid to the decedent sooner. The municipality filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing inter alia that it owed no duty to summon aid outside of its jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

S.A.M.D. v. J.P.D.
W2011-01256-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donna Fields

This post-divorce proceeding involves modification of the primary residential parent designation and contempt. The final decree of divorce designated the mother as the child’s primary residential parent. Subsequently, the mother was found in criminal contempt for failure to adhere to the parenting plan; her sentence was suspended provided there were no violations of the trial court’s orders. A few months later, the mother was found to have further violated the trial court’s orders. Consequently, the trial court ordered the mother to serve a portion of the suspended jail sentence imposed in the prior contempt order. In addition, the trial court held that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred, and it modified the parties’ parenting plan to designate the father as the primary residential parent. The mother now appeals. We affirm.

Shelby Court of Appeals

City of Memphis, Tennessee et al. v. Tre Hargett, Secretary of State et al.
M2012-02141-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The City of Memphis and two persons who had to cast provisional ballots in the August 2012 election because they lacked sufficient photographic identification filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the photographic identification requirement for voting declared unconstitutional, or to have the Memphis library photographic identification card declared sufficient identification for purposes of the voting law. The trial court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing, that the photographic identification requirement was constitutional and that the Memphis library photographic identification card was not acceptable under the law as sufficient identification for voting. The plaintiffs appealed. We find that the plaintiffs have standing, that the law is constitutional and that the Memphis library photographic identification card is acceptable under the law as sufficient proof of identification for voting.

Judgment and Order

Davidson Court of Appeals

Courtney Anne Thompson v. Robert Harrison Thompson, III
M2011-02438-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge John Thomas Gwin

The trial court declared the parties divorced, reserving the designation of primary residential parent for their nine month-old daughter. After a hearing the court adopted a parenting plan that designated the father as the child’s primary residential parent. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard and made a decision contrary to logic and reasoning. We disagree and hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact, and that the court did not err in its application of the facts to the relevant legal principles. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Wilson Court of Appeals