Avie Aleane Harding et al. v. Donovan Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Captain Video & Tanning
A patron of a tanning salon and her husband filed this action seeking to recover damages for injuries the patron sustained when the lid of a tanning bed fell on her head as she was attempting to exit the tanning bed. The plaintiffs allege that the owner and operator of the tanning salon acted negligently by failing to properly maintain or inspect the tanning bed she used, which caused the lid of the tanning bed to become too heavy for the patron to lift and safely exit, and by failing to have a way for a patron to call for help from within the tanning room in the event of an emergency. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate essential elements of a prima facie case, specifically that a defective condition existed or that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of any alleged defective or dangerous condition of the premises. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Denice Pettijohn v. Patrick Carl Pettijohn
In this divorce case, the trial court’s judgment ended the relatively-long marriage of Carol Denice Pettijohn (“Wife”) and Patrick Carl Pettijohn (“Husband”). Husband appeals the trial court’s division of the marital property, its award of alimony in solido to Wife, and the duration of the alimony in futuro award. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Pesce v. East Tennessee Construction Services, Inc.
Charles Pesce (“the Owner”) is a practicing dentist. He contracted with East Tennessee Construction Services, Inc. (“the Builder”) to build him a new office for his practice on a lot owned by him. The Builder constructed the building, but with numerous undisputed defects. The Owner filed this action which culminated in a bench trial that lasted several days. Based upon diminution in value, the trial court awarded the Owner $282,000 in damages. The trial court expressly found that the cost to repair the structure was an unacceptable measure of damages because it “is disproportionate . . . to the difference in the value of the structure actually constructed and the one contracted for.” The court awarded the Owner discretionary costs of over $10,000. The Owner appeals challenging the measure of damages as well as the amount awarded under the diminution in value measure. The Owner also challenges the trial court’s failure to order the Builder to reimburse him for fees charged by one of the Owner’s experts in connection with his discovery deposition taken by the Builder. The Builder challenges the award of discretionary costs and argues that the damages awarded are excessive. We reverse in part and affirm the remaining judgment as modified. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Pesce v. East Tennessee Construction Services, Inc. - Concurring
Given the record presented to us on appeal, I concur fully in the majority’s Opinion. I write separately, however, to express my concern as to the diminution in value damages of $382,000 awarded to the Owner. I agree with the majority that, given the record presented to us, this result is correct. I also agree with the majority that the Owner is “in possession of a fully operational, profitable, dental office...” which the Owner had used for several years by the time of trial. As stated by the majority, the Owner incurred “construction cost of approximately $460,000...” in constructing this building. The diminution in value award of $382,000, with which I concur given the record presented to us, means that the owner will end up with construction costs of only approximately $78,000 for “a fully operational, profitable, dental office.” |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
City of Murfreesboro, Tennessee v. Lamar Tennessee, LLC, d/b/a Lamar Advertising of Tennessee, Inc., et al.
The trial court dismissed the City’s request for injunctive relief to enforce a permit revocation on the common law grounds of prior suit pending based on a pending certiorari action challenging the revocation. Because an original action for injunctive relief cannot be joined with a certiorari action that is appellate in nature, the rule of prior suit pending does not apply. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly M. Henderson v. Gary N. Wilson
A divorced mother of two children filed a petition for child support, alleging that although the father had legal custody of the children and she had been under an order to pay child support to him, the children had actually resided with her for the past six years. The father did not deny that the children had been living with the mother during that entire period. After negotiation, the parties entered into an agreed order, whereby the father was to pay $35,000 in back child support to his former wife. Twenty-three months later, the father filed a Rule 60.02 motion for relief, contending that the agreed order was void as against public policy because it amounted to an impermissible retroactive modification of child support. The trial court denied the father’s motion on the ground that it was entitled to presume that parties who are represented by counsel and who submit a signed agreement to the court have taken every pertinent factor into consideration. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas E. Moorehead et al. v. Joy Vail Allman et al.
The sellers of a mobile home park appeal the trial court’s decision to rescind two real estate sales contracts and refund the purchasers their down payment. The purchasers asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, and breach of fiduciary duty, all of which arose from alleged misrepresentations by the sellers regarding the condition and income potential of the property at issue. Following a lengthy and convoluted procedural history, including a jury trial, the granting of a new trial, and several waves of amended pleadings, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The sellers asserted various defenses including, inter alia, that the purchasers’ claims were time barred. Finding that the sellers fraudulently induced the purchasers into buying the property, and that the statute of limitations had been tolled due to the sellers’ concealment of material facts, the trial court denied the sellers’ motion, granted summary judgment to the purchasers. For relief, the trial court rescinded the sales contracts and awarded the purchasers a refund of their down payments. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Sarah E. L., et al.
The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Kenneth S. L. (“Father”), filed a petition for child support against Melissa G. M. (“Mother”). The hearing for child support was continued on three separate occasions. With each continuance, the trial court instructed Mother to bring medical documentation verifying her inability to work. At the fourth scheduled hearing, Mother failed to produce documentation from her medical providers. The trial court proceeded to set monthly child support payments and imputed a gross income of minimum wage to Mother. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Cavanaugh, et al., v. Avalon Golf Properties, LLC.
Plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from defendant developer, but the purchase contract required plaintiffs to use defendant construction company to build their home. Before the home was completed, defendant construction company defaulted on paying materialmen and suppliers and abandoned the project. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that developer knew, or should have know, that the construction company was incapable of performing the required construction services, and that the developer owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty to provide a contractor who could perform the work in a good, workmanlike manner. They further alleged a breach of contract, in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A default judgment was entered against the construction company, and the developer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court ultimately granted against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Curtis Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francies Hospital, et al.
The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff’s failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Ex Rel. Billie Jo Farris (Satterfield) v. Colin Bryant
This appeal involves child support in a Title IV-D proceeding. In the parents’ divorce trial, the father was not present, so income was imputed to him, and he was ordered to pay child support. In post-divorce proceedings, the State filed contempt petitions on behalf of the mother, alleging that the father was in arrears on his child support obligation. Orders were entered holding the father in contempt and ordering payments on the arrearage. The father filed a motion for modification of his child support obligation, asserting that his income was substantially less than the amount imputed to him, and that he had an additional minor dependent for whom he was required to pay child support. The trial judge denied the father’s motion to modify his child support and sentenced him to jail for contempt. The father appeals the criminal contempt conviction and asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to modify his child support obligation. We vacate the criminal contempt finding and reverse the denial of the father’s motion to reduce his child support obligation. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County v. Barry Construction Company, Inc., et al.
This matter is before the court for a second time. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County initiated suit to compel two developers to complete an unfinished portion of a road in a planned unit development or to recover damages equal to the cost of completing the road if it completed the road itself. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the amended complaint did not provide a legal basis for requiring either developer to complete the road. On appeal this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the court to consider the appropriate allocation of responsibility for construction of the road between the two developers. While the appeal was pending, the Metropolitan Government acquired the land and subsequently completed the unfinished portion of the road. On remand, the trial court assessed costs of constructing the road to the developers equally, but assessed the land-acquisition costs entirely to one developer. The Metropolitan Government appeals. Finding no error in the trial court’s allocation of responsibility, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald J. Roberts IRA, et al. v. Phillip H. McNeill, Sr., et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal from a class certification. The named plaintiffs, former owners of preferred stock in Equity Inns, Inc., filed a class action against the company’s former directors. Their amended complaint asserted breaches of the fiduciary duties allegedly owed to the preferred shareholders during the negotiation and approval of a merger. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification with respect to “[a]ll holders of Equity Inns preferred stock as of June 21, 2007.” We vacate and remand for further consideration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Morgan Development, LLC, et al. v. Raymond W. Morrow, et al.
This appeal involves a failed real estate transaction. Real estate brokers and Raymond Morrow (“Seller”) entered into an agreement to show an unlisted property. Seller did not own the property, but he claimed to have the property under contract with the owner. After the brokers showed the property to Morgan Development and Del Morgan (“Buyers”), Buyers and Seller entered into an agreement for the sale of the property. The transaction was never completed because Seller could not deliver marketable title. Buyers initiated a lawsuit against the brokers along with Seller and the owners of the property, alleging negligent business representation and fraud. The brokers moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Buyers’ suit against the brokers because the purchase agreement included a disclaimer. Buyers appeal. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Ann Grisham v. Mark Alan Grisham
Citing decreased income, Husband filed a petition to modify alimony and child support, and Wife filed a contempt petition against Husband. The trial court reduced both Husband’s alimony and child support obligations, it refused to hold Husband in contempt, and it declined to award Wife her attorney fees and court costs. We reverse the trial court’s modification of Husband’s alimony obligation and we reinstate the provisions of the Consent Order with regard to alimony; we affirm the trial court’s finding of a significant variance, but we remand for a modification of Husband’s child support obligation consistent with this opinion; we affirm the trial court’s finding regarding contempt; we award Wife her reasonable attorney fees and court costs expended in defending Husband’s petition to modify and in filing her petition for contempt, and we remand for a determination of such fees; and finally, we decline to award attorney fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Pamela Champion, et al. v. CLC of Dyersburg, LLC, et al.
The trial court awarded Defendant summary judgment on the basis that Defendant had negated the element of damages in this personal injury action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Alcoa, Inc., v. Tennessee State Board of Equalization, et al.
In this case the Blount County property assessor assessed ad valorem taxes against defendant for certain raw materials the defendant used to fabricate sheets of aluminum at its manufacturing facility in Blount County. The State Board of Equalization and the Chancery Court for Blount County upheld the assessment. Defendants have appealed to this Court arguing that Article II, Sections 28 and 30 of the Tennessee Constitution provide exemptions from ad valorem taxes for "the direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer, and his immediate vendee". We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Goforth-Lange, v. Lisa B. Lange
Appellant, pro se, raised as issues the Trial Judge ordering him to deposit half of his income tax refund, and in ordering him not to have his children around fiance. The record contains an Order by the Trial Judge ordering appellant to pay into the Court half of his income tax refund, but the record is devoid of any order pertaining to the latter issue. The Order on the income tax refund recites that evidence was heard on that issue, but appellant has filed no transcript or statement of the evidence. Accordingly, the Trial Judge's ruling is conclusively presumed to be correct, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Gilbert Olerud, et al. v. Dr. Walter M. Morgan, III, et al.
This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment to a hospital and physician in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of their motion that the trial court recuse itself due to the court’s membership on the board of directors of the defendant hospital and the court’s denial of their motion for default judgment based on spoliation of evidence. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Edmond Cato et al. v. D. L. Batts et al.
Purchasers of home filed this action against the sellers for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation for the failure to disclose defects in the home. The trial court found for the purchasers on their claim of negligent misrepresentation but denied their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation and their request for rescission. Purchasers appealed contending the trial court erred by not finding fraudulent misrepresentation and partially denying their motion to alter or amend the judgment in which they sought to introduce new evidence. We affirm the ruling of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Faith F.
Father filed a petition to relocate with minor child, and mother filed a petition for change of custody. After a hearing, the trial court denied father’s petition to relocate and mother’s petition to change custody but increased mother’s parenting time. A week after the court’s order was entered, mother filed a petition to reopen the proof, and the court granted her motion. After another hearing, the trial court granted mother’s petition for a change of custody. On appeal, father argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition to relocate, in reopening the proof, and in granting mother’s petition to change custody. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Chloe R.P.
In this action to terminate the parental rights of the mother, the petitioner alleged statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The mother answered, defending her right to remain a parent. At trial, the parties stipulated that there were statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The only issue at trial, was whether or not it was in the best interest of the child for the mother's rights to be terminated. Following the evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court found that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, we concur with the Trial Court that there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
W.T. Walker et al. v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
The Walkers, the appellants, sued the appellee railroad seeking a declaration that an easement already existed over the railroad tracks so that appellants could have access to a public road without contracting for an easement from the railroad. The jury found that the easement contract was not valid and that the appellants had an easement by necessity and implication. The trial court granted the railroad a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the existence of the easement. The Walkers appealed. We reverse the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
James and Patricia Cullum, et al. v. Baptist Hospital Systems, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, parents of child who suffered severe, permanent brain injuries during the course of his labor and delivery, filed suit against their physician, physician’s employer, and related hospitals. The physician and her employer settled prior to trial, leaving the related hospitals as the only defendants. This case has been tried twice. Following the first trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, which the trial court set aside pursuant to the thirteenth juror rule. The second trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs, with the jury assigning 3.75 percent of fault to the defendants and 96.25 percent of fault to the nonparty physician. Because the evidence shows that the members of the jury agreed to be bound by the result of a predetermined averaging process, we have concluded that the jury reached a quotient verdict, which is impermissible. Consequently, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Boone et al. v. City of Lavergne, Tennessee, et al.
Two former employees of the City of LaVergne claimed that the defendants retaliated against them in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act for complaining of race discrimination in the workplace and for filing claims with the EEOC. One of the plaintiffs asserted an additional claim for hostile work environment discrimination. The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs for retaliation and for hostile work environment for one plaintiff. The defendants appeal the trial court’s admission of certain testimony and evidence about an alleged listening device as well as the jury verdict for hostile work environment and the amount of damages for humiliation and embarrassment. We find that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, but that the error was harmless. The court did not err in admitting evidence about the alleged listening device. We conclude that there is material evidence to support the jury verdict’s for a hostile work environment as well as the amount of the award for damages. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals |
