In Re Carlie G. C.
Philip C. (“Father”) appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Carlie G. C. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals and challenges the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In Re: Becka L. A. K.
The trial court allowed the mother of a twelve year old girl to move out of state with the child over the objections of the father and set out a generous visitation schedule so the father could maintain a close relationship with his daughter. Shortly after the move, the father filed a petition for contempt and for change of custody, alleging that the mother had deliberately thwarted his court-ordered visitation to defeat his parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the father had proved his allegations, and it transferred custody of the child to him. Since we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings, we reverse and reinstate the parenting plan in effect before the father filed his petition and remand to the trial court for crafting of a transition plan. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Becka L. A. K. - Concurring/Dissenting
The juvenile court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s failure to adhere to the parenting plan, thereby repeatedly frustrating and sometimes preventing Father’s visitation, and that it was in their child’s best interest to be placed in the custody of her father. I would affirm these rulings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This is a tort action for wrongful foreclosure. Suit was filed by Jesse R. Miltier against his lender, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). In his complaint, Miltier demanded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Miltier $750,000 compensatory damages itemized on the verdict form as $350,000 out of pocket money losses “related solely to foreclosure,” $100,000 out of pocket losses “related solely to lawsuit,” $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to foreclosure” and $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to lawsuit.” The jury also awarded Miltier $300,000 in punitive damages. BOA filed post-judgment motions asking that the compensatory damages be remitted to eliminate “amounts related solely to the lawsuit” and amounts awarded in excess of the $200,000 demanded in the complaint. Miltier responded asserting that the issue of damages over $200,000 was tried by consent. The trial court entered an order reducing the award of compensatory damages to $200,000. Later, the court entered a final order approving the jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Miltier appeals challenging the reduction of the verdict. His issues include a challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 which forbids amendment of pleadings after verdict to increase the ad damnum clause. The Attorney General has appeared on appeal to defend the constitutionality of Rule 15.02. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson
This appeal involves countless motions filed over a period of nearly nine years following the parties’ contentious divorce. The mother appeals, challenging numerous rulings by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with most of the majority opinion in this case. I find I must dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the award to Father of statutory interest on Mother’s child support arrearage. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Collateral Plus, LLC, et al. v. Max Well Medical, Inc.
This is an appeal of the grant of a motion for summary judgment. The parties entered into a loan management agreement providing that a placement fee would be paid only upon the occurrence of certain conditions. The agreement explicitly provided that it would terminate when the underlying bank loan was satisfied. When the underlying loan was repaid, the conditions precedent to the payment of the placement fee had not occurred. The Appellee sought payment of the placement fee when the Appellant was acquired a year later, which the Appellant refused on the grounds that the agreement had terminated. Because the agreement states unequivocally that it terminates upon repayment of the underlying loan, making the placement fee provision unenforceable, we reverse the summary judgment award in favor of the Appellee. We hold that, instead, summary judgment should have been entered in favor of the Appellant. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Collateral Plus, LLC, et al. v. Max Well Medical, Inc. - Dissenting
Because I am of opinion that the $900,000 placement fee was earned when Collateral Plus was successful in securing financial assistance for MAX Well and became payable in February 2008 when the remainder of MAX Well’s stock was purchased, I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that MAX Well is entitled to summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jaleia M. R.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of a four year old girl on the ground of abandonment. The court also found that an additional ground that applied to the father was his failure to legitimate the child, and an additional ground that applied to the mother was her failure to remedy the conditions which led her to lose custody of the child, with little likelihood that those conditions would be remedied in the immediate future. Only the mother appealed. We reverse. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry C. Sloan v. William Chadwick Poff
The Juvenile Court found the mother in criminal contempt for violating two orders. The first order governed the manner of the mother’s communications with her son’s father, and the second order governed the father’s right to visit with the child on specific dates. The Juvenile Court sentenced the mother to the Davidson County workhouse for ten days for violating the earlier order, but suspended the sentence for so long as the mother continued to comply with orders. The court fined the mother $50 for violating the second order. On appeal, the mother challenged: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both findings of contempt; an evidentiary ruling; the suspension of her sentence; the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child; and the trial court’s recusal without request. We affirm the Juvenile Court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy Elaine Schiffner v. Curtis James Schiffner
In a divorce action, Husband appeals trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, asserting that the amount was excessive and the duration was not supported by the evidence. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the nature, duration and amount of alimony awarded, the judgment is affirmed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Shem Malmquist v. Danielle Malmquist
This is a divorce case involving a short-term marriage. The husband is a pilot at FedEx and the wife is highly educated. They have two children together. After less than five months of marriage, the husband filed for divorce alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The wife counter-claimed, and unnecessarily protracted litigation ensued. The parties inundated the trial court with filings over a two-year period, many of which contained alarming but ultimately unproven accusations. After one transfer of the case and the withdrawal of many attorneys, the parties proceeded to trial during which they presented the live testimony of 30 witnesses and introduced 122 exhibits. The trial court awarded a divorce to both parties on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, designated the husband as primary residential parent, granted the wife supervised visitation with the children twice a week, awarded the wife half of the 401k benefits the husband accrued during the marriage, and provided the wife transitional alimony for four months. The wife appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kelly Williams, et al., v. the Greater Chattanooga Public Television Corporation, d/b/a WTCI-TV Channel 45
The Trial Court granted summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiffs' causes of action, alleging discrimination by their employer and termination by the employer because of their age, or that they suffered a retaliatory discharge. Upon review of the record, we conclude there is disputed material evidence as to the claims of each plaintiff, and reverse the summary judgment and remand to the Trial Court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Ronnie Gale Gill v. Nancy Jane Gill
This is a post-divorce case. The husband sought to have his alimony in futuro obligation reduced or eliminated, asserting that his income had substantially decreased and the wife’s income had increased. The trial court found a material change in circumstances, and reduced the husband’s alimony in futuro obligation but did not eliminate it, finding that the wife still needed support. The husband appeals. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
C.P. (minor) by and through his mother, Marilyn Powell v. Kevin Shepherd
This is a consolidated appeal from the grant of Defendants/Appellees’ Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motions to dismiss. We are asked on appeal to determine whether each of Plaintiff/Appellant’s complaints states a claim upon which relief can be granted. We conclude that they do. Reversed and remanded. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Wannamaker v. Tom B. Thaxton d/b/a Thaxton Surveying
Landowner sued surveyor for damages due to an improperly prepared survey done for an adjacent landowner. The trial court granted surveyor’s motion to dismiss based on the application of the three-year statute of limitation found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105. Landowner appealed, arguing that the limitation period is four years based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-114. We agree with landowner. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry L. Fox v. Janet E. Fox
In a divorce action, Wife argues that the trial court erred in the amount of its award of periodic alimony and in failing to order Husband to pay her attorney fees. We find that Wife’s periodic alimony should be increased to $3,000 per month. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award Wife attorney fees. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Teresa Lynn Jackson v. Aaron Thomas, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Circuit Court Clerk of Jackson County, Tennessee et al.
Plaintiff appeals the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 dismissal of her claims against two defendants, the Circuit Court Clerk of Jackson County, individually and in his official capacity, and Jackson County, Tennessee for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, and numerous intentional torts. The trial court dismissed all claims against these defendants finding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
Associated Shopping Center Properties, Ltd. v. Edward H. Hodge et al.
The issue in this commercial real estate lease dispute is whether the individual defendants are additional lessees and, thus, personally liable under the lease. Plaintiff, the lessor of retail space, filed this action against the three defendants when the limited liability company, Décor Fabrics, LLC, a lessee, breached the lease by failing to pay rent for the term of the lease. The individual defendants denied liability, asserting that Décor Fabrics, LLC, was the only lessee. The trial court found that the lease unambiguously identifies each of the individual defendants as additional lessees and assessed damages against them for breach of the lease, including the plaintiff’s attorneys fees. Only one of the defendants appealed. He asserts that the trial court erred by finding the lease unambiguous as to the identify of the lessee(s) and by failing to consider the parties’ conduct to conclude that Décor Fabrics, LLC, was the only lessee. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Georgette Marie Bargmann v. Kurt Alan Bargmann
In this divorce action, Mother appeals the trial court’s permanent parenting plan, residential schedule, child support determination, and division of marital property and debt. We affirm the designation of Father as primary residential parent; modify the residential schedule and award of unpaid child support; and vacate the “paramour provision” in the parenting plan and the “equalization payment” from Mother to Father. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
David Bates d/b/a David Bates Construction Co. v. Caroline Benedetti
David Bates d/b/a David Bates Construction Co. (“Plaintiff”) sued Caroline Benedetti (“Defendant”) for breach of a construction contract involving demolition of an existing residential garage and construction of a new one. Defendant answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, (1) that Plaintiff had not proven damages, (2) that Defendant had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-36-103 with regard to her counterclaim and, therefore, pursuant to the statute her counterclaim should be abated, and (3) that Defendant also had failed to give notice and an opportunity to cure pursuant to the common law and that her counterclaim should be dismissed for that reason as well. Defendant appeals the abatement and dismissal of her counterclaim. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-36-103 does not apply to the case at hand, but that the Trial Court correctly dismissed Defendant’s counterclaim. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Roberto Carlos Urtuzuastegui a/k/a Jose M. Carrion-Casillas v. George D. Kirkland, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees and from the trial court’s grant of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(1) motion for involuntary dismissal in favor of Appellees. The trial court granted both motions upon its finding that Appellant had committed fraud upon the court in filing his complaint under an assumed name. Specifically, the court granted the motion for summary judgment finding that the statute of limitations had expired because the amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint, which the court determined was a nullity ab initio. The Rule 41.02 motion was granted based upon the court’s finding that the Appellant had perpetrated a fraud upon the court in filing the complaint under an assumed name. Concluding that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Appellant committed fraud and, specifically, as to whether Appellant’s alleged mental incapacity negates a finding of fraud, we reverse both the order on the motion for summary judgment and the order granting the Rule 41.02 motion. We remand for further hearing on the issues of fraud and mental incapacity. Reversed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jan Oglesby and John Oglesby v. Edwin T. Riggins
This case arises from a car accident in which Appellant was injured when her vehicle was struck by Appellee’s vehicle. Following a jury trial, the jury awarded Appellant damages, including $100,000 for Appellant’s loss of earning capacity claims. Acting as the thirteenth juror, and based upon its finding that Appellant had failed to meet her burden to show loss of earning capacity, the trial court suggested remittitur of the entire $100,000 loss of earning capacity award. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Dylan M. J.
The mother and stepfather of a nine year old boy filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the boy’s father, who was incarcerated at the time the petition was filed. The sole ground alleged in the petition was abandonment by failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s rights. The court ruled that the ground of abandonment had been proved because there was clear and convincing evidence that the father had failed to support the mother during her pregnancy, and that the father had subsequently shown wanton disregard for the welfare of the child prior to his incarceration. The court also found that termination of the father’s rights was in the child’s best interest. We reverse. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony F. Stiel, Jr. v. Susan M. Stiel
This post divorce appeal arises from the lack of symmetry between the parties’ 1995 Final Divorce Decree and a 1996 Qualified Domestic Relations Order that was not entered into contemporaneously with the Divorce Decree. The ex-husband, a General Motors retiree, contends the trial court erred in finding that his ex-wife was entitled to the marital portion of his early retirement supplements of his pension and in finding that her benefits are based on post-divorce increases to his pension benefits. For her issue, the ex-wife contends the trial court erred in failing to grant her survivorship rights in the ex-husband’s retirement benefits. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals |
