In the Matter of: B.A.C. (d/o/b 6/16/07), A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age
This appeal arises out of a termination of parental rights. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Rebecca Cornelius (“Mother”) on April 7, 2009, after finding grounds of severe child abuse and persistence of conditions.1 We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Burks v. The Kroger Company
This is a negligence action resulting from a slip and fall by a customer at a Kroger grocery store. The plaintiff slipped on a pool of water created by one of several leaks in the roof of the grocery store. The plaintiff filed suit against three defendants, The Kroger Company, Roof Management, Inc., a roofing consultant responsible for facilitating necessary repairs to the roof of the grocery store, and Village Roofing Company, Inc., the roofing contractor which made repairs to the roof when called upon to do so. Village Roofing and Roof Management each filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Village Roofing and Roof Management finding they did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff and if they did owe a duty that their acts and omissions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. We have determined there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a determination of whether Village Roofing or Roof Management owed a duty of care to the plaintiff or whether their actions were or were not the legal cause of Ms. Burks’ injuries. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Village Roofing and Roof Management and remand for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Patricia Anne Gho Massey v. Gregory Joel Casals
This is a child support case. The mother filed a petition to increase the father’s child support obligation, alleging that he had misrepresented his gross income. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court judge entered an order finding that the father’s testimony was not credible and that he earned significantly more income than he previously represented. The order increased the father’s monthly child support obligation, retroactive to the date of the filing of the mother’s petition. It also required the father to pay for the child’s private school tuition, and awarded the mother her attorney’s fees. The father appeals, arguing inter alia that the trial court erred in not using evidence such as his tax returns to determine his income, in not finding the mother voluntarily underemployed because she worked part-time, and in requiring him to pay private school tuition. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Shelby County, Tennesse v. James M. Crews, Jr., et al
This is a condemnation case. The appellee county for many years had possession of a small strip of land owned by the appellant family. The county filed a petition for condemnation of the strip of land. A consent order was entered granting the county ownership and possession of the subject parcel, and a hearing was scheduled to determine the amount of compensation due. A week before the hearing, the county gave notice of voluntary dismissal. The family objected to voluntary dismissal, citing Anderson v. Smith, 521 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court permitted the county to voluntarily dismiss its petition. The family appeals. We reverse, finding that voluntary dismissal is precluded where the trial court grants the condemnor right of possession and only the issue of compensation is left to be resolved. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In re S.J.M.
Father in Nebraska allowed his child’s caregiver to take the child to Tennessee. A strange series of events led to DCS’s being given custody of the child by the Dickson County Juvenile Court and the placement of the child in a foster home. Meanwhile, Father ran afoul of the law (again) and became an involuntary guest of the federal penal system under a fifteen-year sentence. The foster parents petitioned for termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights based on abandonment and sought adoption of the child. Father’s mother intervened. Mother did not defend and her rights were terminated. Father defended. The trial court found Father had not abandoned the child, but that the parties had tried by consent the issue of Father’s being sentenced to prison for a term of ten years or more when the child is younger than eight years of age, circumstances which present a ground for termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant t Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). The trial court then granted the adoption. Father filed a motion to alter or amend, presenting to the trial court a document showing that Father’s sentence had been reduced to seven and one-half years. The motion was denied. Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s determination that the issue was tried by consent of the parties. Our decision necessitates that the adoption order be vacated and the child be returned to the legal custody of DCS. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Frazier, et al v. Walter Jerry Mitchell, et al
One of many heirs to certain property in Rutherford County opposed the partition by sale of the property. The property was sold and the proceeds distributed. The heir appealed. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Peterson v. Robert L. Peterson
This is a post-divorce petition for contempt. In the divorce decree, the mother was designated the primary residential parent of the three children; the father had standard alternate parenting time and was ordered to pay child support. After the divorce decree was entered, however, the parties and the children continued to cohabit for about five years. During this period of cohabitation, the father did not pay the mother the court-ordered child support, but instead provided necessities for the family. When the father moved out of the home, he began to pay some child support but did not pay the full amount due under the divorce decree... |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Gena Maglio Chiozza v. Christopher Alexander Chiozza
This case arises from a post-divorce motion to modify child support to include payment of the minor children’s private school tuition. Because Appellant/Father’s brief fails to comport with Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Rule 6 of the Court of Appeals, and because Appellant/Father has failed to comply with this Court’s order to supplement the appellate record with necessary documents, we dismiss the appeal. Mother/Appellee has requested attorney’s fees accrued in defense of this appeal. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122, we exercise our discretion and award Ms. Chiozza her fees, and remand for the determination of the amount of those fees. Dismissed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Norman B. Whitton v. M. Josiah Hoover, III
Plaintiff sued defendant, his attorney, in Sessions Court to recover an attorney fee in the amount of $1,000.00 paid to defendant for legal representation. His theories for recovery were for malpractice and breach of contract. The Sessions Judge entered a Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appealed to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court found that the contract which provided for a fee for certain legal services in the amount of $1,000.00 was unconscionable and entered Judgment for plaintiff for $1,000.00 plus other expenses. Defendant appealed to this Court. We hold on the evidence before us that the contract entered was not unconscionable, but upon the facts and law the amount of the fee was not reasonable and we reduce the fee to $500.00 and Judgment will be entered in favor of plaintiff for $500.00 upon remand. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Lana Walton Luster v. Kenneth Walton
This is a post-divorce child support modification case. The trial court relied upon the parties’ private agreement to modify child support, but failed to determine if the amount agreed to be paid complied with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. Vacated and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joe Henry Moore v. State of Tennessee
This case arises out of a prisoner’s claims for medical malpractice, negligence, and violation of his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. The claims commission, in two separate orders, wholly resolved the prisoner’s claims in favor of the State of Tennessee. Because the prisoner has not argued or otherwise provided any basis for this Court to determine the alleged errors in the judgment of the claims commission, we affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Stephen George Beem v. Joan Nan Gallina Beem
This appeal involves a motion to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. After a long marriage, the parties filed cross-petitions for divorce. After mediation, they entered into a marital dissolution agreement settling division of the considerable martial estate. The parties presented the MDA to the trial court, and it was approved and incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Several weeks later, the husband filed this pro se petition to have the MDA set aside, claiming that, at the time it was signed, he was not mentally competent to enter in to such an agreement. The husband’s motion was denied, and the wife was awarded attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the MDA. The husband now appeals. We affirm. We hold that the evidence supports the factual finding below that the husband was mentally capable of understanding the consequences of the MDA, and we find no abuse of its discretion in the trial court’s denial of the husband’s motion to set it aside. We also affirm the award of attorney fees to the wife, and award attorney fees for this appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Laranda Conner v. Robert King, II
The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in changing the minor child’s surname. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Parker v. Henderson County, Tennessee, et al.
The plaintiff/appellee, Jonathan Parker (“Mr. Parker”), was shot once in the right shoulder by Officer David Stanhope (“Ofc. Stanhope”) of the Lexington Police Department during the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Parker’s residence. The trial court held the City of Lexington (“the City”) liable for the injury that Mr. Parker suffered. The court determined that Sergeant Jeff Middleton (“Sgt. Middleton”) was negligent in failing to properly supervise Ofc. Stanhope during the operation and that Ofc. Stanhope negligently created the dangerous situation leading to the use of deadly force. The court awarded $40,000 in damages to Mr. Parker, which accounted for his fault in failing to immediately respond to police commands. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Nathan E. Steppach, Jr. v. William H. Thomas, Jr., City of Memphis, et al.
This case arises from the grant of a writ of certiorari by the Shelby County Chancery Court. Upon review of the Memphis City Council’s record, the court affirmed the Council’s action in approving a planned development and companion street closure. We conclude that the order appealed lacks finality due to the failure to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tammy Teal Bennett v. David Ross Bennett
Wife appeals claiming trial court erred in finding her agreement to a Marital Dissolution Agreement and Parenting Plan was valid and not obtained under duress. Finding that wife later adopted the disputed Marital Dissolution Agreement and Parenting Plan with advice of counsel and without any allegation of duress, we find that wife waived her objection and, alternatively, that any dispute as to the validity of her agreement had been rendered moot by her later adoption of it. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. V.L.S.C. and M.M.S.
Father challenges the trial court’s termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by failing to visit and by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Finding that the trial court’s decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence, the judgment terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa Hayes v. The City of Lexington, Tennessee
The defendant-city required applicants for its vacant firefighter position to complete a physical agility exam as part of its hiring process. The plaintiff, a female, applied for the position but was eliminated from consideration based upon her performance on the physical agility exam. She sued the city under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, claiming that the physical agility exam had a disparate impact on females. Following a one-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the city and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Joey Conner v. Carmen Conner
After Mother and Father divorced, a parenting plan was entered designating Father as the primary custodian of the parties’ minor child. Mother filed a petition to modify, alleging several grounds, including excessive corporal punishment. The trial court initially found no material change in circumstances, but named Mother primary custodian, based on the minor child’s preference. Father appealed, and this Court remanded, finding that the court’s ruling was premature. On remand, the trial court, again, awarded custody to Mother, finding the following material changes in circumstance: 1) Mother’s remarriage and having had two other children; 2) Mother’s completion of her undergraduate degree, her work towards a Master’s degree, and having a stable job; 3) Mother’s having left the national guard; and 4) the minor child’s preference to live with Mother. We affirm the trial court’s modification of custody. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Adoption of C.A.M. (d/o/b 11/30/96), James Keith Jones and Cari Lecklitner Jones v. Michael Dale Moore
This appeal involves the termination of parental rights. When the mother and father divorced, the mother was designated as the child’s primary residential parent. In light of the mother’s allegations that he had threatened her, the father was granted only supervised visitation. After the divorce, the father lived in Texas and visited the child in Tennessee. Several years later, the father remarried and was awarded unsupervised visitation with the child. Soon thereafter, the child went to Texas for a visit with the father and his new wife. During this visit, the father and his new wife had a domestic dispute in which the father locked her and the child out of their house. After this incident, the mother refused to allow the child to visit with the father. The father was then charged with assaulting his new wife and was given probation on this charge. Soon after that, the father violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. At the time he was sentenced, the child was seven years old. Several years later, the mother remarried. The mother and her new husband then filed this petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and to allow the mother’s new husband to adopt the child. After a hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights, finding grounds for termination and finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The father now appeals, challenging only the trial court’s determination regarding the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Iris Teresa Bowling Chambers v. Faye Bowling Devore
This case involves the interpretation of the term “bodily heirs.” Testator’s will, probated in 1942, left certain lands to his daughter for her life, and then to her “bodily heirs.” The life tenant’s granddaughter concedes that she is not entitled to take through her deceased father, as his interest lapsed when he predeceased the life tenant. However, she contends that she is entitled to take directly as a “bodily heir” of the life tenant. We agree that if granddaughter is her father’s issue, and her father is the life tenant’s issue, she is a “bodily heir” of the life tenant. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens' Services v. Tina Temple, et al.
This a termination of parental rights case. The children were removed from Father’s custody due to his lack of stable housing as well as his allowing Mother to “be with” the children despite her drug use. Numerous permanency plans were entered, which required Father, among other things, to maintain stable housing and income, legitimate the children, complete parenting classes, identify a support system, and attend family and domestic violence counseling. At various times, Father had employment and housing; however, at other times, he did not. In 2008, DCS petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. Following a trial, Father’s parental rights were terminated on the grounds of failure to comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, persistence of conditions, as well as three additional grounds available under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9) for the termination of a non-legal parent’s rights. Although this Court finds that Father failed to obtain and maintain stable housing and income or to legitimate the children, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights, finding that DCS failed to aid Father in such efforts. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, the petition for termination is dismissed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, v. Tina Temple, et al. - Dissenting
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. Specifically, I disagree |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steve Stamson, Clerk of Juvenile Court of Shelby County, Tennessee v. David Lillard
This appeal involves the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. to civil service positions in Shelby County. The Juvenile Court entered a consent judgment on a salary petition filed by the Juvenile Court Clerk pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq. This judgment allowed the Juvenile Court Clerk to fill certain civil service positions. When the positions were not filled, the Juvenile Court Clerk filed a Petition for Contempt. Subsequently, the Juvenile Court entered judgment on the Petition for Contempt. Finding that the Juvenile Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to award relief pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-20-101 et seq., we vacate its judgments and dismiss the case. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Leanne Hudson v. Larson Douglas Hudson - Dissenting
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Davidson | Court of Appeals |
