Ford Motor Credit Company v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Ford vehicles leased by its dealers are simultaneously purchased by Ford Credit, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. Ford Credit is subject to a franchise tax which is determined by the book value of its tangible personal property owned or used in Tennessee. If the leased vehicles are finished goods inventory, their value is excluded from the calculation of franchise taxes. The trial court ruled that the leased vehicles were not held by Ford Credit for sale, and thus did not qualify as finished goods inventory. Ford Credit appeals. The judgment is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Will Henderson and Express Refunds, Inc. d/b/a Henderson Tax Service v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. Janice Fullilove, and Bruce Demps
This is a defamation case. After listening to a local talk radio show, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants, asserting that the defendants had broadcast defamatory material on the radio show concerning the plaintiffs’ business practices. There was no recording of the talk radio show. In a bench trial, many witnesses testified about statements made on the show. After the trial, the trial court found that there were so many different versions, there was no way to determine what was actually said on the radio program. The trial court concluded that, assuming unflattering statements were made, they did not damage the plaintiffs’ reputations. The trial court also concluded that, even if the statements made were defamatory, the plaintiffs did not prove any injury. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Brenda and Stanley Morrison v. Citizen State Bank
This is the third action between Stanley Morrison and Citizen State Bank concerning a series of promissory notes and security agreements. In the first action, Citizen State Bank filed a civil warrant in General Sessions Court against Stanley Morrison to recover a deficiency judgment and repossess a truck that was collateral on a series of loans. The bank obtained a default judgment against Morrison and repossessed the truck when Morrison failed to appear in court. Morrison failed to timely appeal the default judgment. Thereafter, Morrison and his wife filed this action challenging the validity of the default judgment and seeking damages for fraud, misrepresentation, and conversion of property, contending four of six promissory notes and security agreements that the judgment was based upon were forgeries. The trial court held this action was barred by res judicata and dismissed it on summary judgment. We affirm the dismissal of this action on the basis of collateral estoppel. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
The Travelers Indemnity Company of America, et al. v. Moore & Associates, Inc.
The insurer of a general construction contractor brought an action for a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the contractor against the claims raised against the contractor in a demand for arbitration. The Chancery Court for Sumner County, Tennessee, Judge Tom E. Gray, granted summary judgment to the contractor, holding that the insurer, as a matter of law, had a duty to defend the contractor in the arbitration. The court reserved ruling on whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify the contractor for damages paid as a result of the arbitration settlement until after the arbitration proceeding. This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin Perry v. Bruce Westbrooks, Warden, and The West Tennessee State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The petitioner prisoner was found guilty on the charge of “failure to participate” in work as instructed by a prison official. He lost his prison job and was sentenced to a brief period of segregation and a $5.00 fine. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court, naming as respondents the warden and the disciplinary board. The trial court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The petitioner now appeals. We reverse and remand to the trial court for issuance of the writ. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Stanley Arthur Lawson v. Vonda Lea (Lawson) Mattox
The mother has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 application for an extraordinary appeal from an ex parte Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order entered by the Chancery Court for Lawrence County on September 6, 2005. The mother asserts the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order because it had transferred the case to the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2001. The father now agrees that the trial court lacks jurisdiction. We grant the application for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the Emergency Temporary Parenting Plan Order. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond T. Schmidt, Jr. v. Barbara J. Schmidt
This is a petition to modify alimony. The divorce decree required that the husband pay the wife alimony of $1,500 per month for ten years or until she remarries. The husband filed this petition to terminate his alimony obligation, asserting that there had been a material change in circumstances. The wife maintained that the alimony award was alimony in solido and, therefore, not subject to modification. The husband filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the alimony award was modifiable. The trial court held that the alimony award was alimony in solido, not subject to modification. From that order, husband now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the award was alimony in futuro and, therefore, subject to modification. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Troy A. Clark v. Jennifer Dawn Clark
This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the husband argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable division of the marital estate. Specifically, the husband challenges the trial court’s treatment of certain real property as the wife’s separate property, and he challenges the valuation placed on their vehicles. Finding the appeal meritorious, we reverse and remand for a new division of the marital estate. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Russell, Ph.D., et al. v. Meharry Medical College - Concurring
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree as to the rights Dr. Russell had with regard to notice of non-renewal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Shirley Russell, Ph.D., et al. v. Meharry Medical College
Plaintiff, a college professor, appeals the dismissal of her breach of employment contract action upon |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Louis Welch v. Jennifer Rachelle Welch
The juvenile court granted Appellee’s Rule 60.02 Motion to vacate its prior order of legitimation. We reverse. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. deJaeger v. Jennifer deJaeger
The parties were divorced based on stipulated grounds. Husband appeals the award of property to Wife. We reverse and remand. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Thom Shepherd v. Maximus Entertainment Group, Inc.
This appeal involves a dispute between a country music songwriter and a music publishing company arising out of an "exclusive co-publishing agreement" relating to the song "Riding with Private Malone" and other works. Because of the parties' dispute, ASCAP declined to release royalties for "Riding with Private Malone" to either the songwriter or the publisher. The songwriter filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a determination that the publishing company had breached the agreement and that he was entitled to receive the royalties held by ASCAP because all the rights to "Riding with Private Malone" had reverted to him. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the songwriter was not entitled to the withheld royalties. After the trial court denied his motion to amend his complaint to seek money damages, the songwriter appealed. We have concluded that the trial court erred by holding that the songwriter was not entitled to the withheld royalties and that the trial court properly denied the songwriter's motion to amend his complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Hugh Benson v. Deborah Watkinson
Robert Hugh Benson ("Father") sued Deborah Watkinson ("Mother") for divorce. The parties have two minor children. The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and designated Father as the primary residential parent with Mother to have no overnight visitation due to a finding of her alcohol abuse. Mother appeals to this Court. We modify the judgment only to order Father to attend and complete an anger management course, and affirm as so modified. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Sonya Renee Vaden Ausley v. Dempsey Renea Ausley, Jr.
This appeal involves an alimony award granted by the trial court to Plaintiff Sonya Ausley. While the divorce in this case was pending, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay $17,000 to the Clerk and Master of the court after Defendant willfully refused to pay temporary support and further disposed of a $34,000 social security disability settlement in violation of court order. The trial court later granted Plaintiff $5775 from the funds as temporary support. In the final divorce decree, the trial court awarded Plaintiff the remaining $11,225 balance as lump sum transitional alimony. Defendant appeals, arguing that 1) the trial court erred in failing to classify Defendant’s social security benefits as marital or separate prior to ordering its division, 2) the trial court’s order that Defendant pay half of his social security benefits into the Clerk and Master constituted in improper presumption that such benefits were marital property, and 3) that Defendant’s social security benefits were exempt from garnishment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-2-111. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
David E. Conn v. Oksoon Conn
In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals and raises issues involving the division of certain marital property. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its division of the marital property, we affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Roderick McDavis v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
A Metropolitan Nashville police officer seeks judicial review of the Final Order of the Civil Service Commission of Metropolitan Government pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-322 following his termination from Metropolitan Government service. After reviewing the record, the Chancery Court of Davidson County determined that the decision of the Civil Service Commission was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services vs. M.C.M.M.C. and M.E.C.
This is a parental rights termination case. The father appeals the trial court's decision terminating his parental rights to his three children. The father argues, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the decision of the trial court and therefore, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra E. Fox (Gwirtsman) v. Harry E. Gwirtsman
Father appeals from a modification of the residential schedule for his three children which was triggered by Mother's move to another county and the resultant burden on the children of commuting to and from school. Because the evidence supports the trial court's decision, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Moses Pieny v. United Imports, Inc.
The appellant, United Imports, Inc. ("United") seeks relief from a circuit court's order on its appeal from a general sessions action brought by the late Moses Pieny. Pursuant to a Local Rule of Practice, the circuit court's order dismissed United's appeal and adopted the general sessions order in favor of the deceased plaintiff. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case to the circuit court for dismissal of the claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Vernon F. Frame v. Davidson Transit Organization
Former Fleet Manager of Davidson Transit Organization contends he was demoted because of his age in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-401(a)(1). The employer conceded the employee had presented a prima facie case of employment discrimination; however, it contended a prima facie case was insufficient when the employer presented a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. The trial court agreed. The summary dismissal was based upon a finding the burden of proof had shifted back to the employee who was required to, but did not provide additional evidence of age discrimination. An employee’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find the employer's stated reason for its employment decision false may permit the trier of fact to conclude the employer unlawfully discriminated. The employee provided evidence from which a jury could conclude the employer's stated reason for its employment decision was not credible, thus summary judgment was not appropriate. We, therefore, vacate the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey W. Pendleton v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Plaintiff seeks to recover from the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries received when he was arrested by officers of the Nashville Metropolitan Police. In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the actions of the officers constituted an assault and battery, and further argues that the government is vicariously liable through respondeat superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the government after finding that a stand alone allegation of respondeat superior was insufficient to sustain a claim under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act for damages resulting from intentional torts. Rather, the court held that Plaintiff needed to plead a separate and distinct claim of negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Government. Plaintiff has appealed the ruling of the trial court. Because we find that the trial court correctly found that the GTLA requires a plaintiff to assert separate claims of negligence against governmental entities in cases arising from intentional torts, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sherman Alexander Henderson v. David Mills, Warden
Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed suit against the Warden of the West Tennessee State Penitentiary on grounds of retaliation and violation of inmate’s civil rights arising from inmate’s reclassification and transfer. The trial court granted Warden’s Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of J.A.F.
This is an appeal from a Circuit Court determination, in a de novo appeal from juvenile court, that a juvenile was delinquent on the basis of a sale of marijuana to another juvenile. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence presented was insufficient for a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree, and we reverse the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Edward Lee Burch v. McKoon, Billings & Gold, PC., et al.
This is an action to quiet title filed by the grantor against an assignee of the grantees relative to an installment land contract. Remote grantees of the grantor were joined as third party defendants by the original defendant/assignee relative to portions of the land involved in the installment land contract and held by the third party defendants under deeds from the grantor. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the grantor and against the assignee of the grantees in the installment land contract. He further granted summary judgment to the remote grantees of the grantor in the third-party action by the assignee against them. The assignee appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Appeals |
