Himelda Fuentes Guzman v. Salvador Guzman Alvarez
Husband and Wife were married in Mexico while wife's divorce from her previous husband remained pending. The couple eventually moved to Tennessee. Following a marriage of approximately eighteen years, wife filed for divorce alleging adultery, inappropriate marital conduct, and irreconcilable differences. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for annulment alleging that the marriage between the parties was invalid due to wife's prior subsisting marriage. Following a bench trial, the court below declared a marriage by estoppel and granted wife a divorce on the ground of adultery. The trial court then distributed the parties' accumulated property and ordered husband to establish a lifetime trust with income to be distributed to wife and the remainder to the parties' children. The parties were granted joint custody of their four children with wife designated as primary residential parent. From this order, wife appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
John Edward Woods v. Jill Suzanne Woods
This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a twelve-year marriage. Even though the husband filed a petition for divorce in the Circuit Court for Williamson County, the parties eventually stipulated that the wife was entitled to divorce on the ground of the husband's adultery. Following a bench trial, the court awarded the wife eighty percent of the net marital estate, $1,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony for three years, $25,000 in alimony in solido, and one-half of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed. We have determined that the evidence does not support the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate, the amount of the rehabilitative alimony award, the alimony in solido award, or the award for attorney's fees. We modify the judgment accordingly. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Christine Pamela Schoof Goforth v. Terry James Goforth
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce as it concerns custody of the parties' children. The trial court awarded primary residential custody to Father and provided for visitation with Mother. Mother appeals asserting that, pursuant to the factors set out in T.C.A. §36-6-106, she should have been named primary residential parent. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Arlen Whisenant v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc.
Appellee brought suit against Appellant, a car dealership, after experiencing problems with purchased vehicle. Among other things, Appellee alleged fraud in the inducement. Appellant sought to enforce arbitration agreement in the contract for sale. The trial court ruled that, under Tennessee law, claims of fraud in the inducement are not arbitrable. Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rhonda (Qualls) Newman v. Gary Ronald Newman
This appeal involves a charge of civil contempt. The plaintiff wife and defendant husband were divorced by final decree entered in May 2001. In the final decree, the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro as well as marital debts. He did not do so. In December 2003, the wife filed a petition in the trial court, seeking to hold the husband in contempt as well as an award of the alimony arrearage. The wife gave the husband notice of the contempt proceedings by mailing a copy of the petition and notice of hearing to the husband’s counsel of record. At the hearing, the husband’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition for contempt, arguing that the husband had not received proper notice of the hearing. This motion was denied, and the husband was held in contempt of court and ordered jailed until the contempt was purged. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the husband received sufficient notice of the petition for contempt. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Michael William Kwasnik vs. Susan Marie Gillman Kwasnik
In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals and raises issues involving valuation and division of marital property, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Crittenden v. Jerry Green
This is a boundary line case. Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Chancery Court establishing the boundary line as shown by the survey of Appellee's expert. Finding that the survey adopted by the trial court is not in line with Appellee's deed and/or Appellant's deed conveying an additional triangular piece of land, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Roger McGee on Behalf of Bridgewood Baptist Church v. Polly Holmes, Kenneth Holmes and Toni Cox
This is a church dispute. The plaintiff, acting on behalf of the unincorporated church, sued several church members for fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court ordered a vote by the remaining church members on whether to pursue the lawsuit, conducted by a special master. The thirty-five church members voted to pursue a claim against three defendants. After years of litigation, and the addition and deletion of certain defendants, the trial court ordered a second vote by church members on whether to continue the lawsuit. The five remaining church members, two of whom were defendants in the original suit, voted to dismiss the lawsuit. The trial court then dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering a second vote. We affirm, finding that the trial court’s actions were reasonable and within the scope of its authority. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Larry N. Mendelson v. Bert H. Bornblum, et al.
This case involves a dispute over the subdivision of a lot within a residential neighborhood restricted by protective covenants. The plaintiff purchased a lot within a neighborhood in Memphis. Although not required under the then-existing protective covenants, he obtained majority consent of the other neighborhood lot owners to subdivide his lot into two separate lots. The Land Use Control Board denied the side-by-side configuration as well as a previously recommended flag-lot configuration. The plaintiff appealed to the Memphis City Council, and the council overturned the Land Use Control Board’s rejection of the plaintiff’s application. Before the council’s decision was formally issued, however, the lot owners amended the neighborhood’s restrictive covenants so that the plaintiff’s proposed re-subdivision, as well as any further subdivision of lots within the neighborhood, would be prohibited. The plaintiff filed an action for declaratory judgment. At the hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties agreed to submit the case on stipulated evidence, and the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Roberson, et al. v. Motion Industries, Inc., et al.
The jury returned a verdict in this car wreck lawsuit for Carl and Vicki Roberson ("Plaintiffs") in the amount of $900,000. However, the jury assessed 38% of the fault to Carl Roberson, thereby reducing the total verdict to $558,000 under comparative fault principles. On appeal, Plaintiffs claim the Trial Court erred when it denied their motion for a directed verdict made at the close of proof and in their Rule 50.02 motion. In their motion for directed verdict, Plaintiffs argued there was no material evidence to support defendant Motion Industries' claim that Mr. Roberson was guilty of comparative fault. The Trial Court denied the motion and allowed the jury to decide the comparative fault issue. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial which the Trial Court denied after specifically approving the amount of damages awarded by the jury as well as the jury's allocation of fault. Plaintiffs appeal claiming the Trial Court erred when it denied their motion for directed verdict. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Capital Management Partners v. William J. Eggleston, III
Plaintiff-corporation sued defendant, a stockholder, officer, and director of a corporation engaged in the design and manufacture of stereo speakers, to recover the amount due on loans made to the corporation allegedly based on negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations of the defendant. The pleadings also seek to pierce the corporate veil and hold the defendant personally liable for the corporation debts. The trial court found no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the defendant and entered judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David A. Brooks v. Catherine D. Brooks
Husband appeals in futuro alimony awarded Wife at the end of a thirty-one (31) year marriage. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings and the trial court acted within its discretion in applying relevant legal principles, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Jane Laguardia v. Michael J. Laguardia - Concurring/Dissenting
I concur in all aspects of the majority opinion except (1) the majority’s treatment of the trial court’s decree pertaining to Wife’s right, for a period of time, to the exclusive possession and occupancy of the former marital residence; and (2) the majority’s handling of the issue of whether the assets of Husband’s law practice are marital assets. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Jane Laguardia v. Michael J. Laguardia
In this divorce action, the Trial Court awarded the wife custody of the children with visitation to the husband, set child support and alimony in futuro to the wife, and divided the marital property. As per the marital property division, the wife was awarded 60% interest in the marital home and the husband 40%, with the right of the mother to remain in the home until the children reach age 18, and the husband was required to pay for the upkeep of the home. Further the wife was ordered to pay 40% of the taxes and insurance and the husband 60% until the property was sold. On appeal we affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment with modifications. The husband will be allowed to utilize a care taker, if necessary, during visitation; the marital home will be sold within two years and the proceeds divided as decreed by the Trial Court. Following the sale the Trial Court is instructed to determine a new amount and duration of the alimony award. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In re: A.L.B., N.W.B. and C.B.B.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving rights of both parents to their three young children. Parental rights of both parents were terminated after the trial court found substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions that led to the removal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 (g)(3), those conditions being filthy and unsanitary living conditions in the home. The court also found that termination was in the children's best interests. We reverse this decision and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Bert Viar, Jr., v. John W. Palmer
This is a legal malpractice case. Client/Appellant sued Attorney/Appellee for legal malpractice for failure to respond to a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the defendant in the underlying case. Attorney’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Attorney was awarded attorney fees on his Cross-Complaint. Client appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Consolidated Waste Systems, LLC v. Metro Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
A would-be developer of a construction and demolition landfill sued the Metropolitan Government after its legislative body adopted zoning amendments that would effectively preclude the proposed landfill on the property the company had leased with an option to purchase. The company attacked the ordinances on multiple grounds and was successful in having the trial court declare them unconstitutional as violative of substantive due process and equal protection. Because of the company’s limited interest in the real property, however, the court refused to grant an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the ordinances against the company or to award damages. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the company. The Metropolitan Government appeals the holding that the ordinances were unconstitutional on the merits as well as on a number of procedural grounds and also appeals the award of attorney’s fees. The company appeals the trial court’s decision that the ordinances did not constitute exclusionary zoning. We affirm the trial court on all issues. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Alsip, et al. v. Johnson City Medical Center, et al.
In this medical malpractice case involving the alleged wrongful death of Walter Ray Alsip ("Mr. Alsip" or "the deceased"), we granted the plaintiffs' Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for an interlocutory appeal in order to review the trial court's order allowing defense counsel to engage in ex parte dialogue with Mr. Alsip's last-illness, non-defendant treating physicians. We conclude that the trial court erred in entering the order that permitted defense counsel to have private conversations with the non-defendant physicians who treated the deceased during his last illness. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In the Matter of J.L.E.
This is a mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her son. After the Tennessee Department of Children's Services took custody of her son, it prepared a permanency plan requiring Mother to obtain therapy and case management services and perform other remedial tasks within approximately twelve months. After only six months, however, the Department filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the court terminated her rights. Mother appeals claiming, in pertinent part, that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to reunite mother and son and that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse. We have determined that the Department has failed to prove a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and, consequently, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Helen Richardson, Individually and on behalf of her Daughter and her Minor Children, Trina Richardson, Deceased v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis, et al.
This case involves the authority of the General Sessions Court to set aside its own judgment. The plaintiff’s decedent died in January 2000. In January 2001, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim in the General Sessions Court against the defendants. In April 2001, the General Sessions Court entered an order dismissing the case, without prejudice, for lack of prosecution. The General Sessions Court later determined that the order dismissing for lack of prosecution was erroneously entered. Consequently, in May 2001, the General Sessions Court entered a consent order setting aside its April 2001order. In December 2001, the plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the General Sessions lawsuit, and the General Sessions Court entered a consent order of dismissal without prejudice. In June 2002, the plaintiff refiled her lawsuit in the Circuit Court below. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, claiming that the plaintiff was required to refile her lawsuit within one year of the April 2001 General Sessions order, dismissing for lack of prosecution. The defendants asserted that the General Sessions Court was without authority to adjudicate the matter further after the April 2001 order of dismissal was entered. The Circuit Court disagreed and denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The defendants were granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal. We reverse, concluding that the General Sessions Court did not have the authority to set aside its April 2001 judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Author R. Turner v. State of Tennessee
This is a medical negligence case brought by a state prisoner. The plaintiff prisoner alleges injury stemming from an act of medical negligence by a state employee in August 2001, while the plaintiff prisoner was in state custody. In March 2002, the prisoner erroneously filed a lawsuit in chancery court, which was dismissed in January 2003. In February 2003, the prisoner filed the instant claim with the claims commission. The claims commission found that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the filing of the chancery lawsuit because the Attorney General had not agreed to transfer the chancery lawsuit, and dismissed the claim as untimely. The plaintiff prisoner appealed. This Court reversed the dismissal on the basis that the agreement of the Attorney General to the transfer was no longer required, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the claims commission found that the plaintiff prisoner’s claim was not in the class of cases eligible for transfer from chancery court, and on that basis again dismissed the plaintiff prisoner’s complaint as being untimely. The plaintiff prisoner again appeals. We affirm, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the erroneous filing of the chancery court lawsuit, and that consequently the plaintiff prisoner’s claim with the claims commission was untimely. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Puckett, et al. v. Rebecca D. Roberson, et al.
Parents of minor killed as passenger in a single-car accident brought wrongful death action against Defendants/Appellees, a husband and wife whose home decedent had visited, as an uninvited guest, in the hour preceding the accident. Trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants/Appellees. Parents/Appellants appeal, asserting that Defendants/Appellees owed a duty of care to decedent because they condoned the use of alcohol by minors in their home and thereby created a special relation with decedent. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services v. D.W.J.
This is a parental rights termination case. The mother appeals the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to two of her three children. On appeal, the mother argues, inter alia, that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the children. We conclude that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision and therefore, we reverse. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Tim Lewallen, et al. v. J. C. York, Jr.
Tim Lewallen and Marietta Lewallen ("Plaintiffs") sued J.C. York, Jr. ("Defendant") claiming, in part, that Defendant was interfering with their lawful right to use an easement over Defendant's land. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order holding, inter alia, "[t]hat an easement exists which runs with the land and burdens the defendant's property . . . ," and that Plaintiffs "have the use and benefit of the aforementioned easement for the purpose of ingress and egress." Defendant appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs have an easement over Defendant's land, and also that the Trial Court erred in considering parol evidence regarding the easement. We affirm. |
Scott | Court of Appeals | |
Linda Wagner v. Mark Firestone
In this action involving child support, the issues are whether the trial court erred in finding that the father provided adequate discovery information regarding his income and assets; whether the trial court erred in ordering the mother to pay half the cost of the father's airfare to attend his deposition in Tennessee; whether the court should have awarded the mother more attorney's fees than it did; and whether the trial court erred in failing to hold the father responsible for a hospital bill for medical treatment of the parties' child. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |
