A husband and wife divorced after a short marriage. The trial court awarded a
disproportionate share of the marital property to the husband. The wife challenges the
court’s division and its denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no reversible
error, we affirm.
Dyer
Court of Appeals
In Re Ethan W. Et Al. M2021-01116-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Hinson
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. The
juvenile court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence of five statutory
grounds for termination. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing
evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. On appeal, we determine that
some grounds do not support termination of parental rights. Still, clear and convincing
evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination and the best interest
determination. So we affirm.
The appellant, an insurance provider, sought a declaratory judgment against the policy
holder, his wife, and his grandson, relieving the insurance company of the duty to defend
and indemnify the policy holder, his wife, and his grandson against a complaint brought by
the conservator of the grandson’s girlfriend for varying claims of negligence. The
insurance provider filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the grandson
constituted a “covered person” under the grandfather’s policy as an authorized driver and
that the grandson’s girlfriend constituted a “person residing in the same household as a
covered person,” triggering the policy’s household exclusion. Pursuant to the household
exclusion, which excluded liability coverage for bodily injury to “any covered person or
any person residing in the same household as a covered person,” the insurance provider
claimed that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the policy holder, his wife, and his
grandson. The trial court granted the insurance provider’s motion for summary judgment
in part and denied it in part.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
In Re Jackson R. et al. M2021-01545-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Branden Bellar
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. Two years after the
children were removed and found to be dependent and neglected, the Department of
Children’s Services petitioned for the termination of her parental rights. The trial court
found the existence of four grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to provide a
suitable home, abandonment by an incarcerated parent/wanton disregard, persistence of
conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody with
custody posing a risk of substantial harm to the children. Finding it also to be in the best
interest of the children, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. Mother contends
these findings were in error. Finding no error, we affirm.
Smith
Court of Appeals
In Re Piper N. W2021-01185-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor JoeDae L. Jenkins
This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights proceeding where a mother’s
parental rights were terminated on several statutory grounds. The original adoption petition
contained no grounds for termination of the parents’ rights, and therefore, the Trial Court
used the four months prior to the amended petition, which included grounds for
termination, for purposes of the abandonment grounds. We affirm the trial court’s use of
this time period before the amended petition. We hold that the record is insufficient for us
to conduct a meaningful appellate review in this case and that the trial court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment
by failure to financially support, and mental incompetence based on the statutory authority
in effect at the time of the filing of the amended petition alleging grounds for termination.
These grounds are vacated and remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to develop
a proper record from which this Court can conduct a meaningful appellate review and to
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
1-113(k). The amended petition seeking termination of parental rights was filed prior to
the 2018 statutory amendments of the relevant termination statutes. Because the Child was
never adjudicated as dependent and neglected, we reverse the ground of persistent
conditions under the statute in effect when the amended petition was filed. Additionally,
the statutory ground located at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was not pled in the
termination petition and was not tried by express or implied consent; therefore, we reverse
this ground as to the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the probate court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on two separate grounds – res judicata and the statute of limitations. On remand, the appellant filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to set aside the same order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that a recent order from a circuit court necessitated that the probate court’s summary judgment order be “voided and set aside.” The probate court denied the motion. The appellant appeals. We affirm and remand.
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
A new chancellor, during the course of a judicial election and shortly after the election was
held, made extremely critical comments regarding the personal and professional character
of his opponent, the incumbent chancellor. The challenger won the election, and the former
chancellor, who has returned to practice, is now representing a party before the new
chancellor. The former chancellor moved for the new chancellor’s recusal in cases in
which the former chancellor is appearing as counsel as well as recusal from cases involving
the law firm which the former chancellor joined after losing the judicial election. The new
chancellor denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that, even in the absence of actual
bias, based upon concern about the appearance of bias toward the former chancellor,
recusal is warranted. This concern does not extend to the law firm the former chancellor
has joined. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the former
chancellor but affirm the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the law firm.
Defendants appeal from the denial of their effort to invalidate a 2017 judgment on the basis that the trial judge harbored animosity against them at the time the judgment was rendered. Because these allegations were adjudicated in an earlier Rule 60.02 action, we conclude that res judicata bars the instant effort for relief from the judgment.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
In Re Emberley W. et al. M2022-00157-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Judge Charles B. Tatum
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions
and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of the child.
Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in
the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court in all respects.
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying
Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require
recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
This appeal concerns premises liability. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the defendants’ property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm.
A woman filed a complaint alleging she was assaulted at a retail store. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the woman failed to prove her assault claim, and the woman appealed. Due to the deficiencies in the woman’s appellate brief, this Court is unable to reach the substantive issues she raises, and we dismiss the appeal.
This appeals centers upon a challenge to a chancery court’s findings of fact that proved
determinative as to multiple legal issues arising in litigation related to unpaid repair costs
for rendering a private plane airworthy. The chancery court made the factual determination
that the plane owner did not agree to pay for the repairs performed by a mechanic. In
reaching this conclusion, the chancery court resolved the case based upon documentary
evidence in the form of deposition transcripts and exhibits rather than live witness
testimony. Given the documentary nature of the trial court proceedings, we conducted a
de novo review of the evidence presented without affording deference to the trial court’s
factual findings. We find the trial court erred in its factual finding that the owner did not
agree to pay for the repairs. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s legal conclusions
for which the trial court’s contrary factual determinations had been determinative. We
conclude that the plane owner breached his contract with the mechanic and is responsible
for storage costs for the plane pursuant to the possessory lien thereupon. We remand for
further proceedings including a determination of the applicability of prejudgment interest
to the repair costs.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Christa Stephen et al. v. Sarah Hill M2022-00672-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Adrienne Gilliam Fry
This appeal involves a personal injury case where the defendant died during the pendency
of the litigation. Subsequent to the filing of a suggestion of death by the defendant’s
counsel, the plaintiff failed to timely file a motion for substitution within the time provided
in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, the defendant’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for substitution and
simultaneously moved the trial court to enlarge the time for filing the motion. The trial
court denied the plaintiff’s motions and dismissed the case. Upon our review of the record,
we reverse.
This appeal concerns an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §
8-44-101, et seq. Pauline Madron (“Plaintiff”) sued the City of Morristown, Mayor Gary
Chesney, as well as Councilmembers Al A’Hearn, Chris Bivens, Robert Garrett, Tommy
Pedigo, Kay Senter, and Ken Smith (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for
Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the city’s public notice of a
July 12, 2019 special meeting to exceed the certified tax rate was inadequate. Plaintiff and
Defendants filed crossing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act
claim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the city’s notice that it intended to exceed the certified
tax rate was mere jargon that did not reasonably inform the public of the purpose of the
special meeting or the action to be taken. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Open Meetings Act claim is moot as it arises out of a property tax rate that was passed in
fiscal year 2019-2020, which lapsed before this matter was heard. Alternatively,
Defendants contend that, while most people may not understand the intricacies of city
finances, most people do understand what “exceed” and “tax rate” mean. While Plaintiff’s
claim is moot, it warrants resolution nevertheless. We hold that the city’s public notice of
the July 12, 2019 special meeting was adequate. We affirm.
Hamblen
Court of Appeals
In Re Aubree D. M2022-00267-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Tiffany G. Gipson
The mother of Aubree D. appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights—including severe child abuse—and that termination of her rights was in Aubree’s best interest. On appeal, the mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in Aubree’s best interest. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, the Circuit Court for Overton County found that the mother subjected Aubree to severe child abuse, and this court affirmed that finding in In re Aubree D., No. M2021-01229-COA-R3-JV, 2022 WL 4488507 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2022). Thus, the finding of severe child abuse is res judicata. We have also determined that DCS proved other grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in Aubree’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
Overton
Court of Appeals
In Re Jacob J. M2023-00029-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Louis W. Oliver
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. Because the father did not
file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry
of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss
the appeal.
This appeal involves a breach of contract action filed against the agent of an undisclosed principal. The trial court entered an order granting judgment against the agent. The agent appeals. We affirm.
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, filed by N.R.H. (“Petitioner”), seeking to recuse the trial court judge.
Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner, and finding it fatally
deficient, we dismiss the appeal.
A homeowner sued his homeowners’ association in general sessions court. Upon motion of the homeowner’s association, the case was removed to circuit court. After the case was removed to circuit court, the homeowner amended his complaint to add an attorney for the homeowner’s association as a defendant. The homeowner’s association and the attorney sought to dismiss the amended complaint. The circuit court granted the motions to dismiss but allowed to the homeowner to file a second amended complaint against the attorney in order to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the attorney a judgment on the pleadings after concluding that the second amended complaint failed to allege facts satisfying all of the elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation. The homeowner appealed. Discerning that the circuit court erred in granting the homeowner’s association’s motion to dismiss, we vacate that portion of the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
In Re J.S. et al. M2022-00142-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey Usman
Trial Court Judge: Judge David Howard
A Father appeals the termination of his parental rights, asserting his due process rights were
violated as a result of failure to timely appoint counsel in both dependency and neglect
proceedings and termination proceedings. The juvenile court terminated Father’s rights
for abandonment, under several statutory provisions relating to putative fathers, and for
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child, and the court determined
that termination was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that any issue regarding the
appointment of counsel in the dependency and neglect proceedings is not properly before
this court and that Father’s due process rights were not violated in the termination
proceedings. Because the Department of Children’s Services does not defend the
abandonment ground on appeal, we reverse this basis for termination. We also reverse the
trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence established a risk of substantial
physical or psychological harm to the child. Nevertheless, the evidence presented supports
in a clear and convincing manner multiple statutory grounds for termination and that
termination is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Father’s
parental rights is affirmed.
This appeal concerns the ownership of property following the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff college. We vacate the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
This appeal involves a failure to timely move for substitution of parties after the death of
one of the two plaintiffs. In a previous appeal, this Court directed the trial court, on remand,
to determine whether the plaintiff’s response to a motion to dismiss should be construed as
a motion for enlargement of time pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02, and
if so, to determine whether the plaintiff’s failure to timely move for substitution of the
parties pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 25.01 was the result of excusable
neglect. On remand, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s filing should be construed
as a motion for an enlargement of time. However, the trial court also found that the plaintiff
failed to timely move for substitution due to counsel’s misinterpretation of the law, which,
the trial court concluded, did not constitute excusable neglect. As such, the trial court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to timely substitute parties. The
plaintiff appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
This appeal involves an action filed against a funeral home and a cemetery for alleged
mishandling of a dead human body. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the funeral home as to the claims against the funeral home only. The plaintiff appeals. We
affirm.
