E. Joseph Robinson, II et al. v. Nelle Powell Williams Mahaffey et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute between three neighbors over the nature and permissible use of an easement created through a 1983 judgment of the chancery court. The plaintiffs own the property that is burdened by the easement and argue that the trial court correctly found that the 1983 judgment created an easement in gross in favor of the landowner directly north of their property. We find that the trial court erred in finding an easement in gross and hold that the 1983 judgment created an express easement appurtenant creating a dominant and servient tenement; however, the easement appurtenant was not capable of being conveyed to landowners who were not purchasing the dominant estate. Likewise, we find that there was no prescriptive or implied easement allowing the easement to be deeded from one neighbor to another. Because the trial court’s judgment lacked findings of fact relevant to the slander of title cause of action, we remand this issue to the trial court for the entry of specific findings of fact on the elements of slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s holding that defendants are responsible for the cost of re-installing a gate that they damaged. The chancery court’s order is reversed in part, vacated in part, and affirmed in part. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
KLDW Wyocorp, Inc. v. Reginald Hall
Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Raymond Sines v. Regina Tinnin
This post-divorce appeal arises from the trial court’s designation of the primary residential parent of two minor children. Due to the lack of a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we must affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Alexandrea Parker Ex Rel. Orrin Arlo Parker v. Jeanie D. Dassow, M.D.
This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiff sued a physician who had interpreted the results of her fetal ultrasound. The physician was employed by a Tennessee state university as a professor. Her job duties included both educational responsibilities and clinical care to patients in the residency clinics. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that she had received no personal gain by her act of interpreting the ultrasound. Therefore, the physician possessed absolute immunity under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act for her actions within the scope of her state employment. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brayleigh C.
This appeal involves a dispute between unwed parents, in which the mother filed a petition to modify a parenting plan and the father filed a counter-petition to modify the parenting plan and to modify custody. The juvenile court dismissed both the petition and counterpetition finding that modification was not in the child’s best interests. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
The appellant, Agness McCurry, has appealed the September 29, 2022 order of the Circuit Court for Washington County (“the Trial Court”). Because the September 29, 2022 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kendall K.
A father and stepmother sought to terminate the parental rights of a mother to her child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned her child by willful failure to visit during the four months preceding the filing of the termination petition. But the court found the evidence less than clear and convincing that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kailyn B.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. In addition to disputing the grounds for termination and best interest, Mother argues that the petition was fatally flawed, and Petitioners should not have been allowed to amend after the close of their proof. We conclude that the trial court did not err in deciding the case on its merits because the amendments were not prejudicial to Mother and remedied the petition’s deficiencies. We further conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented of both the grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. As such, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Leedy v. Hickory Ridge, LLC
This appeal concerns a breach of contract claim. Mark Leedy (“Plaintiff”) and Hickory Ridge, LLC (“Defendant”) executed the Real Estate Land Installment Contract (“the Contract”) under which Plaintiff would purchase real estate from Defendant located at 195 Derby Drive, Kingsport, Tennessee (“the Property”). Although Defendant accepted money from Plaintiff to be applied toward insurance, Defendant opted to “self-insure.” Sometime later, severe storms damaged the Property. Defendant failed to properly assess or repair the damage. Plaintiff spent another 18 months living on the Property all the while making payments before he left. Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract. Defendant filed a counterclaim. After a bench trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that Plaintiff assumed the risk of loss. We hold, inter alia, that Defendant was obliged to insure the Property pursuant to the Contract and associated documents. However, we reverse the Trial Court’s award to Plaintiff of attorney’s fees and expenses as there is no provision in the Contract for such an award to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Travionna W., et al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to four of her children. The trial court found that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) established several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination of her rights was in the children’s best interests. On appeal, the mother contends that the trial court erred when it terminated her rights because the evidence is insufficient to prove any ground for termination or that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We have determined that DCS proved grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Daily Fuller v. Christopher Mark Fuller
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jason C. Johnson v. Tennessee Department of Corrections et al.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nash M.
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Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Herron, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
This is a consolidated appeal involving two breach of contract actions filed against the Tennessee Department of Human Services in the Tennessee Claims Commission. Following the presentation of the claimant’s proof, the Commissioner dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm the dismissal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corp. v. Kinsley Braden
This is a detainer action brought by a landlord to evict its tenant for possessing a firearm in his apartment in contravention of the lease agreement. The landlord, Columbia Housing & Redevelopment Corporation (“Columbia Housing”), provides subsidized housing for the City of Columbia pursuant to the Housing Authorities Law, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-20-101 to -709, and operates Creekside Acres, a multifamily, low-income public housing complex in Columbia, Tennessee. The tenant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement with Columbia Housing that contained a prohibition against firearms on the premises; nevertheless, the tenant defended the detainer action, contending that the lease agreement violated his rights under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. The circuit court ruled in favor of the landlord on the ground that the lease agreement was a valid and enforceable contract, and the tenant voluntarily waived any rights he may have had to possess a firearm on the leased premises. This appeal followed. Significantly, the landlord is a governmental entity “acting as a landlord of property that it owns.” See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002). As such, its actions must comply with the Constitution, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982), and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine “prevent[s] the government from coercing people into giving” up constitutional rights. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013). Although laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings” do not violate the Second Amendment, see D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), not “all places of public congregation” are “sensitive places.” See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2134 (2022). Moreover, although public housing is government-owned, the leased premises at issue is the tenant’s private home, which is not the kind of “sensitive place” where the government may categorically ban firearm possession. See id. at 2128. Further, complete prohibitions on possession of handguns in the home for self-defense are “historically unprecedented.” See id. Therefore, we hold that Columbia Housing’s prohibition against handguns in the tenant’s “home” is an unconstitutional lease condition. As a consequence, the tenant’s possession of a handgun in his apartment, his home, did not constitute a breach of the lease agreement. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Buddy Davis v. Tennessee Board of Appeals
A preferred service employee appealed the termination of his employment. After failing to obtain relief at the Step I and Step II reviews, the employee requested a Step III hearing before the Tennessee Board of Appeals. The Board determined that the employee engaged in conduct unbecoming of an employee in state service but termination was too harsh a punishment. So it modified the employee’s discipline to a one-step demotion and recommended that he be transferred. The employee sought judicial review of the Board’s decision. The chancery court reversed, finding that the decision to demote the employee was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the chancery court and affirm the decision of the Board.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Kansas B., et al.
The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a dependency and neglect petition with respect to four children, two of whom are the eldest children of the mother and her first husband and two of whom are the youngest children of the mother and her current husband. DCS filed the petition upon receiving a referral that the mother’s sevenyear- old daughter from her first marriage had been sexually abused by her stepfather, the mother’s current husband. The stepfather sought to call the seven-year-old child as a witness during the trial, but the trial court denied his request upon balancing the probative value of the child’s testimony with the potential emotional and psychological harm the child could suffer from testifying. The mother and stepfather have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in utilizing this balancing test and precluding the stepfather from calling the child as a witness. We therefore vacate the trial court’s final judgment adjudicating the children dependent and neglected and remand the case so that the trial court may hear the child’s testimony, provided that the child is competent to testify and that the court does not exclude the testimony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403. If the child is allowed to testify, the trial court should consider utilizing the accommodations set forth in Tennessee Rule of Juvenile Practice and Procedure 306 to ameliorate any potential harm that testifying may cause the child. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Friendship Water Co. v. City of Friendship, Tennessee
This is an interlocutory appeal considered pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically at issue is the trial court’s ruling that a contract entered into between the parties is valid and enforceable. The City of Friendship insists that the contract at issue, which involves its purchase of a water distribution system, is void due to the operation of the Municipal Purchasing Law of 1983, Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-56-301 et seq. For the specific reasons stated herein, we respectfully reject the City’s argument and affirm the trial court’s holding that the contract at issue is enforceable. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Reyes Camacho v. Jessica Lynne Camacho
Mother appeals the trial court’s order naming Father primary residential parent. Because the trial court’s findings of fact are at times vague, inconsistent, and appear to improperly rely on the trial judge’s recollection of testimony from a prior hearing rather than appropriate proof, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and award Mother her reasonable attorney’s fees. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Jefferson Howell Et Al. v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority D/B/A Erlanger Health System Et Al.
This appeal involves a healthcare liability action. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant hospital, which is a governmental entity, alleging negligence by physicians practicing medicine within the hospital emergency department. The supervising physician was not an employee of the defendant hospital but an employee of a company contracting with the defendant hospital. The medical resident physician and medical student treating the patient in the emergency department also were not employees of the defendant hospital. During summary judgment proceedings, the plaintiffs presented no evidence of direct liability by the defendant hospital or of negligence by the nursing staff at the defendant hospital. Plaintiffs presented such evidence only as to physicians not directly employed by the defendant hospital. Determining that the physicians were not employees of the defendant hospital, the trial court held that the defendant hospital could not be held vicariously liable for the actions of these non-employee physicians under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). As such, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant hospital. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Harold R. Gunn v. City of Humboldt
This is an appeal from a grant of an involuntary dismissal. The plaintiff brought suit against the City of Humboldt for damages to his real property due to the collapse of a portion of his parking lot into his adjacent drainage ditch. At trial, the court granted the defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(2) at the close of the plaintiff’s proof and dismissed the case. We affirm. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
Ruth Mitchell v. City of Franklin, Tennessee
This appeal is an action subject to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, in which a pedestrian suffered injuries after she tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Franklin, Tennessee. The pedestrian filed a complaint claiming that the city was negligent. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the city and dismissed the case. The pedestrian appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Joshua M. Et Al.
Grandparents filed a petition in juvenile court seeking to terminate a mother’s parental rights. When the mother failed to file an answer to the petition, the grandparents filed a motion for default judgment. After hearing arguments on the motion and receiving evidence on the termination petition, the court granted the motion for default judgment and entered an order terminating the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to support, (2) persistence of conditions, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility of the children. The court also determined termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm the abandonment by failure to support ground but reverse the other two grounds. Concluding that the juvenile court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding its best interest analysis, we vacate the court’s decision that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children and remand for further findings. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Ray Franks, et al. v. Roger Bilbrey, et al.
This appeal concerns an alleged breach of contract. Danny Ray Franks (“Mr. Franks”) and his spouse Angela May Franks (“Ms. Franks”) (“Plaintiffs,” collectively) hired Roger Bilbrey (“Mr. Bilbrey”) and Bilbrey’s Construction, Inc. (“Defendants,” collectively) to build a “barndominium,” a metal building that looks like a barn with a stained-concrete floor, garage, and living quarters. The parties’ contract (“the Agreement”), which was drafted by Mr. Bilbrey, provided that work would start immediately and be completed by Thanksgiving of 2018. However, the project was not completed by that date. Some five months later, the project still was unfinished. Plaintiffs then fired Defendants. Plaintiffs sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Overton County (“the Trial Court”) for breach of contract. The Trial Court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor. Defendants appeal. We hold that time was of the essence under the Agreement. We further find that Defendants committed a material breach of the Agreement by failing to timely complete Plaintiffs’ barndominium. We affirm. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Steven Meadows et al. v. Sharon Kay Story et al.
The members of a limited liability company, a father and his son, sought the LLC’s judicial dissolution. Disagreements had surfaced between them, primarily over the ownership of assets and the value of their capital accounts. Father and son were also pitted against each other in a separate lawsuit involving other business entities. In the proceeding to dissolve the LLC, the trial court appointed a receiver to determine ownership of the assets. The court approved the receiver’s report. And, after a bench trial, the court found that father’s capital account was less than his son’s account. In doing so, the court excluded evidence offered by father related to the separate lawsuit based on relevancy. The court also excluded the testimony of an attorney based on the attorney-client privilege. Finding no reversable error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
