Kevin Johnson vs. Donna Johnson M2000-00358-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
This appeal involves the dissolution of a ten year marriage. The trial court awarded the husband a divorce after concluding that the wife was guilty of inappropriate marital conduct. The trial court granted custody of the parties' three minor children to the father and refused the mother visitation rights, and held her in criminal contempt of court. The wife now appeals. We have determined that the trial court properly awarded custody to the father but the trial court erred in refusing the mother visitation, and in convicting her of criminal contempt. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
County Residents Against Speedway Havoc, et al vs. Wilson County Commission, et al M2000-01561-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
Opponents of a proposed motor speedway in Wilson County filed a petition which challenged on numerous grounds the zoning change that made construction of the speedway possible. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county government had acted in accordance with the applicable laws. We affirm.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Steven H. Rezba vs. Brian W. Randolph M2000-01973-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
Dr. Steven H. Rezba purchased the dental practice of Dr. Brian W. Randolph in April of 1996, paying some cash down and giving a promissory note for the balance. Dr. Rezba filed this action to rescind the contract claiming that Dr. Randolph had inflated his revenues by fraudulent practices, and Dr. Randolph counterclaimed for damages for breach of the contract. The Chancery Court of Williamson County denied Dr. Rezba's motion to amend to include a claim for damages and granted summary judgment to Dr. Randolph on all issues. We affirm.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Dwayne Hawkins v. Patrick Hart M2000-02449-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This matter began when Plaintiffs signed an agreement to purchase an automobile dealership from Defendant, Patrick Hart. Defendant Hart refused to honor this agreement and later agreed to sell the dealership to Defendant, Nelson Bowers. The current case flows from these breach of contract and inducement of breach of contract actions previously dismissed by the trial court and appealed to this Court. We are now asked to determine whether the trial court correctly applied the Court of Appeals decision in this matter. Plaintiffs appeal two orders issued by the trial court on remand: (1) an order dismissing claims for conversion and interference with business relations against the Bowers Defendants, reinstating the discretionary costs previously vacated by this Court in favor of the Bowers Defendants, and denying Plaintiffs' motion to amend to add additional claims and parties; and (2) a second order dismissing Plaintiffs' separate action against European Motors and Sonic Automotive, parties whom Plaintiffs had previously tried to join in the original action. We find that the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the Court of Appeals decision and affirm both orders in their entirety.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Linda Kinard v. John Kinard M2000-00674-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
Upon remand from earlier appeal, the trial court determined (1) Husband owed Wife past due alimony without interest; (2) Husband owed Wife additional $47,933.50 on note with interest from 30 days after the entry of the Court of Appeals opinion until the amount is paid; (3) Husband was not required to release the residence as collateral on the home equity loan; (4) Husband retained ownership of the insurance policy; (5) no attorney's fees were awarded to either party. Wife filed a second appeal to dispute the decision of the trial court and to determine the date at which post-judgment interest begins to accrue, whether husband should be required to discharge the home equity loan, whether husband should be restricted in use of life insurance policy, and whether attorney's fees should have been awarded. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court in regards to the attorney's fees, life insurance policy, and home equity loan and reverse the decision of the trial court with respect to post-judgment interest.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Robert Terry Davis, et al vs. Wilson County, TN M2000-00785-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
Wilson County sought to modify its health insurance plan providing coverage for "retired" employees. Two employees, fitting the definition of retired employees but not yet retired, challenged the modification on the ground that their rights in the prior plan had vested. The Chancery Court of Wilson County held that the employees had a vested right to continue under the prior plan. We hold that health insurance benefits are welfare benefits that do not vest absent a contractual provision that they cannot be changed. We therefore reverse the lower court's decision and dismiss the complaint.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Marika Avery vs. Thomas Avery M2000-00889-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
In this divorce case ending a 25 year marriage, the trial court classified a bequest made solely to the husband as marital property under an "implied partnership" theory and divided the bequest equally. The parties' other property was divided, and the wife was awarded alimony in futuro. The husband appeals the classification and division of property and the award of alimony in futuro. We reverse the trial court's classification of the bequest as marital property and classify the original bequest as Husband's separate property. We find the increase in value of that separate property to be marital because of the parties' contribution to its maintenance and increase. We modify the award of marital property accordingly, modify the alimony award, and decline to award Wife attorney fees on appeal.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Allison Coats v. Smyrna/Rutherford County Airport Authority M2000-00234-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant following two requests by the plaintiff pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act for certain documents relating to the Smyrna Airport negotiations with Wiggins Group, PLC./Plane Station, Inc. The plaintiff alleged a statutory right to inspect certain documents. Ultimately, the trial court ordered all of the documents released to the plaintiff, but ordered correspondence addressed to or signed by the SRCAA attorney placed under seal pending appeal. The principal issue on this appeal is whether the appellee is entitled to the documents under seal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Patricia Mora vs. Gilberto Mora W1999-02483-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This case involves a dispute stemming from the parties' divorce in 1991. The divorce decree provided that Ms. Mora and the parties' adult daughter could live in the marital home for thirty months following the divorce, at which time the home was to be put on the market for sale and the proceeds divided. After the thirty month period expired, Mr. and Ms. Mora attempted to settle the dispute concerning the marital home. The parties each executed documents, and a dispute arose as to which document embodied the parties' intentions. The trial court ruled on the parties' settlement dispute, and the court also appointed Ms. Mora as the adult daughter's guardian and ordered that Mr. Mora provide support for his daughter. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Musson Theatrical vs. Federal Express W2000-01247-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Plaintiffs, as shippers, sued defendant, FedEx Corporation, for fraud and misrepresentation because of defendant's practice of charging more for economy two-day service than for one-day service for certain packages. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on the basis of preemption by federal law, Airline Deregulation Act, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Susan Sellers vs. Randall Sellers W2000-01475-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This appeal involves a belated attempt by the appellant, Randall Lee Sellers, to obtain relief from child support obligations based upon a claim that he is not the biological father of the child. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Carroll
Court of Appeals
Lula Moody vs. Gen. Motors W2000-01658-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
Plaintiffs sued General Motors Corporation and Townsend Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac, Inc. as a result of injuries sustained by Ms. Moody as a result of a single car accident. In a separate complaint they sued Townsend alleging that it had sold them a purportedly new vehicle when in fact the odometer had been rolled back. The cases were consolidated for trial and the accident case resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. The case involving the odometer was dismissed by the trial court. Appellants failed to present this court with either a transcript or a statement of the evidence. We affirm.
Decatur
Court of Appeals
In matter D.I.S., W2000-00061-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The juvenile court, sua sponte, dismissed the petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother at the end of the petitioner's proof. The petitioner appeals. We affirm, finding that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights would not be in the child's best interest.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Steve Mairose vs. FedEx W2000-00076-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim brought by the Appellants against the Appellee. Following a six week jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the Appellants. The Appellee filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The Chancery Court of Shelby County granted the Appellee's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, granted a conditional new trial. The Appellants appeal the grant of the Appellee's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the grant of a conditional new trial by the Chancery Court of Shelby County. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Donald Blackburn vs. Betty Blackburn W2000-00393-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Donn Southern
Executor of deceased's estate appeals the probate court order closing the deceased's conservatorship. The final order closing the conservatorship, among other things, set aside a part of the order appointing conservator which ordered the appointed conservator to convey to the ward real estate owned by the ward that she had previously conveyed to herself as attorney in fact for the ward. Executor appeals.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Timothy Ellington vs. Linda Maddox W2000-00948-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: J. Roland Reid
Natural father filed a petition to obtain custody of his son against the maternal grandmother and her husband, the child's custodians by previous court order. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied father's petition and retained custody in the maternal grandmother and husband. Father appeals, and we reverse.
Haywood
Court of Appeals
Carroll Co. Waste vs. Odillion Collins W1998-00754-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This case involves a dispute over issues surrounding Carroll County's imposition of a garbage collection fee on its residents. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, and the Defendant appeals.
Carroll
Court of Appeals
Ch-00-0152-2 Ch-00-0152-2
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Billie Mae Manis vs. Donald Ralph Manis E1999-01927-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
Wife sought a divorce after 41 years of marriage on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. With Husband acting pro se, the parties filed a Marital Dissolution Agreement. After retaining counsel, Husband withdrew the agreement and filed a counterclaim for divorce, also alleging inappropriate marital conduct. The Trial Court appointed a Special Master, who conducted two hearings and filed a lengthy and comprehensive Special Master's Report. Both parties filed Objections to the Report, and the Special Master held a third hearing addressing the issues raised in the parties' objections. Husband filed Objections to the Special Master's Amended Report. Wife had no objections to the Amended Report. The Trial Court held a fourth hearing, at which arguments of counsel and Husband's offer of additional proof were made. The Trial Court's Final Judgment adopted the Report of the Special Master, as amended, and affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special Master with minor exceptions. Husband raises ten issues, primarily involving the Special Master's valuation and distribution of marital assets and the amount of alimony he was ordered to pay. Wife contests the amounts awarded to her for periodic alimony and for her interest in the marital estate, and also claims that the Trial Court erred in not placing more restrictions on Husband's future business transactions so as to more fully protect her interest in her marital share. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
Zahreddine vs. Choi M2000-01281-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
This appeal involves the timeliness of a personal injury complaint. Two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs' lawyer placed an envelope containing a complaint and summons in a commercial delivery service's drop-off receptacle in Williamson County. Even though the envelope bore the courthouse address of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County, the commercial delivery service delivered the envelope to a central governmental mail room on the day the statute of limitations expired. However, the central mail room did not physically deliver the envelope to the trial court clerk's office until three days later. The defendant later filed a motion for summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, asserting that the complaint was time-barred. The trial court denied the motion but granted the defendant permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We have determined that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs' complaint was not timely filed with the trial court clerk as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3.
Reid vs. Lutche M1997-00229-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a prisoner's challenges to the Department of Correction's inmate grievance procedures and to an unfavorable disciplinary decision. After the Department denied his requests for a declaratory order, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking declaratory relief and judicial review of the disciplinary proceeding. The trial court dismissed the prisoner's suit because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Audrey Moss vs. Sheila Sankey W2000-00659-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This appeal arises from a negligence action arising out of a vehicular accident. Driver was turning onto a main road from a side street without the right-of-way. As she emerged from the side street, she was struck by Worker, an employee of Company, whose wrecker had been driving on the road. The collision diverted the wrecker into the oncoming lanes of traffic, where it struck a car driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit against Driver, Worker and Company for her injuries. A jury found Driver 100% liable for the injuries. Plaintiff appealed stating that the verdict was against the preponderance of the evidence, that the judge had incorrectly denied a motion for a new trial, and that a sleeping juror had violated Plaintiff's right to a trial by jury. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Annie Truett, Glenda & Marvin Plunk vs. Wayne Bowman W2000-00514-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Roy Morgan
This is a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff's decedent allegedly was improperly intubated in preparation for hip replacement surgery. The plaintiff sued the orthopedic surgeon, the nurse anesthetist, and two anesthesiologists involved in the surgery. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the surgeon, based in part on the assertion of the surgeon and his attorney that the surgeon was responsible only for the orthopedic aspect of the decedent's care. Two years later, the other defendants, also represented by the same attorney who represented the surgeon, testified in depositions that, in contrast to the surgeon's assertions, the surgeon had broad responsibility for the decedent's care. In light of this testimony, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the order of summary judgment in favor of the surgeon. The surgeon's request for interlocutory appeal of this decision was granted. We now affirm, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside its previous order of summary judgment.
