J.C.Bradford vs. Southern Realty W1999-01617-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This cause came to be considered by the Court upon a claim for misrepresentation arising from a real estate transaction. This is the second occasion that the Court has had to address this case. Initially, this cause was set for trial, and following opening statements, the Chancellor ruled from the bench in the defendants' favor. On appeal, this Court remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, renewed a previously filed motion to dismiss and filed a counterclaim for attorneys fees. The trial court granted the defendants the requested relief. This appeal followed. Upon consideration of the record, the Court finds that the trial court's orders granting summary judgment, dismissing the complaint and awarding attorneys' fees should be vacated and that the cause should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Alvin Herring vs. Interstate Hotels W1999-01055-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a dispute between Plaintiff Alvin O. Herring, Jr. and Defendant Interstate Hotels, Inc. d/b/a Memphis Marriott ("Memphis Marriott") regarding the theft of Mr. Herring's property from the Memphis Marriott's premises. The Memphis Marriott argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motion for an extension of time to file an answer to Mr. Herring's complaint, in granting Mr. Herring's motion for a default judgment, and in denying its motion to set aside the default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Daniel Ray Stanfill vs. Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill E1999-01878-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Bill Swann
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court modified the judgment of divorce by changing the custody of Christopher Stanfill (DOB: February 12, 1993) from Karen Elaine Wright Stanfill ("Mother") to Daniel Ray Stanfill ("Father"). The trial court also established Mother's visitation rights with her son. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
Kenneth L. Storey vs. Randall Nichols, et al E1998-00851-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: David H. Cate
An accused awaiting trial on a charge of aggravated rape filed an action in the Chancery Court of Knox County against the district attorney general and two of his assistants. The complaint sought an injunction preventing the defendants from proceeding with his prosecution, a money judgment to compensate him for his mental and physical suffering, and the loss of over two years of valuable time. The complaint also sought to disbar the defendants. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm.
Knox
Court of Appeals
William P. Henderson, et al vs. Henry Clay Hart, Jr. E1999-01446-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
This appeal arises from an executory contract for the sale of real property. Henry Clay Hart, Jr., the Appellant, appeals the judgment from the Knox County Circuit Court in favor of William P. Henderson and Lillian R. Henderson, the Appellees. Mr. Hart raises the issues of whether the Trial Court had proper subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and whether the Court erred in finding that the executory sales contract was no longer in effect. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for such further proceedings as may be necessary consistent with this opinion. We adjudge costs of appeal against Henry Clay Hart, Jr. and his surety.
Knox
Court of Appeals
In Re: Estate of Bernie Riggs W1999-01905-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Lee Moore
This appeal arises from a dispute over the disposition of the assets of Bernie F. Riggs ("Husband"). Plaintiff Julia Mae Riggs ("Wife") filed suit, alleging that Defendant Campbell ("Daughter") had used undue influence and had improperly disposed of Husband's assets through a power of attorney. The trial court found in favor of Daughter, holding that all transactions were valid and in accordance with Husband's wishes. Wife appeals.
Dyer
Court of Appeals
LeCroy-Schemel vs. John Cupp, Sheriff E2000-00024-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Douglas A. Meyer
An attorney was found in contempt by the Chattanooga City Court Judge during proceedings relating to the attorney's client's conviction for violation of a municipal ordinance. The Judge ordered a ten-day jail sentence for the attorney, who was taken into custody and locked in a holding cell. The attorney was able to secure a writ of habeas corpus from the Hamilton County Criminal Court. After the attorney was released, the City Court Judge filed an Order to Appear and Show Cause why the attorney should not be jailed for contempt. The Criminal Court held a hearing at which it heard testimony of the attorney and another witness, and found that the City Court had exceeded its statutory authority by confining the attorney for contempt, that the City Court had not followed procedural requirements for punishing contempt, declared a section of the Chattanooga City Charter null and void, and dismissed the City Court's Order to Appear and Show Cause. The City of Chattanooga appealed the orders of the Criminal Court. We affirm the actions of the Criminal Court relating to the writ of habeas corpus, affirm the finding that the City Court was without authority to punish criminal contempt by confinement or fine in excess of ten dollars, and modify the judgment to reflect the holding of this Court in Poole v. City of Chattanooga.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Judd's Inc. vs. Dors L. Muir, et al E1999-01836-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
In this appeal Doris and Allan Muir insist that the Chancellor was in error in not allowing their homestead exemption as to certain funds realized from the sale of real estate to satisfy a judgment previously entered against them. Their attorney, W. Richard Baker, Jr., insists that the Chancellor was in error in not enforcing a lien for his attorney fees that he claimed was properly perfected as to the same funds. We affirm.
This case involves the use of certain property in Dickson County in light of a 1988 zoning ordinance which provides that mining and quarrying on this property are permitted as a special exception only. When the county attempted to enjoin the property owners from mining or quarrying their property, the property owners argued that their property was being used as a quarrying operation prior to October 1988 when the city passed the zoning ordinance. Thus, it is the property owners' position that their quarrying operation constitutes a pre-existing nonconforming use and may continue pursuant to both the Dickson County zoning ordinance and Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-208(b). In addition, the county enjoined the property owners from hauling rock in violation of a fifteen-ton weight limit on local roads. The property owners argued below that the enforcement of this local rule against them constitutes selective enforcement. The trial court found that the property owners had failed to show a nonconforming use, and it dismissed their claim for selective enforcement. On appeal, we find that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the property owners' operation was not a nonconforming use at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance. In light of that finding, the temporary injunction regarding the fifteen-ton weight limit is dissolved, and the selective enforcement issue does not need to be addressed.
This appeal arises out of a default judgment rendered against the Appellant. The underlying cause of action was for the breach of a construction contract. After the Appellant did not answer the complaint or otherwise defend the action, the Chancery Court of Williamson County granted the plaintiffs’ motion for default and entered judgment accordingly. A subsequent damage hearing was held at which the Appellant did not appear. The Appellees obtained a judgment for $918,073.15. The Appellant filed an application to set aside the default judgment which was denied by the trial court.
A prisoner serving a life sentence petitioned the court to order the Department of Correction to restore sentence reduction credits it had deleted from his record after determining that his sentence was to be served without the possibility of parole. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm the trial court.
This case arises from the decision of the Cold Creek Correctional Facility Disciplinary Board finding the Appellant guilty of attempting to intimidate an employee and being under the influence of alcohol. The Appellant filed a Petition for Common Law and Statutory Writ of Certiorari with the Chancery Court of Davidson County challenging the Disciplinary Board's decision. The trial court affirmed the decision of the Board and dismissed the Appellant's claim.
Plaintiffs, the owner and lessee of property on which a railroad track was located, obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting Defendants, owners of adjacent property, from building a house on what Plaintiffs alleged was their right-of-way. After Defendants presented evidence that Plaintiffs possessed only an easement as needed for railroad operations, rather than a right of-way, the court dissolved the temporary injunction and denied a permanent injunction. Defendants then filed a motion to assess damages and enforce liability of surety on injunction bond pursuant to Tenn.R. Civ. P. 65.05, seeking recovery for the losses resulting from the issuance of the temporary injunction. Defendants appeal the trial court's denial of their motion. We reverse. Tenn. R. App. P. 13 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed and Remanded.
Plaintiff sued to recover monies paid to defendant. Defendant defended on the grounds that the monies were paid to a trust fund for which he was not liable. The Trial Court held the trust had no validity and entered judgment against the defendant. We affirm.
The City of Chattanooga asserted, by counter-claim, that the franchise rights of a state-franchised water company had terminated when the original stated corporate existence of ninety-nine years expired. The Hamilton County Chancery Court found that the water company's franchise was separate from the incorporation, that perpetuity of the franchise is the appropriate interpretation when there exists no limiting language in the franchise grant itself, and that the water company had not trespassed by continuing to operate in Chattanooga past the expiration of the original ninety-nine year grant of corporate existence. The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed.
Hamilton
Court of Appeals
Howell vs. Howell M1999-00753-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
In this post-divorce case, Talisa Gayle Kelly, formerly Howell, ("Wife") filed a petition seeking to increase child support and to enforce other provisions of the judgment of divorce. The trial court ordered Gary Morris Howell ("Husband") to pay Wife the balance due her for her interest in the former marital residence. It further found Husband in contempt for failing to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the parties' minor child and ordered him to pay Wife an amount approximating what he would have paid in insurance premiums had he maintained the policy as required by the divorce judgment. Wife was also awarded half of her attorney's fees. We reverse the trial court's award of the unpaid premiums; in all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Taylor vs. Campbell M2000-00217-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Daniel B. Taylor filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner and several other employees of the Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that he is entitled to various sentence reduction credits and that his sentence is void and illegal. The trial court dismissed Taylor's petition. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Lineberry vs. Locke M1999-02169-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
A citizen whose private photographs and video tapes were seized in the execution of a search warrant sued the sheriff and a deputy for invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants at the close of the plaintiff's proof. Because we agree that the plaintiff did not prove either cause of action, we affirm.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Wilson vs. Wilson M1999-02045-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This is an appeal from the trial court's refusal to modify Mr. Wilson's child support obligation after he was terminated from his place of employment. We reverse the trial court's judgment.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Freethy vs. Maconi M2000-00107-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: L. Raymond Grimes
This Rule 9 interlocutory appeal consists of the singular issue of whether Steven Maconi has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, thus requiring him to defend a paternity action brought in Tennessee. The Trial Court held that Mr. Maconi had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee, and thus, it could exercise personal jurisdiction over him. We reverse the finding of the Trial Court and hold that Mr. Maconi does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Larry Parish vs. Robert Marquis W1999-02629-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: James E. Swearengen
Plaintiffs Larry E. Parrish and Larry E. Parrish, P.C. (collectively, "Parrish"), appeal the trial court's final summary judgment that dismissed Parrish's claim for malicious prosecution against Defendants Robert S. Marquis, McCampbell & Young, P.C., Ronald C. Koksal, and Butler, Vines & Babb, PLLC. The Defendants also have raised an issue on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss for improper venue. We conclude that the Shelby County Circuit Court was not the proper venue for Parrish's malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Parrish's malicious prosecution claim on the alternative ground of improper venue.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Teresa Miles vs. Earl Pace W1999-00407-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
Four tenants in common, each owning a one-eighth interest in the property, filed suit for sale for partition against the other tenant in common, owning a one-half interest. After a non-jury trial, the court found that the property was so situated that it could not be partitioned and also found that it would be manifestly for the advantage of the parties that the property be sold rather than partitioned. The tenant in common owning one-half interest has appealed. We affirm, because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the chancellor.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Abbott vs. Gateway M1999-00653-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman
The General Sessions Court of Davidson County awarded a judgment against the defendant below, Nationwide Insurance Company, in a case involving a car accident. Nationwide filed an appeal to the Davidson County Circuit court but failed to secure a trial date within 45 days as required by Davidson County Local Rule of Practice 20(b) (1999). The circuit court dismissed the case due to Nationwide's failure, and Nationwide filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion to set aside the circuit court dismissal due to its attorney's excusable neglect. When the circuit court denied Rule 60.02 relief Nationwide appealed to this court. On appeal, we reverse the decision of the circuit court finding that it should have granted Nationwide's request for Rule 60.02 relief and set aside the dismissal of Nationwide's circuit court appeal.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Clark vs. Crow M1999-00916-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
We grant this interlocutory appeal to consider a question of first impression regarding whether there is a right to jury trial prior to the issuance of an order of protection pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-3-605, (hereinafter "order of protection"). Specifically, we are asked to determine whether a party against whom an order of protection is sought is entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right before this order is issued. After reviewing Tennessee's constitutional and statutory guarantees to a jury trial, we have determined that there is no right to a jury trial prior to the issuance of an order of protection. The circuit court's decision is affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Tuttle vs. Tuttle M1999-01578-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: L. Craig Johnson
In a previous appeal, this divorce case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the parties had any marital property and, if so, for the trial court to make an equitable division thereof. From the trial court's final decree in compliance with the order of remand, defendant appeals.
