In Re Chance B. Et Al.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Trial Court found the mother to be indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. The Trial Court conducted a trial and entered an order finding that two statutory grounds of abandonment existed for termination of the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the children’s best interest. There is no transcript or statement of the evidence included in the record to permit appellate review of the mother’s issues on appeal concerning the termination of her parental rights. As such, we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to the children and remand to the Trial Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jayda J. Et Al.
In this parental rights termination case, the trial court ruled that DCS proved five grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two children: mental incompetence, persistence of conditions, abandonment by failure to support, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody of the children. The trial court also ruled that termination of Mother’s rights was in the children’s best interest. We reverse the trial court’s rulings as to the grounds of mental incompetence and abandonment by failure to support. We also reverse the trial court’s ruling that termination of Mother’s rights is in the children’s best interests. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Chimneyhill Condominium Association v. King Chow
The defendant appealed to circuit court following a judgment against it in general sessions court. The plaintiff filed no notice of appeal, but amended its complaint to allege an additional claim. The plaintiff later filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking an award of attorney’s fees. Eventually, the defendant dismissed its appeal and asked that the general sessions court judgment be affirmed. The trial court affirmed the previous judgment from the general sessions court, but also granted the plaintiff an additional judgment for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. The defendant appeals the award of attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. We reverse the trial court’s decision to award the plaintiff attorney’s fees, but affirm the award of discretionary costs. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delinquent Taxpayers 2015 (Manfred Steinhagen)
This appeal arises from the court-ordered sale of real property to satisfy unpaid property tax owned by a living trust. After the property was sold, the trustee, acting pro se, moved to set aside the sale, asserting a violation of the trust’s due-process rights. The trial court dismissed the motion because the trustee was not a licensed attorney and was thus unqualified to represent the trust in a legal proceeding. For the reasons explained below, we have determined that the trial court correctly dismissed the motion because the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
The Estate of Stella Ruth Hughes, et al. vs. C. Ray Adams, et al.
This case involves a motion by the defendants to enforce an alleged “walkaway settlement” agreement. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs—through their former attorney— agreed to a binding settlement agreement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The trial court’s decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Darlene Christmas Murray (Godsey) v. Louis Wade Godsey
This appeal arises from a post-divorce contempt action. Darlene Christmas Murray (“Wife”) filed a petition for contempt in the General Sessions Court for Roane County (the “trial court”) in 2015, alleging that her former husband, Louis Wade Godsey (“Husband”), should be held in contempt for failing to pay Wife retirement benefits to which she was entitled under their final decree of divorce. The trial court found Husband in contempt and awarded Wife, inter alia, $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees as punishment. Because the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Husband actually and willfully violated a court order, we reverse. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher et al.
This appeal arises from a healthcare liability action wherein the plaintiff initially sued the doctor, the hospital, and two other defendants. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice against all defendants except for the doctor. The doctor subsequently filed an answer to the complaint, stating that the action should be dismissed under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the hospital, a governmental hospital entity and the doctor’s employer, was not a party to the action. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend,” seeking to set aside the Trial Court’s order of dismissal in order to withdraw his voluntary dismissal of the hospital as a party. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, determining that the voluntary dismissal order was a final order and that the plaintiff knew about the doctor’s employment with the hospital prior to the voluntary dismissal. We determine that the Trial Court erred by treating the plaintiff’s motion as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion, instead of a motion to revise pursuant to Rule 54.02, and further hold that the Trial Court erred by denying the plaintiff’s motion to revise the non-final order of voluntary dismissal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Zimmer US, Inc. v. David Gerregano
This is a taxpayer action challenging the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s decision to deny its refund claim. The taxpayer filed a refund claim in December 2015, after which the parties entered into three consecutive extension agreements under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-1501 and -1802. Shortly before the last extension expired, the taxpayer commenced this action to obtain its refund. The Department responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the one-year statute of limitations to commence the refund action was not extended. Specifically, the Department insisted the extension agreements only extended the limitation periods for it to assess taxes and refund overpayments. For its part, the taxpayer insisted the parties agreed to extend the deadline for filing suit and that its action was timely commenced. The trial court agreed with the Department and dismissed the complaint. We affirm the trial court’s decision because the plain language of each extension agreement references only the assessment and refund of taxes. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca M. Pomeroy v. Michael L. McGinnis
In this action for conversion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who is her brother, unilaterally surrendered an annuity fund that had been titled jointly in their names, received a check for the proceeds, endorsed her signature without her permission, and deposited the proceeds in a bank account to which the plaintiff had no access. Upon the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in which he asserted that the plaintiff had been an owner of the annuity in name only and that the three-year statute of limitations had expired well before she filed the complaint, the trial court found that the plaintiff was a titled co-owner of the annuity and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled by the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the cause of action from the plaintiff. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant had fraudulently concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff and that he had committed conversion of the plaintiff’s one-half interest in the check representing the annuity proceeds. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of one-half of the annuity proceeds plus pre-judgment interest calculated from the date of the check’s endorsement. The defendant has appealed. Having discerned a minor mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the amount to reduce it by $90.00, affirming the trial court’s award to the plaintiff in the amount of $59,674.22 rather than $59,764.22. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Braylon W., et al. v. Armie Walker, M.D., et al.
This appeal stems from a dismissal pursuant to Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Suit was filed against Appellant’s treating physician, among other defendants, for health care liability involving Appellant’s birth. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that, because the physician was an employee of a governmental entity at the time of the incident, Appellant was required by statute to name the physician’s employing governmental entity as a party defendant. Because Appellant failed to do so, the lawsuit against the treating physician could not proceed. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Sullivan County et al. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. et al.
Having determined that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded and possible further sanctions remain pending in this action, we further determine that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Payne v. Jessica Payne
This is an appeal from a dismissal of Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court found that Mother failed to carry her burden of proof in showing a material change of circumstances had occurred. Mother now appeals. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm its denial of Mother’s petition. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Perry Allen Et Al. v. William B. Lee Et Al.
The Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to challenge a series of executive orders issued by the Governor of Tennessee in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Namely, the Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s legal authority to close entertainment and recreational gathering venues, arguing, among other things, that the executive orders were a constitutionally-prohibited implementation of martial law. Although the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, we conclude that the underlying matter is moot given the repeal of the complained of closure requirements. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for dismissal of the complaint in light of its mootness. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miley D.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that two grounds for termination had been established as to Father: abandonment by an incarcerated parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and a sentence for child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court further found the termination of Father’s parental rights to be in the best interests of the two minor children at issue. Although we reverse one ground for termination found by the trial court, we otherwise affirm its order terminating Father’s parental rights. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, TN et al.
This appeal arises from litigation concerning a fatal road accident. Steven W. Lawson (“Decedent”), by and through his wife, Penny Lawson, and on behalf of Corey Lawson, Decedent’s child (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District Board (“ECD-911”), Hawkins County, Tennessee and Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency (“the EMA”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness in Defendants’ response to a road washout that led to Decedent’s death. Plaintiffs specifically alleged nepotism in Defendants’ hiring practices and a failure to train. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, which the Trial Court granted partly on grounds that claims of recklessness could not proceed against the Defendant entities under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Plaintiffs could, in fact, proceed with their claims of recklessness and gross negligence under the GTLA, and the facts pled by Plaintiffs were sufficient to state claims based upon recklessness and gross negligence. We hold further that, based on the facts alleged at this stage, the third special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies so as to remove Defendants’ immunity. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Moorehead Et Al. v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
In litigation regarding an automobile accident, Appellants Jerry and Debra Moorehead reached a mediation agreement with their uninsured motorist carrier, Appellee Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmers”). Under the mediation agreement, Farmers agreed to pay $50,000 to each of the Mooreheads in full settlement of the dispute. Farmers paid only $25,000 each to Mr. and Mrs. Moorehead, deducting amounts it had previously paid under the policy for medical expenses. The Mooreheads moved the trial court to enforce the agreement, arguing that they were due $50,000 each in “new” money. The trial court held that the mediation agreement was enforceable but that the amount owed to the Mooreheads was properly offset by the previous amounts Farmers paid. On review, we conclude that the plain language of the mediation agreement promised future payment of $50,000 to each of the Mooreheads without reference to or incorporation of either the insurance policy or previous payments made thereunder. Reversed and remanded. |
Moore | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Manning H.
This appeal arises from a mother and a stepfather’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. The mother and father were married and had a son and a daughter. When they divorced, they agreed to a permanent parenting plan allowing the father equal parenting time with their son but no parenting time with their daughter. In the three and a half years preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father’s rights, the father fully exercised his parenting time with their son, but he had no contact with their daughter and did not request a modification of the permanent parenting plan. The petitioners alleged three grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights to his daughter—abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and -113(g)(1), and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The trial court determined that the petitioners proved one of the three grounds, abandonment by failure to visit; however, it found that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the daughter’s best interests to terminate the father’s rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. On appeal, the petitioners contend the trial court erred in denying their petition because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interests. They also contend the trial court erred in finding that they did not prove the father failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume physical custody as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). For his part, the father contends his failure to visit was not willful; therefore, the petitioners failed to prove any ground for termination of his parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the father abandoned his daughter by failure to visit during the requisite period of time as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We affirm its determination that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the essential elements of the ground codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the petitioners failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tracy Darrell Adkins v. Rhonda Forlaw Adkins
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Daryl K. Burford v. Tennessee Department of Correction, Et Al.
The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a declaratory judgment, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”); TDOC Sentence Management; TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker; and CoreCivic, Inc., Records Officials (“CoreCivic”) (collectively, “Respondents”), miscalculated his release eligibility date and sentence expiration date. The trial court dismissed the petition upon finding that the petitioner had failed to comply with the court’s two orders notifying the petitioner that his case would be dismissed if he did not pay the initial partial filing fee required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807, file an affidavit of indigency, and submit copies of his petition and summons for each respondent with the court clerk. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ciara Dawn Beaty v. Adam Scott Beaty
This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. In fashioning an initial parenting schedule, the trial court named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and entered a parenting plan awarding 242 days of parenting time to the mother and 123 days to the father. The father appealed. Because we conclude that the trial court’s order regarding the residential parenting schedule does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order as to the parenting plan and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review. |
Pickett | Court of Appeals | |
Theresa Doty v. City of Johnson City
This is a personal injury action in which the defendant tortfeasor claims that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence concerning plaintiff’s claimed medical expenses. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Halliburton v. Tennessee Board of Parole
After being denied parole and exhausting all administrative remedies, an inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The chancery court dismissed the petition pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-812 because the inmate had unpaid court costs from previous litigation. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re James W. et al.
This case involves a petition to terminate parental rights. The petition was filed by the Department of Children’s Services against the biological mother of several minor children. In the petition, the Department alleged five grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) abandonment by exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children prior to incarceration; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. After a trial on the petition, the trial court found that the Department established all five grounds and that termination was in the best interest of the children. As a result, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Kay Tomes v. Michael Joe Tomes
In this post-divorce dispute, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination that she was in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to return certain personal property to the husband. We find no error in the trial court’s contempt ruling or in its denial of the wife’s motion for Rule 60 relief. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Medders v. Landon Newby, Et Al.
An insurance company denied coverage for an accident its insured had with an uninsured/underinsured motorist because the insured had a “non-owner’s” policy, and the car she was driving did not fit the definition of a “non-owned auto.” The trial court concluded, following a bench trial on the bifurcated issue of coverage, that the insured’s policy did not cover the accident, and the insured appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |
