Martha Gilmore, Executrix of the Estate of Nannie Susan Carpenter v. NOL, LLC a/k/a Premier Radiology
A physical therapy patient standing just outside a building was struck by the building’s automatic door, causing her to fall and suffer broken bones. The patient sued the owner of the building, asserting negligence and premises liability. The owner asserted the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The jury returned verdicts finding both parties negligent and assigned more fault to the patient than to the building owner, thus barring the patient from any recovery. The patient moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict finding her to be at fault was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied her motion, and the patient appealed. We conclude that the trial judge did not err in its role as the thirteenth juror, but we vacate the court’s judgment finding the patient comparatively at fault because no material evidence was introduced at trial to support this aspect of the jury’s verdict.
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
KELLY LOVE MCGUFFEY v. BELMONT WEEKDAY SCHOOL ET AL.
A preschool teacher terminated from her employment at a church preschool brought multiple claims against the church, the school, the director of the school, and a church committee. After the teacher presented her evidence to a jury, the court granted motions for a directed verdict as to all defendants except the church and on all claims except common law retaliatory discharge and promissory estoppel. The teacher claimed that the director terminated her employment in retaliation for her complaints about safety issues at the school and that she relied on a promise by the chair of a church committee that a probation report would be removed from her personnel file. The jury found in favor of the church on both counts, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of the church. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Adam Paul Jasinskis et al. v. Don R. Cameron, III, et al.
Homeowners sued their builder, asserting claims for violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (“TCPA”), among others. The builder counterclaimed for attorney’s fees, contending that the TCPA claims were frivolous, without legal or factual merit, or brought for the purpose of harassment. The trial court denied the builder’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the builder moved to amend its counterclaim to add a claim for attorney’s fees based on the parties’ purchase and sale agreement. The homeowners nonsuited their claims against the builder before the trial court heard oral argument on the motion to amend, and the trial court subsequently denied the builder’s motion to amend. The homeowners then moved to dismiss the builder’s counterclaim, and the trial court granted the motion. The builder appeals the trial court’s denial of its motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the denial of its motion to alter or amend, and the dismissal of its counterclaim. We dismiss the appeal of the denial of the builder’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and we affirm the trial court’s denial of the builder’s motion to amend and its dismissal of the builder’s counterclaim for attorney’s fees. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Mitzi Bayne Ruth, Et Al. v. Home Health Care of Middle Tennessee, LLC., Et Al.
This is a breach of contract action in which Plaintiffs sought to recover the balance of a promissory note executed to secure payment for of a deceased owner’s interest in the defendant company and to recover on a guaranty to secure the note. Defendants conceded that they did not pay the note according to its terms and counterclaimed, asserting that Plaintiffs breached a separate agreement which required the deceased owner’s estate to file amended tax returns and tender payment to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes which had been paid on behalf of the deceased owner by the company. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment; the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion, denied Defendants’ motion, and dismissed Defendants’ counterclaim. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Gardenia Parker, et al. v. Epstein Enterprises, LLC, et al.
This is an appeal from a jury trial. The defendants own and manage an apartment complex in Memphis, Tennessee. In 2010, two pit bull dogs left one of the apartments and attacked two individuals in a neighboring lot. One of the individuals died on the scene. The jury found the defendants were at fault and awarded a total jury verdict of $2.5 million. The trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for remittitur of the jury verdict and suggested remittitur of the award to $1.3 million. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest. The defendants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by denying their motion to amend their answers to assert comparative fault; denying their motion for a continuance; denying their motion for directed verdict; denying their motion for a mistrial due to comments made by plaintiff’s counsel during closing arguments; and denying their motion for new trial due to juror misconduct. In her posture as appellee, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in suggesting remittitur of the jury verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
June C. Horton, et al. v. Erin E. Cooley
The maternal grandparents filed this action against their daughter, seeking court-ordered visitation with her four-year-old son, after she ceased their visitation during her parenting time. The daughter insisted that the grandparents accept her new husband and cease contact with the child’s father, her ex-husband, before the grandparents could see her and the child again. The grandparents rebuffed their daughter’s request, choosing to visit with the grandchild during the ex-husband’s residential time instead. Following a trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the daughter placed reasonable conditions on the grandparents’ visitation pending a resolution of the family dispute, that there had not been a severe reduction in the grandparents’ visitation with the child, and there was no danger of substantial harm to the child because the child continued to visit the grandparents on a regular basis. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Sherrie Miller Daly v. John Daly
This post-divorce appeal is the fourth appeal between the parties. This action involves the court’s holding of the mother in criminal contempt for her repeated failure to adhere to the orders of the court. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Potter v. YAPP USA Automotive Stystems, Inc
An employee filed and settled a workers’ compensation claim against her employer for injuries sustained in an assault. The employee then filed a complaint under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 to -702, alleging that the assault, in conjunction with a previous incident, constituted sexual harassment that created a hostile work environment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer, and the employee appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Strategic Acquisitions Group, LLC v. Premier Parking Of Tennessee, LLC
Plaintiff lessor appeals the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment concerning the interpretation of a lease in favor of the defendant lessee. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee State Bank v. Douglas V. Mashek et al.
This case involves a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”) extended to the co-defendant, Douglas V. Mashek, by the plaintiff, Tennessee State Bank (“the Bank”), via a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering real property titled to Mr. Mashek and acquired during Mr. Mashek’s marriage to the co-defendant, Deborah A. Mashek. When the Bank subsequently attempted to foreclose on the property, Mr. Mashek objected based on alterations to the deed of trust and a notice of right of rescission that had allegedly occurred after the deed’s execution and prior to recordation. The Bank filed a complaint against the Masheks in the trial court, seeking declaratory judgment that the recorded deed of trust was valid and enforceable, or in the alternative, reformation of the executed deed of trust to conform to the recorded deed. The Bank also named the title company involved in the loan transaction as a third-party defendant, alleging the title company’s liability in the event that the trial court found the deed of trust, either as executed or as recorded, to be unenforceable.1 The Masheks, proceeding pro se, filed various pleadings in response to the complaint, including a counterclaim against the Bank, alleging, inter alia, common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estoppel, slander of title, statutory estoppel, wrongful foreclosure, and unclean hands. Upon the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion as to reformation of the executed deed of trust, declaring the deed, as reformed, to be enforceable and finding that the Bank was entitled to pursue foreclosure proceedings. The trial court found in part that the Bank or its agent(s) had employed “procedurally questionable and perhaps fraudulent” methods that were “at the very least negligent and potentially criminal in nature” to correct mistakes in the executed deed of trust and to, without authorization, affix the Masheks’ initials over a change in a date of signature on the notice of right of rescission. However, having also found that the mistakes corrected were mutual and amounted to scrivener’s errors that were not intended to and did not prejudice the Masheks, the trial court granted the Bank’s request to reform the executed deed of trust. The trial court 1 The title company is not participating in this appeal. 05/21/2020 2 awarded to the Bank a monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek, as the sole debtor named in the loan documents, in the amount of $294,566.39 for unpaid principal and interest. The trial court also awarded to the Bank reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $8,795.84, limiting such fees to those that “would be expected in an ordinary foreclosure action.” The trial court dismissed the Masheks’ various counterclaims and subsequently denied the Bank’s motion to alter or amend language in the judgment. The Masheks have appealed, and the Bank has raised issues regarding the trial court’s denial of its request to alter the court’s findings and denial of its request for additional attorney’s fees and expenses. Having determined that the Bank or its agent(s) made a unilateral mistake in materially altering the deed of trust after the document’s execution and then recording the altered deed of trust with the unilateral mistake incorporated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to the reformation and enforceability of the executed deed of trust. Having also determined that the action of the Bank or its agent(s) in affixing the Masheks’ initials over the altered date on the rescission notice without authorization or notice constituted gross negligence, we reverse the trial court’s finding that no gross negligence occurred but affirm the trial court’s implied finding that the Bank could not succeed in its request to reform the effective date of the rescission notice. However, concluding that no alterations were made to the promissory note, we further determine that the trial court properly found Mr. Mashek to be liable for the unpaid principal and interest due under the terms of the note. We therefore affirm the trial court’s $294,566.39 monetary judgment against Mr. Mashek. We vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and expenses to the Bank and remand for a hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the Bank solely to obtain a judgment based on the promissory note. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including its denial of the Bank’s request for additional attorney’s fees and expenses and its denial of the Bank’s motion to alter or amend the language of the judgment. Finally, we clarify that no evidence has been presented in this case to support a finding of the intent necessary for forgery as a cause of action against the Bank or its agent(s). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Bruce Gillam v. Destiny Ballew
This appeal concerns the trial court’s designation of the father as the minor children’s primary residential parent after establishing his paternity. During trial, the court granted the father’s motion in limine to exclude testimony from the mother’s expert witness. The mother appeals the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and the designation of primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Aryana S.
Lacy B. and Quentin B. (collectively, “Petitioners”) filed a petition for adoption and to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Morgan S. (“Mother”), to the minor child, Aryana S. (“the Child”). The Trial Court found that Petitioners had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds of abandonment by failure to support and severe child abuse existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights but that termination of her rights was not in the Child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Meigs | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ava M., Et Al.
This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. Janae M. (“Mother”) is the mother of Ava M., Camille W., and Michael W., III (“the Children”).1 Tommy G. (“Grandfather”) and Glenda G. (“Grandmother”) (“Grandparents,” collectively) are the Children’s paternal grandparents. When Mother was incarcerated in 2014, Grandparents received custody of the Children. A few years later, Grandparents filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights. After a trial, the Trial Court found that the grounds of failure to support and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody were proven against Mother, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court wrongly applied two different four-month periods for the ground of failure to support. Grandparents raise their own separate issue of whether the Trial Court erred in not finding the additional ground of failure to visit. We hold, inter alia, that although the Trial Court erred in applying two different four-month determinative periods for failure to support, the error was harmless in this case. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Wilson v. Weigel Stores, Inc.
This is a premises liability action in which the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant convenience store for personal injuries resulting from her slip and fall near the gasoline pump. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant caused or created or should have discovered with reasonable diligence the condition that caused her fall. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decision. We remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah Christine Moore v. Larry Gene Moore
The parties entered into a mediated agreement, which was incorporated into their divorce judgment. Following the entry of the judgment, Husband filed a timely motion to alter or amend the parties’ agreement, alleging a mutual mistake. The trial court granted the motion and reformed the agreement to impose additional obligations on Wife. Following our review, we reverse. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alysia Reese McCracken Hancock v. BJR Enterprises, LLC, Et Al.
This is a healthcare liability action. In her medical authorizations, the plaintiff left blank lines as to who was authorized to receive the patient’s records from the medical providers and others receiving notice. The defendants claimed that the authorizations were not HIPAA1-compliant, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E). The plaintiff responded that by construing the pre-suit notice packet materials as one cohesive document, all of the elements required by the statute are present and that the defendants had at their disposal all of the information necessary to obtain the patient’s medical records. The plaintiff further asserted that the failure of the defendants to attempt to obtain the records precludes any demonstration of prejudice to them. The trial court determined that the plaintiff’s statutory notice failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alysia Reese McCracken Hancock v. BJR Enterprises, LLC, Et Al. - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court. I agree the authorization form was so insufficient as not to allow the medical providers to obtain medical records from the other providers. I, however, continue to adhere to the position as stated in my dissent in Parks v. Walker, 585 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) that if a medical authorization form along with other information provided to the healthcare providers is sufficient to enable them to obtain a plaintiff’s records simply by asking, then there is substantial compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tinin Contracting Company, Inc., et al v. Enviroworks, Inc.
This is a case involving the breach of an oral contract to provide excavation work and materials for an airport construction project in Bolivar, Tennessee. The trial court awarded $128,058.09 in favor of the subcontractor against the project’s general contractor. On appeal, the general contractor argued that the oral contract existing between the parties included the subcontractor sharing in certain surveying and testing costs incurred on its scope of work on the project, that it was entitled to a credit for these costs, and that, ultimately, the trial court miscalculated its award of damages. We affirm the trial court’s finding that there was no agreement existing between the parties for the subcontractor to incur any surveying or testing costs and that, as a result, the general contractor was not entitled to a credit for these expenses against the balance of the moneys it owed the subcontractor. However, because the order contains insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why the trial court included an additional $5,593.40 in the final judgment beyond the damages sought in the complaint, we vacate that portion of the final judgment and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to reduce the judgment against the general contractor from $128,058.09 to $122,464.69. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Ann Pippin v. Christina Michelle Pippin
The non-biological parent of a child born by artificial insemination to a woman with whom the non-biological parent had maintained a long term relationship and who had lived with the child, holding herself out as one of the child’s parents, filed a petition to establish her parentage of the child and to set a parenting schedule; the petition was dismissed on the basis that she lacked standing; the trial court also awarded the petitioner visitation with the child. Upon our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition and vacate the order setting visitation. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Ann Pippin v. Christina Michelle Pippin (Dissent)
This opinion is stuck in the past. In my opinion, Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), altered the way we must interpret many statutes relating to marriage and parentage. In Obergefell, the United State Supreme Court legalized samesex marriage in the entire United States. It has met with resistance, just like Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and other United States Supreme Court cases that required society to alter its thinking about its institutions. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager
This appeal arose from a dispute involving an unpaid promissory note. In May 2014, Plaintiff filed its first suit for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the case under Rule 41.02 for failure to prosecute. Opposing the dismissal, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion and stated the dismissal was neither “with nor without prejudice” and that Plaintiff was “welcome to refile.” Relying on the trial court’s statements, Plaintiff declined to appeal and filed a second action. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the second suit, arguing it is barred by res judicata. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and denied Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion to Reconsider. We agree with the trial court’s dismissal of this suit and subsequent denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s decision and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager - Dissent
I again find myself in disagreement from my learned colleagues as to the application of res judicata. Because I cannot conclude that Defendant met its burden to show all the elements of the defense, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Connie Ellis v. Mike K. Modi
Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded a substantial verdict against the defendant for both compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, he appealed to this Court. The defendant now argues, among other things, that the trial court erroneously excluded his expert psychologist from testifying at trial and, further, that the trial court erroneously allowed certain prejudicial evidence against him to be admitted. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment entered in this matter and remand the case for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffany C. Roby v. NationStar Mortgage, LLC, et al.
This appeal stems from a dispute involving real property that Plaintiff acquired online. The property was previously purchased in a foreclosure action by one of the defendants. The previous owners were holdover occupants of the property. After purchasing the property, Plaintiff signed a real estate purchase contract and closed approximately two and one-half months thereafter. Due to delays in litigation involving the holdover occupants, Plaintiff was unable to take possession of the property for nearly two years after purchasing it online. In this case, Plaintiff brought suit against NationStar Mortgage, LLC; U.S. Bank, N.A.; Auction.com, LLC; and WFG National Title Insurance Company on several contract-related claims and alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Auction.com and WFG were dismissed prior to trial. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the claims, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. A jury trial was held on the remaining claims. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof at trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the court again granted in part and denied in part. One claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act went to the jury, which found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded a verdict of $250,000. The parties filed separate post-trial motions. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied the other requests of the parties or found them to be moot. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Eli H.
The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish two statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Following our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment to include a determination of clear and convincing evidence of the additional statutory ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals |
