State of Tennessee v. Christopher Deon'dre Jones
Defendant, Christopher Deon’Dre Jones, was charged in a four-count indictment returned by the Madison County Grand Jury with aggravated burglary, assault, evading arrest, and vandalism. Following a trial, the jury acquitted Defendant of aggravated burglary and assault, but found him guilty as charged of misdemeanor evading arrest and misdemeanor vandalism. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days of incarceration in the county jail for each conviction. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of the offense of evading arrest. Defendant assigns no error to his conviction of vandalism. After a thorough review of the briefs and the record we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Hank Wise
The Defendant, Hank Wise, was indicted on one count of premeditated first degree murder for the death of the victim, Benjamin Goeser. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years for the offense. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by failing to find him not guilty by reason of insanity; and (2) that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Louis Rhodes, II - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. In my view, the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. The only mention of judicial diversion by the trial court was after the court imposed the sentence in this case. In somewhat of an afterthought, the trial court stated, “I guess, I didn’t state it, but the application for diversion is denied.” Unlike judicial diversion cases in which this court has reversed and remanded due to the trial court’s failure to fully consider, explain or weigh the judicial diversion factors, see e.g., State v. Lewis, 978 S.W .2d 558, 567 (Tenn. Crim. App.1997); State v. Sean Nauss, No. E2011-00002-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 988139 at * 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar 22, 2012) (collecting cases), the trial court here failed even to consider the Defendant for judicial diversion. State v. Cutshaw, 967 S.W.2d 332, (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (concluding that “the trial judge abused his discretion by failing even to consider the defendant’s personal eligibility for judicial diversion”). On this meager record, the trial court’s denial of diversion cannot be cloaked with a presumption of reasonableness. Moreover, the record hardly assists this court in determining the appropriateness of the trial court’s denial of diversion as there was no proof other than the presentence report at the sentencing hearing. To uphold the denial of judicial diversion in this case would render consideration of the judicial diversion factors in all future cases a complete nullity. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Ross Henderson
The Defendant, Zachary Ross Hendrixson, pled guilty to theft of property valued over $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range II offender, to serve a six-year sentence consecutive to a ten-year sentence he was required to serve in Dekalb County. The trial court suspended the Defendant’s sentence, ordering that the Defendant serve six years on probation after his release from Dekalb County. The trial court held a hearing on restitution, after which it ordered the Defendant to pay $60,000, at a rate of $833.33 per month after he was released from prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it set the amount of his restitution because the amount is not reasonable. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that no error exists. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Williams v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Anthony Williams, of first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court ordered a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Anthony Williams, No. M2007-01385-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 564231 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 5, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Louis Rhodes, II
The defendant was convicted of assault and child neglect, both Class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. After carefully reviewing the record de novo to determine if the trial court’s sentencing decisions can be upheld, we conclude that no reversible error was committed. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Damien Darden v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles Damien Darden, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Alternative Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Alternative Petition[] for Writ of Error Coram Nobis” requesting relief from his 1996 conviction for felony murder and his resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that his life sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as discussed in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sarah Rebekah Hodges
The defendant, Sarah Rebekah Hodges, appeals from her Washington County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of eight counts of forgery, one count of theft of property valued at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, and one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, claiming that the trial court erred by denying her bid for judicial diversion and by denying full probation. We discern no error in the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and full probation, but we observe plain error in seven of the defendant’s judgments for forgery. In case number 37513, the trial court attempted to memorialize the defendant’s guilty pleas and the accompanying sentences for all seven counts of forgery contained in the indictment within a single judgment form. Because a separate judgment form is required for each conviction, case number 37513 is remanded to the trial court for entry of a separate judgment form for each conviction of forgery. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mechelle L. Montgomery
The Defendant-Appellee, Mechelle L. Montgomery, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the open container law. See T.C.A. §§ 55-10-401, -416. She filed a motion to suppress, alleging, inter alia, that she was unreasonably seized and that her arrest lacked probable cause. After a bifurcated hearing on the motion, the trial court took the matter under advisement and requested further briefing from the parties. The trial court subsequently entered a written order granting Montgomery’s motion to suppress. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the investigatory detention of Montgomery was unlawful. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mechelle L. Montgomery - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. There appears to be little dispute about the facts of this case. In my opinion, the totality of the circumstances based on these facts demonstrate that the actions of Deputy Reiman were within the bounds of constitutional reasonableness. Unlike the officer in State v. Moats, 403 S.W.3d 170 (Tenn. 2013), Deputy Reiman was careful to pull beside the Defendant’s vehicle in the church parking lot and to not activate his blue lights when he pulled into the church parking lot. As a result, no seizure took place at this point. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bernabe Rodriguez
The Defendant, Bernabe Rodriguez, has appealed the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to sever the counts in his indictment. The Defendant filed a motion to sever, and the trial court denied the motion. The appellate record, however, does not contain a transcript of the hearing on the Defendant’s motion to sever. Our review of the record reveals that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Sharp
The Defendant, Adam Sharp, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s orders revoking his community corrections sentences for his automobile burglary conviction in case number 92782 and his aggravated burglary and reckless endangerment convictions in case number 95696. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his effective eight-year sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Pagan
The Defendant, Daniel Pagan, pled guilty to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver and, thereafter, was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court imposed consecutive terms of six years for the voluntary manslaughter conviction and four years for the drug possession conviction, for a total effective sentence of ten years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he had the requisite intent to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and (2) that the trial court improperly determined that he was a dangerous offender for consecutive sentencing purposes. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harold Tolley v. Sharon Taylor, Warden
The Petitioner, Harold Tolley, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1998 conviction for first degree murder and his resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by summarily denying relief because he was denied his right to defend himself at the trial by presenting an intoxication defense to show he had diminished capacity. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph E. Rainey
A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of the delivery of dihydrocodeinone, a Class D felony, and one count of the casual exchange of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-17-417 and -418 (2009). The trial court sentenced the defendant to three years of probation for each conviction for delivery of dihydrocodeinone and to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation for the marijuana conviction, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. The defendant hired a new attorney to file his motion for a new trial, and his new attorney challenged the trial court’s denial of a continuance prior to trial. New counsel also asserted that the defendant had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. We discern no error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Anthony Frank
The Defendant, Michael Anthony Frank, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for his robbery conviction and ordering his three-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanterrica Madden
The defendant was found guilty after trial by jury of second degree murder and tampering with evidence. She received an effective sentence of twenty-nine years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion to recuse, that her constitutional rights were violated by the manner in which the trial court allowed jurors to ask questions during her trial, and that her sentence is excessive. After review, we find that the defendant has failed to establish her entitlement to any relief on these claims. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shanterrica Madden - Concurring
I join with the majority in this case. I write separately, however, to further elaborate on whether the trial judge’s status as a “Facebook friend” with a prospective witness, standing alone, is sufficient to require recusal. Here, Appellant moved for recusal alleging the trial judge was biased based on his affiliation with MTSU, the judge’s alma mater. Specifically, Appellant claimed she was denied a fair and impartial trial due to the trial judge’s Facebook connections with the MTSU women’s basketball team and their coach, a prospective State’s witness. Rather than an actual conflict of interest, Appellant contends that the trial judge’s Facebook connection gave the appearance of impropriety in violation of the Tennessee’s Code of Judicial Conduct. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky J. Jones and Shane Eugene McClanahan
The Defendant-Appellee, Shane Eugene McClanahan, was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-150 for possession of not less than one-half ounce nor more than ten pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, driving while under the influence of marijuana while accompanied by a child under thirteen years of age, and possession of drug paraphernalia. McClanahan was later indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-193 for driving a motor vehicle on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and driving a motor vehicle on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, second or subsequent offense. McClanahan’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. In a separate case, the Defendant-Appellee, Ricky J. Jones, was indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-147 for the manufacture of marijuana consisting of not less than 100 marijuana plants nor more than 499 marijuana plants, possession of not less than ten pounds, one gram nor more than seventy pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Jones was later indicted in Case No. 2012-CR-268 for money laundering. Jones’s charges stemmed from evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant that substantially relied on the evidence recovered during the warrantless search of McClanahan’s vehicle. McClanahan and Jones filed motions to suppress the physical evidence recovered in their cases. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted McClanahan’s and Jones’s motions to suppress and dismissed their indictments. In this appeal as of right, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting McClanahan’s suppression motions and in dismissing his cases. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky J. Jones and Shane Eugene McClanahan - Concurring in Results
I write separately because my review and interpretation of the record leads me to a different conclusion that those reached by my colleagues in their reasoned and well-written opinions. While I do concur with the results reached by Judge McMullen, I do so based upon different reasoning as herein expressed. Because I do agree with her conclusion, Judge McMullen writes as the majority. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky J. Jones and Shane Eugene McClanahan - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s orders granting the suppression motions filed by Defendant Jones and Defendant McClanahan, reverse the orders of dismissal of the cases, and reinstate the charges for further proceedings. Since the search of Defendant McClanahan was a different search than the one challenged by Defendant Jones, I will discuss each Defendant separately. Initially though it is necessary for me to specifically address a portion of Judge McMullen’s lead opinion. The State filed separate Notices of Appeal for Defendant Jones and Defendant McClanahan, so the issue of the trial court’s order suppressing all evidence seized pursuant to execution of the search warrant at Defendant Jones’ home was preserved for appeal. I acknowledge that the State, for reasons I do not know, in its brief declined to specifically address the issue of the suppression of evidence in Defendant Jones’ case. The trial court’s decision in Defendant Jones’ case rested solely upon the conclusion that the evidence seized as a result of the stop of Defendant McClanahan was illegally seized and therefore could not be used to support probable cause to search Defendant Jones’ home. Perhaps the State assumed that arguing only the facts of Defendant McClanahan’s stop would suffice to address Defendant Jones’ case. Both defendants were represented by the same counsel and both defendants’ cases were included in one brief in this appeal. Despite the fact the State omitted any specific argument about suppression of evidence in Defendant Jones’ case, counsel for Defendants made the following argument in their brief: “All fruits of the stop as initiated by Officer Agee were of the poisonous tree as it pertains to the search of the residence of Ricky Jones. [citations omitted].” Under the circumstances I have no problem procedurally addressing the issue concerning the search warrant for Defendant Jones’ home. |
Smith | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cortino Harris
In Madison County Circuit Court case number 12-285, Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of driving on a suspended license in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-504(a)(1) and of operating a motor vehicle without a valid registration in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-50-114(d). Defendant was sentenced to serve six months in the county jail for the driving on a suspended license conviction. His punishment for the violation of registration law conviction was a $25.00 fine. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for driving on a suspended license and the sentence of incarceration imposed by the trial court. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Rule of the Court of Criminal Appeals 20. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William F. Chumley v. State of Tennessee
William F. Chumley (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of rape of a child and sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. See State v. William Franklin Chumley, No. W2011-01832-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3134033, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 1, 2012). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mashaal Arradi
The Defendant, Mashaal Arradi, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of tax evasion and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 but under $10,000. He received an effective sentence of three years, to be released after serving 10 days incarceration, and was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in (1) permitting admission of unreliable scientific evidence through a non-expert witness; (2) allowing multiple references to 404(b) evidence without a jury-out hearing; (3) permitting the felony theft charge to be based on an aggregation of evidence; (4) permitting multiple references to the Defendant’s Yemeni background and Arabic language; and (5) allowing instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marquest Mays
Marquest Mays (“the Defendant”) was indicted for first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse. A competency hearing was held, and the trial court found that the Defendant was competent to stand trial. The Defendant proceeded to trial, and a jury found him guilty on both counts. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment on the first degree murder conviction and dismissed the aggravated child abuse conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it declared him competent to stand trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (3) the trial court prevented him from presenting a defense when it excluded expert testimony regarding his vulnerability to giving a false confession. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |
