Charjoray P. Weir v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner was indicted for first degree murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to second degree murder, and received a sentence of fifteen years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel resulting in an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The trial court dismissed the petition based on its untimely filing. However, our Court reversed that finding. The Petitioner filed an amended petition, and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the request for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him post-conviction relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven D. King v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven D. King, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip R. Workman
Petitioner, who received the death penalty at his original trial in 1982, now appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, he contends the trial court should have granted relief based upon the recantation testimony of an alleged eyewitness and a newly discovered post-mortem x-ray of the victim. He further contends the trial court erred in prohibiting the testimony of an original trial juror who would testify that the recantation testimony and the newly discovered evidence would have affected the juror's verdict in the original trial. We conclude that the trial court's order reflects varying and sometimes inappropriate standards of review for coram nobis proceedings; nevertheless, the actual findings by the trial court are sufficient for this court to conclude that the trial court found no reasonable probability that the new evidence would have affected the jury's verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Alan Hawkins
A Hamilton County jury convicted the defendant, Richard Alan Hawkins, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county workhouse to be served at 75%. In this appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the state's witnesses violated the rule of sequestration, and (2) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nkobi I. Dunn - Concurring
I write a separate concurring opinion to point out and review certain important facets of the appellate record in this case. The record reflects that the defendant’s guilty pleas were “open”; they did not contain any specified sentences pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C). See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (providing for an agreement between defendant and state “that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case”). Had the plea agreement contained specific, properly articulated sentencing provisions pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C), they may have survived the revocation of judicial diversion probation, depending upon the terms as accepted by the court. See State v. Hollie D. Campbell, No. E2000-00373-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, July 2, 2001) (Witt, J., concurring), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2001); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-203(b) (1997) (dispensing with requirement of sentencing hearing when sentence is agreed upon and accepted by trial court); accord id. § 40-35-205(d). However, the trial court, having apparently received and accepted open pleas made in conjunction with the diversion provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313(a), was positioned and obliged, after revocation of the judicial diversion probation, to resume the case at the pre-diversion point of departure. This means that, following the revocation, the court’s next task was to conduct a sentencing hearing. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-203(a) (1997), -209(a) (Supp. 2002). |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nkobi I. Dunn
Pursuant to the judicial diversion statute, the Defendant pled guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession for resale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony. The plea was entered pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-313, otherwise referred to as judicial diversion, and the trial court placed the Defendant on probation for three years. Approximately six months later, a probation violation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had tested positive for marijuana use. An amended probation violation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that the Defendant had failed to make payments on court costs and had failed to pay child support, the latter being a special condition of probation. The Defendant pled guilty to violating his probation and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation. Without conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgments sentencing the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days to serve in the county jail for the paraphernalia conviction and three years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony drug conviction. After reviewing the record, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank Gaitor
Frank Gaitor appeals from his Washington County Criminal Court convictions of Class B felony possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and misdemeanor simple possession of marijuana. He is presently serving an effective 22-year sentence as a Persistent Offender for these crimes. In this direct appeal, he raises numerous challenges to the firmity of the conviction proceedings. Upon examination, however, none of these claims warrant relief. Thus, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Otis Lee Price
A Cocke County jury convicted the Defendant of attempted burglary, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of attempted burglary. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric T. Davis
Eric T. Davis appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court's revocation of his probationary sentences and order that he serve the sentences as originally imposed in the Department of Correction. He claims that the lower court erred in finding that he committed a criminal offense based upon the uncorroborated testimony of a law enforcement informant. Because we are unpersuaded of error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kynaston Scott a.k.a Kynaston L. Olawumi
The appellant, Kynaston Scott a.k.a. Kynaston L. Olawumi, was convicted by a jury in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree murder and felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight, and the trial court erred in admitting an inflammatory photograph. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerome D. Manning
Jerome D. Manning appeals a certified question of law regarding a police officer's stop of him which resulted in his arrest for illegal possession of narcotics. Because we agree with the trial court that reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts existed for the stop and that the scope and duration of the detention were not unreasonable, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Glenn D. Gold v. State of Tennessee
Glenn D. Gold appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court's dismissal of his pro se petition in which he seeks post-conviction, habeas corpus, and coram nobis relief. Because his attempts to receive post-conviction and coram nobis relief are untimely and his attempt for habeas corpus relief does not state a claim cognizable in that type of action, we affirm the lower court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John H. Williams, Jr. v. Kevin Myers, Warden
The petitioner was convicted in 1988 of felony murder and is currently serving a life sentence. After exhausting his direct and post-conviction appeals, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court subsequently denied. The petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition, arguing that the convicting court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to a defective indictment and that the statute governing first degree murder at the time of his trial was unconstitutionally vague. He contends that for these reasons, his conviction is illegal. Having reviewed the petitioner's claims, we conclude that the original indictment upon which the petitioner's conviction was based was not defective and thus that the convicting court was not without subject matter jurisdiction. We further conclude that the statute governing the petitioner's conviction is not unconstitutionally vague. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Theresa Hallsford
The State appeals from the order of the Maury County Circuit Court reversing the district attorney general's decision to deny the Defendant pretrial diversion for the charge of arson. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Thomason v. Kevin Myers, Warden
The defendant, Michael Thomason, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which the trial court summarily denied. The defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandre M. Broaden
Defendant, Deandre M. Broaden, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for possession of marijuana and for possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Defendant pled guilty to both offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to four years probated under the Community Corrections Act of 1985. Defendant violated the conditions of his sentence, and the trial court resentenced him to five years confinement, crediting him four months for time served in community corrections until the date of his first violation. On appeal, Defendant argues that he should have received full credit for the amount of time served up until the filing of the petition seeking revocation of his community corrections sentence. We agree. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the revocation of Defendant's community corrections sentence and the new sentence of five years, but reverse the trial court's order insofar as it provides only four months of credit. We remand this case for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerry Burke v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jerry Burke, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that his trial attorney was ineffective for (1) failing to request a mental evaluation; (2) failing to investigate his case; and (3) failing to subpoena witnesses and cross-examine witnesses adequately. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Lee Clifton
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant seeks review of the state's denial of pretrial diversion for the offense of sexual battery. We conclude that the prosecutor failed to consider and weigh all relevant factors and, under the circumstances of this case, improperly relied upon the defendant's refusal to take responsibility for his actions. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration of the defendant's request for pretrial diversion in accordance with this opinion. |
Decatur | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kong C. Bounnam v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court for three counts of felony murder and four counts of robbery with a deadly weapon. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide; and (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Joseph Spadafina v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals from the denial of his writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he argues his first degree murder conviction should be set aside because his co-defendant, who testified against the petitioner at trial, recanted his testimony prior to the co-defendant's death. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert S. Neal
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Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenda Ponder
Glenda Ponder appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court's revocation of her probationary sentence and ordering into effect her incarcerative sentence in the Department of Correction. Upon review, we are unpersuaded that the lower court abused its discretion and therefore affirm. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dondie Tidwell
A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant, Dondie Eugene Tidwell, of two counts of first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $10,000. The trial court merged the defendant’s two first degree murder convictions and ordered the defendant to serve twenty-three years for his conspiracy to commit first degree murder conviction, twenty-three years for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and four years and six months for his theft conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to run concurrently to each other and consecutively to the defendant’s sentence for his merged first degree murder conviction, life without the possibility of parole. Thus, the defendant received an aggregate sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty-three years. The defendant now brings this appeal, challenging his convictions and his sentence on the bases that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to excuse a juror using a peremptory challenge; (2) the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the prosecutor made inappropriate comments when delivering the state’s opening statement; (4) the trial court erred by allowing an expert to testify on subjects beyond the scope of that witness’s expertise; (5) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of the drugs that were present in the victim’s system at the time of the victim’s death; (6) the trial court instructed the jury incorrectly on the charge of conspiracy; (7) the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of the victim taken after the victim’s death during the sentencing phase of the trial; (8) the trial court erred by refusing, in the sentencing phase, to allow the defendant to compare his potential sentence to the sentence received by his co-conspirator; (9) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of certain hearsay evidence; (10) the prosecutor exceeded the permissible scope of his rebuttal closing argument; and (11) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court did err by refusing to allow the defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge and that therefore the defendant is entitled to a new trial on this basis. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joel Christian Parker
On February 2, 2000, the defendant was convicted by a jury of the offense of aggravated robbery. He received a sentence of nine years in the state penitentiary. In this appeal he raises eight (8) issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury; (3) whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the offenses of assault or aggravated assault; (4) whether there was prosecutorial misconduct; (5) whether the defendant was subjected to a constitutionally flawed show-up shortly after the robbery; (6) whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to what they must do if they have a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the requisite mental state for the offense; (7) whether the trial court should have dismissed the case because the state destroyed evidence fundamental to the defense; (8) whether the defendant's sentence is excessive. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Marvin Brown
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Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals |
